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History Thesis for MSc Architecture

The design of Great Hall of the People: building "More, Faster, and Better"

Track Architecture

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ABSTRACT



This history thesis tries to study the designing and building process of the Great Hall of the People, the place for the highest political meetings of the People's Republic of China, also an important symbol of the 10th Anniversary of the National Day, and its relationship with the General Road for socialist construction (the main ideology in the early stage of the Second Five-Year Plan). It hopes to explore how this building could be influenced by the individual ideologies of the General Road as "more, faster, better and cheaper", to make an evaluation of these influences and their heritage.

With the detailed memories of designers and officials involved, relevant architectural criticism and historical background, research methodology of literature review and architectural analysis, this paper attempts to study the contemporary background of China's domestic ideological practices and international environment, so as to achieve a clear understanding of the relationship between the Great Hall and ideology of the General Road.

As a main argument, although it is a relatively successful project with a different ending from the Great Leap Forward in the latter part of the Second Five-Year Plan, the Great Hall still only meets the three requirements of the General Road. It fully embodies "more" and is an extreme case under the influence of "faster". It interacts with "better", but does not achieve "cheaper" eventually. The study of its relationship with ideology explains some puzzling aspects of the Great Hall, and reveals the General Road as an idealistic but defective way at the same time.

Keywords: the Great Hall, the General Road, "more, faster, better and cheaper", the Second Five-Year Plan, Ten Major Projects, Chinese Communist Party

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INTRODUCTION



Fig1-1 the picture poster of the general road for socialist construction, in which the four Chinese characters "多快好省" respectively refers to "more, faster, better, and cheaper"

The 1950s was an exciting age for the People's Republic of China. For the Chinese people, the victory of the Agrarian Revolution and the First Five-Year Plan stimulated their tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm to the construction of socialism. For the CPC (Chinese Communist Party), the continuing successful experience of fighting the Japanese (war of resistance, 1937-1945), the Nationalist Party (war of liberation, 1946-1949), also the Americans (Korean war, 1950-1953) and the initial achievements in national construction (1st Five-Year Plan, 1953-1958) gave them full confidence to accelerate its ambition. "How bold the man is, how productive the land is"(1958, Editorial Department of People's Daily), the Chinese people who were eager to make progress really believed slogans like this. They lived hard but were full of enthusiasm, sometimes too optimistic about the future.

In such an atmosphere, the Eighth National Congress of China put forward the General Road for socialist construction of "building socialism in a more, faster, better and cheaper way" (Mao Zedong, 1958) in May 1958 to guide the 2nd Five-Year Plan's construction. In August 1958, The

enlarged meeting of the Politburo decided to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the founding of the PRC on a large scale next year, to exhibit all aspects of China's achievements and unprecedented development speed. As a part of this, the "Ten Major Projects" for national day were decided to be designed and constructed within one year, including an auditorium for ten thousand people, known as the Great Hall of the People today. Located on the edge of Tiananmen Square and the central axis of Beijing, this huge building with a construction area of 171,800 square meters is still where PRC holds the most important national meeting every year. It is a took only 50 days to finalize the design drawings, 10 months to build, and architects from all over China participated in its collective competition: the Party Central Committee sounded the clarion call for progress, there was a new battle.


To this day, we can know that the Great Hall was successfully built, but the Second Five-Year Plan did not have such good luck. The general road is considered to be the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan, followed by the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune Movement. These "three red flags" are generally believed to have a negative impact on China's modernization drive. As the beginning of such a special politicised history, the Great Hall of the People is an important building that has not received enough attention. For a long time, Chinese scholars seldom discussed this politically significant building, while foreign scholars only cared about the meetings held inside of it. The existing literature offers several detailed memories of designers and officials involved (Architectural Creation, 2014), perhaps to avoid criticism, few papers connect its architectural design and construction process with the political context at that time. Similarly, while a few articles have been published that offer insight into the party history and link the whole project with the 2nd Five-Year Plan (Zhao Chuanjun, 2018, "A Child of great Leap Forward": Research on the Design and Construction of great Hall of the People), consideration from the architectural point of view is insufficient there. With the research methodology of literature review and architectural analysis, this article will attempt to fill this gap.

Informed by literature review, this article will study the case of great hall of the people, focusing on the question of "how could this building be influenced by the ideology of the 2nd Five-Year Plan of China", the paper hopes to compare architectural design decisions with the "more, faster, better and cheaper" principles. These principles were not directly proposed as the standards by which this building was judged, but the standards by which all the work was done and the powerful underlying psychology of the society at the time. From this point of view, we can explain some puzzling aspects of the design. On the other hand, although the General Road for socialist construction is the earliest theoretical aim and the most well-known slogan, it was proved to be idealistic but defective in practical works. Because people were in blind pursuit of "more and faster" while cannot achieve "better and cheaper" at the same time. This is why the Great Hall, a relatively successful project in that era, only meets the first three requirements and how the title of this paper comes about.

With the conceptual method of comparing architectural design with the criteria of "more, faster,

better and cheaper", this paper would be divided into four parts to explore its relationship with the 2nd Five-Year Plan. The discussion on the first three aspects " more, faster, and better " is the main content of the article, and the discussion on "better" will be relatively complicated and controversial. Because important decisions in the design process will be reassembled out of chronological order, in order to avoid confusion, the timeline of the design with important design decisions is displayed here for comparison.

Fig.1.2 Timeline of design and construction of the Great Hall with important decisions related to ideology



Chapter I "More": Huge Square, Huge Building




Fig 2-1 The area comparison between the Great Hall of the People and other national political halls

As a building where the country's main authority holds meetings, the Great Hall of the People with a 17-hectare building area is by no means inferior to any other country's parliament building in scale.

1.1 From "more" in the 2nd five-year plan to "bigger" in the Great Hall

"More" was the first guiding requirement of the socialist general road during the Second Five-Year Plan of the PRC. It mainly reflects the contradiction between demand and supply at the national level, that is, "the backward social productivity can't satisfy people's growing material and cultural needs". (Resolution on some historical issues about the CPC since the founding of the PRC, 1981) In practical programs, the "more" ideology is mainly reflected in production indicators.

