Large Language Models (LLMs) are expected to significantly impact various socio-technical systems, offering transformative possibilities for improved interaction between humans and technology. However, their integration poses complex challenges due to the intricate interplay between societal structures, human behaviour, and technological innovation. This research explores these multifaceted challenges, emphasising the need for a human-centered approach in integrating LLMs to ensure that technological advancements are aligned with ethical standards and societal needs. Utilizing a structured methodology comprising a workshop, literature analysis, and expert collaborations, the study uses a multi-dimensional human-centered AI framework to guide the responsible integration of LLMs. Key insights include the importance of inclusive data, considering unintended consequences, maintaining privacy, and respecting intellectual property rights. The paper identifies and advocates for principles like human-in-the-loop, continuous longitudinal studies, proactive awareness campaigns, and regular audits to develop LLMs that are ethically sound, adaptable, and effectively integrated into various socio-technical systems, thus addressing user needs and broader societal impacts. The paper also underlines the importance of collaboration among academia, industry, and policymakers to develop LLMs that are ethically aligned, socially beneficial, and adaptable to future societal needs. The findings offer valuable insights into the strategic integration of LLMs, advocating for a broader research perspective beyond industrial motivations to fully understand and leverage LLMs in socio-technical landscapes.

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This book offers an interdisciplinary introduction to value theory. It reviews how researchers in four academic disciplines – psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy – understand value and value change. It offers an introduction for researchers in these disciplines about how other disciplines define, theorize, and investigate value(s) to foster interdisciplinary communication. The book identifies and summarizes similarities and differences of value theory between the academic disciplines and highlights promising areas where each discipline can learn from the others.@en

This chapter sets up the upcoming chapters of the book and introduces four essential aspects of value. The topic of value has personal, social, and cultural dimensions, and value considerations are related to conceptual and metaphysical questions. These four dimensions of value correspond to four crucial academic disciplines that have focused their theoretical and empirical attention on value(s): psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. These four disciplines developed their own value theories and conceptualizations of value. To make progress in value theory, an interdisciplinary exchange is necessary. This chapter motivates the book’s aim to provide an accessible introduction and over view of value theories in the four disciplines. Paying attention to how different disciplines approach the topic of value is the first step toward a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and improved understanding of value.@en

Previous chapters considered value theories of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. These disciplines can benefit and learn from one another, and closer interaction between disciplines will lead to better value theory. To facilitate an interdisciplinary understanding of value, this chapter will highlight the overlap between the different disciplines and what they can learn from one another. Each section of this chapter compares two disciplines and highlights overlaps, similarities, and differences. The hope is that this constructive comparison will build a bridge between disciplines, which helps to advance the theory development within the disciplines and brings theoretical blind spots into focus. Bringing disciplines together is the first step towards crossing disciplinary boundaries, resolving conceptual differences, and increasing interdisciplinary communication.@en

This chapter traces the development of value theory in sociology and opens with Weber’s influential ideas about value rationality and value spheres. The chapter then outlines Parsons’ idea that values are abstract goals that play a crucial role in explaining social action. Like psychologists, sociologists acknowledge values as essential aspects of the self and have conceptualized the relationship between individual and social value systems. Sociologists are interested in the relationship between the social and the individual, and some suggest that changes in the value systems of individuals are linked to cultural, social, and economic changes. In a section on value change, the chapter focuses on the influential modernization theory (Inglehart).@en

Philosophers ask fundamental questions about values and valuing. Some of the philosophical debates about these fundamental questions have repercussions for the value theories of other disciplines. This chapter focuses on crucial conceptual distinctions and philosophical positions about value. For instance, the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic value. The chapter also reviews important metaphysical positions concerning the nature of value, like objectivism and subjectivism. It also touches upon the issue of pluralism and monism, whether there are many values or just one. Finally, the chapter addresses the issue of value change, emphasizing the pragmatist account of value (Dewey).@en

Anthropological theories of value highlight the cultural processes responsible for value creation, re-creation, and transmission. This chapter provides an overview of the most crucial value theories in anthropology. First, It introduces early anthropological accounts of value, like Kluckhohn’s and Strodtbeck’s theory of value orientations, which was an attempt to provide a tool for cross-cultural comparison. The chapter also outlines the structuralist approach to value, specifically Dumont’s influential account, where values are part of a hierarchical meaning system. The chapter then introduces so-called action-oriented approaches to value (Munn, Turner, Graeber). Action-oriented accounts focus on how humans actively create and reproduce values in a cultural system of meaning into which value actions are embedded. Finally, the chapter also briefly considers anthropological ideas about value change.@en

