The ability to make appropriate delegation decisions is an important prerequisite of effective human-AI collaboration. Recent work, however, has shown that people struggle to evaluate AI systems in the presence of forecasting errors, falling well short of relying on AI systems appropriately. We use a pre-registered crowdsourcing study (N = 611) to extend this literature by two underexplored crucial features of human AI decision-making: choice independence and error type. Subjects in our study repeatedly complete two prediction tasks and choose which predictions they want to delegate to an AI system. For one task, subjects receive a decision heuristic that allows them to make informed and relatively accurate predictions. The second task is substantially harder to solve, and subjects must come up with their own decision rule. We systematically vary the AI system's performance such that it either provides the best possible prediction for both tasks or only for one of the two. Our results demonstrate that people systematically violate choice independence by taking the AI's performance in an unrelated second task into account. Humans who delegate predictions to a superior AI in their own expertise domain significantly reduce appropriate reliance when the model makes systematic errors in a complementary expertise domain. In contrast, humans who delegate predictions to a superior AI in a complementary expertise domain significantly increase appropriate reliance when the model systematically errs in the human expertise domain. Furthermore, we show that humans differentiate between error types and that this effect is conditional on the considered expertise domain. This is the first empirical exploration of choice independence and error types in the context of human-AI collaboration. Our results have broad and important implications for the future design, deployment, and appropriate application of AI systems.

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As algorithms are increasingly augmenting and substituting human decision-making, understanding how the introduction of computational agents changes the fundamentals of human behavior becomes vital. This pertains to not only users, but also those parties who face the consequences of an algorithmic decision. In a controlled experiment with 480 participants, we exploit an extended version of two-player ultimatum bargaining where responders choose to bargain with either another human, another human with an AI decision aid or an autonomous AI-system acting on behalf of a passive human proposer. Our results show strong responder preferences against the algorithm, as most responders opt for a human opponent and demand higher compensation to reach a contract with autonomous agents. To map these preferences to economic expectations, we elicit incentivized subject beliefs about their opponent's behavior. The majority of responders maximize their expected value when this is line with approaching the human proposer. In contrast, responders predicting income maximization for the autonomous AI-system overwhelmingly override economic self-interest to avoid the algorithm.

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Recent advances in machine learning have led to the widespread adoption of ML models for decision support systems. However, little is known about how the introduction of such systems affects the behavior of human stakeholders. This pertains both to the people using the system, as well as those who are affected by its decisions. To address this knowledge gap, we present a series of ultimatum bargaining game experiments comprising 1178 participants. We find that users are willing to use a black-box decision support system and thereby make better decisions. This translates into higher levels of cooperation and better market outcomes. However, because users under-weigh algorithmic advice, market outcomes remain far from optimal. Explanations increase the number of unique system inquiries, but users appear less willing to follow the system’s recommendation. People who negotiate with a user who has a decision support system, but cannot use one themselves, react to its introduction by demanding a better deal for themselves, thereby decreasing overall cooperation levels. This effect is largely driven by the percentage of participants who perceive the system’s availability as unfair. Interpretability mitigates perceptions of unfairness. Our findings highlight the potential for decision support systems to further human cooperation, but also the need for regulators to consider heterogeneous stakeholder reactions. In particular, higher levels of transparency might inadvertently hurt cooperation through changes in fairness perceptions.@en