Agricultural production might be the most typical example of discussing the ideological development of "more". In the first five-year plan of 1952-1957, When the war just ended and the country concentrated on supporting heavy industry, China still achieved a 17.6% increase in grain that exceeded expectations. More importantly, the socialization of the means of production was basically completed, which was considered as a preparation for accelerated development. The initial "Comparison Table of Major Industrial and Agricultural Product Output Plans" of the Second Five-Year Plan expected annual grain output to increase by 3.6%; but with the development of the anti-rightist movement guided by the general road, the annual growth rate was

forcibly increased to over 6%. Under the pressure of such difficult indicators, between 1958 and 1960, the phenomenon of "exaggerated wind", which means the situation of local governments falsely reporting production, began to appear: this eventually led to excessive grain collections, production declines, and even famine disaster.




Fig 2-2 propaganda mural of huge pig

One propaganda mural of an agricultural cooperative during the second five-year period can well illustrate the degree of people's enthusiasm under the ideology of "more", also the translation from "more" to "bigger". The two children in the painting are riding on a huge pig, with the verse on the left saying "Fat pig races with an elephant/ None difference but a short nose/ Kill one pig for cooperative/ Enough meat for half a year"

This huge pig may remind people of the Great Hall in Fig2-1, and think about why it is so much larger than a "normal pig". The construction time of the Great Hall was from September 1958 to September 1959, which was at the beginning of the "exaggerated wind"; and the huge area of the Great Hall of the People also gives people reason to speculate about the relationship between it and the "more" ideology. As a building where the country's main authority holds meetings, the Great Hall of the People with a 17-hectare building area is by no means inferior to any other country's parliament building in scale. As the square in front of the Great Hall, Tiananmen Square was expanded from 6 hectares to 44 hectares during the same year, becoming one of the largest squares in the world. Therefore, this chapter will discuss whether the size of the Great Hall is influenced by the "more" ideology from both the square and the architecture perspectives.

1.2 Planning of Tiananmen Square

As the main venue for the National Day's military parade from 1949, the renovation of Tiananmen Square in 1958 was in the way that was expected. Eventually, it was expanded from the T-shaped square less than 40,000 square meters to the current 440,000 square meters' Rectangular square. More relevantly, the planning of Tiananmen Square determines the location and outline of the Great Hall: under the area defined by the red dotted line in Fig 2-3, the larger the width of the square, the smaller the depth of the building; the larger the depth of the square, the longer the facade of the building needs to be. Due to the tight time for design, the planning of the square was not discussed as a separate topic in advance, but was carried out simultaneously with the architectural design of the Great Hall. Besides, the main consideration for the expansion of

Tiananmen Square were only its scale and spatial relationship with the Great Hall (the original wooden dwellings were all demolished, proving there was less consideration of others factors like urban fabric). Therefore, we will continue the discussion with the width and depth of the square, which the scale depends on.




Fig 2-3 Comparison of the general plan draft design of the square with the Great Hall and T-shaped square before reconstruction (with photo of the National Day parade in Tiananmen Square in 1950)

The width of the renovation design of Tiananmen Square was 500 meters, which was one of the feedbacks from the committee of Beijing municipal (the CBM; most feedbacks were taken as requirements and followed strictly by the designers) on the fourth draft design of the Great Hall in September 1958. This number came from Xin Yi, the head of the National Day and "May Day" parade headquarters. He put forward functional requirements on the square: according to the experience from the National Day parade before, in addition to the procession of 500,000 people, there were still nearly 100,000 people need to stand in the square, so 500 meters' width was necessary.

After personal calculation of the team's turning movements and per capita standing area, Zhang Bo, the chief architect of the Great Hall of the People, believed that the requirement was reasonable and designed based on this number. On the other hand, six scholars from Shanghai jointly sent a report to oppose the 500-meter-wide square, worrying about the "proportionality between the height of the building and the width of the square".(Shen Bo, 1986) Perhaps predicting the same problem, the CBM also added that "the height of the Great Hall can exceed Tiananmen appropriately"(Shen Bo, 1986) in the feedback, which provided the possibility to increase the size of the Great Hall to a certain extent.

If the width of the square of 500 meters is entirely out of functional considerations, the depth of the square of 800 meters might be more suspected of "pursuing bigger". Among the many planning designs roughly finalized around the fifth draft, there were two key choices worth discussing: the first is about enclosing the Monument to the People's Heroes with four (such as plan 1 and 2, which means the main facades of individual buildings, including the northwest one as the Great Hall, can be shorter) or two buildings (such as plan 3 to 5), and the second is about using the southern part of the monument as an independent park (such as plan 1, 3 and 4, which means the size of rigid square can be much smaller) or part of the square (such as plan 2 and 5). Existing records are difficult to clearly explain why the municipal party committee decided on "two buildings" and "part of the square", but such a decision undoubtedly brought the largest single building size and the largest square size among all the possibilities




Fig 2-4 The comparison between several planning for Tiananmen Square, of which the final planning was selected

Such a decision may have a relationship with Mao Zedong's prediction of Beijing's population (he hoped to introduce industrial industries in Beijing to increase the mass base of the capital's political environment, that is, the working class and the broad working masses.) or even his direct participation. In October 1956, Peng Zhen (Mayor of Beijing, 1951-1966) revealed Mao Zedong's views on the size of Beijing's population at the CBM: "Chairman Mao said, will there be at least 10 million people in Beijing in the future? If everyone wants to come to the National Day parade, what will you do?" (Metropolitan culture newspaper, 2009) In fact, in 1950, someone had already proposed to build a "parade road" that "be able to cope with one million people in the future." (Zhong WenLiang, 2020) However, according to the photo of the 10th National Day Celebration on October 1, 1959, the square in the north of the Monument to the People's Heroes was already sufficient for crowds and flowers, and this situation continues to this day. As a result, no matter affected by the "bigger" ideology or not, people indeed made a "bigger" and even over-dimensioned decision.




Fig 2-5 Bird view of the National Day celebration in October 1989 with the Great Hall on the left

1.3 Discussion on the construction area of the Great Hall of the People

On September 8, 1958, the initial proposal for "the auditorium for ten thousand people" stipulated that the building should be located on the west side of Tiananmen Square with an area limit of 70,000 square meters. The simple proposal without other requirements looks sloppy, but the idea about seating numbers might have been around for a long time. As early as the Yan'an period in the mid-1940s, Mao Zedong had envisioned that after the victory of the revolution, a grand hall of ten thousand people would be established for the party and state leaders to discuss national affairs, which was repeatedly mentioned during the First Five-Year Plan. "万"(ten thousand) in Chinese does not necessarily refer to a specific number. It is often used in an abstract sense to describe how great a number is or how strong the will is. Wang Jun's "City Records" interprets the requirements for the scale of the Great Hall as the conversion from abstract "Wan" to specific architectural indicators. This argument might indeed be confirmed by the requirement of 70,000 square meters from the perspective of functional need. Zhu Tao, a professor at the University of Hong Kong, suggested in his paper that the total number of people attending the National People's Congress each year is around 6,000, therefore the goal of building a hall for ten thousand people was already too fanatical. However, compared with the final project area of 171,000 square meters where the auditorium for ten thousand people only occupies a small part, the initial goal was modest enough.

