It is claimed that transaction costs (TCs) affect the effectiveness of any green building (GB) policy. However, few studies have empirically applied TC analysis to GB incentives, which normally should have analyzed the TCs borne by different stakeholders. These include TC typology and determinants during the implementation process, especially the extra administration process where TCs possibly may be incurred. The lack of such in-depth analysis tends to make incentive-design ignore efficiency and fairness amongst the stakeholders. This study aims to improve the efficiency of GB incentives through analyzing TCs borne by the private sector stakeholders. It would identify TC typologies and determinants, and TCs measurement and allocation to different stakeholders. As TCs are policy context-specific, this paper takes a popular GB incentive scheme, Gross Floor Area (GFA) Concession Scheme, as an example. Interviews were conducted with 20 industry experts to validate TCs types and determinants, and to gauge the magnitude of TCs borne by different stakeholders. These empirical evidences are helpful for policy-makers and practitioners to better understand the impacts of TCs, so as to improve the effectiveness of future incentive schemes. In addition, GB policy recommendations for Hong Kong are proposed and many of which are relevant to other countries.

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Green building (GB) policies have been implemented to promote GB and address climate change. Most of the existing literatures have studied the costs and benefits of developing GB, without considerations of GB policies’ impacts. This paper aims to study costs and benefits of implementing GB policy from developers’ perspective. It takes the Gross Floor Area (GFA) Concession, which is a popular policy and has been implemented in the US, Singapore and Hong Kong, as an example, to compare its implementation in three regions and analyze how it affects developers’ costs and benefits. Findings show that Hong Kong has relatively lower threshold to acquire GFA concession for developers and it is the right time to adjust the GFA concession incentive to reflect the market transformation and further encourage developers to go for higher levels of GB.@en

Incentive schemes formed by regulatory or administrative instruments are measures to promote green building (GB) and increase the motivation of developers to meet higher standards. The hidden costs to different stakeholders during the GB transaction are often ignored. Understanding these hidden transaction costs (TCs) helps appraise the costs and benefits of GB and policy effectiveness. The example of a gross floor area (GFA) concession scheme is used systematically to explore and understand the fundamental issues of TCs’ typology and chronology in the GB development process. The GFA
concession scheme is a popular incentive due to its indirect compensation to developers by allowing additional floor area without expenditure by government to implement GBs. A TCs’ framework is used critically to review and evaluate
the costs and benefits of the GFA concession scheme. Its particular implementation in both Hong Kong and Singapore is explored. Hong Kong is used as a case study, complemented with in-depth expert interviews on GFA concession in Hong Kong. The key contribution is to establish the parameters for estimating the optimum GFA bonus that could both motivate various stakeholders and minimize the negative impacts on the built environment in future.@en

About 40% of global energy consumption and nearly one-third of global CO2 emissions are on account of buildings. In Hong Kong, buildings consume up to 90% of electricity during construction and operation, where all the design and construction of private developments is subject to control under the Buildings Ordinance. The way building regulations are applied and the arrangement of supporting systems can affect the effectiveness of building energy consumptions and the corresponding costs induced. Among all the incentives and regulatory instruments, Gross Floor Area (GFA) concession becomes a popular scheme to promote green building (GB), which grant bonus GFA to the developers who comply with the Sustainable Building Design Guidelines (SBDGs) and achieving at least the minimum level of BEAM Plus certification. Transaction costs (TCs) have been debated over the past decades that affect the effectiveness of the policy implementation. This study applies the lens of transaction costs theory to explore the TCs inventories of implementing GFA concession practice in Hong Kong. This paper aims to analyze how the GFA Concession Scheme induces TCs among various stakeholders in practice, and how in turn it affects the effectiveness of building control for GB. Interviews are conducted to identify the TCs determinants regarding the GFA Concession Scheme. Examples are provided from the real practice to illustrate the nature of TCs. Policy implications to reduce TCs are proposed accordingly.@en