In the built environment, often too much focus is put on compliance instead of seeking the optimal fire-safety solution for the building. Because of a lack of tangible incentives for building owners, the benefits of implementing fire safety measures and their societal contribution are often not recognized and therefore, not considered. By means of a literature review and a survey, we have indicated necessary fire-safety related attributes and tool features and analyzed the currently available fire risk assessment tools. This study shows that a limited number of these tools can provide a partial fire risk analysis of a building. A total of 26 tools were found. No tools were found that included all the identified fire consequence-related attributes to ensure fire-safe buildings. However, we did identify 11 tools that have the potential to assess between 32 % and 52 % of the found attributes of building fire safety. To stimulate the development of such tools, this paper provides 12 factors by which to assess fire risk assessment tools – quantifying the overall ‘quality’ of the assessment tool – which can incentivize industry to refine the existing ones with enhanced predictability of the potential consequences of fire incidents. @en

This work explores resource recovery coupled to seawater desalination in small islands. As small islands depend on seawater desalination for water access, they make an excellent ground for exploring the trade-offs associated to resource recovery, like potential economic gains, energy use, and environmental impacts. Here, we investigated these tensions in the context of Lampedusa, in Italy. We then developed and evaluated scenarios for the recovery of additional water, Mg, and other resources from brines, to identify if and how resource recovery is an interesting approach for the island vis-à-vis these tensions. We have found that the potential to increase water production with water recovery from brine is an interesting alternative for small islands, especially when harnessing waste heat. However, while some technologies offer possibilities for recovering additional resources, in places like small islands the potential benefits from additional recovery do not seem to justify the costs to the local system.

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In September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly established the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [...].

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Emerging applications of biotechnology such as new genomic techniques may give rise to new uncertainties and uncertain risks. Particularly the increased complexity and limited knowledge of possible risks associated with these new
techniques, make it currently impossible to perform an adequate environmental risk assessment. As a result, there is a risk that such techniques don’t get beyond experiments demonstrating the proof of principle, stifling their further
development and implementation. To break free from this deadlock, wemust be able to learn what such uncertainties and uncertain risks entail, and how they should be assessed to ensure safe further development. To shape a responsible learning environment to explore uncertainties and uncertain risks, we have organized five stakeholder workshops. By means of a case about the genetic engineering of plants’ rhizosphere–an application abundant with uncertain risks–we identified tensions between different stakeholder groups and their different estimates of uncertainties and uncertain risks. Based upon derived insights, we developed a tool–a script for researchers to organize a
stakeholder workshop–that enables a constructive discussion about emerging risks with a broad range of stakeholders. Thereby, the script provides a step-by-step approach to identify uncertainties, develop anticipatory strategies and adaptations in (experimental) research designs to lower or mitigate the earlier
identified uncertainties, and helps to identify knowledge gaps for which (additional) risk research should be set up.@en

The current regulatory regime regarding GMOs within the Netherlands and Europe does ensure safety but struggles in balancing this notion with innovation. In particular, the way the Precautionary Principle (PP) is operationalized in GMO legislation has resulted in a highly precautionary culture in which there is little room to conduct research with associated uncertain risks or uncertainties – it has resulted in a culture of compliance. Although the debate on how ‘new’ genetic engineering techniques such as CRISPR should be assessed in comparison to recently exempted techniques is ongoing within the European Union (EU), this might not have any consequences for GMO regulation at all. These issues do not only stifle innovation but also illustrate that the current regime is not resilient in dealing with emerging techniques. To break free from the impasse between safety and innovation, researchers should be able to learn what uncertain risks entail, for instance, through Safe-by-Design (SbD). The main question addressed in this thesis is: “How to create an environment that is suitable to learn safely and responsibly what uncertain risks associated with emerging biotechnologies entail?”. I conclude that to enable responsible learning by means of SbD, 3 conditions are needed; regulatory flexibility, co-responsibility and awareness. Thereby, SbD could be a suitable approach to arrive at responsible learning, given that the 3 conditions are met. If not, SbD provides guidelines to lower or mitigate known risks but fails to provide a step-by-step approach to gradually learn what uncertain risks entail. This will leave a knowledge gap between known and uncertain risks which stifles innovation and hinders risk management in ensuring future safety for people, animals and the environment. @en

The increasing societal demand for safer, biobased products, and processes
creates opportunities for industrial biotechnology and chemistry. To succeed,
controlled learning about new emerging risks is crucial but both fields endure
difficulty in doing so by their respective regulation and risk management culture.@en

