The macroeconomic models used by major institutions including the Federal Reserve and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) failed to predict the inflation surge during 2021–2023. The output gap, the unemployment gap, the New Keynesian Phillips curve and inflation expectations did not give timely and relevant signals. The re-emergence of inflation thus threw the ‘science of monetary policy’ off the rails. Faced with the choice between changing their paradigm and proving that there is no need to do so, the ‘scientists of monetary policy’ got busy on the proof. As a result, a number of ad hoc epicycles have been added to the New Keynesian analytical core – with the help of which one can claim to be able to explain the sudden acceleration of inflation post factum. This paper critically reviews the theoretical and empirical merits of three recent tweaks to the New Keynesian core: using the vacancy ratio as the appropriate measure of real economic activity; hammering on the considerable risk of an imminent wage–price spiral; and the resurrection of the non-linear Phillips curve. The paper concludes by drawing out sobering lessons concerning the art of paradigm maintenance as practiced by the ‘scientists of monetary policy’.

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Bernanke and Blanchard use a simple dynamic New Keynesian model of wage-price determination to explain the sharp acceleration in U.S. inflation during 2021–2023. They claim that their model closely tracks the pandemic-era inflation and they confidently conclude that “… we don’t think that the recent experience justifies throwing out existing models of wage-price dynamics.” This paper argues that this confidence is misplaced. The Bernanke and Blanchard is another failed attempt to salvage establishment macroeconomics after the massive onslaught of adverse inflationary circumstances with which it could evidently not contend. It misrepresents American economic reality, hides distributional issues from view, de-politicizes (monetary and fiscal) policy-making, and sets monetary policymakers up to deliver significantly more monetary tightening than can be justified on the basis of more realistic model analyses.

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Economic costs of climate change are conventionally assessed at the aggregated global and national levels, while adaptation is local. When present, regionalised assessments are confined to direct damages, hindered by both data and models’ limitations. This article goes beyond the aggregated analysis to explore direct and indirect economic consequences of sea level rise (SLR) at regional and sectoral levels in Europe. Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model and novel datasets, we estimate the distribution of losses and gains across regions and sectors. A comparison of a high-end scenario against a no-climate-impact baseline suggests a GDP loss of 1.26% (€871.8 billion) for the whole EU&UK. Conversely our refined assessments show that some coastal regions lose 9.56–20.84% of GDP, revealing striking regional disparities. Inland regions grow due to the displaced demand from coastal areas, but the GDP gains are small (0–1.13%). While recovery benefits the construction sector, public services and industry face significant downturns. We show that prioritising recovery of critical sectors locally reduces massive regional GDP losses, at negligible costs to the overall European economy. Our analysis traces regional economic restructuring triggered by SLR, underscoring the necessity of region-specific adaptation policies that embrace uneven geographic impacts and unique sectoral profiles to inform resilient strategy design.

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In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, much of the global South has been immersed in a debt crisis of a breadth and depth not seen since the early 1980s. The debt distress was apparent before the pandemic and the situation over the last decade is best described as a slow burn, which the pandemic and war in Ukraine ignited in often sudden and dramatic ways. However, what remains a surprising feature of the ongoing situation has been the avoidance so far of a generalized domino effect, unlike previous systemic Southern debt crises. This fact does not diminish the severity of the consequences given that the containment of crisis has been achieved by regular and persistent applications of austerity and adjustment programmes with deleterious impacts on development in poor countries. This article frames the Debate by exploring these aspects of the current Southern debt crisis, focusing on its deeper structural drivers versus the role of more proximate triggers of the crisis; the similarities or differences with past crises of recent decades; and the degree to which anything has in fact changed in orthodox responses to crisis management. A theme that emerges from the more heterodox scholarship profiled by this Debate is that the current crisis and its responses are maintaining the dominant development paradigm of the last 40 years, rather than eliciting a shift away from it. There is a continued adherence to neoliberal ideology in macroeconomic policy making and to the punitive subordination of developing countries in debt distress, through crisis responses, to the Northern and especially US-centred international financial system. Ignoring the very strong similarities to the past, especially the 1982 debt crisis that ushered in this paradigm, risks repeating the lost decades to development that followed.@en

