

# Exploring change

Investigating the drivers of public authorities in the infrastructure sector to start with new contract strategies



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# Master's Thesis: 'Exploring change'

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## Preface

Before you lays the final version of my Master's thesis report. With this project, my last requirement to obtain the Master of Science degree in Construction Management and Engineering at the Delft University of Technology will be fulfilled. The topic of this thesis concerns exploring the concept of change in the infrastructure sector. On a personal level, I have always been fascinated why things happen the way they do. Yet, researching this with an academic outlook, thought me a great many things that I never truly realised before. All told, it has been a difficult but fascinating journey that would not have been possible without all the people that stood by me during this time. I would like to use the rest of this page to acknowledge the people that offered me their support, guidance, and encouragement.

First of all, my thesis committee from the Delft University, starting with my first supervisor Leonie Koops. Her guidance and patience during the many conversations we had, has steered me through difficult times. Easing the process and undoubtedly improving the result. Also, I would like to give thanks to my second supervisor Leon Hombergen for his support throughout the process. His position on the topic helped me place matters into perspective. Likewise, I am grateful for the supervision of my chair Marleen Hermans. Particularly for her welcomed criticism and suggestions on the topic.

Secondly, I would wholeheartedly thank all the people from DPI for welcoming me with open arms at their company and above all; their willingness to help. In particular, my supervisor Jesse Brandt that always seemed to sense when times got difficult for me. Herein, continually reminding me that he was there to help. Needless to say, his perseverance and kind-heartedness have been a huge gift in this process. Further, credits are due for the director of DPI Rob Vos, who has given me the opportunity to develop expertise on this topic. In this, granting me the freedom to pursue the research in the direction the members of the commission and I saw fit. Moreover, I would like to thank all the individuals from Rijkswaterstaat, Delfland and the Association of Water Boards for all of their time and efforts. Providing me with irreplaceable information on this topic.

Last and most definitely not least, I would like to thank all my family and friends. Many of you have truly been a lifeline for me. During this process in the midst of a pandemic, I have felt frustrated, miserable, lonely, and without all of your support – this process would have been unthinkable. I am beyond grateful to have you all in my life.

With this thesis I wanted to challenge myself and step out of my comfort zone. Too, studying this topic with an engineering mindsight did bring its challenges, but looking back , I am glad I did it. Now there leaves me nothing but to wish you a pleasant read.

Sebastiaan van Ham  
Delft, December 2021

# Summary

## Introduction

In his book, Pettigrew (1985) expressed his criticism that research on (organizational) changes was largely impaired due to its *ahistorical*, *acontextual*, and *aprocessual* nature. Later in Pettigrew (1990), he added that the failure to identify clear insights with respect to the phenomenon of change is caused by the tendency of researchers to focus too much attention on single change events in the design and execution of their research. In the main, change is an intricate and interconnected process with a multiplicity of research approaches. On that account, this research makes an effort to explore the phenomenon of change further by, among other things, include the critique of Pettigrew (1985) and Pettigrew (1990). What is more, considering that changes are ubiquitous and thus occurring on numerous levels within a broad spectrum of private, public, and not-for-profit organizations – this research has focussed on a specific type of change. Namely, changes at public authorities within the infrastructure sector with respect to their contract strategies. Herein, taking into the account the role of, for instance political, economic, or social macro external factors as well as internal factors such as the influence of the organizations culture. To define the research objective further, the term ‘infrastructure sector’ represents the Dutch infrastructure sector that is mainly active in the geo-, hydraulic-, and infrastructural engineering. In Dutch, this sector is commonly known as the *grond, weg, en waterbouw*. Moreover, the term contract strategy is defined as; *a set of institutionalized cooperative arrangements between public-sector actors and private-sector actors consisting of either a contract type, a procurement method and an award mechanism or any combination of those three*’. Moreover, continuing to the relevance of this research objective, traditionally - existing research on the studying change have been mainly adopting an institutional perspective. Meaning their starting assumption is that the nature of reality is external, objective and independent of social actors (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Concretely, this can be recognized in their predominate presumption that changes are ‘made to’ organizations. Therefore, one ought to focus on the external environment of organisation when considering changes. However, in doing so – the internal environment of organisation would be discerned, potentially leading to inconclusive answers. This is where a more recent perspective comes in; the change management perspective. A theory originating from the private sector arguing that changes can result from intrinsic motivation of organisation. Thereby, emphasising the intra-organizational environment of organization. By utilizing the framework from (Kuipers et al., 2014) that combines these two perspective, this research can effectively answer the main research question:

*What drives public authorities in the infrastructure sector to make changes in their contract strategy?*

## Research design

In the awareness of the complex multi-layered phenomena of change in the public sector, this deductive research adopted the theory of Kuipers et al. (2014) and implemented it for a holistic multiple case study. For the concretization of this holistic multiple case study, a total of three cases over different time periods have been reviewed. These were; the start of the Best Value Approach at RWS, the initiation of DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat, and the commencement of the Best Value at the Water Authority Delfland. In consideration of the exploratory nature of this research, the multi-method qualitative research strategy has been adopted, where both secondary and primary data have been gathered with respect to these three cases. Concretely, the secondary data collection method consisted of conducting a document analysis, where the majority of the information comes from primary sources, such as the strategy department of Rijkswaterstaat, Delfland and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water management. Moreover, semi-structured interviews have been conducted. In this, with regards to obtaining sufficient generalisation – the heterogeneous sample technique has been utilized, meaning both senior managers and team members have been interviewed at two organisations. Thereafter, both types of data have been analysed using the concept-driven analysis procedure, modelled accordingly to the five-factor framework of Kuipers et al. (2014). That, subsequently, will be introduced in the next paragraph.

## Theory

For their framework, Kuipers et al. (2014) analysed over 133 articles from the period 2000 to 2010. Already, a significant portion of their framework was largely based on theoretical issues raised by Pettigrew (1990) and Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron (2001) - who suggested that researchers should examine context, content, process, and outcomes when studying change. In addition to these four factors, Kuipers et al. (2014) recommended a fifth factor in

their conclusion: the role of the leadership. These five factors help to identify the specific characteristics related to change processes and implementation in organizations in a public context. Essentially, these five factors are a combination of the institutional theory and the change management theory. For clarities' sake, the theory of Kuipers et al. (2014) will in this research be referred to as the 'general change management theory'.

**(1) Context factor:** Scholars such as Walter J. M. Kickert and Van Der Meer (2011) remark that every change is embedded in an environment of actors, factors, and in a history. All of which help to understand what type and scale of change is taking place and the reference frames that can be applied. For this contextual reference frame in this research, a distinction is made between four levels; the societal, the national, the inter-organizational, and the intra-organizational level. Respectively ranging from the macro external environment towards the micro intra-organizational setting.


**(2) Content factor:** For this second factor, significant attention is granted to explore the 'what' and the 'why' of the change beforehand. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, several new contract strategies of the past decade have been reviewed. Accordingly, from these - the three cases have been decided upon.

**(3) Process of change:** The dominant way to refer to change approaches is the distinction between planned and emergent change (Burnes, 2004; Pettigrew et al., 2001). Starting with the planned process of change, the implementation of planned change is top-down and programmatic, in the sense that the objectives of change are formulated at the beginning of the change process (Van der Voet, 2014). In contrast, with the emergent process of change - objectives of change are mainly open ended, although a general direction is known (Van der Voet, 2014).

**(4) Leadership factor:** Closely interlinked with the process of change is the role of leadership. Which can either be seen as having driving role or a facilitating role. The driving role corresponds with a planned process of change; therein initiating change, envisioning the content of change, creating a sense of urgency, communicating the change, and role model during the process. While the facilitating role of a leader conforms with an emergent process, where the change is initiating and general direction is provided, responsibilities are dissolved accordingly, and participation is stimulated whereafter the leader takes a step back (Van der Voet, 2014).

**(5) Outcome factors:** Values are important to consider as potential drivers of change as public sector values can become an explicit factor in addressing change (Grimshaw, Vincent, & Willmott, 2002). For this inquiry, the three categories of public values from (Hood, 1991) have been adopted; the sigma, lambda, and theta values. Respectively, strive to keep in lean and purposeful, aspire to keep it honest and fair, intend to keep it robust and resilient.

For comprehensive purposes, the five factors from Kuipers et al. (2014) and their subfactors – have been illustrated in the figure down below.



## Findings

On the basis of the three cases, several findings are made. These are enumerated below in accordance with the five factor from Kuipers et al. (2014). In the subsequent section; the discussion, conclusion, and recommendation of these findings will be presented.

**(1) Context factor:** Firstly, in all of the three cases, the influence of the context factors in the process of change proved itself to be significant. To begin with the societal level, although the theoretical roots, the emphasis, the focus, and key resource mechanism of the different public paradigms were observable in key aspects of the contract strategies of the three cases – a distinctly defined influence of the paradigms could not be tested. Moreover, in view of the contextual factors on the national level, on average – a comparatively small number of factors have been found per case. Though, an a priori estimation on the basis of the document analysis appointed on average fourteen national factors per case as plausible drivers for the specific changes in contract strategy. However, by and large – only three of national contextual factors from the DESTEP analysis were reaffirmed by the respondents. These factors were mainly in relation to political and economic factors, and to a lesser extent; social factors. Meaning that merely 10% of the national factors was eventually recognized by the respondents as influential. Having said that, although the number of these national contextual factors was relatively low, their influence on the change process as stated by the respondents was significant. Moreover, with respect to the inter-organizational level, the role of consultancies, knowledge institutes, and think tanks – were in the three cases seen as insignificant. Mainly, those groups were on average later involved in the process. What is more, the intra-organizational factors were seemingly influential, particularly the aspiration to recede from a former organizational culture and to a lesser extent, the influence from aftereffects of reorganisations.

**(2) Content factor:** It was found that the influence of other contract strategy was less prominent. However, more recent changes saw greater influence of other discontent of existing contract strategy. In the main, the influence came from contract strategies from Anglo-Saxon countries.

**(3) Process of change:** It was found that all of the changes occurred bottom-up initiatives, where the role of administrative leaders was more prominent than that of political leaders. Moreover with concern to the internal process of change, these were in all cases a combination of planned and emergent processes. Firstly, resembling a planned process as the changes were clearly initiated by the top management executives and that communication about the vision of change was mainly top-down. Though, next to that, the processes of change also had some of the incremental character and the absence of highly specified, a-priori formulated change objectives. Also, after the initiations of the top management, the contents of change were mainly formed by active employees.

**(4) Leadership factor:** The leadership factor was distinctly notable in all of the processes of change. Herein, the vision of the top management provided the momentum to change, mainly via a combination an initial driving, followed by a facilitating role. Most notably, in the second case, the intrinsic drive of an individual member of the senior management can be seen as a direct trigger of the change. In turn, predominantly based on the personal believe system of that individual. Though only the leadership factor was mainly reactive in first and third case, there too – the individual visions of a top managers heavily influenced the final interpretation of the content of change.

**(5) Outcome factor:** It was found that the driving force of the predetermined outcome factor was significant in the processes of change. However in measuring this value-based factor – the three categories of Hood (1991) were not all encompassing.

## Discussion, conclusion, recommendation

Substantively, the conclusion for this research is two-folded, which is that public authorities are driven by extrinsic as well as intrinsic drivers. In two of the three cases, the effects of the (external) contextual factors could be seen as direct triggers in the process of change. However, this research found that the conjunction of these triggering factors was less intricated than priorly expected, only one or two macro external factors per case. More still, in the remaining case, the intrinsic motivation of the organisation could be seen as the principal driver of the change. However, this research found that the intrinsic drive from that organisation was, in turn – predominately based on the personal believe system of an individual leader. Although in theory, the main attention is focused on the roles, activities and behaviours of individuals, rather than an orientation that highlights the personality, character or traits of the leader (Burke, 2017). Therefore, for future research, the objectivistic-based positivism philosophy that predominately underlies both previously mentioned perspectives – should be complemented with more a subjectivistic-based research philosophies such as the social constructivism theory. In sum, future research that aims to identify driving factors for specific changes at public authorities, specifically for first and second order changes – should focus on both the macro level and micro level, in order to minimize the possibility of drawing unintentional preclusions. Therein, striking a balance between subjective and objective (primary) data.

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## Acronyms

<b>AWB</b>	<i>Association of Water Boards</i>
<b>BVA</b>	<i>Best Value Approach</i>
<b>CFO</b>	<i>Chief Financial Officer</i>
<b>DBB</b>	<i>Design, Bid, Build</i>
<b>DBFM</b>	<i>Design, Build, Finance, maintain</i>
<b>DC</b>	<i>Design and Construct</i>
<b>DESTEP</b>	<i>Demographic, Economic, Social, Ecologic, Technological</i>
<b>DG</b>	<i>Director General</i>
<b>DMT</b>	<i>Direction Management Team</i>
<b>DOEN</b>	<i>Project DOEN</i>
<b>DWA</b>	<i>Dutch Water Authority</i>
<b>EC</b>	<i>European Commission</i>
<b>EIB</b>	<i>Economisch Instituut voor de Bouw</i>
<b>EU</b>	<i>European Union</i>
<b>GDP</b>	<i>Gross Domestic Product</i>
<b>GWV</b>	<i>Grond, Weg en Waterbouw</i>
<b>HED</b>	<i>Head Engineer Director</i>
<b>HWPP</b>	<i>High Water Protection Program</i>
<b>INK</b>	<i>Instituut Nederlandse Kwaliteit</i>
<b>IT</b>	<i>Information Technology</i>
<b>KRW</b>	<i>Kaderrichtlijn Water</i>
<b>MEAT</b>	<i>Most Economic Advantageous Tender</i>
<b>NPG</b>	<i>New Public Governance</i>
<b>NPM</b>	<i>New Public Management</i>
<b>OCAI</b>	<i>Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument</i>
<b>PA</b>	<i>Public Administration</i>
<b>PIPS</b>	<i>Performance Information Procurement System</i>
<b>PPP</b>	<i>Public Private Partnerships</i>
<b>RWS</b>	<i>Rijkswaterstaat</i>
<b>UAV-IC</b>	<i>Uniforme Administratieve Voorwaarden – Integrated contracts</i>
<b>VUCA</b>	<i>Volatile Uncertain Complex Ambiguous</i>

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# Chapter 1 | Introduction

With the purpose of introducing the reader to the topic of this research, the introduction of this report is structured in the following way; at first, the reader is provided with the necessary research context (chapter 1.1). Next comes the research gap (chapter 1.2), indicating the missing links in the literature. Subsequently, the research objective (chapter 1.3) is formulated that is subsequently been subdivided into four sub questions. Thereafter, the research outset (chapter 1.4) is put forward, wherein the research methodology and research design are discussed. Lastly, this chapter closes with stating the relevance, focus, and scope of this inquiry (chapter 1.5).

