Digital identities and credentials are gradually replacing physical documents, as they can be verified with more accuracy and efficiency. Since online privacy is becoming more crucial than ever, it is essential to preserve the privacy of individuals whenever possible. Therefore,
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Digital identities and credentials are gradually replacing physical documents, as they can be verified with more accuracy and efficiency. Since online privacy is becoming more crucial than ever, it is essential to preserve the privacy of individuals whenever possible. Therefore, anonymous attestation of digital credentials should be feasible, where provers can selectively disclose attributes and create abstractions over attributes in their credential, in order to solely disclose the minimum amount of information required to complete the goal of verification.
Many schemes in the field of attribute-based credentials consider a single root authority issuing credentials to provers. This is coherent to the traditional way of the issuance of credentials since the process of producing physical documents is costly to distribute to multiple issuers. Digital identities provide the opportunity for authorities to distribute credential issuance rights (consecutively) to smaller entrusted entities.
To the best of our knowledge, we propose the first protocol which combines both anonymous attestation with attribute-based credentials and the delegation of selective signing rights for the issuance of these credentials. Root authorities could delegate signing rights for selective attributes consecutively to trustees, which are able to create anonymous attribute-based credentials with the acquired attributes for provers. Verifiers are able to verify presentation tokens with solely the public key of the root authority, without gaining knowledge about the identities of the prover and intermediate delegators. We introduce three adapted signature schemes based on existing work in order to realize a concrete instantiation of the protocol. Anonymity is achieved by incorporating Schnorr's zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with bilinear pairings to efficiently prove the correctness of presentation tokens.
We realized a prototype of our concrete instantiation and optimized the verification algorithm in order to achieve optimal pairing performance. Complexity analysis of the protocol shows improvement in efficiency by aggregating attribute signatures throughout signing right delegation. Experimental results demonstrate a degree of practical feasibility for the verification of presentation tokens on commodity hardware within the challenging public transportation access control time bound of 300 ms.