Social Honeypots are tools deployed in Online Social Networks (OSN) to attract malevolent activities performed by spammers and bots. To this end, their content is designed to be of maximum interest to malicious users. However, by choosing an appropriate content topic, this attractive mechanism could be extended to any OSN users, rather than only luring malicious actors. As a result, honeypots can be used to attract individuals interested in a wide range of topics, from sports and hobbies to more sensitive subjects like political views and conspiracies. With all these individuals gathered in one place, honeypot owners can conduct many analyses, from social to marketing studies. In this work, we introduce a novel concept of social honeypot for attracting OSN users interested in a generic target topic. We propose a framework based on fully-automated content generation strategies and engagement plans to mimic legit Instagram pages. To validate our framework, we created 21 self-managed social honeypots (i.e., pages) on Instagram, covering three topics, four content generation strategies, and three engaging plans. In nine weeks, our honeypots gathered a total of 753 followers, 5387 comments, and 15739 likes. These results demonstrate the validity of our approach, and through statistical analysis, we examine the characteristics of effective social honeypots.

Review platforms are viral online services where users share and read opinions about products (e.g., a smartphone) or experiences (e.g., a meal at a restaurant). Other users may be influenced by such opinions when deciding what to buy. The usability of review platforms is currently limited by the massive number of opinions on many products. Therefore, showing only the most helpful reviews for each product is in the best interest of both users and the platform (e.g., Amazon). The current state of the art is far from accurate in predicting how helpful a review is. First, most existing works lack compelling comparisons as many studies are conducted on datasets that are not publicly available. As a consequence, new studies are not always built on top of prior baselines. Second, most existing research focuses only on features derived from the review text, ignoring other fundamental aspects of the review platforms (e.g., the other reviews of a product, the order in which they were submitted).In this article, we first carefully review the most relevant works in the area published during the last 20 years. We then propose the User-Review-Item (URI) paradigm, a novel abstraction for modeling the problem that moves the focus of the feature engineering from the review to the platform level. We empirically validate the URI paradigm on a dataset of products from six Amazon categories with 270 trained models: on average, classifiers gain +4% in F1-score when considering the whole review platform context. In our experiments, we further emphasize some problems with the helpfulness prediction task: (1) the users' writing style changes over time (i.e., concept drift), (2) past models do not generalize well across different review categories, and (3) past methods to generate the ground truth produced unreliable helpfulness scores, affecting the model evaluation phase.

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a reality that changes several aspects of our daily life, from smart home monitoring to the management of critical infrastructure. The 'Routing Protocol for low power and Lossy networks' (RPL) is the only de-facto standardized routing protocol in IoT networks and is thus deployed in environmental monitoring, healthcare, smart building, and many other IoT applications. In literature, we can find several attacks aiming to affect and disrupt RPL-based networks. Therefore, it is fundamental to develop security mechanisms that detect and mitigate any potential attack in RPL-based networks. Current state-of-the-art security solutions deal with very few attacks while introducing heavy mechanisms at the expense of IoT devices and the overall network performance. In this work, we aim to develop an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) capable of dealing with multiple attacks while avoiding any RPL overhead. The proposed system is called DETONAR - DETector of rOutiNg Attacks in Rpl - and it relies on a packet sniffing approach. DETONAR uses a combination of signature and anomaly-based rules to identify any malicious behavior in the traffic (e.g., application and DIO packets). To the best of our knowledge, there are no exhaustive datasets containing RPL traffic for a vast range of attacks. To overcome this issue and evaluate our IDS, we propose RADAR - Routing Attacks DAtaset for Rpl: the dataset contains five simulations for each of the 14 considered attacks in 16 static-nodes networks. DETONAR's attack detection exceeds 80% for 10 attacks out of 14, while maintaining false positives close to zero.

The increased demand for machine learning applications made companies offer Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS). In MLaaS (a market estimated 8000M USD by 2025), users pay for well-performing ML models without dealing with the complicated training procedure. Among MLaaS, text-based applications are the most popular ones (e.g., language translators). Given this popularity, MLaaS must provide resiliency to adversarial manipulations. For example, a wrong translation might lead to a misunderstanding between two parties. In the text domain, state-of-the-art attacks mainly focus on strategies that leverage ML models' weaknesses. Unfortunately, not much attention has been given to the other pipeline' stages, such as the indexing stage (i.e., when a sentence is converted from a textual to a numerical representation) that, if manipulated, can significantly affect the final performance of the application. In this paper, we propose a novel text evasion technique called 'Zero-Width attack' (ZeW) that leverages the injection of human non-readable characters, affecting indexing stage mechanisms. We demonstrate that our simple yet effective attack deceives MLaaS of 'giants' such as Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft. Our case study, based on the manipulation of hateful tweets, shows that out of 12 analyzed services, only one is resistant to our injection strategy. We finally introduce and test a simple input validation defense that can prevent our proposed attack.