On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine after months of military preparations. Although secondary to the human tragedy resulting from the war, the Internet connectivity in the region was disrupted due to the military conflicts and economic sanctions. We study the Internet peering connectivity of the conflicted countries before, during, and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our analysis shows that de-peering activity by Ukrainian, Russian, and international networks started months before the invasion at peering facilities in Ukraine and Russia, respectively. De-peering continued after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with only minor changes in peering taking place until end of 2023. Our study shows that several Internet exchange points have stopped operating in Ukraine. We also report that the invasion has impacted the registry country code of operational networks in Ukraine and Russia, creating a new status quo in Internet peering in the region.

Content Hypergiants deliver the vast majority of Internet traffic to end users. In recent years, some have invested heavily in deploying services and servers inside end-user networks. With several dozen Hypergiants and thousands of servers deployed inside networks, these off-net (meaning outside the Hypergiant networks) deployments change the structure of the Internet. Previous efforts to study them have relied on proprietary data or specialized per-Hypergiant measurement techniques that neither scale nor generalize, providing a limited view of content delivery on today's Internet. In this paper, we develop a generic and easy to implement methodology to measure the expansion of Hypergiants' off-nets. Our key observation is that Hypergiants increasingly encrypt their traffic to protect their customers' privacy. Thus, we can analyze publicly available Internet-wide scans of port 443 and retrieve TLS certificates to discover which IP addresses host Hypergiant certificates in order to infer the networks hosting off-nets for the corresponding Hypergiants. Our results show that the number of networks hosting Hypergiant off-nets has tripled from 2013 to 2021, reaching 4.5k networks. The largest Hypergiants dominate these deployments, with almost all of these networks hosting an off-net for at least one - and increasingly two or more - of Google, Netflix, Facebook, or Akamai. These four Hypergiants have off-nets within networks that provide access to a significant fraction of end user population.