Rechargeable Li||I2 batteries based on liquid organic electrolytes suffer from pronounced polyiodides shuttling and safety concerns, which can be potentially tackled by the use of solid-state electrolytes. However, current all-solid-state Li||I2 batteries only demonstrate limited capacity based on a two-electron I−/I2 polyiodides chemistry at elevated temperatures, preventing them from rivaling state-of-the-art lithium-ion batteries. Herein, we report a fast, stable and high-capacity four-electron solid-conversion I−/I2/I+ chemistry in all-solid-state Li||I2 batteries at room temperature. Through the strategic use of a highly conductive, chlorine-rich solid electrolyte Li4.2InCl7.2 as the catholyte, we effectively activate the I2/I+ redox couple. This activation is achieved through a robust I-Cl interhalogen interaction between I2 and the catholyte, facilitated by an interface-mediated heterogeneous oxidation mechanism. Moreover, apart from serving as Li-ion conduction pathway, the Li4.2InCl7.2 catholyte is demonstrated to show a reversible redox behavior and contribute to the electrode capacity without compromising its conductivity. Based on the I−/I2/I+ four-electron chemistry, the as-designed all-solid-state Li||I2 batteries deliver a high specific capacity of 449 mAh g-1 at 44 mA g-1 based on I2 mass and an impressive cycling stability over 600 cycles with a capacity retention of 91% at 440 mA g-1 and at 25 °C.@en

Password hardening encryption (PHE) is an emerging primitive in recent years. It can resist offline attack brought by keyword guessing attack from server via adding a third party with crypto services joining the decryption process. This primitive enhances the password authentication protocol and adds encryption functionality. This paper presents an active attack from server in the first scheme that introduced this primitive. This attack combines the idea from a cutting-edge threat called algorithm substitution attack which is undetectable and makes the server capable of launching offline attack. This result shows that the original PHE scheme can not resist attacks from malicious server. Then this study tries to summarize the property that an algorithm substitution attack resistant scheme should have. After that this paper presents a PHE scheme that can resist such kind of attacks from malicious server with simulation results. Finally, this study concludes the result and gives some expectation for future systematic research on interactive protocols under algorithm substitution attack.

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