When a technology is seen as the right solution to a recognized problem, the development of alternative technologies comes under threat. To secure much-needed resources, proponents of alternative technologies must, in these conditions, restart societal discussion on the status quo, a process at once technological and discursive known as ‘path creation’. In this article, we investigate discussion-restarting strategies employed by supporters of emerging technologies in the field of solar fuels, particularly the advocates of a technology referred to as ‘artificial photosynthesis’. For illustrative purposes we explore four such strategies: revisiting weak spots, resizing the problem, redefining the game, and renegotiating labels. We conclude with a methodological reflection on the empirical study of discursive strategies in a socio-technical system. We further suggest a more systematic application of discourse-analytical and argumentation-theoretical insights that can complement current scholarship on path dependence and path creation.@en

To address societal challenges, research and innovation approaches, involving a wide range of actors, are increasingly promoted by policy communities. This paper explores the practice of Quadruple Helix collaborations for responsible innovation and how these implement the theoretical ambition of including actors from different societal sectors in innovation, including actors from the fields of arts, media and civil society, which is conceptualized as the Fourth Helix in this concept. Referring to cross-sector collaboration literature and based on an empirical investigation, we explore which actors, representing the Fourth Helix, actually engage in innovation collaborations, how this engagement plays out in practice, and the institutional and systemic dynamics involved in output and value creation. We rely on data from three Social Labs in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, which constitute qualitative, change-oriented research processes, where we researched and engaged with actors from cases constituting- or aiming for a Quadruple Helix collaboration. This was accompanied by a desktop study including qualitative interviews of 51 further cases. We find that the actual engagement of actors from civil society is fragile and that forces beyond Quadruple Helix cases impact these quite firmly in some cases.

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What does it mean to convince? In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, convincing is done by arguments. The perlocutionary act of convincing is fundamentally related to the illocutionary act of arguing. I propose a critical reassessment of this relationship. The arguing-convincing pair presents conceptual difficulties, I argue, both in the pragmatic description based on felicity conditions and in the dialectical one based on intersubjective procedures. To tackle these problems, I develop a proposal that takes the speakers’ non-verbal interaction with evidence, as opposed to their verbal interaction with one another, as the basis for understanding the resolution of differences of opinion. The proposal is compatible with the pragma-dialectical theory, provided some methodological adjustments are conceded.

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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which the concept of learning organization can support the embedding of responsible innovation (RI) in organizations. Design/methodology/approach: Based on literature in the fields of corporate social responsibility, learning organizations and quadruple helix collaborations, the authors constructed the responsible learning organization (RLO) framework for RI. With the framework, the authors want to show that the RLO can enable RI within organizations. Findings: Based on this framework, the distinction is made between, on the one hand, the learning processes inside the organization, which resemble reflexivity, and, on the other hand, the learning processes that take place with stakeholders outside the organization, which resemble the other three core processes of RI: anticipation, inclusion and responsiveness. Based on these insights, the authors argue that if an organization wants to do good on innovation, which is seen as the core of RI, organization’s core values should guide that. Practical implications: Organizational core values should be developed by means of learning inside the organization. Therefore, the process of reflexivity should be stressed more, and employees should be empowered to take part in developing these values, which in return can guide the organization as a compass through all the uncertainty it will encounter during the learning outside the organization when interacting with stakeholders. Originality/value: The RLO framework for RI shows what learning processes organizations should facilitate first and what content should be at stake during these learning processes to embed RI. Furthermore, the framework puts emphasis on reflexivity as a condition for responsiveness, inclusion and anticipation.

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We propose and illustrate a model for evaluating the moral impact of technologies from a pluralist perspective. We conceptualize technological artefacts as having moral profiles that consist of the values served and disserved along five levels of decision-making: (1) problem, (2) strategy, (3) resources, (4) product and (5) design. The notion of complex equality, directly stemming from the pluralist philosophy of Michael Walzer, can function as a heuristic principle to guide the identification and analysis of imbalances along these five levels. We provide an illustrative case study of the moral profile of artificial photosynthesis (AP), an emerging technology for renewable fuel production that promises to resolve our current dependence on fossil fuels. We conclude by providing future directions for the implementation of pluralist ideas in R&D policy and in societal discourse on emerging and incumbent technologies.@en

What does it mean to be irresponsible in developing or using a technology? There are two fundamentally different answers to this question and they each generate research strands that differ in scope, style and applicability. To capture this difference, I make use of two mythical creatures of Jewish origin that have been employed in the past to represent relationships between man and man-made entities: the Golem (Collins and Pinch, 2002, 2005) and the Leviathan (Hobbes, 1994). The Golem is the traditional image of technology as a creature that can be helpful but needs to be controlled. Irresponsibility in this perspective is the failure to exercise control. The Leviathan is the image of technology as a difficult compromise between fundamental values. Irresponsibility is in this perspective is allowing some values to systematically dominate others. Having worked out the basics of these images, I show that each comes with its specific methodological challenges: where the Golem gives rise to the Collingridge Dilemma of control, the Leviathan gives rise to Münchhausen’s trilemma of justification. Since the Golem image is predominant in scholarship on irresponsibility, I conclude with an appeal for a more equal distribution of efforts in conceptualizing technologies as Golems and as Leviathans.@en