Most psychologists take value to be abstract motivational goals that transcend situations and that systematically relate to one another. First, this chapter introduces the ideas of historical precursors of the psy¬chological investigation of value, like Windelband, Lotze, Scheler, and Brentano. Then, the chapter outlines influential psychological theories of value, specifically the theories of Vernon and Allport, Rokeach, and Shalom Schwartz. The chapter also considers the recent functional theory of value (Gouveia) and presents how psychologists distinguish values from other concepts, like attitudes and traits. The last part of the chapter focuses on psychological research concerning value change.@en

Risky technologies such as biotechnology, energy technologies, and digital technologies are frequently highly controversial. While such technologies can contribute to people’s well-being, they can also create social disruption. The latter requires approaches for decision-making on how to responsibly design risky technologies. Technology is not value neutral, rather, design choices imply value choices. That is why scholars in risk ethics and philosophy of technology have argued for long that we need value-sensitive design and responsible innovation in order to ensure that value choices are made explicitly and based on sound ethical considerations. This chapter focuses on the contribution that emotions and values can make to the responsible innovation of risky technologies, based on the idea that emotions can play an important role in ethical decision-making about risky technologies. The chapter develops this idea further and expands it to approaches to responsible innovation in the context of the following key stakeholders: universities, industry, policy makers, and the public. The central idea this chapter investigates is that embedding emotions and values in the innovation of risky technologies can enhance the quality of deliberation and decision-making regarding technological risks, can help to overcome stalemates, and can lead to morally and socially more acceptable, as well as responsible technological innovations.@en

Many researchers from robotics, machine ethics, and adjacent fields seem to assume that norms represent good behavior that social robots should learn to benefit their users and society. We would like to complicate this view and present seven key troubles with norm-compliant robots: (1) norm biases, (2) paternalism (3) tyrannies of the majority, (4) pluralistic ignorance, (5) paths of least resistance, (6) outdated norms, and (7) technologically-induced norm change. Because discussions of why norm-compliant robots can be problematic are noticeably absent from the robot and machine ethics literature, this paper fills an important research gap. We argue that it is critical for researchers to take these issues into account if they wish to make norm-compliant robots.@en

ChatGPT is a highly advanced AI language model that has gained widespread popularity. It is trained to understand and generate human language and is used in various applications, including automated customer service, chatbots, and content generation. While it has the potential to offer many benefits, there are also concerns about its potential for misuse, particularly in relation to providing inappropriate or harmful safety-related information. To explore ChatGPT's (specifically version 3.5) capabilities in providing safety-related advice, a multidisciplinary consortium of experts was formed to analyse nine cases across different safety domains: using mobile phones while driving, supervising children around water, crowd management guidelines, precautions to prevent falls in older people, air pollution when exercising, intervening when a colleague is distressed, managing job demands to prevent burnout, protecting personal data in fitness apps, and fatigue when operating heavy machinery. The experts concluded that there is potential for significant risks when using ChatGPT as a source of information and advice for safety-related issues. ChatGPT provided incorrect or potentially harmful statements and emphasised individual responsibility, potentially leading to ecological fallacy. The study highlights the need for caution when using ChatGPT for safety-related information and expert verification, as well as the need for ethical considerations and safeguards to ensure users understand the limitations and receive appropriate advice, especially in low- and middle-income countries. The results of this investigation serve as a reminder that while AI technology continues to advance, caution must be exercised to ensure that its applications do not pose a threat to public safety.@en

Technology should be aligned with our values. We make the case that attempts to align emerging technologies with our values should reflect critically on these values. Critical thinking seems like a natural starting point for the critical assessment of our values. However, extant conceptualizations of critical thinking carve out no space for the critical scrutiny of values. We will argue that we need critical thinking that focuses on values instead of taking them as unexamined starting points. In order to play a crucial role in helping to align values and technology, critical thinking needs to be modified and refocused on values. Here, we outline what value-centred critical thinking could look like@en

