We assess the case of the abrupt discontinuation of the three-in-one policy, a high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) restriction, in Jakarta, with the objective of mapping potential interdependencies in the transportation system. Statistical investigation of the passenger volume in the bus rapid transit (BRT) system in the whole city before and after the policy change revealed a significant increase in the number of passengers during peak hours, especially in the evening period. The extent of the increase, however, depended on whether the area had been subject to the initial policy restriction. The case of sudden discontinuation of the three-in-one policy in Jakarta illustrates how a change in policy aimed at a single transportation mode may spill over to alternative transportation modes. The importance of acknowledging the systemic nature of urban transportation systems when altering policies intended to discourage the use of a single transportation mode within the larger transportation network is discussed.

@en

Car sharing services gain momentum as a potential alternative to various modes of transportation, including privately owned cars. This trend goes hand in hand with a renewed interest in the sharing economy, which has as essential premise that product ownership is of minor relevance. Using an online experiment, this study investigates if individual differences in psychological ownership influence the effects of well-known instrumental car attributes (price, parking convenience, and car type) on people's intentions to select a shared car. Results confirmed that instrumental attributes generally impact preferences for car sharing services, and that a low psychological ownership may lead to a higher preference for a shared car under specific circumstances. This suggests that not only instrumental car attributes, but also psychological disposition, specifically psychological ownership, of potential customers need to be taken into consideration when developing measures to stimulate car sharing services in society.

@en

In electricity markets, supply and demand have to be balanced perfectly in real time. A major task of the Independent Systems Operator (ISO)2 on the wholesale (transmission) level and of the Distribution Utility (DU) on the regional (distribution) level is to monitor the grid and to maintain balance while keeping voltage, frequency, and power factor within very tight bounds. This task gets more challenging as more renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, are connected to the grid [2]. Many of these sources (e.g. wind) are only partially predictable. The grid balancing problem has been studied on various levels (wholesale vs. retail) and with different approaches [1]. We study the problem of how to determine the price that energy brokers (retailers) need to pay in case their profile of consumption and production of electricity is imbalanced in the current time slot.3 In a retail electricity market, brokers have the possibility to control some portion of customer production and consumption, such as by offering price concessions in exchange for the ability to remotely interrupt loads or sources for limited periods of time. Examples of such controllable loads are remotely controlled CHPs (Combined Heat and Power - gas turbines that supply both heat and power, and allow some control of production) and domestic water heaters that can be remotely turned off to temporarily reduce consumption. We present two different scenarios and the related market mechanisms to balance supply and demand: I) without controllable loads, and II) with controllable loads for the current time slot. Our main mechanisms for a regional real-time balancing market are efficient, and create an incentive to resolve imbalances in the day-ahead market. An advantage of our methods is that they are compatible with existing energy market structures (keeping the day-ahead market as a given), and therefore the required restructuring would be less disruptive than with other methods currently suggested.@en