Responsible innovation is centered around the ideal that societal stakeholders are entitled to participate in scientific and technological decision-making by voicing their needs and worries. Individuals who believe in science conspiracies (referred to here as ‘science conspiracists’) pose a challenge to implementing this ideal because it is not clear under what conditions their inclusion in responsible innovation exercises is possible and advisable. Yet precisely because of this uncertain status, science conspiracists constitute an instructive case in point to travel towards the edges of inclusion and understand how we draw the line between ‘includables' and ‘unincludables’. In this paper, we seek to explore this relationship between responsible innovation and science conspiracism by using the method of thought experimentaiton. We test four possible exclusion criteria for science conspiracists. We conclude by revisiting the relationship between conspiracism and responsible innovation and sketching a novel perspective on the ideal of stakeholder inclusion.@en

How do individuals change their minds as a result of argumentation? It is generally assumed the speech act of argumentation can trigger a change of mind in the other party—the perlocutionary act of convincing. This means that a discussant changes her commitment relative to the proposition under scrutiny when the other party presents argumentation that is in some way convincing or persuasive. I challenge this received view by showing that argumentation cannot trigger this change of commitment in the way that scholars commonly assume. Convincing cannot be triggered by assertives that are already in the listener’s commitment set, nor can it be triggered by assertives that are newly introduced in the discussion. Using the notion of “joint commitment” I propose an alternative account according to which change of mind is the result of two speakers jointly experiencing facts as stipulated by a joint commitment. I conclude the paper by sketching the impact of such an approach in the study of argumentation and provide suggestions for further developments.@en

The inclusion of stakeholders in science is one of the core ideas in the field of responsible innovation. Conspiracists, however, are not your garden-variety stakeholders. As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, the conflict between conspiracists and science is deep and intractable. In this paper, we ask how the game of responsible innovation can be played with those who believe that the game is rigged. Understanding the relationship between conspiracism and responsible innovation is necessary in order to understand the unvisited corners of the science-society interface in the post-pandemic future. We claim that pluralism, already part of the philosophical background that spurred responsible innovation, can offer insights into how conspiracism can be approached. As a case in point, we develop these insights starting from the policy on conspiracism developed in 2021 by the European Commission. We show that the ideal of inclusion can only be extended to conspiracists by accepting a pluralist framework, and we explain this pluralist response.@en

Disagreements come in all shapes and sizes, but epistemologists and argumentation theorists have singled out a special category referred to as deep disagreements. These deep disagreements are thought to pose philosophical and practical difficulties pertaining to their rational resolution. In this paper, I start with a critique of the widespread claim that deep disagreements are qualitatively different from normal disagreements because they arise from a difference in ‘fundamental principles’ or ‘hinge commitments.’ I then defend the following two claims: (1) All disagreements are deep to the extent that they are actual disagreements. This first claim implies, I will argue, that disagreements typically regarded as normal (‘shallow’) can be explained away as misunderstandings or communicative mishaps. (2) The resolution of a disagreement can be rational either through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts or through an exchange of arguments that leads to a reformulation of the disagreement that, in this new form, lends itself to a resolution through a joint experience of mutually recognized facts. I conclude with a reflection on the consequences of these two theses for the idea of deep disagreement and that of rational resolution.@en

I highly recommend Hanganu-Bresch and Berkenkotter’s work to anyone who is interested in the vicissitudes of early psychiatric diagnosis, confinement and treatment. The book is well written and well documented. The reader benefits form the authors’ admirable knowledge on the evolution of psychiatry in the 19th century, the social co-creation of the institution of asylum and the many genres of discourse (from admission reports to science fiction) that have shaped these developments. While the book offers but a snapshot of a more extended historical process, I believe there is a lot to learn from such a snapshot.@en

We develop a method for analyzing argumentative discussions centered around the notion of ‘stock issues’, i.e., the field-dependent standard issues addressed by the participants in such discussions. The method yields an overview of the structure and content of complex argumentative discussions with multiple participants, including the activated stock issues and the ‘depth’ of the argumentation advanced per each stock issue. We start from the assumption that any given discussion context requires a set of stock issues to be addressed by the participants through their argumentation, tied together by a decision rule regulating the weight of each stock issue on the matter at hand. The building blocks of our method and the results of its application are illustrated through an example. We discuss several extensions and problems, concluding with directions for further research.@en

Fallacies are traditionally defined as potentially deceptive failures of rationality or reasonableness. Fallacy theories seek to model this failure by formulating standards of rationality or reasonableness that arguers must observe when engaging in argumentative interaction. Yet it remains relatively easy to reject or avoid fallacy judgments even in the most clear-cut cases. In this article, I argue for a pluralist approach to criticism in which the fallacy accusation is only the starting point for a more complex form of criticism. In a pluralist approach, the identification of fallacies works as a first step precisely because it can be so easily set aside. In doing so, the evaluator seeks other evaluative angles that depart from the original one. As a case in point, I exemplify the approach on a piece of argumentative discourse in the scientific context. I conclude by spelling out some of the methodological consequences of the present approach.@en

