Influence of Reputation on Resistance against Bad Agents in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Bachelor thesis (2021)

Authors

H.J.M.T. Knops Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Contributors

N. Yorke-Smith Algorithmics - EEMCS (mentor)
Ranga Rao Venkatesha Prasad Embedded Systems - EEMCS (coach)
Faculty
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science
Copyright: © 2021 Per Knops
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Published Date

28-06-2021

Language

English

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Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Abstract

In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma players can take advantage of other players. This has no drawbacks for the player after that game, since it is assumed that the players have no memory. When reputation is introduced however, a single game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can influence other games. In this paper research is done on how reputation can influence the population of a spatial Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is then extended by adding groups. While in total the amount of ’bad players’ decreases and the amount of ’good players’ increases, the cooperation does not always increase.