This chapter argues for the following definition of terrorism. Terrorism is a strategy that: 1. Consists in state or non-state actors deliberately performing acts of violence aimed at (directly or indirectly) seriously harming persons who are not military combatants, human rights violators or violent revolutionaries; 2. Consists of violent actions that ought to be criminalized; 3. Is an intended means of terrorizing the members of some social, economic, ethnic, political, etc., group in order to achieve a political purpose; 4. Relies on the violence receiving a degree of publicity, at least to the extent necessary to engender widespread fear in the target group.

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During the Covid-19 pandemic, the governments are trying to contain the spread with non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), such as social distancing rules, restrictions, and lockdowns. In an effort to identify factors that may influence population adherence to NPIs, we examined the role of optimism bias, anxiety, and perceived severity of the situation in relation to engagement in protective behavioral changes and satisfaction with governments' response to this pandemic. We conducted an online survey in 935 participants (M_age = 34.29; 68.88% females) that was disseminated in April and May 2020 in the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, and USA. Individuals with high optimism bias engaged less in behavioral changes, whereas individuals with high levels of anxiety and high perceived severity engaged more in behavioral changes. Individuals with high optimism bias and high levels of anxiety were less satisfied with the governments' response, albeit for different reasons. Individuals who reported low perceived severity and low government satisfaction engaged the least in behavioral changes, whereas participants who reported high perceived severity and low government satisfaction engaged the most in behavioral changes. This study contributes to a better understanding of the psychological factors that influence people's responses to NPIs.

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The terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons is a worst-case scenario for most security agencies. Yet traditionally, the risk of CBRN-terrorism is characterized as a so-called “high impact – low probability” threat. Academics and analysts consider it challenging for terrorists to acquire these weapons and, hence, assign a low probability to the terrorist use of impactful CBRN weapons such as nuclear devices or weaponized microorganisms. Most researchers, however, assess the impact of a terrorist weapon solely based on its capability to physically destroy structures or harm organisms. This one-dimensional assessment rules out those toxic substances that are commonly considered CBRN-agents, but only possess limited destructive capabilities. Hence, these agents are not considered a priority for most security agencies. Rather, most resources in CBRN-defense are allocated to subjects like international non-proliferation efforts, whereas toxic substances that are openly available in hardware stores are often overlooked. The present study focuses on three of these toxic substances; ricin, phosphine, and americium. It will be shown that, while arguably having limited physical impact in the hands of terrorists, these and other toxic substances exhibit characteristics that could be of high value to the strategic and tactical goals of terrorist groups. For example, attacks with phosphine have the potential to inflict massive amounts of fear and disruption and are capable of causing political damage and damage to security institutions. The potential to inflict substantial amounts of non-kinetic damage as well as the availability and ease of use of these substances need to be properly acknowledged and met with a multi-layered web of countermeasures (web of prevention) by security institutions. However, as this thesis will show, this web of prevention ought to include not only Government agencies, but also other stakeholders such as manufacturers and vendors of these products, the press, researchers, and citizens. It will be argued that all of these stakeholder groups share a joint moral responsibility to combat terrorist attacks with toxic substances. This joint moral responsibility can be translated into specific actions of individuals in these groups of stakeholders that include, for example, the reporting of suspicious purchases in hardware stores or the flagging and deletion of weapon manuals on the internet. It will be shown that most of the current cooperative measures against these substances suffer from issues that can be traced back to the inability of the stakeholder groups to identify their respective responsibilities within the web of prevention. Furthermore, security institutions miss opportunities to operationalize the moral responsibilities of stakeholder groups such as vendors of toxic products. Based on this assessment, this thesis will give recommendations on how to improve the current CBRN security architecture. It will be shown that the responsibilities and actions of each stakeholder group have to be defined, discussed, and coordinated by all relevant stakeholder groups jointly. In order to do so, the theoretical concept of the web of prevention has to be turned into an institutionalized web in the form of a joint center. Such a joint center gives the stakeholder groups the opportunity to (1) assess the threat, (2) define tasks and actions of each group, and (3) equip each group with the means to perform these actions in an efficacious and ethically sustainable manner. @en

The concept of WMD is part of numerous national laws and is the core of one of the most important treaties of the United Nations (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, 1992; United Nation Office of Disarmament Affairs in The convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, 1975). Yet, the definition of what should be considered a WMD is far from established and subject to controversial debates. Academics, policymakers, and legislators have been introducing a variety of partly conflicting conceptualizations of WMD into scientific debates, public discourse, and legislations over the last eight decades.@en