Traditional approaches to conflict are oriented towards establishing (or re-establishing) consensus, either in the form of a resolution of the conflict or in the form of an ‘agree-to-disagree’ standstill between the stakeholders. In this paper, we criticize these traditional approaches, each for specific reasons, and we propose and develop the agonistic approach to conflict. Based on Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic democratic theory, the agonistic approach to conflict is more welcoming of dissensus, replacing discussion stoppers with discussion starters and replacing standstills with contestation. We illustrate such replacements and develop this approach, we analyse technological conflicts in a concrete R&D setting: the global hydrogen economy. From this context, we focus on the conflict between the proponents of blue hydrogen (drawn from fossil fuels) and those of green hydrogen (created through electrolysis). We conclude by highlighting the advantage of the agonistic approach but also drawing attention to its own specific risk, namely, antagonism.@en

Anticipating the ethical impact of emerging technologies is an essential part of responsible innovation. One such emergent technology is the digital twin which we define here as a living replica of a physical system (human or non-human). A digital twin combines various emerging technologies such as AI, Internet of Things, big data and robotics, each component bringing its own socio-ethical issues to the resulting artefacts. The question thus arises which of these socio-ethical themes surface in the process and how they are perceived by stakeholders in the field. In this report we present the results of a qualitative study into the socio-ethical benefits and socio-ethical risks of using digital twins in healthcare. Employing insights from ethics of technology and the Quadruple Helix theory of innovation, we conducted desk research of white literature and 23 interviews with representatives from the four helixes: industry, research, policy and civil society. The ethical scan revealed several important areas where the digital twin can produce socio-ethical value (e.g., prevention and treatment of disease, cost reduction, patient autonomy and freedom, equal treatment) but also several important areas of socio-ethical risks (e.g., privacy and property of data, disruption of existing societal structures, inequality and injustice). We conclude with a reflection on the employed analytical tool and suggestions for further research.@en

We propose the use of discussion structures as tools for analyzing policy debates in a way that enables the increased participation of lay stakeholders. Discussion structures are argumentation-theoretical tools that can be employed to tackle three barriers that separate lay stakeholders from policy debates: difficulty, magnitude, and complexity. We exemplify the use of these tools on a debate in research policy on the question of responsibility. By making use of discussion structures, we focus on the argumentative moves performed by the parties involved in this debate. We conclude by discussing advantages and limitations of discussion structures and we trace several opportunities for further research on these instruments.@en

R&D collaborations between industry, government, civil society, and research (also known as 'quadruple helix collaborations' (QHCs)) have recently gained attention from R&D theorists and practitioners. In aiming to come to grips with their complexity, past models have generally taken a stakeholder-analytical approach based on stakeholder types. Yet stakeholder types are difficult to operationalise. We therefore argue that a processual model is more suited for studying the interaction in QHCs because it eschews matters of titles and identities. We develop such a model in which the QHC is represented as a process of generating four types of value: research value, market value, political value, and societal value. We then apply this processual model in analysing real-life cases of friction in QHCs. Friction is seen, not as an interpersonal clash, but as a discrepancy between two or more value-creation processes that compete for limited resources (some over-performing while others under-performing). @en

To stimulate research and innovation (R&I), to contribute to the solution of societal challenges and to align R&I with societal values, the European Commission has launched the governance framework of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). RRI figures in many high-level EU policies as a means to promote smart growth, and a growing community of R&I practitioners from both the public and private sectors appears committed to it. Although debates on what RRI precisely entails have not reached closure yet, RRI provides an interesting avenue to explore ways of making R&I more societally germane. While recognizing the usefulness of keeping critical reflection on RRI’s meaning alive, we suggest that to make the step from theorizing to implementation, RRI could benefit from a clearer conceptualization. This chapter presents the iterative trajectory in conceptualizing RRI followed as part of RRI Tools, one of a number of EC-funded research projects and support acts aimed at fleshing out what RRI can and should be, and the conceptualization of RRI that this led to. It suggests that RRI is best captured if in R&I governance attention is paid to the five p’s of Purpose, Products, Processes, Preconditions and People, and that further elaborations on the meaning of RRI should happen in dialogue with attempts at practicing RRI.@en

In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative nor-mativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover (or claimed to have discovered) fundamental principles of 'good' argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical (Bartley, 1984) view of normativity.@en

In this paper, I defend two skeptical claims regarding current research on visual arguments and I explain how these claims reflect upon past and future research. The first claim is that qualifying an argument as being visual amounts to a category mistake; the second claim is that past analyses of visual arguments fault on both end of the "production line"in that the input is not visual and the output is not an argument. Based on the developed critique, I discuss how the study of images in communicative events can be carried out without the concept of "visual argument"and I illustrate this with two new directions of interdisciplinary research. @en