This article critically evaluates debates over the causes of U.S. inflation. We first show that claims that the Biden stimulus was the major cause of inflation are mistaken: the key data series—stimulus spending and inflation—move dramatically out of phase. While the first ebbs quickly, the second persistently surges. We then look at alternative explanations for the price rises. We assess four supply-side factors: imports, energy prices, rises in corporate profit margins, and COVID. We argue that discussions of COVID’s impact have thus far only tangentially acknowledged the pandemic’s far-reaching effects on labor markets. We conclude that while all four factors played roles in bringing on and sustaining inflation, they cannot explain all of it. There is an aggregate demand problem. But the surprise surge in demand did not arise from government spending. It came from the unprecedented gains in household wealth, particularly for the richest 10% of households, which we show powered the recovery of aggregate US consumption expenditure, especially from July 2021. The final cause of the inflationary surge in the U.S., therefore, was in large measure the unequal (wealth) effects of ultra-loose monetary policy during 2020–2021. This conclusion is important because supply-side (and thus potentially inflationary) pressures are unlikely to subside soon. Going forward, COVID, war, climate change, and the drift to a belligerently multipolar world system are all likely to keep straining global supply chains. Our conclusion outlines how policy has to change to deal with a world of steady, but irregular supply shocks, including Covid’s continuing impact on labor markets. By their nature, such shocks create problems that monetary policy can cope with only at an enormous cost; they require targeted solutions. But when supply plummets or becomes more variable, fiscal policy also has to adapt: existing explorations of ways to steady demand over the business cycle have to embrace much bolder macroeconomic measures to control over-spending when supply is temporarily constrained.@en

Sharp increases in systemically important crude oil prices have been a major cause of the recent surge in the inflation rate in the U.S. This paper investigates the extent to which the increase in oil prices can be attributed to excessive speculation in the oil futures market. Our analysis suggests that excessive speculation in the crude oil market has been responsible for 24%–48% of the increase in the WTI crude oil price during October 2020–June 2022. These estimates translate into an oil price increase of around $18-$36 per barrel and an increase in the U.S. PCE inflation rate by circa 0.75–1.5% points during the same period. We complement the analysis with an empirical investigation of the crude oil market, which shows that (speculative) long noncommercial open-interest positions in oil futures have increased considerably relative to short noncommercial positions. We further find that higher futures prices for crude oil “Granger-cause” oil spot prices, the futures prices of corn and soybeans and the fertilizer price. These econometric results show that oil speculators have to be held accountable for not just raising oil prices, but also driving up food commodity prices. We finally discuss measures to clamp down on excessive speculation in oil in order to eliminate its systemically adverse consequences for the U.S. economy.@en

The concern that an economy could experience persistent stagnation, caused by a structural weakness of aggregate demand, goes back to Alvin Hansen's thesis of “secular stagnation.” Hansen's thesis has been revived in recent times, when it became clear that productivity and potential growth in the OECD countries have been declining for decades. However, in line with deep-rooted theoretical beliefs, that inadequate demand can only affect growth in the short run, secular stagnation (of potential growth) is treated as an exclusively supply side problem, the root of which is a worrying steady decline in productivity growth. This paper argues that it is a mistake to dismiss secular demand stagnation as main cause of declining potential growth in the OECD. We argue that the theoretical case for demand-caused secular stagnation is strong and empirical evidence that it has affected the U.S. economy after the mid-1970s is entirely convincing. Demand is leading supply, also in the long run. Hansen had it right, after all.@en

The Rebuilding Macroeconomic Theory Project, led by David Vines and Samuel Wills (2020), is an important, albeit long overdue, initiative to rethink a failing mainstream macroeconomics. Professors Vines and Wills, who must be congratulated for stepping up to the challenge of trying to make mainstream macroeconomics relevant again, call for a new multiple-equilibrium and diverse (MEADE) paradigm for macroeconomics. Their idea is to start with simple models, ideally two-dimensional sketches, that explain mechanisms that can cause multiple equilibria. These mechanisms should then be incorporated into larger DSGE models in a new, multiple-equilibrium synthesis–to see how the fundamental pieces of the economy fit together, subject to it being “properly micro-founded”. This paper argues that the MEADE paradigm is bound to fail, because it maintains the DSGE model as the unifying framework at the center of macroeconomic analysis. The paper reviews 10 fundamental weaknesses inherent in DSGE models which make these models irreparably useless for macroeconomic policy analysis. Mainstream macroeconomics must put DSGE models, once and for all, in the Museum of Implausible Economic Models–and learn important lessons from non-DSGE macroeconomic approaches.@en

