Side-Channel Based Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems

Van Aubel, Pol; Papagiannopoulos, Kostas; Chmielewski, Łukasz; Dörr, C.

Side-Channel Based Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems

Conference paper (2018)

Authors

Pol Van Aubel Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

Kostas Papagiannopoulos Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

Łukasz Chmielewski Riscure

C. Dörr

EM Intrusion detection ICS Side-channel Industrial control system PLC Programmable logic controller

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Published Date

2018

Language

English

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Abstract

Industrial Control Systems are under increased scrutiny. Their security is historically sub-par, and although measures are being taken by the manufacturers to remedy this, the large installed base of legacy systems cannot easily be updated with state-of-the-art security measures. We propose a system that uses electromagnetic side-channel measurements to detect behavioural changes of the software running on industrial control systems. To demonstrate the feasibility of this method, we show it is possible to profile and distinguish between even small changes in programs on Siemens S7-317 PLCs, using methods from cryptographic side-channel analysis.

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