Boolean Negotiation Games

Conference paper (2016)

Authors

N. Bulling Interactive Intelligence - EEMCS
K.V. Hindriks Interactive Intelligence - EEMCS
Research Group
Interactive Intelligence (EEMCS) (TU Delft)
Copyright: © 2016 N. Bulling, K.V. Hindriks
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1748
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Published Date

2016

Language

English

Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Department

Intelligent Systems

Research Group

Interactive Intelligence

Abstract

We propose a new strategic model of negotiation, called Boolean negotiation games. Our model is inspired by Boolean games and the alternating offers model of bargaining. It offers a computationally grounded model for studying properties of negotiation protocols in a qualitative setting. Boolean negotiation games can yield agreements that are more beneficial than stable solutions (Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game.