

## The validity of informed consent with regard to human genetic sequencing.

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### Abstract

Modern societies manage an ever increasing amount of data. By mining these data-sets, it is possible to gain understanding of problems. Through a process of informed consent companies have been able to sequence the genome of large populations. Providing insight to the consumer about their family lineage and possible future risks that they could face. As a consequence of providing such services to consumers, companies are in the position where they can monetize a database of information that they possess. The primary issue that will be addressed is how private genetic data should be handled correctly. As without clear ethical guidance corporations will (un)willingly abuse trust. The result of aiming to maximize asset value can be unethical conduct such as selling the data to third party insurance companies. The apparent need to process larger quantities of data in order to acquire new information to fill our knowledge gaps is a trade off between privacy and anonymity of the individuals within society. Creating an ethical conundrum for companies trying to profit. This research makes a contribution to prove that certain actions when sequencing or using genetic information infringe on privacy and are not morally permissible. Providing greater clarity when trying to decide whether a use case of personal data is ethically permissible. By reviewing modern literature that describes the ethical implications of informed consent and human genome sequencing the research will identify key areas requiring further work to develop the ethics of technology in a way that enables innovation whilst keeping society safe.

*Keywords:* Informed consent, Technology management, Whole genome sequencing


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1 **1. Introduction**

2 Possibly the strongest argument for human genetic sequencing is the ability  
3 to detect those who will be born with rare disorders. As indicated by Posey  
4 in *Genome sequencing and implications for rare disorders*

5 Genomic studies of neuropathy support a model whereby an ag-  
6 gregation of rare variants in disease-associated genes can influence  
7 clinical severity and can contribute to common complex traits [1].

8 Before age 25, roughly 0,053% of people can be predicted to suffer from dis-  
9 eases with an important genetic component [2]. As shown below in figure 1,  
10 in recent times the cost of genetic sequencing has dramatically decreased at  
11 a rate much faster than Moore's law. This means that a growing and greater  
12 proportion of the population has access to genome sequencing.



15 Figure 1 Decreasing cost of sequencing courtesy of the National Human  
16 Genome Research Institute [3].

17  
18 An advantage of early disease detection is to provide treatment earlier. By  
19 editing genetic information it may be possible to provide preventative help  
20 to some of the most vulnerable in society. We propose to resolve the ethical

21 challenge that our society has had surrounding the ownership of biological  
22 material such as genes and what happens once they have been separated from  
23 the human in whom they grew by arguing that humans are not commodities  
24 and that selling organs is known to be morally impermissible and thus by  
25 extension gene or organ transfer should only be done in an emergency. In the  
26 context of human genome sequencing traditional notions of informed consent  
27 may not provide a suitable safeguard. For a person to make the best possible  
28 decisions it is critical that they are given clear understandable information  
29 about the risks associated with what they are about to undertake. In this  
30 way they are aware of future danger and can also try mitigate harm. There  
31 are further practicalities pertaining to who is required to give consent since  
32 a decision from one person may adversely effect a family. The concept of  
33 informed consent therefore needs to be extended to include to the extent of  
34 what is possible everyone who is connected. Mitigating a situation whereby  
35 privacy has been infringed upon. Since private information of a large pro-  
36 portion of the population could easily be collected without their knowledge  
37 or consent. [4].

## 38 **2. Informed Consent**

### 39 *2.1. Individual*

40 For an individual to give informed consent it is required that said individual  
41 fully understands the topic to be able to make a decision. Furthermore they  
42 should be able to convey their consent. We will assume that the individuals  
43 are able to communicate their wishes and show that it would still not be pos-  
44 sible for them to consent to human genetic sequencing, by using the health  
45 sector as an example application of this technology.

46  
47 It is impossible for all patient on which this technology is used to be knowl-  
48 edgeable on the technical process. The health sector treats the general public,  
49 it is a fact that the general public is comprised of individuals of different in-  
50 terests, professions and capabilities. From this it is concluded that there  
51 must be individuals who do not have an interest in, or have their profession  
52 lie in the field of human genetic sequencing. Furthermore we can conclude  
53 that there must be individuals that due to their capabilities are not able to  
54 grasp this topic. Thus there exist individuals in the general public that do  
55 not understand the topic of human genome sequencing.