Although both the Inherent Safety Principles (ISPs) and the Safe-by-Design (SbD) approach revolve around the central value of safety, they have a slightly different focus in terms of developing add-on features or considering initial design choices. This paper examines the differences between these approaches and analyses which approach is more suitable for a specific type of research—fundamental or applied. By applying the ISPs and SbD to a case study focusing on miniaturized processes using Hydrogen Cyanide, we find that both approaches encounter internal value-conflicts and suffer from external barriers, or lock-ins, which hinder implementation of safety measures. By applying the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs), we gain insight in the matureness of a technology (thereby distinguishing fundamental and applied research) and the extent of lock-ins being present. We conclude that the ISPs are better able to deal with lock-ins, which are more common in applied research stages, as this approach provides guidelines for add-on safety measures. Fundamental research is not subject to lock-ins yet, and therefore SbD would be a more suitable approach. Lastly, application of either approach should not be associated with a specific field of interest, but instead with associated known or uncertain risks.@en

Veiligheid staat hoog in het vaandel in het huidige risicomanagement van biotechnologie. Maar dit leidt ook tot een restrictief regime waarin weinig ruimte is om te leren over onzekere risico’s. Om binnen de biotechnologie innovaties mogelijk te maken die bijdragen aan maatschappelijke doelen en tegelijkertijd veilig zijn, moeten we naar een cultuur waarin ruimte is voor verantwoord leren over risico’s. Hoe doen we dat?@en

Genetic engineering techniques (e.g., CRISPR-Cas) have led to an increase in biotechnological developments, possibly leading to uncertain risks. The European Union aims to anticipate these by embedding the Precautionary Principle in its regulation for risk management. This principle revolves around taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty and provides guidelines to take precautionary measures when dealing with important values such as health or environmental safety. However, when dealing with ‘new’ technologies, it can be hard for risk managers to estimate the societal or environmental consequences of a biotechnology that might arise once introduced or embedded in society due to that these sometimes do not comply with the established norms within risk assessment. When there is insufficient knowledge, stakeholders active in early developmental stages (e.g., researchers) could provide necessary knowledge by conducting research specifically devoted to what these unknown risks could entail. In theory, the Safe-by-Design (SbD) approach could enable such a controlled learning environment to gradually identify what these uncertain risks are, to which we refer as responsible learning. In this paper, we argue that three conditions need to be present to enable such an environment: (1) regulatory flexibility, (2) co-responsibility between researchers and regulators, and (3) openness towards all stakeholders. If one of these conditions would not be present, the SbD approach cannot be implemented to its fullest potential, thereby limiting an environment for responsible learning and possibly leaving current policy behind to anticipate uncertain risks.@en

Advanced gene editing techniques such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR)/Cas have increased the pace of developments in the field of industrial biotechnology. Such techniques imply new possibilities when working with living organisms, possibly leading to uncertain risks. In the Netherlands, current policy fails to address these uncertain risks because risk classification is determined process‐wise (i.e., genetically modified organism [GMO] and non‐GMO), there is a strong focus on quantifiable risks, and the linearity within current governance (science–policy–society) hinders iterative communication between stakeholders, leaving limited room to anticipate uncertainties at an early stage of development. A suggested concept to overcome these shortcomings is the Safe‐by‐Design (SbD) approach, which, theoretically, allows stakeholders to iteratively incorporate safety measures throughout a technology's development process, creating a dynamic environment for the anticipation of uncertain risks. Although this concept originates from chemical engineering and is already widely applied in nanotechnology, for the field of biotechnology, there is no agreed upon definition yet. To explore the possibilities of SbD for future governance of biotechnology, we should gain insight in how various stakeholders perceive notions of risk, safety, and inherent safety, and what this implies for the applicability of SbD for risk governance concerning industrial biotechnology. Our empirical research reveals three main themes: (1) diverging expectations with regard to safety and risks, and to establish an acceptable level of risk; (2) different applications of SbD and inherent safety, namely, product‐ and process‐wise; and (3) unclarity in allocating responsibilities to stakeholders in the development process of a biotechnology and within society.@en

Dit verslag geeft de bevindingen weer van een kortlopend onderzoek naar het gebruik van waterstofcyanide (HCN), ook wel Blauwzuur genaamd, in het veld van de (bio)chemie. In dit verslag worden de toxische eigenschappen van deze chemische stof afgewogen tegen veiligheidsaspecten vanuit het kader van Safe-by-Design gebruik makende van Inherent Safety Principles (ISPs).@en