Boolean Negotiation Games

Conference paper (2017)

Authors

N. Bulling Interactive Intelligence - EEMCS
K.V. Hindriks Interactive Intelligence - EEMCS
Research Group
Interactive Intelligence (EEMCS) (TU Delft)
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Published Date

2017

Language

English

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Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Department

Intelligent Systems

Research Group

Interactive Intelligence

Abstract

We propose Boolean Negotiation Games, a computationally grounded model to investigate strategic aspects of negotiations. Our model is inspired by the popular Boolean Game framework and Rubinstein’s bargaining model of alternating offers. We analyse restrictions on negotiation protocols and investigate properties of agreements. We propose and investigate protocols that do not allow repeating offers. In the context of Boolean Games we then naturally obtain finite games, which arise in many practical negotiation contexts. We show that Boolean negotiation games (BNGs) can yield agreements which are more beneficial than the stable solutions (i.e. Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game, and propose an algorithm to compute stable negotiation strategies.

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