According to the existing memoirs, two architects named Zhao Dongri and Shen Qi, together with their project manager Liu Ren, expanded the floor area of their design due to "the area required is not compatible with the country's highest standard of meeting hall" and "the plan design is not grand enough to suit Tiananmen Square"(Zhao Chuanjun, 2018). On October 14th, out of satisfaction with the styling effect and functional layout, Premier Zhou chose Zhao and Shen's plan. On October 16, the chief architect Zhang Bo confirmed the construction area of the selected plan to be 171,800 square meters, which had an excess of 145.43% to the assignment. He was worried and immediately reported to seek decisions level by level. At the same time, other contestants expressed dissatisfaction, believing that the 70,000 square meters' restriction from other project managers put them at a disadvantage in the competition; some experts and scholars opposed the selected plan of such a size plan. At the Royal Bridge expert meeting in November, Premier Zhou expressed his views on this: We should pursue "the greatness of socialism", but not "the purposeless greatness"; the building should be "big and useful (or magnificent and appropriate)", but not "big and useless".(Shen Bo, 1986)

On December 20, the Politburo of the Central Committee held a meeting to discuss and passed the National Day Projects, therefore the plan for the Great Hall Project was elevated to "the will of the top leaders of the party" (Zhao Chuanjun, 2018). On January 6, 1959, at the second architect's opinion seminar, some people continued to raise the problem of building "big and useless" and solutions for adding patios. After the meeting, although the drawings can still be greatly modified, designers chose to add other functional rooms "once proposed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress" in an attempt to make the building "big and useful." Furthermore, to make the facade more dignified, under Liu Ren's suggestion, the plan increased the number of rooms to extend the building facade to the south. As a result, from the ground floor plan of the Great Hall, we can see that the auditorium for 10,226 people only occupies a small part of the building area.




Fig 2-6 The floor plan of the Great Hall of the People and the location of the auditorium

In general, the positions and considerations of participants from all aspects were relatively clear during the decision-making of the Great Hall. The "Huge Party" represented by Liu Ren and the "Worry Party" represented by Zhang Bo respectively reflect the architect's pursuit of effect (may contain ideological elements) and the engineer's pursuit of rigorous cost. The central government acquiesced in the result of the excess area, and guided architects to continue to explore the issues of "big and useful" and "big but useless" on the premise of affirming "big". We are able to confirm that the "more" ideology during the Second Five-Year Plan period has indeed affected the huge area of the Great Hall

Chapter 2 "Faster": Unprecedented Speed of Socialism



Fig 3-1 The photo of the construction site of the Great Hall of the People

Speed was one of the core pursuits of the construction of the Great Hall of the People. This photo shows that the project was so urgent that the surrounding residents did not have time to be completely relocated even until the building was under construction.

2.1 "Faster" in the second five-year plan period and the motive of "ten major buildings for National Day"

"Faster" was the second guiding requirement of the socialist general road during the Second Five-Year Plan of the PRC. At the same time, it is often regarded as the leader and object of compromise for all other requirements, with the saying that "speed is the soul of the general road." The "Great Leap Forward" movement from 1958 to 1962 was just evidence of the fact that "faster" ideology ultimately dominated the period of the Second Five-Year Plan. If "more" came from the Chinese people's need for material conditions, "faster" was not only a need but also a comparison with other countries, it was used to build the national self-confidence of the Chinese people and prove the correctness of China's socialist construction road. "Ten thousand years are too long to wait/ seize this day/ seize this hour." Chairman Mao wrote this in his poem, hoping to inspire the Chinese people.

China's large-scale steel smelting movement is the most typical example of discussing the ideological development of "faster". In general, this movement was Mao's formal proposal in June 1958 that the steel output that year would double from 5.35 million tons in 1957 to 10.7 million tons. Under the call of the central government, nearly 100 million people from members of people's communes, government officials, school teachers, to students, have been invested in steel production, disrupting the normal order of production work. However, the steelmaking technology outside the factory was substandard, and the end of the national movement is to produce a large amount of scrap iron, which also brought serious economic problems. (Luo Pinghan, 2014) This movement exposed problems similar to many projects under the "faster" ideology: goals were exaggerated and arbitrary, preparations and investigations were insufficient: as a result, huge waste was caused in the process.

The exaggerated target in the steelmaking movement originated from the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution in Moscow in November 1957. Due to the accumulation of previous conflicts, the friendly relations between China and the Soviet Union had begun to undergo subtle changes at this time. Khrushchev wanted to maintain the hegemony of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, and did not approve of China's development road; Mao Zedong, on the other hand, resolutely safeguarded China's sovereignty, also firmly believed that the CCP (the Communist Party of China) had found a better transition road to communism than the CPSU. Based on these, it is not difficult for us to understand why when Khrushchev stated in his report that "the Soviet Union could surpass the United States in fifteen years," Mao Zedong would say that "in fifteen years, we may catch up with or surpass the United Kingdom." (Zheng Qian & Wei Jin, 2003)

Steel output is an important indicator of the country's industrialization level, and China's requirements for steel output were aimed at catching up with the British steel output as soon as possible. Britain's annual steel output is estimated to reach 30 million tons in 15 years, while Mao originally hoped to reach the target of 40 million tons in 15 years, which is three times the figure of 5.35 million tons in 1957. However, the investigation report from the Ministry of Metallurgy and the "faster" ideology added fuel to the fire, shortening 15 years to 3 to 5 years. Finally, in June 1958, Mao formally proposed to double the steel output that year, reaching the number of 10.7 million tons.

