Geographically distributed infrastructures, such as buildings, dams, and solar power plants, are commonly maintained via Internet-connected remote management devices. Previous studies on detecting and securing industrial control systems (ICS) have overlooked these remote management devices, as they do not expose ICS-specific services like Modbus and BACnet and thus do not show up in Internet-wide scans for such services. In this paper, we implement and validate a discovery method for these devices via their Web User Interface (WebUI) and detect 890 devices in Japan alone. We also show that many of these devices are highly insecure. Many allow access to the status or even the control over industrial systems without proper authentication. Taking a closer look at three prevalent remote management devices, we discovered 13 0-day vulnerabilities, several of which were rated as medium or high severity. They have been responsibly disclosed to the manufacturers. By using honeypots that imitate these systems, we show that over time, only a small number of attackers enter these systems, but some do change critical parameters. Attackers appear to interact more with the system when more facility information is displayed on the WebUI. Finally, we notified operators of 317 vulnerable remote management devices by email and telephone. We reached 212 persons in charge of the devices and received confirmation that our method had correctly identified the device. 50% of the persons in charge of the devices stated that they mitigated or will mitigate the problem. We confirmed their actions via a followup scan for vulnerable devices and found that measures were taken for 58% of the devices when we could reach the persons in charge of the device.@en

Distributed Denial of Service attacks against the application layer (L7 DDoS) are among the most difficult attacks to defend against because they mimic normal user behavior. Some mitigation techniques against L7 DDoS, e.g., IP blacklisting and load balancing using a content delivery network, have been proposed; unfortunately, these are symptomatic treatments rather than fundamental solutions. In this paper, we propose a novel technique to disincentivize attackers from launching a DDoS attack by increasing attack costs. Assuming financially motivated attackers seeking to gain profit via DDoS attacks, their primary goal is to maximize revenue. On the basis of this assumption, we also propose a mitigation solution that requires mining cryptocurrencies to access servers. To perform a DDoS attack, attackers must mine cryptocurrency as a proof-of-work (PoW), and the victims then obtain a solution to the PoW. Thus, relative to attackers, the attack cost increases, and, in terms of victims, the economic damage is compensated by the value of the mined coins. On the basis of this model, we evaluate attacker strategies in a game theory manner and demonstrate that the proposed solution provides only negative economic benefits to attackers. Moreover, we implement a prototype to evaluate performance, and we show that this prototype demonstrates practical performance.

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