## 1.1. Research context

In the following two section, the research context will be introduced. Herein, discussing developments surrounding the concept of change and moreover, development within the Dutch infrastructure concerning the contract strategies of public authorities.

### 1.1.1. Developments surrounding the concept of change

*'Time itself sets a frame of reference for what changes are seen and how those changes are explained'*. This is a line from the introduction of Pettigrew (1985), the book where he expressed his criticism that research on organizational changes was largely impaired due to its *ahistorical*, *acontextual*, and *aprocessual* nature. Later, he added in Pettigrew (1990) that the failure to identify clear insights with respect to the phenomenon of change is caused by the tendency of researchers to focus too much attention on single change events in the design and execution of their research. Though, to provide some context, the literature surrounding the phenomena of change is vast and researchers are confronted with a plethora of views. These academic disciplines include managerial, public administrative, organizational, institutional, psychological, leadership, network, complexity and chaos theory (Van der Voet, Kuipers, & Groeneveld, 2016). All of this makes it difficult to identify the specific characteristics related to change processes and implementation in organizations. For this reason, this research makes an effort to explore the phenomenon of change further by, among other things, include the critique of Pettigrew (1985) and Pettigrew (1990). Considering that changes are ubiquitous and thus occurring on numerous levels within a broad spectrum of private, public, and not-for-profit organizations – this research focussed on a specific type of change. Namely, changes at public authorities within the infrastructure sector. More specifically, changes related to the contract strategies. The subsequent section will provide some context on recent developments in the infrastructure sector with respect to the contract strategies of public authorities.

### 1.1.2. Developments within the infrastructure sector

In attachment A, an outline is provided of the historical development the past 75 years with significant social, economic, and political events. Moreover, in order to roughly portray the trend that has been spreading throughout the infrastructure sector, examples will be provided of changes within contract strategies. Herein, the term contract strategy broadly encompasses the aggregation of a contract type, a procurement method, and an award mechanism used in a tender. The examples provided will be in accordance with these three elements.

To start, the introductions of new contract types. Here, a trend can be observed to tighter integrations between project phases. Initially the public authorities themselves were responsible for the execution of the project design, but starting from the 1980s, the liking shifted more towards integrated contracts. Where at first only the design responsibility was transferred to the market (i.e. design & construct contracts), in later years, the responsibility for the maintenance and project finance was similarly transferred to the tenderer, in co-called DBFM projects. I

In addition, the procurement method has also seen some changes. Traditionally, projects were mainly procured via standard procurement procedures, meaning the selection of suppliers knows only one phase where tenderers can hand in tender documentation whereupon they will be evaluated. After the change of the millennium, procurement procedures that included some sort of dialogue between the contractor authority and the contractor gained popularity. This dialogue-driven element can also be recognized in contract strategies such as the Best Value Approach and the Project DOEN philosophy.

Lastly, the developments surrounding the awarding criteria in tenders. Whereas before projects were solely procured on the 'lowest price' criteria, the last decade and half have seen the introduction of the 'quality' component in a tender evaluation in one form or another. Although there have been several ways to asses this quality component – especially in relation to the price component – the tender documentation of the contractors will often be judged on the aspects such as risk management, stakeholders management, or overall sustainability of the design.

The paragraph above merely functions as an exemplification of recent changes in the contract strategies of public authorities in the infrastructure sector. However, over these past decade, the GWW sector have seen some notable changes. Changes that will be more explicitly discussed in chapter 3.

## 1.2. Research Gap

To start, the motives from public authorities to adopt new contract strategies as described above, seem - to the author's knowledge - not clearly explored yet. Especially not from a methodical point of view. For instance, the construction fraud of 2002 is often considered as having had a significant impact on the rise of integrated contracts or the usage of the 'most advantageous economic offer' (MEAT) award mechanism. However, this doesn't, for instance, explain the relatively large divergence in implementation date of certain contract strategies at different public authorities. To elaborate, the fact that Rijkswaterstaat implemented the MEAT awarding system in 2005, whereas many water boards only started doing so around 2012 (Crucq & Bossink, 2011; S. Hardeman, 2013). Hence, phenomenon such as these, raise the question; why though have two types of public authorities that are essentially working in the same sector, and are thus subjected to similar external factors, have such a significant time difference between changing their contract strategy? Moreover, while the construction fraud is a frequently heard incident, could there been other lesser-heard internal or external factors that acted as catalyst for similar changes in contract strategies? To name but a few, the effects of the gradual individualization of the public potentially effecting the decision to start adopting more alliance types of contract. Or, the effects of the Lehman crisis on the decision to adopt the Best Value approach? Lastly, besides external or internal factors, could there be other difference types of factors that influenced the contract strategies of the public authorities? On the whole, as could be observed - many aspects surrounding changes in contract strategies of public authorities are yet to be further investigated. This brings us to the second part of the research gap, an apparent methodological structure concerning the study of change appears to be largely missing. For instance, in existing research, such as Koppenjan and de Jong (2018) research on the introduction of public-private partnerships in The Netherlands, the ascent of new types of contract strategies appear not to have been studied according to a strict methodological framework. Considering the intricacy, multiplicity, and interconnectedness of a change process, this seems to be desirable.

## 1.3. Research Objective

In consideration of the research gap, a two-folded research objective will now be provided. Firstly, a theoretical framework will be devised, by which the specific characteristics related to any change process can be studied in a structured way. This framework will be in accordance to the theoretical issues raised by Pettigrew. Secondly, this theoretical framework will simultaneously be tested in this research by exploring specific cases. These cases will be the changes of public authorities in the infrastructure sector with respect to their contract strategies. At this point, the research objective can be summarized; exploring the drivers of public authorities in the infrastructure sector to start with new contract strategies. In this particular objective, there are some terms that need to be clearly defined, in order to minimize the unnecessary development of ambiguity. So, the term 'infrastructure sector' represents the Dutch infrastructure sector that is mainly active in the geo-, hydraulic-, and infrastructural engineering. In Dutch, this sector is commonly known as the *grond, weg, en waterbouw*. Moreover, the term contract strategy is defined as; *a set of institutionalized cooperative arrangements between public-sector actors and private-sector actors consisting of either a contract type, a procurement method and an award mechanism or any combination of those three*. For an explicit, theoretical substantiation of this last statement, the reader is referred to chapter 3. In any case, the research objective as stated in the preamble of this paragraph can now be translated into the following main research question:

### 1.3.1. Main research question:

*What drives public authorities in the infrastructure sector to make changes in their contract strategy?*

Up until chapter 3, this research will undertake a moderate holistic approach, essentially seeking to avoid precipitately converging to a certain time period. Instead, in order to manufacture a well-grounded decision, the definitive periods will be determined after the literature review and theoretical foundation. Here, the exploratory nature of the research shows through; commencing an initial broad focus, whereafter the focus narrows down as the research progress. Also, for readability purposes and to considerably keep this first part of the report concise, the chosen periods



– including the apropos contract strategies – will be stated in chapter 3. In order to promote a fluent inquiry process, the central research question has been split into four sub questions, as shown below;

### 1.3.2. Sub-research questions

1. What theoretical framework should be adopted when studying changes within public organisations?
2. What theoretical drivers can be found that explain the changes in the contract strategies of public authorities?
3. What practical drivers can be found that explain the changes in the contract strategies of public authorities?
4. What patterns can be identified when comparing the theoretical drivers and the practical drivers of public authorities to change their contract strategy?

At last, in the subsequent chapter, the research outset will be introduced that prudently introduces the reader to the research methodology and research design that have been adopted for this inquiry. Among other things, it discusses the different methods that were deemed necessary to obtain an answering the main research question. More still, the research outset clarifies the underlying reason behind dividing the main research question into these four sub questions.

## 1.4. Research outset

A vital part of every research is choosing the right methodology, that is the systematic strategy to achieve the decided research objective. In order to do so in a structured manner, the ‘research union’ of Saunders et al. (2009) has been utilized for this research. The Research Onion symbolically illustrates the ways in which different elements involved in the research could consecutively be examined to develop the research outset. Moreover, in doing so, it has enabled the researcher to choose most suitable theories or practices within existing layers in order to answer the research questions. Melnikovas (2018) adds to this that the step-by-step guide this model undertakes, is especially helpful for students and scholars new to the field of research, which indeed proved to be the case. The Union Research is depicted in Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1 - Research Onion (Saunders et al. (2019))

Turning to the actual structure of this model, the onion consist of six main layers. Each of these six elements will progressively be covered in this chapter. Hence, this section can simultaneously be viewed as the reading guide of this chapter. Before anything else, some terms that are used throughout this chapter, should be clearly specified beforehand. Particularly, what this research means by 'methods' and 'methodology', as in practice, these terms are occasionally used interchangeably (Saunders et al., 2009). So, to define methodology at first; it refers to the theory of how research *should* be undertaken. Whereas 'method' refer to techniques and procedures used to obtain and analyse data. With respect to the structuring of this chapter, the first section of this chapter will focus on the methodology, meaning the research philosophy and research approach that this inquiry has undertaken will be further discussed. Note that these are the two outer layers of the research onion. Thereafter, the research design will be covered, elaborating further on the definite decision of the research method, research strategy, time horizon, and the techniques and procedures. These, thereby, being the inner four layers of the research onion.

#### 1.4.1. Research methodology

At the outset of this inquiry, the research philosophy and the research approach have been considered. These two elements form the two outer peels of the research onion, depicted in Figure 1.1. To start with the first element of the two; it is important to acknowledge that in every research, assumptions will be made. Crotty (2020) states the following with regards to this; *'the assumptions about human knowledge and about the nature of the realities the researchers encounters in their research, inevitably shape how one understands the research questions, the methods, and how one interpret findings'*. In this, the researcher will be influenced by practical considerations. However, the main influence is likely to be the researchers particular view of what is acceptable knowledge and the process by which this is developed (Saunders et al., 2009). Here, Saunders et al. (2009) provide a suiting exemplification; *"a researcher who is concerned with facts - such as the resources needed in a manufacturing process - is likely to have a very different view on the way research should be conducted from a researcher concerned with the feelings and attitudes of the workers towards their managers in that same manufacturing process"*. The reason why this aspect is explicitly stated here at length, is the fact that this has proven to be, in retrospective, a fundamental predilection of the researcher. In the chapter Discussion and Recommendations, this will be further expounded upon. For now, it is important to acknowledge that this research has undertaken a rather positivism approach that mainly has leaned to the objectivistic view in relation to the nature of reality. In short, without starting a profound philosophical discourse; this represents the position that social entities exist in reality external to and independent of social actors (Saunders et al., 2009). Essentially, this research philosophy is of pertinence, considering it inevitably manifested itself in the direction this research has ultimately undertaken. What is more, now that the research philosophy has been clarified, the next peel of the onion can be considered, which is the research approach that has defined this research. As will be further elaborated upon in the upcoming chapter, this research has taken an existing theory (the 'general change management theory') and thereafter applied it to specific phenomena (changes in contract strategies of public authorities). Thus, it can be concluded that this research has undertaken a predominant deductive approach. Evincing this further, on the basis of the 'general change management theory', specific data has in due course been gathered. Whereafter, in the final stage of this research, a final judgement has been provided that argues if the chosen theory indeed proofs to be applicable for the specified cases. As stated just before, the exact plan will be further covered in the subsequent section; the research design.

#### 1.4.2. Research design

The main focus of this section is to further explore the research design that has been adopted for this research. The research design consist of four elements – the four inner peels of the research onion – that represent the methodical choice of the research, the research strategy, the time horizon, and lastly the techniques and procedures have been used. The main requisite of this research design is providing the justification for choosing particular options within each of these four elements. With that, this implies presenting a coherent link to the nature of the research question and the objectives, while also being consistent with the research philosophy and research approach that are mentioned in the previous section. For clarity's sake, the four elements have each been assigned an individual paragraph. The subsequent chapter will start with the methodical choice.

### *Methodical choice*

The methodical choice for a research is narrowly linked to both the research philosophy and the nature of the research itself. As the nature of the research is largely exploratory – coming from the fact that the precise drivers for the changes in contract strategies are lesser known – the purpose of the research emphasises the initial use and prioritisation of qualitative research (Saunders et al., 2009). In light of this, within business and management research, a new method is increasingly frequently advocated, as a respond to the ‘mono method’ methodological choice, named the ‘method choice’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). Considering that this method uses more than one data collection technique, this method is likely to overcome weaknesses associated with using only one method as well as providing scope for a richer approach to data collection, analysis and interpretation (Saunders et al., 2009). Something that is similarly in line with the positivistic research philosophy described earlier, as that philosophy emphatically considers the context of the research (Kaushik & Walsh, 2019). Another important to consider is the circumstances surrounding this particular research; the fact that the concept of ‘change’ can be seen as a complex process. Here, among other things, the complexity component of ‘change’ assumes different layers and interconnectedness that, to the positivist researcher, ought to be studied. Therefore, the possible chance of gaining a richer data collection using the ‘multimethod choice’ was welcomed. Finally, combing the advantages of the multimethod and the prioritisation of qualitative research, it would come as no surprise that the methodical choice that has been utilized for this inquiry is the ‘Multimethod qualitative study’.

