Asset discovery is fundamental to any organization's cybersecurity efforts. Indeed, one must accurately know which assets belong to an IT infrastructure before the infrastructure can be secured. While practitioners typically rely on a relatively small set of well-known techniques, the academic literature on the subject is voluminous. In particular, the Internet measurement research community has devised a number of asset discovery techniques to support many measurement studies over the past five years. In this paper, we systematize asset discovery techniques by constructing a framework that comprehensively captures how network identifiers and services are found. We extract asset discovery techniques from recent academic literature in security and networking and place them into the systematized framework. We then demonstrate how to apply the framework to several case studies of asset discovery workflows, which could aid research reproducibility. These case studies further suggest opportunities for researchers and practitioners to uncover and identify more assets than might be possible with traditional techniques. @en

In 2012 we presented the first systematic study of the costs of cybercrime. In this paper, we report what has changed in the seven years since. The period has seen major platform evolution, with the mobile phone replacing the PC and laptop as the consumer terminal of choice, with Android replacing Windows, and with many services moving to the cloud. The use of social networks has become extremely widespread. The executive summary is that about half of all property crime, by volume and by value, is now online. We hypothesised in 2012 that this might be so; it is now established by multiple victimisation studies. Many cybercrime patterns appear to be fairly stable, but there are some interesting changes. Payment fraud, for example, has more than doubled in value but has fallen slightly as a proportion of payment value; the payment system has simply become bigger, and slightly more efficient. Several new cybercrimes are significant enough to mention, including business email compromise and crimes involving cryptocurrencies. The move to the cloud means that system misconfiguration may now be responsible for as many breaches as phishing. Some companies have suffered large losses as a side-effect of denial-of-service worms released by state actors, such as NotPetya; we have to take a view on whether they count as cybercrime. The infrastructure supporting cybercrime, such as botnets, continues to evolve, and specific crimes such as premium-rate phone scams have evolved some interesting variants. The overall picture is the same as in 2012: traditional offences that are now technically ‘computer crimes’ such as tax and welfare fraud cost the typical citizen in the low hundreds of Euros/dollars a year; payment frauds and similar offences, where the modus operandi has been completely changed by computers, cost in the tens; while the new computer crimes cost in the tens of cents. Defending against the platforms used to support the latter two types of crime cost citizens in the tens of dollars. Our conclusions remain broadly the same as in 2012: it would be economically rational to spend less in anticipation of cybercrime (on antivirus, firewalls, etc.) and more on response. We are particularly bad at prosecuting criminals who operate infrastructure that other wrongdoers exploit. Given the growing realisation among policymakers that crime hasn’t been falling over the past decade, merely moving online, we might reasonably hope for better funded and coordinated law-enforcement action. @en

Cybercriminal activity has exploded in the past decade, with diverse threats ranging from phishing attacks to botnets and drive-by-downloads afflicting millions of computers worldwide. In response, a volunteer defense has emerged, led by security companies, infrastructure operators, and vigilantes. This reactionary force does not concern itself with making proactive upgrades to the cyber infrastructure. Instead, it operates on the front lines by remediating infections as they appear. We construct a model of the abuse reporting infrastructure in order to explain how voluntary action against cybercrime functions today, in hopes of improving our understanding of what works and how to make remediation more effective in the future. We examine the incentives to participate among data contributors, affected resource owners, and intermediaries. Finally, we present a series of key attributes that differ among voluntary actions to investigate further through experimentation, pointing toward a research agenda that could establish causality between interventions and outcomes.@en

Hosting providers play a key role in fighting web compromise, but their ability to prevent abuse is constrained by the security practices of their own customers. Shared hosting, offers a unique perspective since customers operate under restricted privileges and providers retain more control over configurations. We present the first empirical analysis of the distribution of web security features and software patching practices in shared hosting providers, the influence of providers on these security practices, and their impact on web compromise rates. We construct provider-level features on the global market for shared hosting -- containing 1,259 providers -- by gathering indicators from 442,684 domains. Exploratory factor analysis of 15 indicators identifies four main latent factors that capture security efforts: content security, webmaster security, web infrastructure security and web application security. We confirm, via a fixed-effect regression model, that providers exert significant influence over the latter two factors, which are both related to the software stack in their hosting environment. Finally, by means of GLM regression analysis of these factors on phishing and malware abuse, we show that the four security and software patching factors explain between 10% and 19% of the variance in abuse at providers, after controlling for size. For web-application security for instance, we found that when a provider moves from the bottom 10% to the best-performing 10%, it would experience 4 times fewer phishing incidents. We show that providers have influence over patch levels--even higher in the stack, where CMSes can run as client-side software--and that this influence is tied to a substantial reduction in abuse levels.@en

Motivation: Participants on the front lines of abuse reporting have a variety of options to notify intermediaries and resource owners about abuse of their systems and services. These can include emails to personal messages to blacklists to machine-generated feeds. Recipients of these reports have to voluntarily act on this information. We know remarkably little about the factors that drive higher response rates to abuse reports. One such factor is the reputation of the sender. In this article, we present the first randomized controlled experiment into sender reputation. We used a private datafeed of Asprox-infected websites to issue notifications from three senders with different reputations: an individual, a university and an established anti-malware organization.

Results: We find that our detailed abuse reports significantly increase cleanup rates. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that sender reputation improves cleanup. We do see that the evasiveness of the attacker in hiding compromise can substantially hamper cleanup efforts. Furthermore, we find that the minority of hosting providers who viewed our cleanup advice webpage were much more likely to remediate infections than those who did not, but that website owners who viewed the advice fared no better.@en