We study a setting where a detector wishes to detect and deter adversarial manipulation in an electronic voting machine. An adversary tries to win the election by tampering the votes while obfuscating its manipulation. We pose this problem as a game between the detector and the adversary and characterize the equilibrium payoffs for the players and the asymptotic nature of these payoffs. We find that if the detector is too cautious, then in equilibrium the adversary wins with a probability higher than its prior probability of winning. We derive an expression for the deterrence threshold, i.e., the minimum level of false-alarm that the detector should endure so that the adversary is not any better off by the manipulation. With this, asymptotically, the detector can ensure that the probability of missed-detection becomes zero by appropriately adjusting the rate of decay of probability of false-alarm. But if this rate of decay is too 'fast', then the adversary can get an arbitrarily high probability of winning in spite of having a vanishing prior probability of winning. We then extend the results to a setting where the detector has incomplete information about the adversary.

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In this paper, we propose a stand-alone, battery powered, wireless temperature sensor that can be used for diagnostic purposes in harsh industrial environments, including magnetic interferences and very low pressure (vacuum). Being easily mountable and removable during machine stoppage, this autonomous temperature sensor can be used at any location in a machine to gather temperature data over a period of a few months. The proposed sensor is realized with easily available, off-the-shelf components. It outperforms wireless temperature sensors available on the market in terms of the resolution achieved: 0.2 mK (3 sigma/ 1 reading per second), and the power consumption: <1 mW.@en