### *Research strategy*

This section will bring the attention to research strategy that has been employed in this research. First and foremost, the research strategy is essentially a plan of action on how a researcher aims to achieve their research goal. Or to put it differently; the strategy that has been implemented to answer the main research and sub questions. Principally, it is the methodological link between your philosophy and subsequent choice of methods to collect and analyse data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Naturally, the research strategy should be guided by the research questions, as well as the research approach and research philosophy. Moreover, it is inherently concerned with more positivist consideration such as the extent of existing knowledge, the amount of time that is reserved for the research and lastly; what other resources are available (Saunders et al., 2009). Considering the exploratory and qualitative nature of this research – the author was of the opinion that the case study research strategy was the most advantage research strategy to adopt. To substantiate this decision further; case studies are according to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) preferable if the researcher wishes to gain a rich understanding of the context of the research and the processes that has been enacted. In turn, case studies are have the considerable ability to answer the ‘why’, ‘what’, and ‘how’ questions, making them suitable for exploratory researches (Saunders et al., 2009). Bearing in mind the multimethod qualitative study that has been argued for in the previous paragraph, the case study can be combined with different methods to collect and analyse data, as will be further discussed in the upcoming paragraphs. Lastly, case studies can be worthwhile to explore existing theory, making them suitable for deductive researches such as these. Where, in this particular case, the general change management theory has been adopted. Saunders et al. (2009) adds to this; *a well-constructed case study strategy enables a research to challenge an existing theory*. Though, between a case study, a further distinction had to be made. Yin (2009) states that there are four different types of case studies one can conduct;

- Single vs multiple case
- Holistic vs Embedded case

At this point in the research outset, a progressive transition can be made from a rather abstract research theory to the more practical decisions that largely have formed the final outcome of this research. That is to say; funnelling towards how exactly the research questions have been answered, and what the focus was. Started with the first distinction; single vs multiple case studies. The difference is obvious, the first studies a ‘critical’ or ‘unique’ case, whereas the multiple case study focusses on different cases in a single inquiry. Here, to avoid any ambiguity, the word ‘case’ can imply different things. For instance; any individual, group, organization, event, belief system, phenomenon or other real-life contexts. On the whole, this has been the first notable consideration that the researcher has undertaken. After all, this touches on the overall relevance and focus of the research. In any case, when conducting a research of like nature, it especially interesting to realize a comparison between different public authorities. Indeed, such a comparison between different public authorities operating in the same sector – with likewise similar contextual factor – could provide insight on potential differences in, among other things, motives. An additional benefit is that many of the factors stated in the ‘general change management theory’ are, theoretically, the same for these public authorities operating in the infrastructure sector. For that reason, the researcher wasn’t greatly burdened with extra work when gathering the

theoretical basis for this research, while still acquiring the arguably valuable outcome of a comparison, compared to solely a singular case. This introduces another consideration; whether cases have been chosen on the basis that similar results were predicted or not. Here, Yin (2009) makes a further distinction within a multiple case study; a literal replication or a theoretical replication. Where the literal replication opts to choose cases on the basis that similar results are predicted, the theoretical replication selects cases where a certain factor is deliberately different and the impact of which is anticipated in the findings (Saunders et al., 2009). The latter has ultimately been preferred, ensuing a selection of cases – in this case: public authorities in the infrastructure sector – that are notably different from one another. Eventually, both Rijkswaterstaat and the Waterboard Delfland have been considered in this research. For readability purpose, the further substantiation will be provided in the next chapter Relevance and Scoping. Next, Yin's second dimension (holistic vs embedded cases) will now be considered. This dimension refers to the unit of analysis. Essentially, an holistic case study considers, for this particular research, the organisation of a public authority as a whole, whilst the embedded case study focusses on sub-units within this particular organisation. For instance, examining solely the procurement department of an organisation. For this research, an holistic approach has been undertaken as the researcher valued the input of different departments within a certain organisation. In concluding, the research strategy that this research has undertaken can best be described as a holistic multiple case study.

#### *Time horizon*

Another important consideration has been deciding upon the time horizon of this research. In essence, there are two types of time horizon one can opt for in a research; cross-sectional or longitudinal. These dimensions indicate if a research has been conducted at a particular time (snapshot) or over a period of time (diary). The main strength of a longitudinal research is that it provides data on how certain variables over time. The latter being highly useful when a researcher studies an (ongoing) change or development. Nonetheless, this inquiry has focussed on time periods that have long past. Thereby, this type of research has little additional value for this particular research. Hence, the cross-sectional time horizon has been adopted.

#### *Data collection and analysis*

At last, the exact data collection techniques can now be specified. First and foremost, there are two types of data, that each have their strengths and weaknesses, namely; primary data and secondary data. Here, primary data is information that the researcher empirically gathered. Secondary data, on the other hand, is information that already has been gathered by someone else. Once obtained, these data can be further analysed to provide additional or different knowledge, interpretations or conclusions (Bulmer et al. 2009). For this particular research, in accordance with the multimethod system, both primary as secondary have been studied. Initially, secondary data has been gathered from public records and archival documents, often referred to as a documentation analysis. Secondary data in the form of such documents have numerous advantages. For instance, a well-gathered documentation analysis is an important source on key events chronologies and they often provide records for arguments or justification (Buchanan & Bryman, 2009). For this particular research, the documentation analysis has mainly been used for enquiry of the contextual factors. What is more, conducting the documentation analysis as a student has the additional advantage that sources of potential secondary data - and the ease of gaining access - have expanded rapidly alongside the growth of the internet (Saunders et al., 2009). Naturally, there are likewise some disadvantages with conducting a documentation analysis. Mainly, public records or archival documents can emphasize the 'official' truth and tend to gloss over conflict and complexity (Buchanan & Bryman, 2009). With respect to primary data, these have the advantage of being temporarily versatile. To elaborate, respondents can draw on their own memories and link phenomenon across time. Also, they can be multiplied easily, providing different perspectives on temporarily embedded phenomenon (Buchanan & Bryman, 2009). There are numerous pathways to gather primary data, examples of which are; surveys, questionnaire, or interviews. Evidently, the preferred method mainly relates to the nature of the research, the research strategy, and the methodical choice. In this case, interviews were the favourable method considering the qualitatively-driven, exploratory nature of this research. Moreover, concerning this particular topic, it was foreseeable that, for every case, there were only a small number of individuals that could be considered 'experts' on the topic. Hence, the principal advantage of a survey or questionnaire – being able to gather data from large variety (sample) of respondents – has little to no additional benefit for this particular case. Moreover, some forms of interviews have the advantage of being non-standardised. From this perspective, the researcher has the possibility to intentionally focus more on particular questions or themes or purposely omitting certain questions when the researcher sees fit. Something that can be useful when conducting an exploratory research where little definitive literature is available. Or, in the occasion that specific

organisational context or roles of interviewee differ. Lastly, between non-standardized interviews, the last decision had to be made for either semi-structured or unstructured interviews. Taking into account that, prior to the interview rounds, general theories and secondary data have already been gathered that deepened the knowledge of the researcher. Thus, enabling him to predetermine a list of questions organized by certain themes – and thereby providing a rather specific direction of the interview – the usage of unstructured becomes obsolete. Nonetheless, similar to secondary data, primary data have also some drawbacks. Namely, (semi-structured) interviews are artificial interactions that can be influenced by lapses of memory, impression management, the moods of participants, and the quality of the rapport between interviewer and interviewee (Buchanan & Bryman, 2009). All things considered, opting for secondary and primary data – or more precisely: a documentation analysis and semi-structured interviews – triangulation can be achieved. Simply put by Saunders et al. (2009); *the use of different data collection techniques within one study in to ensure that the data are telling you what you think they are telling you*. Lastly, the analysis method that will be conducted for this research is concept-driven. Meaning data categories are developed in advance by consulting the literature. For this particular research, the five change management factors from Kuipers et al. (2014) are used for this. Concludingly, the research outset described in this chapter is recognizable in the structuring of this report. In summary, in line with the deductive research approach, a theory ('the general change management theory') has been adopted that – after having gathered the primary and secondary data – will evidently be verified or falsified for these particular cases. Thereby answering the first sub question. These theories will be further discussed in chapter 2. Thereafter comes the gathering of secondary data, mainly through the use of public records and archival documents. This will answer the second sub question and be depicted in chapter 3. Next, on the basis of semi-structured interviews, primary data will be obtained, that in due course will answer the third research question. Lastly, the secondary and primary data will be analysed using the concept-driven analysis procedure, and so, satisfy the fourth sub question. In consideration of this method, the main research question will at last be answered in chapter 6.

## 1.5. Framing, relevance, and scoping

In the research outset, it was already briefly introduced that, in order to make the research objective more concrete and achievable for a master thesis, this inquiry will focus after the document analysis on both Rijkswaterstaat and the Waterboard Delfland. Rijkswaterstaat is the executive agency of the ministry of Infrastructure and Water State and holds, in their own words; *the social task of preserving and improving the Dutch infrastructure network to the utmost standard*. Herein, the infrastructure sector (Dutch: GWW sector) forms the largest domain of their procurement portfolio. The Waterboard Delfland on the other hand is – together with 20 other water boards - in charge of maintaining the quality and quantity of the surface water in The Netherlands (Warner, Winnubst, & Roth, 2008). Whereas Rijkswaterstaat works on a national level, the Waterboard of Delfland is, as the name suggest, responsible for the region of Delfland, a region roughly spanning from The Hague, to Rotterdam to 'Hoek van Holland'. At this point, the question can be raised why only a single water board will be studied. Here, it is important to initially note that the comparison itself is already more engaging than a 'ordinary' evaluation of a single public organization. Of course, the research could have broadened the focus towards a greater number of DWAs, or perhaps even to municipalities and provinces. But having said that, this research requires prospectively numerous rounds of interviews per type of organization. In addition, various roles between to personnel ought to be interviewed as a means to gain a respectable perspective on the development surrounding the changing process. Next to that, an extensive document analysis needs to be carried out. Taking all of these prerequisites into account and considering the prescribed duration of a master's thesis, only a single DWA could be further investigated.

Attentive readers might at this point question the overall relevance of bringing forward these two particular organisations as cases for public authorities, eventually indirectly comparing them. A valid point, considering the diverging characters of the two. To mention just a few disparities; average project turnover, the magnitude of commissioned contractors, the frequency of large-scale projects, and the autonomy of the organizations. Nonetheless, and above all, these divergences do not necessarily hinder the equivalence - but rather spike more curiosity towards the possible effects of them. And so, are worthwhile to juxtapose for scientific purposes. To clarify, such a juxtaposition illustrates how practically similar macro environmental factors influenced the contract strategy of the two public organizations possibly different. All the more relevant, considering that RWS as a contract authority, is too often contemplated as an exemplification of how public commissioning should be undertaken. Whereas, it would arguably be equally worthwhile to study the rationale of other public authorities. What is more, transition to the broader relevance of

conducting suchlike research – it will provide the building blocks for future, more in-depth research on change processes at public authorities. By all means, completely explaining to the utmost detail why and how changes at public authorities with respect to, for instance, their contract strategy actually took place – would be ideal. Nonetheless, conducting this type of explanatory research – or even a descriptive research – requires exploratory research such as this. That is to say, the theoretical framework from this research can in future research be used to, for example, gather quantitative data. More still, the framework can even be used in future longitudinal research, where researchers measure if the influence of the factors of this framework change over time.

Lastly, this chapter closes with stating what falls outside the scope of this research. For the reason to eliminate detrimental confusion as much as possible. So, firstly, this research will not focus on the fact if a certain contract strategy is correctly implemented in the field by either public organization. Secondly, this research won't substantiate how a change should be implemented to achieve success. Thirdly and lastly, evaluating the effectiveness and overall success of a contract strategy will similarly fall outside the scope of this research. Now that the relevance, focus and scoping have been established, the subsequent chapter can introduce the theories that are concerned with studying change.

## Chapter 2 | Literature review

In the previous chapter, the research approach and nature of the research have been recognized; essentially a deductive approach with an exploratory nature. To explore the facets of a deductive research further, Saunders et al. (2009) state that a deductive research should have four characteristics; a highly structured methodology, incorporation of the principle of reductionism, utilize the operationalization of concepts, and make use of overall generalisation. The first characteristic (structured methodology) has already been regarded in the research outset and is key to facilitating replication and thus ensure reliability (Gill & Johnson, 2002). The second and third characteristic, principle of reductionism and the operationalisation of concepts will be touched upon in this chapter, while the last characteristic (overall generalisation) will be discussed in chapter 4. So, firstly, citing the traditional meaning of the principle of reductionism; the idea that problems as a whole are better understood if they are reduced to the simplest possible elements (Saunders et al., 2009). As will become apparent when reading through the first section of this chapter, (traditional) reductionism cannot be applied when studying a concept such as 'change'. Rather, several academics argue that 'change' follows the principles of complexity theory. Thus, the main challenge was finding a theory that endorses those principles. Moreover, the operationalization of the concept of change will be taken in consideration. Operationalisation can be seen as the translation of concepts into tangible indicators of their existence (Saunders et al., 2009). Meaning, although the concept of change cannot merely be reduced further without losing its essence – can something be said about the degrees of a 'change'? Both of these characteristic will be discussed in the first section of this report. The second section of this report will introduce a theory that touches upon these two characteristics. Hereby, providing a framework of five (change management) factors by which changes at public authorities can further examined. Evidently, offering a stepping stone for the future document analysis. In turn, the third section of this research will introduce a (unrelated) theory by which this document analysis can be systematically conducted. Lastly, the conclusion of this chapter will answer the first sub question.

### 2.1. The concept of change

Without the use of apparent demarcated definitions, the research topic becomes ever more prone to eventually culminating into an unfeasible research, particularly so for a master's thesis such as this one. Hence, firstly, the concept of change calls for further exploration. Along these lines, this sub chapter starts with briefly analysing two different theories that currently dominate this particular academic field. Both of which concerned with studying 'change', be it in a different manner. Central to this comparison are comparatively recent insights surrounding the very nature of 'change' (reductionism vs complexity). After that, an essential criterion will be provided that describes how various changes can be classified (i.e. operationalisation). Following this, a general framework will be presented that, to an extent, integrated the two fields of study mentioned earlier. While doing so, specifically focussing on how change ought to be studied when considering public organisations.

#### 2.1.1. Administrative reform perspective vs change management perspective

The available literature on change management is vast, with lengthy debates of what counts as change and what not (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Here, containing many interpretive and positivist methodologies, along with backgrounds in managerial, public administrative, organizational, institutional, psychological, leadership, network, complexity and chaos literature (Van der Voet et al., 2016). Nonetheless, the intention of this chapter is to initially provide an explicit and succinct clarification on the two different perspectives regarding the study of 'change', whereafter the chapter will introduce a framework that aspired to combine both.

Traditionally, studying change in the public sector belongs to the field of public management or administrative reform perspective (G. Boyne, Farrell, & Law, 2003; Walter J. M. Kickert, 2000; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). In these fields, the institutional theory is dominant. This field tends to focus more often on reforms on the national or sector level, rather than change on the organizational level (Van der Voet, 2014). Also, the administrative reform perspective mainly highlights the macro content and focuses on specific rational reasons for organizational change. However, in recent years, a growing number of studies have adopted a change management perspective in order to study organizational change in public organizations (Coram & Burnes, 2001; Klarner, Probst, & Soparnot, 2008; Sminia & Van Nistelrooij, 2006). This field of study was initially involved in the private sector. In contrast with the reform perspective, the empirical focus in change management perspective is on the organizational or intra-organizational level (Van der Voet, 2014). Thereby focusing on the processes of change and the driving force of the top management. unsurprisingly, the theory

that underlies the change management perspective is often referred to as the change management theory (Van der Voet et al., 2016).