In fact, the decision to hold a large-scale National Day event in 1959 and to build ten major buildings in Beijing, including the Great Hall, was motivated by similar factors of the steel movement. On the one hand, these decisions wanted to foster the ambition of the Chinese people and build people's confidence in the development road. On the other hand, these demonstrated to the Soviet Union and other countries the unprecedented speed under the guidance of the Chinese road, to strengthen China's position in the socialist camp. When mobilizing the designers of the ten major projects, Premier Zhou said: "The Soviet Union restricts our development and imperialists also imposed heavy sanctions. We must rely on ourselves to make the buildings reach a modern

level to foster the ambition of Chinese people.” This call became the common goal of all participants, inspiring their morale and being an indestructible spiritual force. (Zhang Bo, 1994)



Fig 3-2 National Day in 1959, Mao Zedong and Khrushchev on Tiananmen



Fig 3-3 models of the buildings in the parade

Eventually, on October 1, 1959, when Mao Zedong and Khrushchev stood on the Tiananmen Gate at the same time, watching the parade with the Great Hall as the background, the models of Beijing ten major buildings in the team became a striking highlight. "People's Daily" reported that: "Construction workers in the capital are carrying models of huge buildings one after another. Among them are the Great Hall of the People and other major buildings recently completed. These buildings mark the development of China's construction industry. Ten Major Projects created the 'Chinese Speed'." (Xu Qingquan, 2019)

The influence of this construction motive on our discussion is decisive. It proves that the construction of the Great Hall of the People, for political purposes, was under the influence of "faster" ideology from the beginning. As the leader of the city hall project, the central government itself was also the publisher of the "faster" ideology: the Great Hall and "faster" are inseparable.

2.2 The performance of "faster" in the design and construction process of the Great Hall

If we return to the timetable, the project of ten major buildings was set up in August 1958; on September 8, the government held a mobilization meeting for all participants. September 10th, the design of the Great Hall began; on October 14, Premier Zhou chose the final rough proposal in the seventh edition of the drafts. October 28, the construction drawings were completed and the construction officially started; on September 10, 1959, the construction was completed. Overall, this 172,000-square-meter Great Hall took one month to complete the design, 10 months to complete the construction. On the other hand, the Great Auditorium of Chongqing city, which was constructed at a normal speed in the early days of the RPC, could be a good example to compare

with the Great Hall: the Great Auditorium with a floor area of 66,000 square meters was built from June 1951 and completed in April 1954. For the same type of building, under similar construction conditions, the construction speed of the Great Hall reached even nine times that of the Great Auditorium.

The above series of figures fully prove that the Great Hall is "fast", and equally important are the working characteristics of the "together of three", that is, dealing with the design, material preparation, and construction at the same time. When the first mobilization report was made in September, the construction team had already begun to prepare materials and machinery. When the final design draft was passed in October and there was still no construction drawings, the construction team had already entered the site and started leveling the foundation. When the construction with more than 10,000 workers working continually in three consecutive shifts began officially, the architects were still changing the plan and adjusting the details.

Such rapid construction undoubtedly brought a lot of pressure to the project. Insufficient preparation led to some problems even considered taboo in the project, such as 1. The geological exploration before the design task was insufficient. With the continuous revision of the design plan and three stages of exploration by the Beijing Municipal Survey Office, it became clear that the site of the Great Hall was selected for the underground river channel of the Yuan Dynasty. Some foundations failed to avoid the river channel, for which parts the constructional process was laborious. 2. In order to pursue the Chinese style, the porch column on the east side widened the column space in the middle. However, due to insufficient time for reviewing drawings of the CBM, the problem of insufficient widening distance was not discovered until the site inspection. The MPC requested to move the perfused load-bearing column, but it was technically impossible. Eventually, as the Fig3-5 shows, the skin of the middle four columns was moved eccentrically to expand the middle space as a compromise.




Fig 3-4 Schematic diagram of the general structure. The shaded area is the range of the old river channel.




Fig 3-5 Dimensional change drawing of the column, where some skins are biased to one side of the structure, and the positions of the columns do not correspond to the axes

To sum up, we could find that the characteristics and problems in the construction of the Great Hall are similar to other engineering projects affected by the "faster" ideology, like the steelmaking movement.

2.3 Rational adjustment and extreme case

From the motivation and performance discussed in the previous two sections, we can obtain the basic position that the construction of the Great Hall was deeply influenced by the "faster" ideology. However, although the Great Hall showed a similar performance to the projects in the later stage of the Second Five-Year Plan, at this time people had not yet completely fallen into the craze for "faster". Not everyone fully agreed with this pursuit of speed, and some rational adjustments were also made.

Firstly, in July 1985, the CBM sent an urban investigation team to the Soviet Union and held a small-scale design competition for a hall of 10,000 people in the Beijing Architecture Design Institute at the same time. To a certain extent, these actions were preparations in advance. When it was decided to build the Ten Major Projects in August, some people already worried that the quality could not be guaranteed and there were still doubts about the time issue during the construction: some technical squadron leaders believed that "more, fast, better, and cheaper" is contradictory. It won't be better if has to be faster". (Zhao Chuanjun, 2018) As indirect support, although there is no dissatisfaction, project director Shen also described the participants' anxiety and poor health condition many times in his memoirs.

In June, the structure of the Great Hall was basically completed, but the comrades on the construction site believed that due to the constraints of the construction period and materials, a high-standard interior decoration was difficult to achieve. In July, Premier Zhou expressed his opinion on the construction site of the Great Hall: "In such a short time, the incomplete consideration was inevitable for such a large project. However, the key parts must be done well and we can gradually modify the secondary parts. We could build it in one year and complete it in five years." (Shen Bo, 1986)

If we think that the impact of these adjustments was too small to shaken the position of "faster" fundamentally, some other examples indirectly related to the Great Hall may prove the existence of rationality better. Before the design of the Great Hall began, the government had considered designing the National Theater at the same time in the surrounding area and had already transferred architects from Shanghai to take charge. But with the development of the project, Premier Zhou quickly decided to abandon the National Theater project and concentrate human and financial resources to complete the Great Hall. Later, after receiving letters from the people whose houses were demolished because of the ten major projects about the problem of housing difficulties, in February 1959, Premier Zhou again convened a meeting of relevant ministers and

decided to postpone the construction of the science and technology museum, art gallery, and movie palace (three of the ten major projects).

According to these, we could see that due to the location of the building at the center of the National Day celebration, the status of the Great Hall is very special even in the ten major projects. Against the extreme background of prioritizing completion at any cost, the description of the Great Hall exaggerated the ideological fanaticism of that time to a certain extent.

