This paper considers the combined effect of two trends in commercial aviation. On the one hand, there is a continuing demand for pilots, implying that a new generation of pilots, will soon be flying our aircraft. On the other hand, legal aspects have had an adverse effect on innovation in the safety level of established procedures, leading to a trend for aircraft operating companies to adopt manufacturer’s recommended flight deck procedures rather than reviewing these and adapting these where appropriate to local needs. However, with the influx of new pilots to the workforce, the lack of innovation and adaptation of flight deck procedures poses a safety treat. The safety level of the aviation industry relies on the experience of the individual operator (pilot), the demands of the tasks and the available support tools. If the experience is not in the operator (pilot) we have to put the experience in the procedures to maintain the existing safety level in aviation. This conference paper is a plea to develop type, and operation, specific flightdeck procedures, adapted to present day operation and usable by the future pilot population. @en

In the analysis of human performance and human error, considerable attention is given to the cognitive processes of actors involved in error or success scenarios. Even with awareness of hindsight bias, it takes effort to understand the actions of agents in later inspection of error scenarios. One such topic of heated discussion was the perceived poor performance of pilots in the two 737 MAX MCAS-related crashes in applying the “memory item” checklist pertaining to a runaway trim. In this paper, we argue that it is not so much the reproduction of the checklist that was lacking in these scenarios, but the trigger for even starting the checklist. Not only trim run-away problems, but several other issues likewise require an instant reaction from pilots, designated as “memory items”. Rasmussen’s simplified schematic for the “skill, rule and knowledge” taxonomy already provides the tools for properly analyzing this. The skill to provide the triggers for these reactions relies on pattern extraction from the available sensory input, and, importantly, it can only be learned in a valid training context. It is argued that re-appraisal of these items is needed, addressing explicitly the validity of the training environments that enable pilots to learn the required pattern recognition skills.@en

Certification is an important process in the aviation industry. The certified status of aircraft, aircraft equipment and procedures is often regarded as a guarantee for safety. However, if shortcomings emerge during operation, this certified status can prevent improvement of the design. In addition, to develop and certify new equipment, it is often easier to modify existing, certified equipment than have a full certification of a new system. Doing so, safety problems may be overlooked. In this paper, a link is made between the certification process and organizational safety of both manufacturers of aircraft or aircraft equipment and airline companies. @en

When an aircraft experiences an engine failure during takeoff, it must be able to either reject or continue the takeoff without exceeding the longitudinal or lateral dimensions of the usable runway. This paper focuses on the lateral deviation. During certification, the minimum control speed ground is determined in certification tests; at this speed, the allowable maximum lateral deviation is 30 ft. These tests are done with a free castering nose wheel and other requirements such as not using ailerons. These are all V _mcg increasing factors. On the other hand, the aircraft manufacturer chooses the most favorable conditions, new tires, a dry runway, and no crosswind. It is unclear if the free castering nose wheel is a stringent-enough requirement to compensate for reduced runway friction, and the effect of crosswind is not considered in the certification tests. Furthermore, the rejected takeoff condition is not certified against a lateral excursion limit. Therefore, in this paper, a model is developed to determine the lateral deviation in a continued as well as a rejected takeoff, including the effect of pilot reaction time, runway surface condition, and crosswind. For the present evaluation, a Boeing 737-300 model was used.

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Vmcg, or ground minimum control speed, is established by aircraft manufacturers during the aircraft certification process. Vmcg is used as a limiting speed for V1 (decision speed) when performing takeoff performance calculations. Performance calculations on contaminated and slippery runways will result in a V1 speed equal to Vmcg-limited V1 for a wide range of takeoff weights when using aircraft manufacturer procedures in a flight crew operationsmanual or computer calculations based on theV1−min policy. In this paper, itwill be shown thatVmcg will not be a safe speed to continue a takeoff after an engine failure in strong crosswind or reduced runway surface friction conditions. A model is used to determine the effect of these environmental conditions on lateral deviation. Apart from the continued takeoff, the lateral deviation in the rejected takeoff after an engine failure was also calculated under different environmental conditions. This resulted in advice for the use of a differential braking technique to prevent a runway excursion if a runway is not dry. A method to mitigate the risk of runway excursion on contaminated and slippery runways is presented. An evaluation, conclusions, and subjects for further research are also presented. @en