Both perspective – and the underlying theories - have their strong points and weaknesses. Still and all, if only one of these theories would be used to study change in the public sector, some data would possibly be overlooked. Or stated differently by Kuipers et al. (2014); *"If change is consequently studied on the macro-level, such as in the reform literature prescribes, attention to micro-processes seems to almost automatically be absent. However, too much attention given to the micro-level often disregards the broader context"*. Therefore, this research will use a framework by Kuipers et al. (2014) that aims to combine both macro and micro aspects that are involved in examining the emergences behind the phenomenon of change. On the whole, both fields of study have seen some significant degree of revision in the past half a century. Initially, researchers were focusing on finding direct linear correlations were usually 'management is in control', in the literature this is called a directing image regarding change. However, Pettigrew (1990) broke with tradition by writing a critical response wherein he suggested that the failure to identify clear insights was caused by the tendency of researchers to focus too much attention on single change events in the design and execution of their research. More or less from that time onwards, there arose a growing realization that change should be seen as a complex process (Pascale, 1990; Rumelt, 1991; Senge, 1997). More recent research (e.g. Grobman (2005)) has considered the emerging field of complexity theory and the associated development of the new sciences as a source of understanding change. Complexity theory states that since a certain phenomenon classifies as a complex process, the only thing one knows, is that it cannot exactly predict the outcomes of such a process. In view of this, it should be mentioned that the change management theory - and to a lesser extent institutional theory - is most often used as an ex-ante tool. For example, how should a (financial) manager act in the starting phase of an experimental investing process to achieve success. This is a situation that requires forecasting (predictive) of some sort. Nonetheless, this research uses an ex-post methodology. Hence, the ability to flawlessly predict a situation is not necessarily a requisite for this study, given the fact that this study performs a so-called 'back-cast'. That is; a retrospective approach. Therefore, a significant proportion of the ongoing academic debate can, to a certain extent, be evaded. Still, Kuipers et al. (2014) demonstrated that sensibly combining both theories, a fitting scientific framework can be obtained for this type inquiry. Mainly, since the rationale behind an ex-ante methodology might similarly work for an ex-post analysis.

### Combing two perspectives

A general critique in the field of administrative reform perspective is that most (large-scale) change management literature focuses on business side instead of the public sector (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Todnem, 2005). Given that this research focuses on public bodies - the adopted theoretical framework should naturally typify the public sector as such. There are crucial differences between business and the public sector. Some of the fundamental differences between private and public organizations are the political context of democracy (parliament, politics, and politicians) and the juridical context of 'Rechtsstaat' (legislation, rules, bureaucracy) (Kuipers et al., 2014). In any regard, for the framework in Kuipers et al. (2014), the researchers analysed over 133 articles from the period 2000 to 2010. On their part, a significant portion of their framework was largely based on theoretical issues raised by Pettigrew (1990) and Pettigrew et al. (2001) - who suggested that researchers should examine context, content, process, and outcomes when studying change. In addition to these four factors, Kuipers et al. (2014) recommended a fifth factor in their conclusion: the role of the leadership. These factors may help to identify the specific characteristics related to change processes and implementation in organizations in a public context. Essentially, these five factors are a combination of the institutional theory and the change management theory. For clarities' sake, the theory of Kuipers et al. (2014) will from now on in this research be referred to as the 'general change management theory'.



Figure 2.1 - Change management factors of Kuipers et al. (2014)



*Orders of change: Three orders of content factors*

In the beginning of this chapter, the four characteristics that are imperative for any deductive research approach were introduced. In light of this, in the previous section, a case was made how the principle of reductionism isn't ideal when studying a concept such as 'change'. Instead, the 'general change management theory' was adopted that, in turn, endorses the principle of the complexity theory. The third characteristic, the operationalisation of the concept of change - will be remarked in this chapter. To reiterate quickly; operationalisation should be seen as the translation of concepts into tangible indicators of their existence (Saunders et al., 2009). Simply put; can 'change' be classified by some measurement? Against this background, Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) have drawn-up an useful classification system; the nature of the change encountered by an organization. Firstly established by Bartunek and Moch (1987) and now considered virtually fundamental, change can be differentiated between different 'orders'. In total three distinct order were identified: sub-system change (first order), organization change (second-order), and sector change (third-order). The first order changes are described as adaptation of systems or structures, wherein the change is characterized as incremental process. What is more, the second order are viewed as transformational changes on affect the entire organization. Lastly, whenever an entire identity of an organization changes and the effects are notable in the complete sector, one speaks of third order changes. On the whole, Table 2.1 summarizes the descriptions of the three orders of change. Important to emphasize is this system is merely a general instrument to classify changes. In case of this research, it will become useful when making distinctions between the differences in 'content of change' factors.

*Table 2.1 - Orders of change (Kuipers et al., 2014)*

Order	Description	References
1st: Sub-system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation of systems or structures</li> <li>Occurs within part of an organization or subsystem</li> <li>Is incremental</li> </ul>	(Burnes, 2004; Carnall, 2007; Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 2011)
2nd: Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Movement in core organizational paradigms</li> <li>Organization-wide</li> <li>Whole systems change</li> </ul>	(Burnes, 2004; Carnall, 2007; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995; Watzlawick et al., 2011)
3rd: Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cross-organizational change</li> <li>Change spans specific organizational boundaries</li> <li>Affects many organizations/sector- wide change</li> </ul>	(Gratton, 2005; Tsoukas & Papoulias, 2005)

**2.1.2. General change management theory**

In this section of the report, the five factor from the 'general change management theory' of Kuipers et al. (2014) will be further elaborated upon. Concurrently, illustrating their relation to the concept of change. This section will commence with the context factor.

*Context: Four levels of contextual factors*

Scholars such as Walter J. M. Kickert and Van Der Meer (2011) with an predominately institutionalist perspective, remark that every change is embedded in an environment of actors, factors, and in a history. All of which help to understand what type and scale of change is taking place and the reference frames that can be applied. For this contextual reference frame, four different levels are depicted that are based on the framework of Hartley, Butler, and Benington (2002). These are; the societal level, the national level, the inter-organizational level, and the intra-organizational level. The first three level can also be seen as external contextual factors, as they originate from the external environment and are in most cases outside the control of the organization. The contextual factor on the intra-organizational level can also be viewed as internal contextual factors. For the purpose of comprehensibility, an example for every of the four levels will be provided. The uppermost level is the societal level that – is rather theoretically defined by Alford and Friedland (1985) as – a complex pattern of interinstitutional relations, encompassing a multiplicity of value spheres, each associated with a distinctive set of material practices and symbolic constructions. Simply put, these are the model and menus that shape, constrain and facilitate structures and actions at lower levels (Hartley et al., 2002). For this particular research, the primary focus is on models and menus related to 'Western society'. To clarify this further by way of an example, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) identify the New Public Management (NPM) movement – a world-wide reform trend in the public sector – as a significant context issue. In brief, underlying these reforms is a managerial logic

which implies that government organizations should be more based on business-like values, rather than Weberian, bureaucratic principals (Wise, 2002). These reforms are aimed at making government organizations more efficient, cost-effective and client oriented (Walter J. M. Kickert, 2000). Authors such as J. P. Meyer, Srinivas, Lal, and Topolnytsky (2007) have argued that the NPM reform does not only result in the implementation of new organizational forms or managerial practices, but that those reorientations may also imply a change in the central values or organizational identity of public organizations. Thus, to a certain extent, the NPM reform may entail the radical transformation of public organizations (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). At this point, the concepts evolving around the societal level might, at this point – be somewhat incomprehensible. Nonetheless, these will be further discussed in chapter 3.1. To continue, the second level describes contextual factors on the national level. Contextual levels on the national level could be described as macro external factors. Examples of which are; the introduction of the network society, increasing citizen participation, or a movement towards more governmental transparency. In addition, policy changes, changes in financing, and new regulations implemented by central governments (often by EU regulation in European countries) can also be seen as contextual drivers of change (Reichard, 2003). The third level is concerned with contextual factor take place on the inter-organizational level. For example, certain literature on organizational change in public contexts shows how the role of complex stakeholder networks, and their competing values, may affect not only the shape and occurrence of change but also, directly, the process of implementation (Grimshaw et al., 2002; Van der Voet et al., 2016). What is more, environmental characteristics not only affect network arrangements (T.-Y. Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006), but participation in the network also shapes the context of the change in which the organization is an actor (Downe, Hartley, & Rashman, 2004; Grantham, 2001). Fourthly and lastly, the intra-organizational level; describing the contextual factors that are within the direct environment of the organisation. These can, for example, include levels of formalization and centralization, managerial attitudes toward change, and organizations' prior change history (Reichers, Wanous, & Austin, 1997). At this point, it might become apparent that obtaining information with regards to the four levels of context factors, requires executing a thorough document analysis. This will be discussed in the chapter 3.

#### *Content factor: Changes in contract strategy*

The content factor describes what is changing in an organization. Examples of content of change are organization's strategies, structures, and systems (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). Essentially, the content of the change is one of the main issues in the administrative reform literature but also receives considerable attention in the change management literature (Van der Voet, 2014). As already mentioned earlier, when analysing this particular change management factor, it is practical to distinguish between the three order orders of change (see Table 2.1). For the first-order changes, the change is limited to sub-systems or organizational processes. For instance, the introduction of new process, systems, and procedures. Although first-order changes might be introduced in an entire sector, they often also do not change the organization or sector as a whole (Kuipers et al., 2014). What is more, the second-order change are more substantial than the first-order and include, for example reorganizations. Such a transformational change often triggers an organizational wide change, wherein core organizational paradigms or cultures might shift. Last of all comes the third-order changes. These transformations include sizeable changes that can be characterized by complete identity changes of organizations and affect numerous organizations across the sector or beyond. Public service reforms in general, privatization of public organization, the mergers of government organization or EU reforms are all examples of third-order changes. In any regard, for this particular inquiry, the content factor will be the contract strategies of public organisations. Something that will be further defined in chapter 3.

#### *Process of change: planned or emergent?*

The content of change that is described in the previous paragraph, refers to what changes in an organization, while the process of change refers to how organizational changes come about (Van der Voet et al., 2016). Similarly, as for the content of change factor, the process of change factor is in some literature grouped into three areas of focus, be it that they are different than the content of change factor. The literature on organizational change offers many different theories and approaches about how the process of (organizational) change comes about (Boonstra, 2012). The dominant way to refer to these anti-typical change approaches is the distinction between planned and emergent change (Burnes, 2004; Pettigrew et al., 2001). For this, Kuipers et al. (2014) uses the three following groups: planned versus emergent change processes, resistance to change, and factors defining the success or failure of the change implementation. The last two of these groups are of minimal interest for this research, as determining the success or failure of the implementation of new contract strategy falls outside of the scope of this research and will therefore not be covered in this report. What is important, however, is the planned versus emergent change process, as will become clear shortly. Starting with the planned process of change, this implementation method relies heavily on the role of (top)

management. The implementation of planned change is top-down and programmatic in the sense that the objectives of change are formulated at the beginning of the change process (Van der Voet, 2014). Basically, objectives are described before the organizational change is instigated, and managers try to convince employees of the desirability of the change by emphasizing the contents of the change (Van der Voet, Groeneveld, & Kuipers, 2014). Hence, this implies that the process and the content of change are related. On the whole, this perspective leans greatly on the (private) change management theory. In contrast, with the emergent process of change, the change comes about through the participation of employees (Van der Voet, 2014). Employees are thus not seen as passive recipients of the organizational change, but as active participants in the change process (Russ, 2008). Essentially, Bottom-up tactics for organizational change involve sharing power and decision-making (Packard, Patti, Daly, Tucker-Tatlow, & Farrell, 2007). What is more, managers - rather than being drivers of change as in the planned change approach - are facilitators of change (Higgs & Rowland, 2005). What is more, the content of an emergent change is often not the starting point, but rather an outcome of an emergent change process. For illustrative purposes, the most relevant differences are shown in Table 2.2. Furthermore, it should be noted that when identifying if a change is planned or emergent, the national culture plays a significant role. The country-specific culture can influence the trajectories of public management reforms. More majoritarian-based systems often exhibit rapid, 'top-down' (Hill & Hupe, 2014). However, consensus-based systems might exhibit slower, 'bottom-up' patterns of reform (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). For example, Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) showed that all of the reforms in the Netherlands (and most in Switzerland) were bottom-up innovations involving informal and voluntary reform cooperation, their major driving forces are administrations, and they are characterized by passive politicians, municipal think tanks, the late involvement of academics, and the strong influence of consultants. In closing, identifying the direction of the change process will benefit in pinpointing the actual motives of public authorities to change their contract strategy, as the researcher would roughly know where the change movement originated.

*Table 2.2 - Planned and emergent processes of change (Van der Voet, 2014)*

	Planned change	Emergent change
<i>Direction of change process</i>	Top-down	Bottom-up
<i>Objectives of change</i>	Objectives are formulated in detail at the beginning of the change process	Objectives of change are open ended, although a general direction is known
<i>Emphasis on</i>	Content of change	Process of change
<i>Role of management</i>	Driver of change	Facilitator of change
<i>Role of employees</i>	Passive recipients	Active participants
<i>Scope</i>	Change is programmatic and organization-wide	Local differentiation between departments may exist

#### *Leadership: The role of the leader*

Leadership in the frame of reference of change, is commonly conceptualized as a specific form of behaviour and activities aimed at initiating or advancing the implementation of change (Van der Voet, 2014). In the context of public sector organizations, scholars differentiate between political leadership and administrative or bureaucratic leadership (Trottier, Van Wart, & Wang, 2008; Van Wart, 2003). Essentially, political leadership is necessary in the decision-making phase of public sector reforms, whereas administrative leaders are able to influence the content of change during the implementation phase (Ahmad & Cheng, 2018). Askim, Christensen, Fimreite, and Læg Reid (2009) make herein a more precise connection, stating that organizational (in first- and second-order) changes, administrative leadership is emphasized, but in sectoral (third-order) changes, the role of politicians is more prominent. As has already been revealed in the previous paragraph, the exact task for the leadership is to a large extent dependent on the underlying process of change (Planned vs emergent change). Depending on this, the influence of leadership can be either seen as a driver of change or facilitator of change. What is more, the significance of the leadership as a driver of change has been notably pronounced in the change management theory, and less so in the institutional theory. For instance, Fernandez and Rainey (2006) and (Walter J. M. Kickert, 2010) state that organizational change is mainly generated by the intentional actions of agents. Stewart and Kringas (2003) add to this that the leadership is often described from a 'heroic', vertical perspective in the change management literature. With little consideration for different types of leadership, for example; shared, distributed or team leadership (Jackson & Parry, 2011). However, leadership is also needed during emergent processes of change. Rather, than acting as 'hero' or 'prime mover', emergent processes of

change ask for a sense maker who redirects change (Weick & Quinn, 1999). On a final note, leadership can take place on different hierarchical levels in the organization, and is not necessarily reserved to individuals with the highest formal management position (Van der Voet, 2014). In light of this, Burke (2017) argue that higher-level leadership may be especially important during the beginning or initiation of organizational change, but that middle and lower level managers are more important during the implementation of change. Though, in this research, the role of the leadership will be reserved for the senior management or members of the board. In summary, the lesson is that the planned and emergent processes of change do not necessarily consist of different activities. Rather, change leadership activities in emergent processes of change are performed in a different way and on different organizational levels (Van der Voet, 2014). Thereby, in emergent change, a considerable challenge for the senior management is to balance between delegating responsibilities but showing support, and stimulating lower level organizational members to take on the role of leader (Van der Voet, 2014). The characteristics of the role of the leadership of each approach are summarized in Table 2.3. What is more, when reviewing the literature on leadership, the main attention is focused on the roles, activities and behaviours of individuals, rather than an orientation that highlights the personality, character or traits of the leader (Burke, 2017). Concludingly, for this research, the leadership factor will be subdivided into three factors; the role of the leadership, the vision of the leadership, and lastly; changes in leadership. The latter could technically also be seen as a contextual (reorganisation) factor, but considering the change of leadership occurs on the actor level – it will be included in the leadership factor.

