Exploiting PUF Variation to Detect Fault Injection Attacks

Conference paper (2022)

Authors

T.C. Köylü Computer Engineering - EEMCS
L. Caetano Garaffa Computer Engineering - EEMCS
Cezar Reinbrecht Computer Engineering - EEMCS
M.Z. Zahedi Computer Engineering - EEMCS
S. Hamdioui Quantum & Computer Engineering
M. Taouil Computer Engineering - EEMCS
Research Group
Computer Engineering (EEMCS) (TU Delft)
Copyright: © 2022 T.C. Köylü, L. Caetano Garaffa, Cezar Reinbrecht, M.Z. Zahedi, S. Hamdioui, M. Taouil
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/DDECS54261.2022.9770154
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Published Date

2022

Language

English

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Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Department

Quantum & Computer Engineering

Research Group

Computer Engineering

Abstract

The massive deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) devices makes them vulnerable against physical tampering attacks, such as fault injection. These kind of hardware attacks are very popular as they typically do not require complex equipment or high expertise. Hence, it is important that IoT devices are protected against them. In this work, we present a novel fault injection attack detector with high flexibility and low overhead. Our solution is based on the reuse of a security primitive used in many IoT devices, i.e., ring oscillator (RO) physically unclonable function (PUF). Our results show that we obtain a high detection effectiveness and no false alarms against most popular fault injection attacks based on voltage and clock manipulations.

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