Begun in 2020, Polkadot is one of the largest blockchains in market capitalization and development. However, privacy on the Polkadot network has yet to be one of the key focus points. Especially unlinkability between the user’s IP address and Polkadot address is essential. Withou
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Begun in 2020, Polkadot is one of the largest blockchains in market capitalization and development. However, privacy on the Polkadot network has yet to be one of the key focus points. Especially unlinkability between the user’s IP address and Polkadot address is essential. Without this unlinkability, users are vulnerable to targeted ads, manipulation, blackmail, reputational damage, financial loss, physical harm, discrimination, and more. This thesis investigates the viability of Tor or a VPN with Polkadot as external privacy-enhancing tools to hide the user’s IP address, as users aiming to achieve unlinkability cannot easily change the Polkadot code.
To analyze the viability, we set up a measurement study to examine the performance of a Polkadot full node behind Tor or a VPN. We investigated, among other things, the latency, throughput, and the number of discovered and connected peers to determine the performance of three Polkadot full nodes located in London, Seoul, and North California. Furthermore, we did a security analysis to determine any vulnerabilities that could emerge from using Polkadot with either of the network environments. And we investigated in-depth the susceptibility of the Polkadot node to an Eclipse attack, as previous research has shown that Bitcoin with Tor was vulnerable to an Eclipse attack.
Our results show that a Polkadot node with Tor has considerably high latency and cannot maintain long-lasting connections. The short connection time decreases the time to perform an Eclipse attack on a Polkadot node from a couple of months and weeks for the normal and VPN environment to potentially six days or less for the Tor environment. We calculated the cost of running an Eclipse attack to be approximately €482 per week. The Polkadot node behind the VPN does perform considerably better. The Polkadot node in London, behind the VPN located in Frankfurt, performed similarly in terms of latency to the Polkadot node in a normal network environment. However, the Polkadot nodes in both
the Tor and VPN environment have only outgoing connections. If too many nodes ran behind one of these environments, fewer peers would be able to establish connections with one another, resulting in network partitions or network failure.
This study emphasizes the importance of unlinkability between a Polkadot user’s address and IP. However, using Tor or a VPN as privacy-enhancing tools could impact the security of the Polkadot node and the whole Polkadot network. So users should avoid using Tor with Polkadot and carefully consider the tradeoff between privacy and security when using a VPN. The security issues mentioned in this thesis should be further investigated and tested. Furthermore, a default solution built into the Polkadot source code should be investigated.