As a conclusion, many facts about the construction of the Great Hall reflect a strong "faster" ideology, but the minds of the builders still maintain a considerable degree of rationality. The Great Hall was no doubt deeply influenced by the "faster" ideology, and it should also be regarded as an extreme case for this ideology in the early period of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Chapter 3 "Better": collective collaboration, learning from all the best



Fig 4-1 The discussion between officers, technicians and workers during the construction of the Great Hall

Emphasizing class equality and collective collaboration was an important part of the pursuit of "better" in the era of the Second Five-Year Plan. As the photo shows, during the construction of the Great Hall, participants sit together as equals to discuss engineering problem. This was regarded as an early example of "combination of the three", which means combining officers, technicians and workers.



Fig 4-2 The mixed-style facade of the Great Hall with the distance between columns in the middle gradually increases

The mixed-style facade of the Great Hall combines the western colonnade and the enlarged central compartment in the east, the western stigma decoration and the eastern glazed roof eaves. This was considered to be the international spirit of learning from all the best. Besides, these design decisions was the collective result of the collaboration of officials, architects, and technicians.

3.1 "Better" and the good hard to define

"Better" was the third guiding requirement of the socialist general road during the Second Five-Year Plan of the PRC and is often considered to be a vague one. From the pursuit of communism to make the country prosperous and strong, to the high quality of specific engineering projects, can all be regarded as the pursuit of "better".

Although the target objects of "better" often changed, collective collaboration based on public ownership has always been regarded as a "better" organization. The most representative of the period of the Second Five-Year Plan was the people's commune, which was a grassroots production organization that advocated collective labor, unified distribution, and egalitarianism. It is also a grassroots government, which prevailed from 1958 to 1984. The People's Commune emphasized the production methods of "class equality" and "communist collaboration" from the starting point, which were important parts of the pursuit of "better" in the era of the Second Five-Year Plan. At the same time, this organizational logic further extended to factories and enterprises, where the similar "two participations" and "combination of three" have been formed ("two participations" means that officers participate in production and workers participate in enterprise management; "combination of the three" means combining officers, technicians, and workers). These measures were undoubtedly fruitful from a certain perspective: Many people who have experienced that era believe that the Chinese workers in the Mao Zedong era are truly dignified. They carried the "golden rice bowl" and eat the "big pot of rice", owning the rights to their own destiny. (Fred Engst, 2013)

In addition to organizational logic, in terms of specific results, "the people are the masters" created a clear vane of political correctness for "better". Take architecture as an example. On the one hand, buildings that represent feudal authority and religious rights were considered bad, while buildings that condense the wisdom of laborers were considered good. On the other hand, the dividing line between these different understandings in specific projects was not clear, and the "goodness" of social science and art itself is even more difficult to judge clearly. As a result, in the fluctuating political climate of China in the mid-1950s, discussions on architectural style were highly politicized and various formal languages were capriciously attacked. (Tao Zhu, 2011) To a certain extent, this caused the architects of the time to hesitate among several styles and make eclectic designs. At the beginning of the design of the Great Hall, government officials also understood that architects had gone through the anti-retro and anti-waste movement in 1955 (against Chinese-style buildings with large roofs) and the anti-rightist struggle in 1957 (against conservatism) and had no idea about a "politically correct" architectural style. (Zhu Tao, 2012) To pursue the best result, the inclusiveness of "hundreds schools of thought" and the "learning from all the best" from internationalism were re-emphasized by the central government to guide the architectural design of the Great Hall.

3.2 Approach: communist collective collaboration

Under the public economy, China's tendency of collective cooperation can explain why the proposal collection of the Great Hall did not adopt the method of open competition, that is, the participants keep each other secret and the selection is made at one time. On the contrary, in the design competition of the City Hall, every design proposal was public, architects discussed and analyzed together to accumulate experience, finally assembling into a "best solution" which learned from all the best. (Ruan Zhida, 2000) This later developed into the Chinese 'semi-open collective competition': Chinese officials sometimes establish the schematic design competitions not to select the winner but instead to assign an affiliated architect (or design institute) to integrate the strengths of all different parties.

In the design process of the Great Hall, the architect group responded to the call with great enthusiasm. On September 7, 1958, the government project manager and the Secretary-General of the Architectural Society of China agreed on a list of inviting experts from all over the country and sent the telegram to 16 provinces. Many experts didn't even know what the work was, but still went to Beijing without hesitation. After all arriving on the evening of September 10th, the experts went to work immediately, working overtime day and night and repeating continuous evaluations. By the time Premier Zhou reviewed the plan on October 6, six series of drafts had been made. On October 9th, when the seventh draft was completed, experts from other places left one after another. Just in one month, around 30 experts from all over the country made 84 kinds of plans and 189 kinds of facades, from which we could see the intensity of the work.

The further pursuit of "communist collaboration" in the design of the Great Hall was reflected in the extensive collection of opinions from the masses. When the seventh draft was completed, the design team selected eight designs to collect further opinions from 27 provinces and some large cities. After the implementation plan was selected, the design team also solicited opinions from comrades in major hotels and restaurants for the kitchen part. Since then, in addition to the formal meetings reviewed by various experts, two symposiums for architects were organized in December and January 1959. When deciding on the artificial fake stone color for the outer wall of the Great Hall in February, teachers, and students of the Department of Architecture of Tsinghua University were invited to visit the actual model and express their opinions on the disputed plans.

"Communist cooperation" was not only reflected in the design and opinion collection, but also in the construction. Based on the construction conditions at the time, the fact that the main structure was completed within 10 months largely relied on the launch of the mass movement under political calls. The construction of the Great Hall was formally compared to a big battle and workers wrote "Determination Letters" and "Guarantee Letters" under the title "all soldiers of a certain command". According to the official requirements at the time, the time of voluntary work for government officials should be no less than 30 days per year, so each work team was assigned a department as a voluntary labor unit to cooperate with the work. In addition, there were youth

commandos from all over the country (could be understood as a professional team of volunteers) rushing to Beijing to sign up for the construction. Among them, the most representative 300-members young commando team led by Zhang Baifa, after fighting for nine days and nights, successfully completed the task that was originally planned to take 16 days: binding the 680 tons of foundation steel bars in the office part of the Great Hall.