*Table 2.3 - Role of the leadership (Van der Voet, 2014)*

	Driver	Facilitator
<b>Senior management</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Initiating change</li> <li>- Envisioning the content of change</li> <li>- Creating a sense of urgency</li> <li>- Communicating change</li> <li>- Role modelling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Initiating change and providing direction</li> <li>- Devolving responsibilities</li> <li>- Stimulating participation</li> <li>- Taking a step back but showing support</li> </ul>

*Outcome factor: Value-based*

The fifth and last of the change management factors used in the framework is the outcome of the change. Researchers are often interested in the outcomes of organizational change, in order to estimate in which the degree of an organizational change has made a difference (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). In evaluating this, researchers often use the terms ‘success’ or ‘failure’ to address the outcomes of change. As already mentioned, numerous times, whether or not a change of contract strategy can be seen as successful, is not purpose of this inquiry. However, examining the outcome of the change may assist in discovering some underlying reasons (in relation to the content or context of change) and therefore should not be disregarded completely. So, having considered the difference between planned and emergent change in the previous paragraph, we can consider two different outcome criteria. To reiterate the concept of the planned change approach briefly, change begins within the remarking a (undesirable) present situation. From this situation, an image is formed of the (desired) future situation. Hence, for planned change approaches, results are planned in advance (Kuipers et al., 2014). The outcomes of these approaches can be seen as traditional criteria such as greater profitability or increased client satisfaction and are therefore easily examined. With the emergent change approach, outcomes are not previously determined but emerge and are defined as the change process evolves. Accordingly, the outcome of an emergent approach is much harder to assess, using the ‘traditional’ criteria such as client satisfaction, profitability, etc. This is why some authors argue that focusing on (changing) values such as efficiency, transparency, or equity - seems to be an appropriate mechanism for examining these types of changes (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). In general, values are important to consider as potential drivers of change as, according to Grimshaw et al. (2002) - public sector values can become an explicit factor in addressing change. Advantageously, this has another (practical) benefit for the interviews that will be conducted in a later phase. To clarify, an equitable estimation will be that the median interviewee is not equipped with in-depth knowledge concerning the different public paradigms (New public Management, New public Governance, etc). Thus, questioning what the effects of the societal contextual factors where on changes in contract strategies seems unproductive. However, asking if the interviewee perceived a transformation in the (core) organizational values seems more sensible. Ergo, using certain value-base questions in the interview might be effective to indirectly measure the effects that the public paradigms had on the decision-making. The

categories of the (public) values will be discussed in chapter 3. Lastly, this literature review expanded the scheme of change management factors, the result of which is depicted in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2 - Five factors from (Kuipers et al., 2014) with added sub factors

#### Interplay between change management factors

In the previous section of this chapter, it was already stated that the theories surrounding the concept of change have shifted from linearly, single event thinking towards embracing the interconnectedness of multiple events, arising from the complexity theory. Almost by definition, this has the effect that the interconnectedness between the different change management factors might initially be difficult to grasp. Therefore, in an attempt to clarify potential doubtfulness, two simplified scenarios will be provided that serve as an example that outline the difference between the sequence of events of both planned and emergent changes. Herein, mainly illustrating how change management factors are placed in different orders, depending on if the change is planned or emergent.

Starting with the series of events in a planned change; the (top) management analyse the present position of the organisation (Context of change) → Identifies the desired future state (predetermining outcome of change) → determines what needs to be changed (content of change) → specifies course of action (process of change and role of leadership) → Realizes change (actual outcome of change). As might be apparent, this is more or less a linear sequence of events, where the initial drivers – in this specific example is the context of change determined by the top management – is reasonably straightforward to determine. Now, in contrast, let us run through a possible sequence of events of an emergent change. At any given point in time, several (influential) employees feel that the organisations need to re-align with its changing environment (context and process of change) → there is a wish to revive traditional public values in the organisation (outcome of change) → (Top) managers take notice and may facilitate emergent change (Role of leadership) → Ultimately, the wish for revival of traditional public values results in new contract strategy (content of change). So, what are the key take-aways from these two scenarios? First, it should be noted that the roles of the (top) management differ in the planned and emergent change; one being a driver and the other being the facilitator. Second, values can be seen as explicit drivers, particularly when public organisations work in networks or alliances with other public bodies (Grimshaw et al., 2002). An explanation for this regression comes from researchers such as Reay and Hinings (2009) and Liguori (2012) that argue how the introduction of managerial principles conflicts with more traditional, administrative values in public service organizations. Greater still, R. E. Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006) state that strategic reorientations resulted from, for example the NPM paradigm- may have also implied a change in the central values or identity of an organisation. In other words, an introduction or shift from a public paradigm can be a (societal) contextual factor or as an content of change. Or in other words, for one particular research, public sector reforms can be seen as third order content factor, while for another research, it is a (societal) contextual factor. At this point, a previous made comment might finally make more sense; that different undulating events (contents of change) can be seen as contextual factors from each other. Hence, the metaphor of a wavefield of different sinuses. The 'heights' of the sinuses refer to the order of changes and, according to Kuipers et al. (2014), give

us already some sort of sense how the process of each change came about. At last, at this stage it might become clear that there is no distinct set of rules to comprise the five change management factors. Or, how Van der Voet et al. (2016) formulates it; *the theory of change management [and therefore the framework it produces] is internally incoherent*. Largely, this is, they argue; *due to the fact that the theory of change management is informed by distinct academic disciplines, and therefore – is often studied based on different epistemological and ontological traditions*. Simply put, researchers among themselves have a different view on the nature of reality or being and, moreover; what constitutes as acceptable knowledge. Among other things, this results in a different distinction of certain change management factors. So, forestalling to descend into another unavailing methodological debate, and to obviate further ambiguity; this research has adopted a particular way of depicting the five management factors, one of which is worth mentioning. So, the different values that are associated with the three paradigms will be seen as 'outcome factors'. To clarify this decision further, the outcome of change factor used in the general change management theory of Kuipers et al. (2014) is mainly concerned with the success and failure of a change, this research is looking towards the *drivers* of a certain change. Hence, if the outcome of an emergent or planned process of change is, for example, more efficiency, transparency, safety, etc - it doesn't matter if that is deemed successful or not, but it rather might well provide crucial information about the initial driving factor of this change. Now that the factors – and the interrelatedness between them - from the 'general change management theory' are clarified, the subsequent section can introduce a method by which the context factor on the national level can be systematically analysed; the DESTEP method.

## 2.2. DESTEP: Method for macro external analysis

On the national level, the external environment of governmental organizations is characterized for its abundance of challenges, among which are the increasing complexity of societal problems, increasing interdependence of societal parties, and changing relations between the government and the citizen (J. van der Voet, 2019). Without utilizing a structured approach, one could be surprised by the intricacy of this environment. Aguilar (1967) recognized this problem and introduced the ETPS method, a structured method that is concerned with studying strategic planning. ETPS is an acronym, where each letter portrays a factor to generally portray the external environment of an organisation, namely; Economic, Technical, Political, and Social. Over the years, this method has seen numerous alterations, as will become clear shortly. At that point in time, the assessment had two basic functions. The first is that it allows identification of the contextual environment on the national level wherein the organization operates. The second basic function is that it provides data and information that will enable the company to predict situations and circumstances that it might encounter in future (Yüksel, 2012). Later, this acronym has been changed numerous times by different scholars. Firstly, the order was changed – and arguably popularized by the Arnold Brown Institute of Life Insurances – into STEP. Subsequently, the 'E' for ecological was added and not much later in the 1980's, the Legal dimension was added (Richardson Jr, 2006). Finally becoming PESTEL. At this point in time, the method become more frequently applied outside its traditional field of strategic developments (Katko, 2006; Richardson Jr, 2006; Shilei & Yong, 2009). Nonetheless, for this particular research, an important external factor is missing still; the demographic component. Also, a distinct separation between the legal component and political component has little to no additional benefit for this inquiry. Hence, the preferred method for this inquiry is a variation on the PESTEL method, called the DESTEP method. By all means, a DESTEP analysis can – similarly to a PESTEL analysis - just as well be used to analyse the past. In this regard, the analysis is often referred to as a 'backlog'. It is crucial for a DESTEP analysis that a multitude of sources will be assessed, in order to establish a near complete view on the external environment of the organizations. This will be further elaborated upon in the chapter 3.

## 2.3. Conclusion: Answering first sub question

At the outset of this chapter, the problem with plainly applying the principle of reductionism on a concept such as 'change' has been expressed. Alternatively put; setting the initial focus on finding linear relationships with isolated events. Instead, actualized by criticism of Pettigrew (1990), some researchers (e.g. (Grobman, 2005) and (Plowman et al., 2007)) started arguing that the concept of change should be studied according to the principles of the complexity theory. Therein, embracing the holism and uncertainty that come with it, while at the same time, de-emphasizing reductionism, linearity and predictability (Grobman, 2005). Moreover, in an effort to define a measurement of the concept of 'change', in order to make it reasonably indistinguishable for later empirical observation - Bartunek and

Moch (1987) provided a system of dimensions by which ‘changes’ can be organized, so-called; orders of change. These dimensions did proof to be useful in obtaining an initial sense of direction with regards to the several drivers of change, as will become clear shortly. Considering all of the above, a theory from Kuipers et al. (2014) – largely based on critiques of Pettigrew (1990) – was adopted that essentially combined the two dominant perspectives when studying change in the public sector; the institutional theory and the change management theory. With this, Kuipers et al. (2014) provided a framework consisting of change management factors that ought to be considered when studying change. For the purpose of clarity, this theory is in this research referred to as the ‘general change management theory’. The general change management theory prescribes that five factors should be taken into consideration when studying change at public organisation. These are; the context factor, the content factors, the process of change, the role of the leadership and the outcome of change. In addition, the meta-analysis of Kuipers et al. (2014) provided some sense direction through which researchers are most likely to find the prominent drivers of change. Again, it remains important to reiterate that their theory combines both the institutional and change management perspective, resulting in moderately opposing views on the significance of these five change management factors. To clarify, the institutionalist perspective is highly context-aware, thus placing greater emphasis on the contextual factors of change. In this, essentially arguing that organizational change is imposed by the organization’s environment. Rather than intentionally implementing change to improve efficiency, organizations pursue legitimacy by conforming to environmental pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kuipers et al., 2014). In view of this, institutionalists often argue to conduct a full historical analyses when studying change at public organisations. Scholars such as By and Macleod (2009) add to this that herein; shifts in public paradigms are an important phenomenon to consider when reviewing changes. These shift are depicted in this inquiry as contextual factors on the societal level. Alternatively formulated, the institutional theory focuses mainly on the external environment of public organisation, split into three level; the societal, national and inter-organizational level. Kuipers et al. (2014) concludes; institutionalists tend to presume that changes are ‘made to’ organizations rather than changes being intrinsically made by organizations. Contrast to thus is the change management theory, a rational-adaptive theory that places significant emphasis on the process of change. Though, it tends to lack consideration for the context of the change (Kuipers et al., 2014). Moreover, the change management perspective places great attention on the presuming vertical (heroic) perspective with regards to the role of the leader (Stewart & Kringas, 2003). Generally speaking, the empirical focus in change management theory is on the intra-organizational level (Coram & Burnes, 2001). Concludingly, Kuipers et al. (2014) has – by virtue of the critique of Pettigrew (1990) – provided the research with a framework to systematically analyse the changes in contract strategies of public authorities. This framework - combined with the established relationships between particular events, forms of collaboration, and both national and organizational cultures – has allowed for an initial sense of direction for ultimately achieving the research objective. Though as remarked earlier, for now, a certain degree of ambiguity ought to be accepted. To end this paragraph with reiterating the inclusive critique of Kuipers et al. (2014) and Pettigrew (1990) that will remain central in this inquiry; *change should consequently be studied with regards to both the macro level and micro level, in order to minimize the possibility of drawing unintentional preclusions.* Therein, assuming an interrelatedness between multiple (starting) events, which evidently helps to better understand the complex multi-layered phenomena of change in the public sector (Kuipers et al., 2014). Lastly, from comprehensive’s sake – the five factors from Kuipers et al. (2014) have been illustrated in Figure 2.3.




Figure 2.3 - Five factors from (Kuipers et al., 2014) with added sub factors

## Chapter 3 | Theoretical drivers of public authorities: Secondary data collection

So far, the general understanding of the concept of change has been gradually broadened by the utilization of the literature study. Among other things, the literature study provided a theoretical framework that granted some structure when studying changes at public organisations. In this, it was observed that there appears to be a correlation between particular change management factors. Thus, offering a starting point for the research to come. Bringing us to the topic of this third part of the report; utilizing the theoretical framework from the previous chapter to bring together notable theoretical drivers that could provide insight in why public authorities change their contract strategy. In other terms, seeking an answer to the second sub question. To achieve this, a document analysis will be conducted in this chapter as the main data collection method. Concretely, this means retrieving four of the five change management factors; the content factor, the context factor, in part the leadership factor, and the outcome factor. The exact role of the leadership and the process to which the change came about are ineffective to obtain via such an analysis. Therefore, these factors have to be obtained in the subsequent phases; collecting the primary data. Now, with regards to the reading guide for this chapter - the first section of this chapter will start off with discussing the content factor; the changes in contract strategy. In which case, the rationale behind the adoption of a term such as 'contract strategy' will - with concern to the principle of reductionism - be further elaborated upon. Before now, the principle of reductionism was disadvantageous with respect to a concept such as 'change'. However, the principle of reductionism proved quite essential to apply in relation to the term 'contract strategy'. Other than that, the second chapter will focus on mapping the four levels of contextual factors. Herein, covering the societal, national, inter-organisational, and intra-organizational level for both public authorities. Subsequently, the third section will be concerned with examining the leadership factor. Herein, mainly focussing on the vision of the leadership and specific changes on the actor level. Fourthly, the outcome factor will be discussed. These being, for this particular research - being three different categories of (public) values from Hood (1991). Fifthly, on the basis of the information that has to that extent be discovered - three cases are considered that will serve as exemplifications for answering the second sub question. Something that will, lastly, be done in the conclusion of this chapter.

