The central figure of merit for quantum memories and quantum communication devices is their capacity to store and transmit quantum information. Here, we present a protocol that estimates a lower bound on a channel's quantum capacity, even when there are arbitrarily correlated errors. One application of these protocols is to test the performance of quantum repeaters for transmitting quantum information. Our protocol is easy to implement and comes in two versions. The first estimates the one-shot quantum capacity by preparing and measuring in two different bases, where all involved qubits are used as test qubits. The second verifies on-the-fly that a channel's one-shot quantum capacity exceeds a minimal tolerated value while storing or communicating data. We discuss the performance using simple examples, such as the dephasing channel for which our method is asymptotically optimal. Finally, we apply our method to a superconducting qubit in experiment.

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Quantum mechanics and the theory of gravity are presently not compatible. A particular question is whether gravity causes decoherence. Several models for gravitational decoherence have been proposed, not all of which can be described quantum mechanically. Since quantum mechanics may need to be modified, one may question the use of quantum mechanics as a calculational tool to draw conclusions from the data of experiments concerning gravity. Here we propose a general method to estimate gravitational decoherence in an experiment that allows us to draw conclusions in any physical theory where the no-signalling principle holds, even if quantum mechanics needs to be modified. As an example, we propose a concrete experiment using optomechanics. Our work raises the interesting question whether other properties of nature could similarly be established from experimental observations alone—that is, without already having a rather well-formed theory of nature to make sense of experimental data.@en

A central assumption in quantum key distribution (QKD) is that Eve has no knowledge about which rounds will be used for parameter estimation or key distillation. Here we show that this assumption is violated for iterative sifting, a sifting procedure that has been employed in some (but not all) of the recently suggested QKD protocols in order to increase their efficiency. We show that iterative sifting leads to two security issues: (1) some rounds are more likely to be key rounds than others, (2) the public communication of past measurement choices changes this bias round by round. We analyze these two previously unnoticed problems, present eavesdropping strategies that exploit them, and find that the two problems are independent. We discuss some sifting protocols in the literature that are immune to these problems. While some of these would be inefficient replacements for iterative sifting, we find that the sifting subroutine of an asymptotically secure protocol suggested by Lo et al (2005 J. Cryptol. 18 133–65), which we call LCA sifting, has an efficiency on par with that of iterative sifting. One of our main results is to show that LCA sifting can be adapted to achieve secure sifting in the finite-key regime. More precisely, we combine LCA sifting with a certain parameter estimation protocol, and we prove the finite-key security of this combination. Hence we propose that LCA sifting should replace iterative sifting in future QKD implementations. More generally, we present two formal criteria for a sifting protocol that guarantee its finite-key security. Our criteria may guide the design of future protocols and inspire a more rigorous QKD analysis, which has neglected sifting-related attacks so far..@en