Fig 4-3 A construction team held a mobilization meeting and everyone submitted a letter of guarantee



Fig 4-4 Minority women official who came to Beijing for meeting participated in the labor in the Great Hall

When 14,000 workers worked in three shifts to let the project continue around the clock, Beijing citizens voluntarily provided various assistance, and tens of thousands of citizens took part in voluntary labor on weekends, evenings, or holidays. (The direct source has not been found yet) The construction site needs dozens of cubic meters of camphor wood from Guizhou province, but the materials that have been transported exceed the needs because people along the road voluntarily store their camphor wood to the transport convoy. According to Ye Qingcheng's article "How We Built the Great Hall of the People", with people's enthusiasm for the collective and the country in that era, even if there was no call, everyone would participate in voluntary labor with pleasure, especially the glorious voluntary labor for the Great Hall.

3.3 Result: delicate mixed style

The result of this series of collaborative designs is today's Great Hall of the People, a delicate mixed-style architectural design. There have always been various opinions about the style of the Great Hall, including national (or ethnic) style, neo-classical, new and mixed style, socialist-realist, Stalinist, and so on. To some extent, the different opinions with different reasons just prove that the style of the Great Hall is mixed, which is the conclusion of this article's tendency. The controversy over the "politically correct" architectural style during the Second Five-Year Plan period and the

complexity of the style decision itself made it a suitable perspective for studying the effects of collaborative design of the Great Hall. In the process of determining the architectural style, Premier Zhou Enlai, the Beijing Mayor Peng, the government project director Shen, the chief architect Zhang, the expert representative Professor Liang, and the winning architect Zhao all played important roles. From their standpoints and the final result, we may be able to get a glimpse of the specific practice of collective collaboration in the design of the Great Hall.



Fig 4-5 Main decision makers for the style:

1. Zhou Enlai inspected the construction site (second from the right: project director Shen)
2. Zhou Enlai inspected the site (second from the left: chief architect Zhang, third from the right: Professor Liang Sicheng)
3. Beijing Mayor Peng Zhen inspected the construction site

National Premier Zhou played a decisive role in the decision-making of architectural style. From the collection of early proposals for the design of the Great Hall, we can see that there was no shortage of submissions that have a particularly obvious ethnic (like proposal 1.1-1.2 in figure 4-6), neo-classical (like 2.1) or modern style (like 3.1-3.3). As of the sixth draft on October 6, Premier Zhou decided the direction of the colonnade (proposal 2.3) based on the design of the three drafts before. He believed that the large roof proposal (designed by chief architect Zhang, proposal 1.1) could be used on the Beijing Art Museum (another project of the ten major projects). After the eighth draft, on October 14, Zhou finally chose Zhao's plan among the three plans provided, and the architectural style was initially determined.




Fig 4-6 A summary of early proposals for the design of the Great Hall

However, the neoclassicism style of the winning proposal caused controversy from all quarters. Before the start of the National Day project, Beijing Mayor Peng, along with government project director Shen, visited major cities across the country and investigated famous historical buildings. He paid special attention to the doors and windows of buildings. Peng believed that the complete equidistance of the stone columns in the western classical colonnade is determined by the structural performance of the stone. While for traditional Chinese wooden structures, the column distance can be widened on the colonnade, forming a sequence of large column distances in the middle and small column distances on the side. Peng believed that enlarging column distances in the middle is an important inheritance and innovation of tradition. Therefore, in mid-November, after exchanging opinions with Zhou, he put forward the request for partly enlarging the column distances.

On November 20th, at the Royal Bridge expert meeting, the important expert representative Professor Liang put forward his opinions on artistic style. He believed that the order of preference in the style of Great Hall should be: ① Chinese and new, ② Western and new, ③ Chinese and ancient, ④ Western and ancient. He said that the winning plan belonged to the "western and ancient" and was not a good choice. On the other hand, Premier Zhou expressed his support for the original plan from a political perspective: a building always has its own style, while it is difficult to satisfy everyone. The well-known buildings at home and abroad in ancient and modern times are essentially from the hands of the working people, and they are all buildings with the emotion of internationalism in the mind of the proletariat. We should learn from all the best of ancient and modern, China and foreign. (Shen Bo, 1986) Later, with the continuous revision of the design, at the second architects' symposium on January 6, 1959, Professor Liang stated that the new model was much better than the original plan after removing the "western and ancient things".

Chief architect Zhang, as the designer of the early Chinese large roof proposal, naturally leaned towards the ethnic style. He tried to achieve a nearly traditional style in the specific refinement of the design. For example, in the treatment of the eaves, the parapet above the eaves is not a straight 90° angle but with the ends lightly raised. On the contrary, as the defender of his own proposal, the winning architect Zhao preferred Western classical style. When the interior decoration style of the Hall of ten thousand people became controversial, Zhao advocated designing it in the luxurious form of the western theater, setting up a series of staterooms that layered to the stage, but chief architect Zhang didn't agree with this.

The dispute between architects was ultimately decided by the government with power. In the end, Premier Zhou proposed the concept of Chinese traditional artistic conception "water and sky in one color" to guide the design of the hall. When this was transformed into a form in operation, in simple terms, it is to connect the arc of the ceiling and the wall with a continuous curve to form a whole shape without corners, resulting in a unified effect of up and down. Although the design concept here was taken from traditional Chinese aesthetics, the final curvilinear form was closer to the Western Baroque or Art Nouveau style, and the result was still like a mixed style.



Fig 4-7 The interior view of the Hall of ten thousand people

After combing through the historical facts in the first two sections, we can conclude that the Great Hall is affected by the "better" ideology. As an ideology that has already carried out social practice, "Better" provided direct guidance to the Great Hall through mass movement and opinion solicitation; as an ideology that is taking shape, "Better" also gained new connotations in the design of the Great Hall. For example, the method of collective architectural design gained early practice and gradually developed into the Chinese "semi-open collective competition". At the same time, the "learning from all the best" emphasized in the selection of style also established a weather vane of tolerance for different architectural styles, alleviating the phenomenon that various formal languages were capriciously attacked by political correctness at that time, and enriching the meaning of "better" in architectural judgment.

In general, "better" is a relatively complex ideology that changing in the *process* of exploration. The Great Hall and "better" interacted and confirmed each other. This is mainly reflected in the collective collaboration and mixed styles of the Great Hall, which also has a causal relationship.

3.4 Comments: Is that effective?

After having the conclusion of the relationship, the working methods of the collective design and mass movement construction of the Great Hall are still so special that one cannot help but want to reflect on it. And this leads to an extended question: Is this way of working effective?