### 3.1. Content factors: The changes in contract strategy

In this chapter, substantial changes of the past decades with respect to contract strategies will be discussed. This will be structured according to changes in types of contracts, types of procurement methods, and types of awarding mechanisms. Lastly, recent introduction of so-called 'hybrid models' will be discussed. The purpose of this chapter is exploring how much is commonly known on each of these individual changes. Before, however, some matters surrounding the motivation to adopt the newly coined term 'contract strategy' will be further elucidated upon.

#### 3.1.1. Defining the term 'contract strategy'

Frankly, the term 'contract strategy' is - in the author's concern - a neologism. That is; a fictitious term, in order to obviate from other nebulous concepts it closely resembles. The concepts in question are terms such as 'project delivery model' or 'public-private partnership' (PPP). To clarify, albeit that usage of the term 'public-private partnership' started around the early 90s, it appears, there is still some neologism involved when discussing public-private partnerships as a concept (Hodge & Greve, 2007; Weihe, 2005). For example, van Ham (2002) and G. Verhees (2013) make a distinction between an 'alliance PPP' and a 'concession PPP'. Though, Sanders and Heldeweg (2012) argue for a differentiation between a 'market PPP', a 'network PPP' and an 'authority PPP'. To spare the reader from further mundane exemplifications, Weihe (2005) concludes that; *there is nothing novel in stating that PPP is a contested and ill-defined concept*. Him referring to the sheer number of scholars that intermeddled in pointing out definitional problems attached to the term PPP (e.g. (Domberger & Fernandez, 1999; Hodge & Greve, 2005; McQuaid, 2000). The same goes for the term 'project delivery model', where in fact, in academic literature phrases such as; project delivery method, project delivery system, or project delivery approach - are occasionally used as means to describe to describe an identical mechanism. At this point, it can be remarked that the academic dispute described above, mainly focusses on what could potentially count as a 'PPP' or 'project delivery model', rather than attempting to codify a structure that outlines the various elements of a 'PPP' or 'project delivery model'. Effectively, after this reasonably long introduction, it might become apparent that the term 'contract strategy' is chosen in order to abstain from convoluting this research further with a unnecessarily semantic discussion. Or to put it differently; a term such as the 'contract strategy' enables the



research to move stir away lexical bicker and more towards a productive typological discourse. To clarify this last statement, by ultimately choosing the term contract strategy as the focal point of this research, the author was able to draw up a scheme of components wherewith particular changes in the infrastructure sector could be studied. Ultimately, though, a project delivery method or PPP – or for that matter a contract strategy - is merely a credo upon which a public authority acts (or position it selves). But at the same time, shifts in these organizational philosophies – and even more so when entirely new contract strategies are being establishment – suggest a noteworthy underlying drivers. Exactly these drivers are of interest for this research objective. In other words, something has changed, and the fact that the change occurred, is more interesting than how that change can be academically categorized. Inevitably, this requires some generalisation of some sort. With this in mind, the process of effectively establishing a definition can now be explicated. To the best of the author's effort – the most suitable framework that could be found in the literature came from Eriksson, Lingegård, Borg, and Nyström (2017). In this article, a framework has been devised to compare the 'delivery system' of five countries for a case study, mainly by the use of comparing their 'procurement strategy'. Their framework has served for the main inspiration for the distinct components in the term 'contract strategy'. As it happens, the reason why the term 'contract strategy' has been coined for this research, is because the term 'procurement strategy' in Eriksson et al. (2017) was also concerned with focussing on the exact 'collaboration model' of individual projects. As it stands, this particular component is difficult to generalize, compared to the other components and similarly; won't fit the scope of this research. Thus, at last, the term contract strategy can – with the help of Hodge and Greve (2007) and Eriksson et al. (2017) - finally be defined. For this particular research; *'a set of institutionalized cooperative arrangements between public-sector actors and private-sector actors consisting of either a contract type, a procurement method and an award mechanism or any combination of those three'*. The last part of the definition (*.. or an combination of those three*) will in this research be referred to as 'hybrid' model. To conclude, with this new definition, changes that have occurred over the past decade related to the newly defined term 'contract strategy' can now be systematically investigated. To provide an practical example why this new definition is useful; it allows the researcher to review seemingly different concepts such as the Best Value Approach and the DBFM contract side-by-side. Considering that – according to the definition above – both the Best Value Approach and the DBFM contract can be seen as changes in 'contract strategies'. In this way, a theoretical foundation can be formed, wherefrom a particular content of change can be highlighted and further investigated in the subsequent chapter.

### 3.1.2. Exploring recent changes in contract strategies

In Figure 3.1, an overview is provided of recent changes that occurred within the Dutch procurement field, subdivided in accordance with the four sub components of a 'contract strategy'. This section will provide a theoretical foundation on these changes. Besides identifying theoretical drivers with respect to these changes, equally important is determining missing links. In turn, the findings of this chapter will be used in the subsequent chapter to choose particular cases for this research.




Figure 3.1 – Content factor: Recent changes in contract strategies within the Dutch Infrastructure sector

#### Contract type

The first component of the contract strategy are the different types of contract that are available. In this case, the contract type provides essential information concerning the overall project integration as well as the general risk allocation. Here, the first is concerned with an optional combination between the design and other phases of a project, thus potentially combining different disciplines. Whereas the latter reveals how the risks will be distributed. For example, allocated between contract authorities and contractors or rather that the risks will be shared as a form of partnering. In attachment 2, the following contracts are discussed; the design, bid, build contract; the design and construct contract; the design, build, finance, maintain contract; the alliance contract; the two-phase contract, and the 'no-contract' form. Naturally, many more different types of contract have been introduced in the past few decades, but these six were deemed the most notable, as each of them seemed to have marked significant shifts in the overall procurement philosophy compared to their predecessors. Especially considering the different options for project integration or the allocation of risks.

#### Procurement method

In this section, the second component of a contract strategy will be further elaborated upon; the procurement method. Similarly to the changes in contract types, there have been notable developments with regards to how procurement methods are organized. Arguably the most distinguished of them being; the decision whether or not to conduct a dialogue at the beginning of the procurement phase. Until 2005, governments had, according to the

European legislation, three types of procurement procedures at their disposal. The open or restricted procedure were applied when the contract authority could determine a fitting price level based on accurate technical specifications himself. If this is not the case, the contract authority was permitted to take advantage of the third procurement procedure; the negotiation procedure. Collectively, these procurement methods were already around since the publication of the European Commission's white paper for '*Completing the Internal Market*' in 1985. Essentially, the paper – combined with the Single European Act – formed the conceptual foundation of the contemporary EU procurement law (Bovis, 2012). Then, from 2005 onwards, the number of procurement procedures started slowly to increase. First, the competitive dialogue procurement procedure was created by the European Commission. Some years later, more forms followed, for example the innovation partnership procedure. Or perhaps, lesser known forms such as the preliminary market consultation and pre-commercial procurement. Principally, these last three procurement methods have very specific purposes. As for example, when the contract authority needs research & development prior to the procurement or when the contract authority doesn't have sufficient knowledge of the market to define requirements for end-solutions, these procurement methods can be used (Bustinza, Gomes, Vendrell-Herrero, & Baines, 2019). In any case, in like manner considering these procurement methods, will result in an overly broad scope with little extra benefit for this research. Therefore, these are put aside from here onwards. In sum, the remaining four official EU procurement procedures can be roughly divided into two categories: (traditional) non-dialogue procurement method and the dialogue procurement method. Here, the open and restricted procedure are covered by the non-dialogue procurement method, that is; the procedure where no preliminary dialogue has been conducted. Further, the competitive dialogue and negotiated procedure belong to the dialogue procurement procedure. Both categories – including their relation with Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland – are discussed in attachment 3.

#### *Awarding mechanism*

Procurement essentially revolves around inviting project offers and selecting the most suitable offer. This, however, needs to be done on so-called award criteria. Unsurprisingly, the evaluating system on which a tender offer is being judged, can differ significantly. Here, too, various alterations have been made over the years. Progressively shifting from being solely concerned with the price element, towards including a 'quality-component' in the evaluation procedure. In the main, these transition have been categorized into three different types of award mechanism; 'lowest price', 'MEAT', and '100% quality'. All of these three award mechanism are covered in attachment 4.

#### *Hybrid models*

Thus far, this inquiry divided the term 'contract strategy' into three distinct components; the contract type, procurement method, and the awarding mechanism. In turn, each of these three components was further subdivided into more distinct parts. To shortly recap; the contract type component was arranged into six parts; the DDB, D&C, DBFM, alliance, two-phase contract, and the 'no-contract' method. For this procurement method, two types were identified; the non-dialogue procedure and the dialogue procedure. Lastly, the awarding mechanism had three different options; the Lowest price, MEAT, and 100% quality criteria. Accordingly, by combining the three main components, the contractor authority establishes a particular 'contract strategy'. As aforementioned, the term 'contract strategy' is by no means a clear-cut definition. For one thing, DBFM model can be both a contract type and a 'contract strategy'. To clarify, the DBFM contract type refers to the scope, risk allocation and integration of project phases for a particular undertaken. Nonetheless, the EU directive prescribes the competitive dialogue (component of the 'dialogue procedure') for a DBFM contract. While also, to a certain extent, the MEAT award criteria are customary for DBFM model. From this perspective, a DBFM model is both a contract type whilst also a 'contract strategy'. To a certain extent, this can be done with the other contract types, although to a lesser evident extent. Having said that, there are certain model/philosophies that neither fit the three component (contract type, procurement method, awarding mechanism), but can be considered as singular contract strategies. Some facets of these *hybrid* models have already been incidentally discussed in the some three components, but the full principal behind them has yet to be conceptualized. These two hybrid models are the DOEN philosophy and the BVA. Both models will be discussed in the following manner. First, explicating the rationale behind the model and connecting these to the three components. Thereafter, the progressive undertaken of both models over the years will be further elaborated upon.

#### Best Value Approach

First off, the rationale behind the philosophy of BVA; it assumes that the suppliers are the experts, and the client is the non-expert. This notion implicates that the contracting authority cannot understand or grasp ex-ante all possible ways to solve its needs. Put differently, the BVA states that the client is not fully aware of all its preferences, due to the

fact that it has incomplete knowledge on what is possible in the market (Santema, Van de Rijt, & Witteveen, 2011). In essence, the BVA states that the client should let the expert take the lead (Kashiwagi, 2011) and perhaps even more importantly; should involve the contractor early in the process so that the expertise of the contractor can be optimally used (Santema et al., 2011). The entire process of a BVA entrusts on the so-called PIPS system, developed by the founder Dean Kashiwagi, a professor from the Arizona State University. 'PIPS' is an acronym that stands for; Performance Information Procurement System. Leaving aside the evolution of the PIPS and BVA models for now, the terms are being used interchangeably. By all means, the rationale behind PIPS/BVA shows through in each of the three components (contract type, procurement method, awarding mechanisms). All of which will be briefly discussed, starting with the effects on the contract type. The BVA assumes that given the opportunistic behaviour and limited rationality of the actors; the transaction properties (specificity, insecurity and frequency) will give way to predictable problems by which the contractual party should readily cope with. Also, it is assumed that ownership affects behaviour (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990). Thus, fully transferring risk to the contractor (risk owner), leads to increasing 'commitment', and the client can expect constructive behaviour with regards to the management of these risks. Additionally, according to the method; 'trust' between client and contractor during a project is only needed in a non-transparent environment (Snippert, Witteveen, Boes, & Voordijk, 2015). Instead, the BVA is founded on calculus-based trust by ingraining dominant measurements to minimize the need to plainly 'trust' other (Kashiwagi, 2003). These measurements are already established in the initiation phase and, thus be the topic of the upcoming component; the procurement method. So, the main objective for the client is selecting the best contractor and by doing so, obtaining calculus-based trust that will be vital throughout the duration of the project. Key in this process is that the client expresses their wishes in more abstract sense. This translates into the fact that the suppliers each set their own performance level, without the client indicating which performance level it wants and consequently enables market parties to differentiate themselves from their competitors (Santema et al., 2011). This is the point where the first two letters of the PIPS acronym come in. First, the client judges the contractor based on 'past experiences' (first P). Then, information is gathered and processed in a systematic fashion (I). Here, contractors must provide the necessary information about past performance to express their suitability for the required functionalities according to controlled criteria (Kadefors, 2004; Van Duren & Dorée, 2008). Thirdly and lastly, the BVA in relation to choosing the awarding mechanism. At this moment, two last letters of the PIPS system stand out. The second 'P' depicts the quality/price ratio that will be used as an awarding mechanism. As discussed before, the ratios for quality-price accompanied with BVA tenders would normally exceed the quality-price ratio normally used with MEAT criteria. According to Santema et al. (2011), this should give the owner more value-for-money. What is more, the second P stands for the structured approach that should be adopted in the various stages, leading to contractor selection based on careful consideration of both performance and cost (Van Duren & Dorée, 2008). The entire process is depicted in Figure 3.2. On the whole, promises were made that the BVA should lead to more innovation and let the parties involved work with a common interest (win-win) (Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi, Kashiwagi, & Sullivan, 2013). In turn, this will discourage opportunistic behaviour (van Duren, 2013). Moreover, decision-making would be simplified and transaction cost would be lower (Kashiwagi, 2011). Finally, the philosophy presses on the insight that monitoring and bonding costs – especially in addition to the influence of information asymmetry – have their limitations. By realizing and internalizing this, lower direct costs and transaction cost will be obtained and thus a better project performance (van Duren, 2013).