Comparative empirical evidence for 22 OECD countries shows that country differences in cumulative mortality impacts of SARS-CoV-2 are caused by weaknesses in public health competences, pre-existing variances in structural socio-economic and public health vulnerabilities, and the presence of fiscal constraints. Remarkably, the (fiscally non-constrained) U.S. and the U.K. stand out, as they experience mortality outcomes similar to those of fiscally-constrained countries. High COVID19 mortality in the U.S. and the U.K. is due to pre-existing socio-economic and public health vulnerabilities, created by the following macroeconomic policy errors: (a) a deadly emphasis on fiscal austerity (which diminished public health capacities, damaged public health and deepened inequalities); (b) an obsessive belief in a trade-off between ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’, which is mostly used to justify extreme inequality; (c) a complicit endorsement by mainstream macro of the unchecked power over monetary and fiscal policy-making of global finance and the rentier class; and (d) an unhealthy aversion to raising taxes, which deceives the public about the necessity to raise taxes to counter the excessive liquidity preference of the rentiers and to realign the interests of finance and of the real economy. The paper concludes by outlining a few lessons for a saner macroeconomics.@en

This is a rejoinder to the stimulating comments by David Colander, Drucilla Barker and Jeronim Capaldo on my critique of the non-progressive macroeconomic DSGE research paradigm. The three comments expand my arguments and underscore the need for a drastic change in the mainstream approach to macroeconomics.@en

This book aims to reclaim the mission, relevance and intellectual orientation of development studies – something that is increasingly challenged from different directions. Confronted by the status quoist enterprise of randomized control trials ( RCTs) on the one hand and the radical endeavour to decolonize dominant knowledge systems (decoloniality) on the other, the study of development as an enduring societal ambition needs urgent revival.The essays featured in this book build on the contributions of Ashwani Saith – an ardent critic of development orthodoxy and who at the same time is not ready to give up on the emancipatory potential of the development project. Written by leading scholars in the field, the essays touch upon many of the key questions of development studies centred around structural change, labour and poverty and inequality. They also highlight the continued necessity to ground the study of development processes in a critical political economy approach while interrogating the quick-fixes touted by the mainstream discourse on development.@en

The prolific writings of Marc Lavoie and Mario Seccareccia include outstanding contributions to Keynesian macroeconomics, macro modelling, the analysis of fiscal and monetary policymaking, theories of (endogenous) money and credit, and political economy in general. One thread that runs through their papers and books over their long and distinguished careers is a critical examination of conventional neoclassical or ‘New Consensus’ economics, often with a particular focus on its approach to money and interest rates. This chapter takes up this thread and focuses on the revival of the Wicksellian loanable funds model in the (policy) discussions on the secular stagnation of the advanced economies, in particular of the US. Mario Seccareccia and Marc Lavoie have consistently argued against the relevance of this model for a monetary production economy, and this chapter, which acknowledges the cogency, clarity and power of their analyses, puts forward the main criticisms of the loanable funds argument in six points.@en

De-carbonization to restrict future global warming to 1.5 °C is technically feasible but may impose a “limit” or “planetary boundary” to economic growth, depending on whether or not human society can decouple growth from emissions. In this paper, we assess the viability of decoupling. First, we develop a prognosis of climate-constrained global growth for 2014–2050 using the transparent Kaya identity. Second, we use the Carbon-Kuznets-Curve framework to assess the effect of economic growth on emissions using measures of territorial and consumption-based emissions. We run fixed-effects regressions using OECD data for 58 countries during 2007–2015 and source alternative emissions data starting in 1992 from two other databases. While there is weak evidence suggesting a decoupling of emissions and growth at high-income levels, the main estimation sample indicates that emissions are monotonically increasing with per-capita GDP. We draw out the implications for climate policy and binding emission reduction obligations.

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Using macroeconomic data for 1960-2018, this paper analyzes the origins of the crisis of the ‘post-Maastricht Treaty order of Italian capitalism’. After 1992, Italy did more than most other Eurozone members to satisfy EMU conditions in terms of self-imposed fiscal consolidation, structural reform and real wage restraint — and the country was undeniably successful in bringing down inflation, moderating wages, running primary fiscal surpluses, reducing unemployment and raising the profit share. But its adherence to the EMU rulebook asphyxiated Italy’s domestic demand and exports — and resulted not just in economic stagnation and a generalized productivity slowdown, but in relative and absolute decline in many major dimensions of economic activity. Italy’s chronic shortage of demand has clear sources: (a) perpetual fiscal austerity; (b) permanent real wage restraint; and (c) a lack of technological competitiveness which, in combination with an overvalued euro, weakens the ability of Italian firms to maintain their global market shares in the face of increasing competition of low-wage countries. These three causes lower capacity utilization, reduce firm profitability and hurt investment, innovation and diversification. The EMU rulebook thus locks the Italian economy into economic decline and impoverishment. The analysis points to the need to end austerity and devise public investment and industrial policies to improve Italy’s ‘technological competitiveness’ and stop the structural divergence between the Italian economy and France/Germany. The issue is not just to revive demand in the short run (which is easy), but to create a self-reinforcing process of investment-led and innovation-driven process of long-run growth (which is difficult). @en