The high level of nitrogen emissions over the last decades and their adverse impact on the natural environment and human health are a pressing environmental issue. A nitrogen tax can be a cost-efficient and effective policy instrument to reduce nitrogen emissions. However, adverse effects on low- and middle-income households might lead to societal and political frictions that could end up in resistance. In this paper we investigate how a hypothetical nitrogen tax covering the specific external costs of nitrogen could be implemented and estimate its short-term distributional effects on household income groups in Germany. The findings show that the proposed tax would be regressive. However, if the tax rate is set equal to the true cost of nitrogen, the monetary impacts would overall be small, ranging from 1.15% of income for the first income quintile to 0.66% for the fifth. Complementary policy measures to lower the burden on low-income households, farmers and the energy sector could preempt social resistance against the tax.@en

International trade and emission offshoring can reduce a country's domestic carbon dioxide emissions, helping it to reach emission reduction targets set under the prevailing territorial climate policy frameworks. We ask what is the net contribution of trade to national production-based emissions. Existing metrics (consumption-based emissions and the technology-adjusted balance of emissions embodied in trade) do not answer this question. Based on global multi-regional input-output tables and the domestic technology assumption, we calculate net emission onshoring as the difference between the emissions embodied in gross exports (onshoring) and the emissions avoided by gross imports (offshoring) for 43 countries between 2000–2014. We find that the USA offshores emissions and China onshores emissions; the aggregate trade balance explains this result while the trade composition plays a negligible role in either country. In general there is no cross-country relationship between net offshoring and per-capita income, and neither one between trade specialization in emission-intensive products and per-capita income. The developed countries’ absolute decoupling of economic growth and production-based emissions since 2000 is “genuine” in the sense that it reflects domestic economic developments and is not owed to emission offshoring.@en

We propose a new method for standardizing the production technology at the world average level and derive interpretations for the resulting carbon emission concepts. The technology-adjusted emission balance measures net weak carbon leakage defined as the difference between the foreign emissions avoided by exports and the foreign emissions generated by imports. We use global multi-regional input–output tables to document the variable’s spatio-temporal variation for 49 economies between 1995 and 2015. There is a positive cross-country correlation between net leakage and per-capita income. Changes in net leakage are generally small and do not account for country-specific emission trends, that is, domestic emission decreases were not offset by foreign emission increases.@en

De-carbonization to restrict future global warming to 1.5 °C is technically feasible but may impose a “limit” or “planetary boundary” to economic growth, depending on whether or not human society can decouple growth from emissions. In this paper, we assess the viability of decoupling. First, we develop a prognosis of climate-constrained global growth for 2014–2050 using the transparent Kaya identity. Second, we use the Carbon-Kuznets-Curve framework to assess the effect of economic growth on emissions using measures of territorial and consumption-based emissions. We run fixed-effects regressions using OECD data for 58 countries during 2007–2015 and source alternative emissions data starting in 1992 from two other databases. While there is weak evidence suggesting a decoupling of emissions and growth at high-income levels, the main estimation sample indicates that emissions are monotonically increasing with per-capita GDP. We draw out the implications for climate policy and binding emission reduction obligations.

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The quantitative growth and increased social prominence of financial institutions and markets can be usefully seen in terms of the constraints or 'discipline' they impose on other private and public decision makers. The role of finance in allocating real resources may be less important than its role in supporting the claims and authority of wealth-owners vis-a-vis other social actors. This article discusses the political economy of financialization in the United States, Europe and India. In the United States, the latter role is most visible in the pressure non-financial corporations face to increase payouts to shareholders. In Europe, the financial constraints on national governments are more salient. Tightening these constraints is openly acknowledged as the major benefit of financial integration, yet, on the other hand, the constraints financialization imposes on policy may also limit the extent to which finance can in fact be liberalized. This countervailing pressure is visible in the great expansion of central banks' balance sheets and management of financial markets over the past decade. It is even more clearly visible in India, where the conflict between financialization and concrete policy goals has sharply limited the extent of liberalization, despite consistent rhetorical support.

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The article uses a demand-constrained small-open-economy model in the tradition of Keynes and Kalecki to study the effects of offshoring on aggregate demand and domestic employment. Offshoring is represented as labor-saving import-using technical change. The results depend on the behavior of the markup on unit costs. If higher markups absorb the competitiveness gain, the scale effect of labor demand is negative, and offshoring unambiguously reduces domestic demand and employment. If the markup remains constant, the net effect of offshoring on domestic demand and employment is ambiguous; it depends crucially on the price elasticity of exports.

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We use data from the World Input-Output Database to fit a closed multiregional input-output model in order to estimate the size of spillover effects of Germany's final demand on GDP, employment and the trade balance in Southern European countries. We find that spillover effects are rather small. Germany alone will hardly make a significant contribution to the external adjustment process in the European South.

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