Can Confucian ethics contribute to diagnosing the root causes of video games' toxicity and formulating design requirements for redressing it? Contemporary Confucian studies on technology have not addressed these questions, although video games have become an important part of contemporary human life. This paper advances Confucian-inspired ethical studies on technologies by bringing attention to the moral dimension of this underexamined aspect of contemporary life. By focusing on League of Legends (one of the most popular toxic online multiplayer games), we argue that League's toxic environment hinders the cultivation of ren, shu, and he, but Confucian conceptual resources can inspire the formulation of at least three design recommendations against League's toxicity. The first is to eliminate killing in the game by banking on players' desire to express their skillfulness. The second is to include a rewatching feature to sanction toxic players with the aim of inculcating sympathy in them. The last is to add a procedure before and after each match, where players can cordially interact with each other and develop mutual respect.

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This article shows how Pierre Hadot’s idea of philosophy as a way of lifecan be applied to Confucian philosophy. Specifically I will show how thephilosophy of the Confucian thinker Mencius has two characteristicsthat are indicative of a philosophy that is a way of life. For Hadot, AncientGreco-Roman philosophical schools were mainly concerned, not withphilosophical discourse, but with changing their students’ way of living.Based on Mencius’ own words, it can be inferred that he also believed thathis philosophizing was mainly about transforming people, and that hetreated philosophical discourse as ancillary to this. Furthermore, Hadotbelieved that “spiritual exercises” were employed by Ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools to precisely help transform the lives oftheir aspirants. He divides these spiritual exercises into two phases. Thefirst is “Concentration of the I” where the aspirant ceases to identify withhis conventional and vicious self. This leads to the second phase, namely,“Expansion of the I” where the aspirant becomes free to identify with thewhole of reality. I suggest that spiritual exercises, or something similar,can also be seen in Mencius’ teachings. In particular, Mencius’ activity of“reflection and extension” can be considered a kind of “Concentrationof the I,” whereas his intimation of attaining unity with Heaven and theworld through cultivating qi, can be understood as a kind of “Expansionof the I.”@en

My paper aims to use the philosophical resources of Saint Augustine’s thought, particularly as found in the City of God, in order to sketch a basic worldview which can educate and lead people towards living lives that promote sustainable development. Specifically, I wish to show how Saint Augustine’s concepts of order, rightly ordered love, and temporal peace can serve as material to create a rough metaphysical framework in which human beings are understood to be an integrated part of a greater whole which is the earth. The ethical corollary of this framework is that human beings should act in such a way that does not damage this greater whole but rather preserves its order and integrity. In doing this, I also hope to show that Saint Augustine’s thought can still have relevance for contemporary issues.@en

Recent philosophical scholarship tends to cast Zhuangzi’s philosophy as promoting moral relativism. This is especially true with Chad Hansen’s interpretation of Zhuangzi’s writings. This article seeks to challenge this dominant relativist reading by showing that such a reading does not align with the numerous normative and evaluative remarks that can be found in Zhuangzi’s work. Furthermore, this article aims to show that it is more plausible that Zhuangzi’s metaethical view is that of moral realism instead of moral relativism. This is because a moral realist interpretation of Zhuangzi’s philosophy fits more, not only with the aforesaid evaluative and normative remarks of Zhuangzi’s writings, but also with the mystical elements found in the same writings.@en

This paper aims to establish a rapport between Heideggerian and Classical Chinese philosophy by comparing Heidegger’s notion of physis and techne, as gleaned from »The Question Concerning Technology,« with the understanding of human nature according to the Daoist philosophers and the Confucian thinker Mencius. Specifically, I will show that the Daoist idea of ziran or a thing being »so-of-itself,« is similar to Heidegger’s understanding of physis as the bringing-forth of a thing in itself. Likewise, I will attempt to show how Mencius’ conception of the complementariness between human nature and Confucian praxis resonates with Heidegger’s understanding of techne as a way of revealing that is in harmony with beings. Through this, I hope to contribute to the on-going dialogue between Heidegger and Eastern thought@en

I aim to show how Confucian philosophy can contribute to the contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics education by arguing that it has the resource to address a lacuna in Aristotelian ethics. Aristotelian ethics, which is arguably the main resource of contemporary virtue ethics, lacks a virtue that corresponds to the notion of loving each person as one’s self or the Golden Rule. To be more precise, Aristotelian ethics has no virtue about loving all people as one’s self, although philia comes close but is precisely limited because it lacks universality. However, I believe that Dai Zhen’s interpretation of the Confucian virtues of shu and zhong does have this universal scope which philia lacks. For Dai, the ground for loving another is not any characteristic that a particular group of people have in common, such as, in the case of philia, being virtuous. Rather, the ground is universal human nature itself.@en

In this article, I show how resources for an education for non-dichotomous thinking can be drawn from the two Daoist texts, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Dichotomous thinking can be defined as thinking that considers things in terms of strict and even irreconcilable dichotomous oppositions. The authors of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are known for their criticism of such dichotomous thinking. At the same time however, these authors seem to fall into this very kind of thinking which they criticize. That is to say, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi often promote adherence to conventionally ‘lower’ values over ‘higher’ ones. I believe though that this tension can be resolved if viewed through a pedagogical framework. Specifically, the adherence to ‘lower values’ can be seen as the initial step in the process of Daoist self-cultivation where one reduces the artificial distinctions one adheres to in order to prepare one’s disposition for union with Dao, which in turn entails non-dichotomous thinking.@en