Despite the widespread attention for the private financing of infrastructure projects, actual empirical work on financing public-private partnerships remains limited. Especially the topics of return on equity and lenders’ cash flow control in relation to uncertainty are under-researched. The aim of this paper is to investigate and discuss the mechanisms applied by private financiers of infrastructure projects to protect their returns on investment. Using semi-structured interviews, the qualitative viewpoints of infrastructure financiers and their consultants on infrastructure investment are examined. The findings identify nine control mechanisms that financiers apply, including a range of asset and risk diversification portfolio strategies for their infrastructure investments, and reveal that they depend on governance mechanisms relating to the project environment, relations, knowledge and expertise. Hence, this study provides a better understanding of the actions and mechanisms applied to protect a return on infrastructure investments that leverage partnering strategies between public authorities and private investors in public infrastructure projects. This contributes to the debate on project financing under uncertainty and its implications for project governance in public private partnerships.

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Collaboration can bring multiple benefits to projects. Real collaboration appears, however, complex to implement. So far, there is no scientific agreement on the importance of the formal and relational (behavioural) sides of project collaboration. Through a qualitative study of two collaborating teams in large engineering and construction projects we uncover the roles of these two sides of collaboration and analyse their interplay. We find that relational and formal aspects of collaboration are complementary, yet each has a distinct role. The formal integrative mechanisms provide an arena for relational norms to be established, and for collaborative behaviours to be practiced and implemented. Relational norms transform traditional project management activities into collaborative, integrative ones. We advance theory of collaboration by offering a holistic and at the same time fine-grained view on it, and stress that project teams need to pay equal attention to both formal and relational sides for collaboration to succeed.

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Complex project networks confront project actors, with value pluralism originating from a plethora of competing organizational and institutional systems related to the project environment. Using a single urban redevelopment case study, we present a dynamic understanding of the emergence and nature of conflicts in different conflict arenas of collaborative project networks. We identify seven coping patterns to reduce and engage with this complexity in the process of delivering value throughout projects. The coping patterns enable a more dynamic and flexible approach toward conflict management in project networks with a high degree of conflicting project interests.

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The next step in the use of innovative, dynamic and performance-based contracts for service delivery by contractors could be use of monetary incentives to stimulate self-regulation of the network. Because it is currently unclear how performance-based payments in network tenders can effectively encourage network members to coordinate their own operations, a serious game was performed that simulates road maintenance planning to study changes in decision making and the emergence of network coordination. The experiments show that monetary incentives influence decision making, but their effect may be opposite to their intended aim and can lead to a competitive network. It was, however, also found that this competitiveness is not shown in networks where members are familiar with each other. This leads to the conclusion that penalty-based incentive mechanisms probably interfere with self-regulation and that the social dimension of contractor collaboration is paramount to the success of network-based contracting of construction activities.

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Variations are inevitable in public-private partnerships (PPP), due to the extensive duration of these contracts and the dynamic environment in which PPPs are usually implemented. Changes may lead to variations in the contract and consequently adverse reactions by partners. For the social and financial viability of the project, it is important to have mechanisms that can actively deal with variations that occur during the project life cycle. However, formal contracts with standardized project procedures do not always offer effective ways to cope with potential project dynamism. This paper presents the results of an in-depth case study into the modus operandi of a large-scale PPP infrastructure project with regard to variations in the realization phase. It was found that variations in infrastructure projects could not be dealt with solely through the formal contract rules, but that additional social mechanisms between the public commissioners and contracted companies were needed. Changes and contractual mechanisms are extensively discussed in project management literature. Also, the use of social mechanisms - complementary to the formal contract rules - is stressed. However, the literature offers little evidence about how these dealing mechanisms work in practice. This study reflects a real-life practice in responding to variations in a PPP and presents different ways in which various mechanisms, such as contract provisions, human relationships, organizational structure, digital tools, professional knowledge, and actor competences are interactively employed by project managers to deal with variation. General conclusions are drawn about the mechanisms observed, which may be applicable in the coordination of future interaction in public and private collaborations.@en

This white paper describes the Road Maintenance Planning game, a game that simulates planning, coordination and execution of maintenance projects in the domain of infrastructural maintenance. In particular, the game models the dynamic contracting procedure of Volker et al. (2014), an innovative way of contracting public works to a team group of service providers. Foremost, this paper describes the game design, its practical set-up and the methodology for collecting data from gaming sessions so that future researchers can make use of the game. Additionally, this white paper includes a complete overview of the first empirical results obtained from 7 gaming sessions as part of the research in (Scharpff et al. 2019). The source code and design documents can be found on GitLab and may be used for academic purposes only.@en