The proliferation of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) is decentralizing the power system, with more and more capacity installed in the distribution grids. Concurrently, the energy sector is embracing the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm, resulting in the emergence of the Internet of Energy. However, this transformation introduces new concerns regarding cyber security. As the number of interconnected devices increases, the possible attack surface for malicious actors expands. Recognizing this challenge, researchers are investigating the potential cyber security benefits of applying blockchain in power systems. Blockchain offers some secure-by-design features, such as the immutability of the stored data, that can be leveraged to improve the cyber security of smart grids.
In this work, a blockchain-based application for the monitoring and control of a feeder in the Low-Voltage (LV) distribution grid is designed and tested. A smart contract is created and deployed in a private Ethereum blockchain utilizing the Proof of Authority (PoA) consensus mechanism. The blockchain application enhances the cyber security of the LV distribution system in three ways. First, it detects cyber attacks targeting DERs by comparing the setpoints received by prosumers with smart meter measurements. Second, it prevents cyber attacks by enabling the exchange of measurements and setpoints on-chain and by preventing unreliable prosumers from participating in the voltage regulation market. Third, it mitigates the effects of cyber attacks on the steady-state voltage magnitudes by enforcing a novel voltage regulation mechanism, in which a new metric is proposed to quantify the power-to-voltage relationship while considering the location of the power exchange.
The efficacy of the blockchain application is tested in a co-simulation environment together with a modeled LV distribution network, simulated in DigSILENT PowerFactory. The distribution network model is first used to assess the impact of cyber attacks manipulating the setpoints of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESSs), which have been identified as the most critical DERs. The simulation results demonstrate that the considered cyber attacks can force the disconnection of inverters by causing violations of the acceptable steady-state voltage magnitudes. One of the scenarios demonstrates that a cyber attack targeting half of the BESSs in a feeder can lead to the collapse of the voltage, causing a local outage. Finally, the results of the co-simulation of the blockchain-based monitoring and control system, achieved by the Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) communication protocol and by a series of clients managing the data streams, demonstrate its efficacy in detecting cyber attacks and mitigating their impact on the voltage magnitude across the feeder, thus reducing the number of disconnected DERs.