The term 'deepfake' refers to artificial or 'fake' content on the internet made using 'deep learning' or 'machine learning' algorithms. This technology was immediately (ab)used to fabricate non-consensual sexual deepfakes involving celebrities and later on not-famous people. In light of the technological advancements and frequent incidents with sexual deepfakes, we assume they are here to stay. As a result, many states confronted with this issue consider the implementation of legislation criminalising sexual deepfakes.In our paper, the authors aim to provide an answer to the question 'How do sexual deepfakes proliferate online, to what extent is the non-consensual production, distribution, possession of, and/or access to sexual deepfakes of adults currently criminalised, and to what extent should it be criminalised in the future?' with a combined empirical and legal approach. To that end, they have conducted an explorative analysis of the online market for sexual deepfakes. The empirical research was focused on Telegram groups, in particular Dutch-language groups, and combined with a legal analysis of the legal frameworks on sexual deepfakes in Belgium and the Netherlands. The research shows that sexual deepfakes proliferate on the clear web and public Telegram groups. Subsequently, the authors have examined to what extent the non-consensual production, distribution, possession of, and/or access to sexual deepfakes are already criminalised and to what extent they should be criminalised. From the legal analysis they conclude that - if there is any positive obligation to criminalise sexual deepfakes of adults at all - it is limited to the production and subsequent distribution of sexual deepfakes of existing people.

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Purpose: This paper aims to shed light into money laundering using bitcoin. Digital payment methods are increasingly used by criminals to launder money obtained through cybercrime. As many forms of cybercrime are motivated by profit, a solid cash-out strategy is required to ensure that crime proceeds end up with the criminals themselves without an incriminating money trail. The authors examine how cybercrime proceeds can be laundered using services that are offered on the Dark Web.
Design/methodology/approach: Focusing on service-percentages and reputation-mechanisms in underground bitcoin laundering services, this paper presents the results of a cash-out experiment in which five mixing and five exchange services are included.
Findings: Some of the examined services provide an excellent, professional and well-reviewed service at competitive cost. Whereas others turned out to be scams, accepting bitcoin but returning nothing in return.
Practical implications: The authors discuss what these findings mean to law enforcement, and how bitcoin laundering chains could be disrupted.
Originality/value: These cash-out strategies are increasingly facilitated by cryptocurrencies, mainly bitcoin. Bitcoins are already relatively anonymous, but with the rise of specialised bitcoin money laundering services on the Dark Web, laundering money in the form of bitcoins becomes available to a wider audience.@en