Figure 3.2 – Four phases of the BVA procedure (Cornelisse, 2014)

The use of BVA at Rijkswaterstaat gained momentum at RWS around 2007, when half of the projects of the Urgent Approach Roads (Dutch: Spoedaanpak Wegen) were delivered using the BVA (van de Rijt, Witteveen, Vis, & Santema, 2011). This program concerned resolving major bottlenecks on the Dutch highway network, totalling 800 million euro worth of infrastructure projects. Because of the success of the approach in this program, Rijkswaterstaat decided to test the approach in other pilot projects (Horstman & Witteveen, 2013). Notably, already in 2004, the Dean Kashiwagi (Founder of BVA) came to Netherlands to present a lecture about his BVA/PIPS system, herein simultaneously promoting it. But at that time, according to de Koning (2020), the public consisted of leading procurement managers of large contracting authorities in The Netherlands, but his theory did not catch on. Later in 2007, van de Rijt et al. (2011) argued that the BVA was adopted in an economic high-tide. Right before the start of the American Housing crisis. Instead, the tender capacity in the Dutch infrastructure market was limited, as contractor appeared to have full portfolios. For this reason, RWS was asked by suppliers and contractors to develop a procurement strategy that would be heavily based on quality, shorten the tender procedure and thereby lowering the transaction costs. At the time, the sector believed that D&C contracts usually lead to higher transaction costs. (van de Rijt et al., 2011) Besides that, contracting authorities and the market discerned a need for more quality in projects (Sloots, Keulen, de Koning van Rutte, Stuijts, & Heibly, 2013). Lastly, public organisation wanted a contract strategy that encouraged innovation (Verwey, de Vries, Kashiwagi, & Kashiwagi, 2015). Over the years, the BVA has evolved from a procurement method to a combination of procurement method, project management method, and risk management method (Horstman & Witteveen, 2013). For this reason, Rijkswaterstaat stopped using the term Best Value Procurement and started adopting the term Best Value Approach, indicating that the rationale of the philosophy is equally important in the subsequent phases after to the procurement phase.

#### DOEN

Similarly to the BVA discussed in the previous paragraph, DOEN is also a hybrid model that can be a mix between certain contract types, procurement methods, and awarding mechanism. In essence, the DOEN philosophy is based on five pillars. Achieving maximum customer-value, honest work for an honest compensation, aiming for optimal collaboration, work from the intention, lessons-learned should be clearly documented and be further communicated throughout the infrastructure sector. All in all, the implementation of the DOEN philosophy urged a collaboration on the basis of trust. Disreputable tensions between client, contractors, and for that matter end-users would wither. The five pillars can be included in the three components in several ways. Some of the most common forms will now be discussed. As of the contract type with DOEN, it can be executed in various ways. In the beginning it started with the Design and Construct contracts, some of the new projects use the Plan, Design and Construct contract type. More recently, withal, the DOEN philosophy is applied on two-phase contracts. There is, however, a common denominator for the DOEN projects; the seemingly insignificance of a contract. In this inquiry surnamed a 'no-contract' contract type. At first glance somewhat of a discrepancy, but to clarify; the DOEN philosophy doesn't use the conventional extensive UAV-IC contract as a standard to create uniformity and universal administrative conditions for the parties. Instead, a

manual is created in the beginning of the project, in a process where parties collectively discuss the intention behind many of the clauses in the hope to create limpidity. Summarized in the words of the former director-general from RWS: *the contact is more important than the contract* (P. DOEN, 2017). For the second component, the procurement method, DOEN also takes a slightly less than conventional approach. For example, the role of the contracting authority can be different, as a 'client' priority needs to be determined. Hereafter, the newly defined client ought to state if an element has a value contribution to the project. Eventually, the indicator of this statement should candidly commence conversation with the expert. This elementary process should ultimately result in more client satisfaction (DOEN, 2019b). What is more, the whole method is with four phases quite extensive. After the pre-qualification (phase 1), the remaining contractors will in the second phase purely be assessed on their capability to collaborate with the contracting authority. Hereafter comes the third phase with the competitive dialogue and only after that phase, the tender is pre-awarded to the remaining contractor. After this is done, the contractor and contractor authority have to establish an agreement (i.e., project scope) wherein they acknowledging each other's project goals. According to the DOEN manual, mutual understanding and equivalence between collaborating parties will develop and in doing so; should trigger an inspiring dialogue between the end-user and the contractor, creating more fit-for-purpose solutions. Potentially resulting in more suitable combinations of public spaces for mobility, working and recreation (DOEN, 2019b). During these dialogues between the parties, innovative thinking is encouraged, while the exchange also makes more efficient use of the design capacity of the sector. As claimed by the DOEN team; miscommunication in the procurement phase occurs frequently when for example parties passingly sign an inexact agreement. Thirdly and lastly is the awarding mechanism in the DOEN philosophy. Because the price of the project is only determined in the fourth phase after the pre-award, the price component is not included in the awarding mechanisms. Besides the fact that this entail the contracting authority only procures on the basis of quality, this form of 'early contractor involvement' also enables a more accurate project cost determination (DOEN, 2019b). In line with the DOEN philosophy, daring to argue is vitally important in a wholesome working environment. By doing so, the possibility of unwanted profuseness could be minimized (DOEN, 2017). Figure 3.3 illustrates the entire DOEN process that has just been described above. On the whole, the philosophy shows – and explicitly stated by the developers – an judicious ambition towards structurally changing the infrastructure sector (DOEN, 2017), but how did it came into being?




Figure 3.3 – Four phases of the Project DOEN procedure (DOEN, 2016)

The DOEN philosophy was formally initiated by Jan-Hedrik Dronkers, the former Director-General from RWS, and first applied in the project Nijkerkerburg in 2013. The philosophy was supposed to be a one-time pilot, but as of now; eight different projects have been procured using that contract strategy. Important to note, DOEN is actually is an (practical) implementation of RWS' Market Vision signed in 2015 (DOEN, 2019b). In order to understand story and progression of DOEN better, one has to address what the Market Vision is and how it came to be. So, the Market Vision officially launched at the Marktdag of 2015 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2016a). At that time, all the public and private organisations that signed that agreement seemed to acknowledge the short comings of a considerable contractual, financial and economical orientation of contract strategies that hallmarked those times. Moreover, in this agreement, the aspiration was to strive for a finer allocation of risks, where all parties would recognize each other's risks and opt to bring mutual support in the risk management process. In their search towards a neoteric approach, the emphasis seemed to shift towards relations were openness, transparency, and trust would be first and foremost (Koppenjan, Klijn, Warsen, & Nederhand, 2018). Too, seeking the intention for more equitable pricing, with realistic profit margins for private companies. This prerequisite would counter opportunistic pricing in the procurement phase (Rijkswaterstaat, 2016a; Van Meer, 2016). Moreover, around that time, the opinion of some was that the infrastructure sector was lagging behind in terms of 'innovations'. Indeed, research showed that, around that time, the budget for R&D funds in the entire Dutch infrastructure sector was significantly lower compared to the infrastructure sectors of other EU countries (MEC, 2019). The 'honest price'-aspect of DOEN – and similarly a point of focus in the Market Vision - would enable construction companies to increase investing in their R&D department. Conceivably, the lack of innovation could have spurred this 'fair-price for fair work' notion. By and large, the DOEN and the Market Vision contemplated a shift from a predominantly contractual method of arranging a contract strategy, to an increasing relational method, and with this; undertook the effort to embrace a more conning method for collaboration.

### 3.1.3. Conclusion

Taking everything into account, this chapter provided insights in recent changes in contract strategies. That is, new types of contract types, procurement methods, and awarding mechanism that have sprung up over the years. Along with new 'hybrid models' that could be seen as amalgamations of these three components. Overall, this section offered a the theoretical foundation on recent changes in contract strategies from Dutch public authorities. Nonetheless, besides effectively identifying theoretical drivers with respect to certain changes, equally important was determining missing links with respect to certain changes in contract strategies and their theoretical drivers. Take for example, a change in contract strategies such as the DBFM model. The (theoretical) drivers seem to be formally researched by Klijn and Koppenjan (2016) and Koppenjan et al. (2020). In contrast, drivers with concern to contract strategies such as the BVA and DOEN seem less so. On the whole, this section has provided a solid basis that prove useful when eventually deciding which contract strategies will be further explored as part of the case study. In view of the fact that, as will become clear in the subsequent chapter when discussing the primary data collection method – it isn't feasible to conduct field research with concern to all these changes discussed above. Hence, further scoping seems inevitable. In any case, the final decision of which, will be made in chapter 3.5. Nonetheless, before we can do so, it is essential to further explore the contextual and outcome factors that surrounded these contents of changes. This will be done in the upcoming two section, starting off with the contextual factors.

## 3.2. Context factors: Four levels of contextual factors

Now that the content of change have been discussed, the inquiry can continue with exploring the context factors, this factor being the second of the five factors adopted in the theoretical framework. Moreover, Kuipers et al. (2014) provided – as already stated in the conclusion of the literature review – an explicit direction with respect to notable contextual factors when considering changes at public organisations. For readability purposes, the contextual factors in this chapter have been split into four categories. Contextual factor on the societal, national, inter-organizational and intra-organizational level. The four levels of contextual factors and their subfactors have been depicted in Figure 3.4. For all of these categories, secondary sources have been analysed from primary sources. Naturally, the types of sources differed between the four levels of contextual factors, as will become clear shortly. For the first three levels of contextual factors, however, it is important to note that these factors will apply for both Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland. Especially considering that both organisations are active in the infrastructure sector. Needless to say, the intra-organizational

contextual factors for both organisations clearly differ from each other. Alternatively put, the internal factor analysis will be the first point in this research were a clear differentiation will be made between the two organisations. Lastly, the exact execution of these document analysis, for example; what types of documents have been reviewed - will be discussed at the beginning of each section. The contextual analysis will start on the societal level; the shift in public paradigms.




Figure 3.4 – Context factor: Four levels of factors

### 3.2.1. Societal level: Public paradigms

In the previous chapter, the different perspectives on change have been illustrated, the institutionalist perspective and the change management perspective. The first perspective primarily focusses on sectoral (third-order) changes by positioning them in a full historical analysis. In this regards, shifts in public paradigms are seen by institutionalist as important drivers when considering change (By & Macleod, 2009). Roughly speaking, shifts in public paradigms belong to the biggest changes of content, as they drastically shape much of the fundamental believe in the governmental sector and are herein concerned with the very notion of government. Essentially, the model and menus of these paradigms, shape, constrain and facilitate structures and actions at lower levels. Thus, some aspects of these paradigm can indirectly be recognized in the contextual factors on the lower three levels. Principally, these paradigms are acknowledged time periods within the field of public administration wherein a particular point of view was dominant, similarly to how historians organize, for example, certain eras on the basis of their cultural history. Moreover, in the introduction of this report, a summary of significant historical events has already been provided. Principally, this current chapter structuralizes these historical events into three paradigms. Certainly, the three paradigms will eventually help to put changes in contract strategies – discussed in the previous section - into perspective. Specifically the ‘key resource allocation system’ is important appears to be important to consider for this particular research objective. On the whole, the three paradigms that will be discussed in this chapter are the Public Administration paradigm, the New Public Management Paradigm and the New Public Governance paradigm. Lastly, for this particular part of the document analysis, secondary data from primary sources such as academic books and (peer-reviewed) academic journals have been used. Thereby assuring, as Saunders et al. (2009) prescribes; *the usage of detailed reports of research, written by*



*experts and evaluated by other experts to assess quality and suitability for publication.* Before this chapter peers into the characteristics of each paradigm, firstly, some nuance surrounding the usage of the term 'paradigm' will be discussed.

### *Delimiting any 'new' paradigm*

So far, a term such as new public management has already been briefly mentioned numerous times in this report. The term became increasingly popular, even outside the field of public administration. In spite of the fact that the exact meaning of 'new public management' - or for that matter other public paradigms such as 'new public administration' and 'new public governance' - are in reality much less understood. Considering the fact that these public paradigms are from an institutionalist's perspective deemed inherently impactful on changes concerning public organisations, this inquiry ought it necessary to eliminate potential ambiguity insofar as possible. Starting by noting that in the field of public administration and management, something is always 'new'. In America, proclaiming "the new" has long been popular among academics. John Gaus announced the "new administration" in the early 1920s; Leonard White celebrated the "new management" and John Pfiffner the "new public administration" in the 1930s. Participants in a historic conference at Minnowbrook unveiled a new "new public administration" in the 1970s. And the habit has spread to Europe. A "new public management" was famously identified by Christopher Hood in the early 1990s and a "new city management" was born in the Netherlands (Lynn, 2010). Hence, before this concise literature review with regard to political sciences starts, it is important to already bring some nuance in the discussion of these different 'new' paradigms. Furthermore, since already forever, there is an ongoing debate if 'New' Public Management and 'New' Public Governance are actually different paradigms of public services delivery at all (Gow & Dufour, 2000). Herein, the definition of a paradigm by Margolis (1993) is used: *habits of thought or mind shared by policy-makers concerning how to resolve problems of governance.* To continue, some critics argue that the NPM has actually been a transitory stage in the evolution from traditional Public Administration and to what is now called by 'New' Public Governance (Osborne, 2010). In short, none of terms PA, NPM and NPG are normative or that prescriptive (Osborne, 2010). More charitably, they might be viewed as heuristics that stimulate critical thought and investigation, and innovations in practice, although often at the cost of distorting history for effect (Lynn, 2010). Nonetheless, the purpose of this part of the study is researching the important characteristics of each 'paradigm'. Potentially to draw parallels with changes in the contract strategy from both public organisations. Hence, characteristics such as the focus, emphasis, value base, resource allocation system and a rough time period are more interesting for this research. Therefore, a note upon the terminology is of importance here. The term "public policy implementation and public services delivery" is used here to denote the overall field of the design and implementation of public policy and the delivery of public services. Within this, Public Administration, the NPM and the New Public Governance (NPG) are then denoted as policy and implementation regimes within this overall field - thus neatly skirting the above, rather redundant, argument as to whether these regimes are actually paradigms or not (Osborne, 2010). The argument advanced here is that public policy implementation and public services delivery have passed through three design and delivery regimes: a longer, pre-eminent one of PA, from the late nineteenth century through to the late 1970s/early 1980s; a second one, of the NPM, through to the start of the twenty-first century; and an emergent third one, of the NPG, since then (Osborne, 2010). Inevitably, such a tripartite regime model is a simplification - elements of each regime can and will coexist with each other or overlap (Osborne, 2010). To continue in this line of reasoning, defining periods in the evolution of any complex system, such as public management systems in advanced industrial countries, is a tricky task. New developments accrete and accumulate while older trends are still playing out and apparently flourishing. Relatively established ideas move from leading-edge countries or sectors to implementation in previously laggard areas, even as the same ideas are being repudiated or reversed in the erstwhile pioneering locations (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006). But nonetheless, as argued above, this will be sufficient for this document analysis.