56

57 Patients are also not able to fully grasp the risks that come with human  
58 genetic sequencing. Like other medical data, it needs to be stored in order  
59 for it to be used for medical purposes, this to help with appropriate and  
60 effective treatment for the individual's conditions and health [5]. Company  
61 23andMe has stated its "longer-range goal is to collect a massive biobank  
62 of genetic information that can be used and sold for medical research and  
63 could also lead to patentable discoveries" [6]. The storing of data also brings  
64 some risks with it. When this data is mismanaged or stolen and released, it  
65 becomes accessible to individuals of the public. From here, these individuals  
66 can decide to use this data whether lawfully or not. We describe the conse-  
67 quences in greater detail in section Privacy & Discrimination, but one needs  
68 to understand that the chance of data getting stolen carries problems with  
69 it. This chance of data being stolen is never 0, but the consequences can be  
70 huge. Creating a situation where it is difficult to grasp the impact it has on  
71 ones life. One off these problems could be identity theft[7], but again it is  
72 difficult to grasp in the implications that this can have, making is difficult to  
73 provide informed consent. Furthermore, more ways to use released medical  
74 data will be discovered as time goes on. But once a dataset is released it is  
75 permanently out there, which means these new techniques can be used on  
76 it. It is impossible for a patient to consent to future harm of which we are  
77 currently not able to determine its impact.

78  
79 One might say that a doctor can provide the information required for the  
80 patient to make their informed decision, but this line of reasoning is flawed.  
81 The statement supposes that the doctor is knowledgeable on the topic to the  
82 extent where they can explain the topic to a patient in a way that leaves the  
83 patients understanding it (fully). This statement also assumes that there is a  
84 doctor with the time available to goes through this process for every patient.  
85 But these two suppositions are not true. As previously shown there exists  
86 patients that are sometimes not willing or capable of grasping the topic. In  
87 such a situation it would not be possible for them to be fully informed, which  
88 in turn leaves them unable to make a fully informed decision. The increase in  
89 time required to explain procedures would come at a cost somewhere. Most  
90 likely it will come from the amount of time spent on other patients, which  
91 has been shown to decrease patient satisfaction and increases the likely hood  
92 of a doctor prescribing medication [8].

93  
94 To conclude, not all patients are able to grasp the concept of human genetic

95 sequencing to the extent needed to make a fully informed decision about it,  
96 leaving them unable to give informed consent.

### 97 *2.2. Prenatal and Children*

98 The most common use of genetic sequencing in medicine is the screening  
99 of newborns for potential diseases. Enabling better management of genetic  
100 disorders. False Positives are the scariest ethical challenge surrounding treat-  
101 ment resulting from genetic testing. A False Positive is someone who is in-  
102 correctly diagnosed with a disease [9]. Abortion is a notable ethical challenge  
103 associated with prenatal genetic sequencing. Therefore, we propose that ge-  
104 netic sequencing should only be conducted after the embryo is too old to be  
105 aborted by its parents.

### 106 *2.3. Transitive Consent*

107 The issue of obtaining consent for DNA sequencing is further complicated by  
108 the fact that someone's DNA doesn't only contain information about that  
109 individual, but also about their relatives and community. A person shares  
110 half of their DNA with each of their parents and siblings, a quarter with their  
111 grandparents. This raises the question of whether an individual's consent is  
112 enough, given that the impact of this single decision is shared among many  
113 people. In this section we will illustrate this effect of consent being carried  
114 over to other people – what we will label as "transitive consent" – with a few  
115 examples and discuss its consequences.

116  
117 Many jurisdictions allow for the collection of DNA samples by law enforce-  
118 ment, whether done with consent or not. DNA databases for forensic pur-  
119 poses are commonplace, and may store data indefinitely. In *S and Marper*  
120 *v United Kingdom*, the European Court of Human Rights decided that the  
121 retention of DNA of individuals who are arrested but never convicted of a  
122 crime constitutes a violation of their right to privacy under the European  
123 Convention on Human Rights [10]. However, family members of convicted  
124 criminals whose DNA is stored undergo the same violation; they may be  
125 identified by police solely by their DNA, despite never having been arrested  
126 or even suspected of a crime. In some cases individuals hand over DNA sam-  
127 ples voluntarily to assist in investigations. In these cases their consent would  
128 be taken as enough justification to retain their DNA. Though if the conse-  
129 quences of this are extended to their family members, and these are deemed  
130 by the ECHR to be a violation of privacy, the argument can be made that

131 it is still unlawful.