From the perspective of how to make scientific decisions on large-scale projects, the collaboration of the Great Hall had a good original intention and strong mobilization ability, but the absolute egalitarianism in it also weaken the voice of professionals and other forces' constraints on government decision-making. We could see the government actively hoped that people from all walks of life put forward their opinions and satisfy everyone, but in actual operations, the central government was still the decisive leader. On the one hand, Mayor Peng could proposed and led to

ingenious design techniques that even professional architects did not notice; on the other hand, Premier Zhou also had the power to deny Professor Liang's professional comments with abstract political terms. Besides, as the management department, the Beijing Municipal Planning Bureau also sent a large number of architects to participate in the competition, this practice of "being a referee and playing football at the same time" provided the possibility of corruption, and Zhao Ridong's bid winning proposal was also questioned partly because of this.

From the perspective of architects reviewing design results, the mixed style of the final design did not have a clear stand, which was not very clever in terms of design. But the realization of this plan still broke the phenomenon that the architectural style was capriciously attacked by political correctness so architects dare not express their views, which had positive significance at the time. Therefore, just like the result of mixed styles, the Great Hall also received mixed comments. At the end of this chapter, we may be able to experience this contradiction from different architects' voices:

1) In a paper published in 1960 by Zhao Ridong, the designer of the Great Hall, he believed that the design of the Great Hall showed the "new style" and new creative methods of Chinese architecture, which was a great achievement.

2) According to the opponent, Mr. Tan Yuan, one of the six Shanghai experts who submitted their opinions against the 500-meter width of Tiananmen Square, the Great Hall of the People is "huge but not great". He thought the western neoclassical eclectic style was nothing new and it went against the trend of the time.

3) Chief Architect Zhang bo expressed helplessness in his autobiography "My Road to Architectural Creation": "Unlike the "pioneering" results presented by international competitions, the collective product is very likely to be an eclectic one. As a result, it will inevitably cause endless controversy."

Chapter 4 "Cheaper": warning for the over-ideal General Road



Fig5-1 Construction workers were processing the roof steel frame of the auditorium room

The main structure of the Great Hall used more than 11,000 tons of steel bars and about 4,000 tons of section steel. The space span of the banquet hall and the auditorium required the steel frame length of the roof truss to be as high as 61 meters. Under the designation of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, this batch of steel was specially smelted and rolled by Anshan Iron and Steel Company, but quality problems were constantly discovered during the cutting process. After extensive inspections, the National Day Engineering Office was forced to decide to scrap more than 4,000 tons of finished steel that had problems at the beginning of the project, which caused huge waste.

4.1 "cheaper" was neglected during the Second Five-Year Plan period

"Cheaper" (or "cost-saving") was the last guiding requirement of the socialist general road during the Second Five-Year Plan of the PRC and was also considered the least important one. The embryonic form of the General Road "more, faster and better" first appeared in Chairman Mao's discussion of cooperatives. When this statement was extended to socialist economic construction, the word "cheaper" was added under the suggestion of Li Fuchun (Deputy Director of the Finance

and Economic Committee and Minister of the Ministry of Heavy Industry). It can be said that "cheaper" was not included in the General Road at the beginning, and it was not taken seriously either after joining.

During the Second Five-Year Plan era, "Cheaper" was not taken seriously from the beginning and was negatively affected by other ideologies at the same time. For example, the Steel-smelting Movement we discussed at the beginning of Chapter 2 also caused huge waste. Under the call to the whole people, many farmers donated metals such as pots, ironware, iron door handles, and iron frames of windows to make steel. However, due to the substandard technology, the result was only a large amount of scrap steel. What's more serious was that the young and middle-aged laborers in rural areas went to smelt steel, leaving the old and weak for agricultural production, so that a large number of crops cannot be recovered when mature. It is estimated that the grain loss that year accounted for about 15% of the grain receivable. (Luo Pinghan, 2014) In this process, the waste of industrial raw materials, normal urban production and rural food production was undoubtedly huge, but the "cheaper" ideology didn't play its due controlling role, while was completely ignored, and finally paid for the "faster" ideology.

This basic explanation of "cheaper" above also applies to the construction cost of the Great Hall. In the design and construction of the Great Hall, the cost restrictions were relaxed, and the specific saving measures were mostly the redress of existing waste. These facts objectively resulted in the high cost of the Great Hall.

4.2 The high cost of the Great Hall

After discussing "more, faster, and better" in the previous chapters, we can have the intuitive feeling that the construction of the Great Hall cannot be "cheap". This is indeed the case. The fact that the National Day project regardless of costs, judging from the economic consequences of the "Great Leap Forward" (from 1958 to 1961, China's economy fell to 14%, data to be verified), had exceeded China's economic capacity at that time. Li Yunzhong, director of the General Office of the Northeast Cooperation Zone, once wrote to Mao Zedong, reflecting on the serious economic problems at that time, and pointed out that "the ten major projects are also a bit too much." He believed that the investment for this was about 8.9 billion, "it is enough to build a steel enterprise with an annual output of 30 billion tons or 16-18 million square meters of employee housing." (Zhao Chuanjun, 2018)

Besides, from a relative value point of view, the construction cost of the hall far exceeded expectations. According to estimates before the construction, the building area of the hall would be 60,000 square meters, and the total construction investment was 36 million yuan. On November 6, after approving the doubling of the building area of the winning design, the National Construction Commission proposed that the cost per square meter should not exceed 500 yuan, the total cost

should not exceed 84 million yuan, and the area should be controlled within 168,000 square meters. When the construction was completed in 1959, the actual construction area was as high as 171,800 square meters, and the construction cost soared to 101 million yuan, almost close to the total construction investment of all ten major projects estimated a year ago.

4.3 Waste phenomenon and correction

In addition to the unavoidable expenses caused by the continuous expansion of scale and high-level requirements (cost of "more" and "better"), construction errors (partly because of "faster") have also led to further waste. For example, the steel produced for the roof truss of the banquet hall and the auditorium during the initial construction period was mostly found not meet the quality standards, so more than 4,000 tons of finished steel were scrapped. Similarly, the workers for the western part of the Great Hall misused cement 300 as cement 400 and this was not discovered until 50 tons of cement was wasted.

