Power Side Channel Attacks: Where Are We Standing?

Conference paper (2021)

Authors

M. Taouil Computer Engineering - EEMCS
A.A.M. Aljuffri Computer Engineering - EEMCS
S. Hamdioui Quantum & Computer Engineering
Research Group
Computer Engineering (EEMCS) (TU Delft)
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Published Date

2021

Language

English

Reuse Rights

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Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Department

Quantum & Computer Engineering

Research Group

Computer Engineering

Abstract

Side channel attacks are a serious threat to integrated circuits. They are hardly detectable and use inherent information leaked by the hardware to infer sensitive information like secret keys. Over the last ten years, numerous side channel attacks have been examined, exploring various forms of leakage channels such as time, power, electromagnetic field, photon emission, and acoustic. Among them, power side channel attacks are the most popular ones. Developing an appropriate counter-measure against such attacks requires a deep understanding of these attacks. This paper presents a study of the most popular power attacks such as differential power attack and correlation power attack and discusses the latest countermeasures in this domain and their shortcomings.

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