132

#### 133 *2.4. Privacy & Discrimination*

134 When the sensitive data stored after genome sequencing is mismanaged or  
135 stolen it has serious implications for the individual. There are some implica-  
136 tions this has for privacy, first one being that when information is released it  
137 makes the individual vulnerable to targeting doxing[11]. By having genetic  
138 information available to others, it might motivate them to act hostile because  
139 of the information they find, which can lead to bullying, ridicule and abuse.  
140 This would result in the person feeling unsafe. Another implication would  
141 be the violation of the individual's trust. They have put their trust in an  
142 institution, thereby sharing information with them. When data is leaked it  
143 will influence the level of trust the person has in the system, which might  
144 result in them not seeking treatment in the future.

145

146 The fact remains that the individual did not want their genetic information  
147 released to the public, yet is experiencing the consequences. Consequences  
148 the company storing the data is responsible for as "One is responsible for,  
149 as it were ... in a straightforwards way." [12]. Which falls in line with the  
150 agency the company has over its actions. There are also implications regard-  
151 ing discrimination that come to mind. Companies could use the sequence  
152 information to discriminate, an example being an insurance company that  
153 charges more to a person with a higher risk of getting certain illnesses, or  
154 refuses to accept them as a client. Just like the discrimination in which  
155 contraceptives are not covered under insurance [13]. The data could also  
156 be used in decision processes. When a potential employer or dating partner  
157 looks you up online and finds your genetic information, it can not be guar-  
158 anteed that this information will not be used in the decision making process.  
159 While there are laws in place that try reduce the amount of discrimination  
160 happening [14], it does not prevent it from happening. Where there now is  
161 a way to combat this injustice, it still holds that it would not have occurred  
162 if the genetic sequence was not available. Furthermore by having the data  
163 accessible it will impose a mental strain of not knowing when you are being  
164 discriminated against, and when you are being treated fairly.

### 165 **3. Conclusion**

166 The main contribution of this scientific ethics research is the closing of the  
167 current knowledge gap by describing the relationship between morality and  
168 the management of technology. Identifying the fundamental moral challenges  
169 associated with the handling of human genetic information. Obtaining con-  
170 sent for DNA sequencing is complicated by the fact that a persons's DNA  
171 does not only contain information about that individual, but also about their  
172 relatives and community. Therefore when an individual hands over their  
173 genetic information for sequencing they are also handing over the genetic  
174 information of others. Technological management risks are associated with  
175 the storage of genetic information which is required for the training of an AI  
176 model. The consequences of data mismanagement or theft is that important  
177 private information becomes accessible for malign intentions. For example,  
178 companies such as those in the insurance industry may use the genetic infor-  
179 mation to unfairly discriminate by charging an exorbitant amount of money  
180 to a person with a higher risk of certain illnesses, or refuse to accept them  
181 as a client. By failing to address the ethical challenges presented by this re-  
182 search in an appropriate manner our society condones and further exacerbate  
183 unethical actions.

### 184 **4. Future Research**

185 There are significant challenges identified surrounding informed and tran-  
186 sitive consent along with individual privacy being infringed upon. These  
187 concerns warrant attention and need to be incorporated to ensure that so-  
188 ciety is kept safe. Individual ownership of genetic information is a potential  
189 system that may adhere to these constraints whilst still fostering critical  
190 innovation required. This model is built on the foundation whereby each  
191 individual is the sole owner of their own genetic information. An individual  
192 may hand over their information to be checked by a professional with a pre-  
193 trained AI model for health care reasons. After a maximum period of six  
194 month all information stored must be deleted. Individual ownership deals  
195 with the challenge of developing an AI that requires training data. Genetic  
196 information can only be handed over in some anonymised form for a limited  
197 period of time. After training the AI this data must be deleted. Allowing  
198 scientists to make breakthroughs in medicine without putting individuals at  
199 risk by limiting the number of people who at any one time could have their  
200 personal information hacked and placed into the wrong hands.

201 **5. Acknowledgment**

202 We would like to thank Dr Lopez-Cantero for her guidance, encouragement  
203 and advice provided throughout the research. We have been fortunate to  
204 have a supervisor who cared so much about our research and well-being.

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