Besides, early in the project, the central government's management of construction site was not enough, and grassroots workers were not fully aware of "cheaper". In May 1959, comrade Jiang Hong from the Secretariat of the Economic Commission's Office, who participated in voluntary labor at the Great Hall site, wrote to the Central Committee, stating that "the current supply of construction materials is relatively tight, but the waste of materials on this site is serious". (Zhao Chuanjun, 2018) For example, a large number of good timber slipped downstairs and much of them were broken. Many scaffolding poles were thrown down as soon as they were removed, steel nails and cement were spilled on the ground. An old carpenter who participated in the construction was also very sad about this situation. He wrote to Mao Zedong and Zhu De (commander-in-chief of the Chinese People's Liberation Army) to report the waste problem, which caused a shock to the central government.

In the later stage, the lack of awareness of conservation has improved. The reports on the waste problem prompted the central government to emphasize "strict economy and oppose waste" in the National Day Project Staff Report in March 1959 and the National Day Project Five-level officer Meeting in June. On the construction site, rectification campaigns were intensively carried out from the end of 1958 to June 1959, and a large number of materials were cleaned and recovered. According to records, during the 8 days from June 12th to 20th, 119 tons of steel bars were recovered from the construction site of the Great Hall. However, behind the fruitful cleaning and recycling results, the fact that there was a huge engineering waste is again reflected. (Zhao Chuanjun, 2018)

In short, due to not being taken seriously, "cheaper" compromised with the high-cost bought by "more" and "better", also some technical errors by "faster". In the construction of the Great Hall, "cheaper" cannot compete with other ideologies, and cannot fulfill even the requirements of basic conservation consciousness. The "cheaper" ideology has very limited influence on the Great Hall, and to some extent, the failure of the Great Hall on the "cheaper" also exposed the structural problems of the over-ideal General Road.

CONCLUSION

Building "more, faster, and better"



Fig.6-1 The National Day ceremony in 1959. The slogan of "Three Red Flag" held by the parade from the perspective of the Great Hall of the People. The sign of the General Route (1958) was followed by the slogans of the Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) and the People's Commune (1958-1984), which clearly foretold the future of China after that.


In general, the Great Hall of the People is a large-scale national construction project successfully completed under the influence of ideology during the Second Five-Year Plan period of China. Judging from the technological and economic level at that time, the construction of the Great Hall was an engineering miracle, but it also paid a huge price. On the one hand, the construction process under the guidance of ideology showed the enthusiasm of all participants for selfless dedication to the country and the spirit of overcoming difficulties; on the other hand, there were also huge waste and many engineering mistakes that could have been avoided. The Great Hall is not so much a demonstration of the "achievements of socialist construction", but rather a portrayal of the social spirit that the new ideology caused at the time.

Before summarizing the relationship between the Great Hall and the ideology of the Second Five-Year Plan, we must understand that the Great Hall and the new ideology grew and took shape together. It is also a building located at one of the turning points in the history of the PRC. 1958 was not only a turning point for China from blind optimism of continuous success to setbacks but also a turning point from the socialist camp close to the Soviet Union to the independent "Third World". These basic facts can explain why the Great Hall had different relationships with different ideologies, and why the Great Hall and other later projects of the Second Five-Year Plan had different destinies.

The biggest impact on the Great Hall of the People was the "faster" ideology because it was directly related to the motive of the large-scale National Day celebration and the Ten Major Projects, also covered the entire process of design and construction of the Great Hall. After that, under the premise that the size of the site provided the possibility of bigger and the importance of the building made the central government willing to pay the price, the "bigger" ideology was also fully manifested, resulting in an area of structure much more than the original plan and functional requirement. For the "better" ideology, its collective collaborative organization deeply affected the Great Hall, while at the same time, it also gained new content about the architectural style from the design result of the Great Hall. In the end, although the problem was realized and some adjustments were made, the design and construction of the Great Hall still caused huge waste, so the ideology of "cheaper" was completely ignored.

During the construction of the Great Hall, the fact that the "cheaper" ideology could not be realized was warning for the over-ideal General Road. In many other projects of the Second Five-Year Plan later than the Great Hall, under the blind pursuit of "more and faster", not only "cheaper" but also "better" was ignored. In some extreme cases, even the original intention of "more and faster" cannot be realized. As an early project of the Second Five-Year Plan, the Great Hall has already manifested many problems from the radical ideology, but the construction cost was still within the country's tolerance. Therefore, the Great Hall was finally successfully built, receiving a fate different from that of the Great Leap Forward.

Fig.6-2 View from Tiananmen before the Great Hall.



EPILOGUE

The limitation and profoundness of an era




Fig.7-1 The National Day Ceremony in 2019. The same view from the Great Hall of the People to the matrix of Mao Zedong Thought in the parade. Gone are the giant slogans, leaving only the question of history: for the Chinese people, what is the most important legacy from the limitation and profoundness of that era?

If the Great Hall managed to built "more, faster and better", what exactly has it left for the Chinese people? Thinking twice, this article decides not to avoid the controversy, and the controversy over the Great Hall is the controversy over the ideology of the Second Five-Year Plan with "faster" as the core.

It might be necessary to use the method we used in the "better" chapter again to separate the argument for the original intention and the result. For a former big country in the East and the world that has been bullied by Western powers for more than 100 years, China's pursuit of "faster" is completely understandable: people hoped to achieve modernization as soon as possible, making the country prosperous and reshaping national dignity. They really put themselves into it with the spirit of selfless dedication. However, judging from the results of economic construction in the early period of the Second Five-Year Plan period, the blind pursuit of "faster" caused a serious imbalance in the proportion of the national economy, a huge waste of production materials and production, and even a serious disaster of a large number of abnormal deaths during the peace era.

From the initial "more, faster, better, and cheaper" to "accelerating development", and then from "fast and good" to "good and fast", the description of "fast" has been continuously adjusted in different stages of the planned economy of China, but it never disappeared. Xi Jinping, the core of the fifth generation central collective leadership of the CPC, defined "realizing the Great Revival

of the Chinese nation" as the collective great dream of the Chinese people since modern times. As long as the dream has not been fully realized, China will not give up the pursuit of "fast". As the origin of this ideology, "more, faster, better, and cheaper" pointed the way with the high price paid, and demonstrated determination with unyielding effort.

We can believe that the positive spirit in the ideology of the Second Five-Year Plan has indeed continued: it survived the PRC's toughest era and regained its vitality in the rapid economic growth under reform and opening up. We could say that, after the baptism of sacrifice, the experience and spirit from "more, faster, better, and cheaper" are the most significant legacy for Chinese people, from that era, from the Great Hall of the People.




Fig.7-2 View from Tiananmen with the Great Hall on the right

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