The power of technology to transform religions, science, and political institutions has often been presented as nothing short of revolutionary. Does technology have a similarly transformative influence on societies’ morality? Scholars have not rigorously investigated the role of technology in moral revolutions, even though existing research on technomoral change suggests that this role may be considerable. In this paper, we explore what the role of technology in moral revolutions, understood as processes of radical group-level moral change, amounts to. We do so by investigating four historical episodes of radical moral change in which technology plays a noteworthy role. Our case-studies illustrate the plurality of mechanisms involved in technomoral revolutions, but also suggest general patterns of technomoral change, such as technology’s capacity to stabilize and destabilize moral systems, and to make morally salient phenomena visible or invisible. We find several leads to expand and refine conceptual tools for analysing moral change, specifically by crystallizing the notions of ‘technomoral niche construction’ and ‘moral payoff mechanisms’. Coming to terms with the role of technology in radical moral change, we argue, enriches our understanding of moral revolutions, and alerts us to the depths of which technology can change our societies in wanted and unwanted ways.
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It is often suggested that social media is a hostile environment for critical thinking and that a major source for epistemic problems concerning social media is that it facilitates emotions. We argue that emotions per se are not the source of the epistemic problems concerning social media. We propose that instead of focusing on emotions, we should focus on the affective scaffolding of social media. We will show that some affective scaffolds enable desirable epistemic practices, while others obstruct beneficial epistemic practices, or enable hostile epistemic practices. Particularly, we will show that emotions play a crucial role in the epistemic practice of critical thinking and that the affective scaffolding of social media can support, or hinder, online critical thinking. The upshot of our argument is that affective scaffoldings of social media can harness emotions to support beneficial epistemic practices, like online critical thinking.@en

Social media technologies (SMTs) are routinely identified as a strong and pervasive threat to digital well-being (DWB). Extended screen time sessions, chronic distractions via notifications, and fragmented workflows have all been blamed on how these technologies ruthlessly undermine our ability to exercise quintessential human faculties. One reason SMTs can do this is because they powerfully affect our emotions. Nevertheless, (1) how social media technology affects our emotional life and (2) how these emotions relate to our digital well-being remain unexplored. Remedying this is important because ethical insights into (1) and (2) open the possibility of designing for social media technologies in ways that actively reinforce our digital well-being. In this article, we examine the way social media technologies facilitate online emotions because of emotional affordances. This has important implications for evaluating the ethical implications of today’s social media platforms, as well as for how we design future ones.@en

Research has documented robust associations between greater disgust sensitivity and (1) concerns about disease, and (2) political conservatism. However, the COVID-19 disease pandemic raised challenging questions about these associations. In particular, why have conservatives—despite their greater disgust sensitivity—exhibited less concern about the pandemic? Here, we investigate this “conservatism-disgust paradox” and address several outstanding theoretical questions regarding the interrelations among disgust sensitivity, ideology, and pandemic response. In four studies (N = 1,764), we identify several methodological and conceptual factors—in particular, an overreliance on self-report measures—that may have inflated the apparent associations among these constructs. Using non-self-report measures, we find evidence that disgust sensitivity may be a less potent predictor of disease avoidance than is typically assumed, and that ideological differences in disgust sensitivity may be amplified by self-report measures. These findings suggest that the true pattern of interrelations among these factors may be less “paradoxical” than is typically believed.@en

Research conducted on Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) has grown considerably during the last decades. With the help of BCIs, users can (re)gain a wide range of functions. Our aim in this paper is to analyze the impact of BCIs on autonomy. To this end, we introduce three abilities that most accounts of autonomy take to be essential: (1) the ability to use information and knowledge to produce reasons; (2) the ability to ensure that intended actions are effectively realized (control); and (3) the ability to enact intentions within concrete relationships and contexts. We then consider the impact of BCI technology on each of these abilities. Although on first glance, BCIs solely enhance self-determination because they restore or improve abilities, we will show that there are other positive, but also negative impacts on user autonomy, which require further philosophical and ethical discussions.

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Philosophy of emotions has become an established sub-discipline of philosophy, and emotions are no longer exclusively seen as disturbances that threaten our rational faculties. Philosophers now take seriously the multi-facetted relation between emotion, knowledge, and reason. Laura Candiotto's edited volume on emotions and their role in epistemic practice brings together texts that look at this relation from different angles and from different traditions. The volume includes texts that zoom in on a wide variety of themes, like agency, emotion regulation, group emotions and social epistemology, cognitive science, and pragmatist accounts of emotions. The book will be interesting not only for those engaging with philosophy of emotions but...@en