Integrating process safety and process security risk management is increasingly essential for enhancing resilience in the chemical process industry. This study addresses how practitioners perceive the integration of these two domains, identifying key benefits, barriers, and strategies for effective implementation. A mixed-methods approach was applied, combining quantitative survey data from 47 industry professionals with qualitative insights from open-ended responses. The findings highlight significant advantages of integration, such as optimized resource use, reduced operational redundancies, and improved risk management. However, barriers such as knowledge gaps, resource constraints, and communication silos were identified. Respondents emphasized the importance of adopting a resilience-oriented approach involving proactive risk management, continuous improvement, and adaptability in both safety and security practices. Critical enablers for integration include strong leadership, alignment of societal values, cross-disciplinary training, and integrated risk assessment methodologies. Emerging technologies and regulatory alignment were also identified as critical factors in facilitating integration. The study contributes to the theoretical understanding of integrated risk management by supporting resilience engineering and systems theory. It offers actionable strategies for overcoming barriers and leveraging enablers, laying the groundwork for developing a resilience-oriented framework for process safety and process security risk management.@en

This paper presents a systematic literature review of risk assessment methods in the chemical process industry (CPI), focusing on process safety, process security, and resilience. We analyzed peer-reviewed articles from 2000 to 2022 using the PRISMA methodology and identified twelve predominant methods. Our findings reveal a shift towards dynamic, systemic-based assessments like the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) and System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). These methods are particularly effective at capturing the complexities of sociotechnical systems in the CPI. However, a significant observation from our review is the limited emphasis on the resilience paradigm within many existing methods when addressing both process safety and process security risks, which is crucial for preventing and recovering from disruptions. Given the evolving challenges in system safety and security threats, there is an urgent need for holistic methods that integrate process safety, process security, and resilience. Our review highlights the opportunity for further research to better prepare the industry for future challenges, ensuring safer, more secure, reliable, and resilient operations.

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This research explores how process safety and process security risk management methods may be integrated into a unified framework, thereby considering the resilience engineering paradigm. Employing a systematic literature review and expert surveys with industrial practitioners alongside representatives from key regulatory bodies to understand the complexities and opportunities of such integration. The interactions that result from a mixed-method study ensure the gaining of insights into the practical challenges and opportunities of integration in diverse operational and regulatory environments. Utilizing Microsoft Forms analytics tools and ATLAS.ti for qualitative analysis, the research identifies patterns and conditions, as well as the context, which is pivotal for constructing a comprehensive, adaptable risk management framework. This paper introduces a novel, holistic risk management perspective, advocating for the amalgamation of process safety and process security within the chemical industry, adopting the System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model underscored by resilience principles.

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