### *New Public Administration*

As far as Public administration is concerned, it has a long history which has basically been going in parallel with the very notion of government. The classical approach to public administration, derived from Weber, Wilson and Taylor, largely dominated most of the 20th century (Katsamunskaja, 2012). But in fact, according to Fry and Raadschelders (2013) there were at least nine theorist that each influenced the movement. Namely, Max Weber, Frederick W. Taylor, Luther H. Gulick, Mary Parker Follett, Elton Mayo, Chester Barnard, Herbert A. Simon, Charles Lindblom, and Dwight Waldo. Starting with Weber in the late 19th century and continuing all the way to Waldo in the mid-20th century. In view of the numerous authors just mentioned, one could already foresee that there is not one 'Traditional Public Administration'. Also, going into complete detail with respect to every conceptualization of the many authors, naturally falls far outside

the scope of this inquiry. For clarity's sake, the key elements of the paradigm are depicted in Table 3.1 below and the commendation with regards to the key elements will start underneath the table.

*Table 3.1 - Key elements Public Administration paradigm (Osborne, 2010)*

Paradigms	Theoretical roots	Nature of the state	Focus	Emphasis	Relationship to external (non-public) organizational partners	Resource allocation mechanism	Value base
<i>Public Administration</i>	Political science and public policy	Unitary	The policy system	Policy implementation	Potential elements of the policy system	Hierarchy	Public sector ethos

To start, the nature of the state surrounding this paradigm can be described as unitary, where policy making and implementation are vertically integrated as a closed system within government. Moreover, the focus is on the policy system, with an emphasis on the policy implementation (Osborne, 2006). Therefore, a significant assumption within the PA paradigm is that effective administration is comprised of the successful implementation by public managers of policies decided "up-stream" (Simey, 1988). These being democratically elected politicians that are - implicitly assumed - accountable (Day & Klein, 1987). Due to its vertically integrated nature, the key resource-allocation mechanism for PA is hierarchy. Here, the focus is upon vertical line-management to ensure accountability for the use of public money (Osborne, 2006). What is more, the value base is based on the explicit assumption of the hegemony of the public sector ethos (Osborne, 2006). Lastly, the hierarchical resource allocation mechanism can, among other things, be recognized in the 'traditional' design, bid, and build contract strategy.

Starting from the 1970s, the key elements from this paradigm stopped being the focal point of the public sector. From then on, the traditional public ethos was gradually exchanged for a paradigm that has its theoretical basis in public choice theory: New public management. Further details will be provided in the subsequent paragraph.

#### *New Public Management*

Following the dwindling of the Public Administration paradigm in the late 1970s, the movement of New Public Management slowly gained grip in the Western world. Some critics argue that the principles of NPM can be found within Dutch public administration from 1983 onward. Primarily forced by an economic decline (oil crises), a more market oriented approach came about (Noordhoek & Saner, 2005). Essentially, New Public Management held the promise of changing traditional bureaucracies into a results-oriented and transparent form of government, directed and supported by efficient and effective public managers (Noordhoek & Saner, 2005). All the key elements of this paradigm are summarized in Table 3.2.

*Table 3.2 - Key elements of the New Public Management paradigm (Osborne, 2010)*

Paradigm/key elements	Theoretical roots	Nature of the state	Focus	Emphasis	Relationship to external (non-public) organizational partners	Resource allocation mechanism	Value base
<i>New Public Management</i>	Rational/public choice theory and management studies	Disaggregated and regulatory	Intra-organizational management	Service inputs and outputs	Independent contractors within a competitive market-place	The market and classical or neo-classical contracts	Efficacy of competition and the market-place

Considering that Hood (1991) called the emergence of the NPM one of the 'most striking international trends in public administration', this paradigm is worth exploring in greater detail. To start, what inspired the NPM movement? Hood (1990) states that the NPM paradigms can be seen as 'a marriage of two different streams of ideas'. In the table above referred to as the 'theoretical roots'. One 'partner' of this marriage were the 'new institutional economics' and the other one was the 'managerialism'. 'Managerialism' helped to generate a set of administrative reform doctrines based on the ideas of 'professional management' expertise as portable (Martin, 1994), paramount over technical expertise, requiring high discretionary power to achieve results ('free to manage') and central and indispensable to better

organizational performance (Peters & Waterman, 1984). At a practical level, it led to the evolution of management as a coherent and legitimized role and function within public service organizations, in contrast to (and often in conflict with) the traditional professional groupings within those organisations (Osborne, 2006). With regard to the other ‘partner in the marriage’ (the new institutional economics), this theory, in turn – is largely based on three theories, mainly agent theory, transaction cost theory, and the property rights theory (Alston, 2008). Naturally, the theoretical roots – and thus the three underlying theories – are closely connected to the other key elements. For these reason, these three theories will now be discussed at greater length.

To begin with, the agent theory, transaction costs theory, and the property rights theory, all have some sort of economic footing and are also complementary. On the whole, they lead to more understanding of behaviour motives with regards to the undertaking, agreeing and executing economic transactions (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). Starting with the agent theory, it assumes that the principal (public authority) and the agent (contractor) have different goals and interest. Also, the principal doesn’t know if the agent performs to the its utmost capability, whereas the agent does. Thus, the theory assumes that there is both imperfect information (information is incomplete) and information asymmetry (parties are not equally informed). A core assumption in the theory is that in a hypothetical world full of incomplete and asymmetrical information relationships, both parties are assumed to only pursue their own interest. In general, the agent has more information than the principal after the tender has been awarded. Thereby, Williamson (1985) argues that agents acts with limited rationality and are often giving in into opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, the contract stipulates how trust is secured between principal and the agents, in terms of what costs for bonding and monitoring should be made (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the contract is central in the agency theory where the focus is on ex-ante incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms. The second theory from the ‘new institutionalist economics’ is the transaction costs theory. Whereas the agent theory assumes a complete contract, the transaction cost theory assumes an incomplete contract setting. In other words, the focus is mainly on ex-post transaction costs (J. Kim & Mahoney, 2005). Basically, the *transaction* is central instead of the *contract*. Here, Williamson (1979) defines ‘transaction’ as follows: a transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface. Examples of which are the cost for searching, evaluating, and choosing options concerning planning, design, negotiation of agreements (Williamson, 1985). Moreover, Nooteboom (1993) adds to this; the costs for supervision, inefficiencies due to miscommunication, faulty decisions, bad coordination, imperfect compliance of agreements, and risks concerning loss of investments. On the whole, Speklé (2001) encapsulates this theory as follows; *given the opportunistic behaviour and limited rationality of the actors, the transaction properties (specificity, insecurity and frequency) will give way to predictable problems by which contractual parties should cope with’*. The third and last theory that underpins contractual governance is the property right theory. Similarly to the former two theories, it is a complementary organizational economics approach that informs analysis of both institutions and governance within the discipline of strategic management (J. Kim & Mahoney, 2005). Furthermore, the theory provides insight in the fact that ownership affect behaviour (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990). Here, it suggests that two economic elements are critical for understanding ownership: residual control rights and residual rights to income (J. Kim & Mahoney, 2005). Here, residual control rights are defined as the right to determine the uses of assets under circumstances that are not specified in a contract (Foss & Foss, 1995). The residual rights to income encompasses the income that continues to be received after the completion of the incoming-producing work. In essence, the focus is on ex ante property rights allocation and ex post distributional conflicts. A comparison of the three different theories are summarized in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 - Comparison of theories contractual governance (J. Kim & Mahoney, 2005)

	Agency theory	Property rights theory	Transaction costs theory
<i>Unit of analysis</i>	Principal-agent contract	Institution	Transaction
<i>Focal dimension</i>	Incentives	Property rights	Various types of asset specificity
<i>Focal cost concern</i>	Residual loss	Externalities. Rent-seeking	Maladaptation. Holdup problems
<i>Contractual focus</i>	Ex ante incentive alignment. Monitoring mechanisms	Ex ante property rights allocation and ex post distributional conflicts	Choice of (ex post) governance mechanism
<i>Theoretical orientation</i>	Constrained optimization	Comparative assessment	Comparative assessment
<i>Strategic intent</i>	Shareholder view	Stakeholder view	Shareholder view
<i>Sources of market frictions</i>	Information asymmetry, unobservability, risk aversion (by agents)	Externalities, unclearly defined and difficult to enforce property rights (Weak appropriability), vested interests	Bounded rationality, uncertainty, information asymmetry, opportunism, and asset specificity

When reviewing the 'managerialism' aspect and the 'new institutional economics' aspect (with the three underlying theories) - the focus, the emphasis, the resource allocation mechanism and the value base of the NPM stated in Table 3.2 can be recognized. Starting with the focus, this is wholly on intra-organizational processes and management. In this the business-like interpretation of 'managerialism' can be recognized. Generally speaking, NPM models the production of public services as an intra-organizational process that turn inputs into output, with an emphasis upon the economy and efficiency (Osborne, 2006). This can be recognized in value base as well as in the NPM belief. That is; that a competitive marketplace and its workings, consisting of independent contractors - provide the most appropriate place for the production of public services (Osborne, 2006). Lastly and perhaps most notably for this particular research, the key resource-allocation mechanism is a variable combination of competition, the price mechanism and contractual relationships. The latter can be predominately recognized in (neo-)classical contract strategies, such as the D&C and DBFM.

Still, the intellectually and practically dominant set of managerial and governance ideas of the last three decades, has according to some authors; died in the water (Dunleavy et al., 2006). Although this cognitive and reform schema is still afloat, and a minority of its elements are still actively developing, key parts of the NPM reform message have been reversed because they arguably lead to policy disasters, and other large parts are stalled (Dunleavy et al., 2006). To start, NPM suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding between a value driven and an effectiveness driven approach to government. The democratic process has more goals than the delivery of services. Perhaps most of all it is about the transfer of values. NPM was a reaction to a perceived lack of effectiveness of the way government works. The rejection of NPM is due because it has never taken root in a social movement representing social values, and as far as it does so, those market-oriented values provide inconclusive direction (Noordhoek & Saner, 2005). Second, some critics argue that NPM has been used as too much of a standalone method. The mistake was that it was not used with more consideration for the context in which it was being applied. This is a context of a larger economic and social-political environment. Economic realities were ignored, like the effect you get when prices for public services suddenly become visible when services are privatized or simply published. Still, the fact that NPM has not fulfilled its promises does not mean that the underlying reasons why NPM came into existence have disappeared (Noordhoek & Saner, 2005). What was needed was a combination of more traditional public virtues and modern management approaches. This is where a new political ideology comes into play: the New Public Governance.

#### *New Public Governance*

As might already be apparent from reading the previous paragraph, the New Public Management - although its effects are still working through in countries new to NPM - the wave has largely stalled or been reversed in some key "leading-edge" countries, including The Netherlands (Dunleavy et al., 2006). Followed by the gradual undoing from NPM, began the establishment of new public governance in The Netherlands. Bossert (2002) states that the release of the report titled 'Government Governance' in September 1996 set the introduction of new public governance in motion by the Dutch government. From that moment onwards, the paradigm is influencing the fundamental believe concerning by which manner governmental organization ought to act. So, what is characterizes this new paradigm and how is it different from PA and NPM? Before answering this question, a critical remark from Lynn (2006) should be considered: "*Comparing a completed story with a work in progress is [inherently] problematic*". It goes without saying that the academic debate concerning specifying the exact implication of NPG is still ongoing. Nonetheless, the disputation of some prominent in this study of field might provide a general representation. At the outset, Dunleavy et al. (2006) states that within the NPG movement the following themes are recognizable; collaboration, coordination, and reintegration of government into more coherent public sector or government-wide processes. Some authors even argue that the introduction of the many new forms of public-private partnerships are part of the broader new public governance movement (Greve & Hodge, 2013; Osborne, 2010). The key elements of the New Public Governance paradigm are summarized in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 - Key elements of the New Public Governance paradigm (Osborne, 2010)

Paradigm/key elements	Theoretical roots	Nature of the state	Focus	Emphasis	Relationship to external (non-public) organizational partners	Resource allocation mechanism	Value base
<i>New Public Governance</i>	Organizational sociology and network theory	Plural and pluralist	Inter-organizational governance	Service processes and outcomes	Preferred suppliers, and often inter-dependent agents within ongoing relationships	Trust or relational contracts	Neo-corporatist (Dispersed and contested)

To expand on the table above further, the theoretical roots of the NPG paradigm can be found in the institutionalist and network theory. In these theories, the ideas are stressed for the need for interactions and trust building in order to internalize externalities, create stable, negotiated environments, and prevent the emergence of principal-agent-type relationships with their inherent pattern of strategic information exchange (Holton, 2007). These “forms of multi-social organisation” are distinct from market (NPM) and hierarchies (PA) - involving more enduring forms of social commitment and trust than markets, but more flexible and less centralized than hierarchies (Holton, 2007). This can be observed in the usage of resource allocation mechanisms. Something that is particularly important with regard to the subject of this inquiry; contract strategies. The key resource allocation mechanism that hallmarks the NPG paradigm are relational contracts (See Table 3.4 - Key elements of the New Public Governance paradigm (Osborne, 2010)Table 3.4). Note that this is a different approach to contracting than the contractual contracting that was expanded upon in the NPM paragraph. Though, importantly - many scholars argue that contractual and relational shouldn't be seen as mutually exclusive resource allocation mechanisms, but rather have an complementary interplay. Having said that, for comprehensive purposes, firstly - the different components that characterize relational contracting will be outlined. Thereafter, the theoretical roots of this type of resource mechanism will be expanded upon.

Starting with the describing what the measures the extent of 'relationality' in contracts. Essentially, it defines the extent in which arrangements are governed by social relations and shared norms (Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger, 2008; Zhao & Wang, 2011). Hereby, it relies heavily on informal structures and self-enforcement of each party (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). In the literature regarding this topic, *trust* and *relational norms* are two of the most frequently discussed components (Griffith & Myers, 2005; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Starting with the trust-component, this social process refers to the confidence in the partner's integrity, credibility, and benevolence in a risky exchange relationship (Das & Teng, 1998; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). On the whole, relational contracting strives for mutual trust in relationships. Meaning that both parties share mutual confidence that the other party will not exploit any adverse situation (Barney & Hansen, 1994). And above all; are more likely to consider their partner's interests rather than just their own (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009). Secondly, the relational norms describe the shared expectations about the behaviours of each party (Cannon, Achrol, & Gundlach, 2000; Heide & John, 1992). Some examples of relational norms are informal rules of social exchange such as flexibility, solidarity, participation in decision-making, communication and problem-solving through consultation (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Kaufmann & Dant, 1992; Macneil, 1980; Xue, Yuan, & Shi, 2017). More concretely with regards to the context of possible contract strategies, this means relational norms emphasize the need to openly discuss and involve different perspectives for addressing project issues, given the diverse nature of public and private organizational logics (Rufin & Rivera-Santos, 2012), and the tacit concern of public transparency (Ke, Ling, & Ning, 2013; Ling, Ong, Ke, Wang, & Zou, 2014). Also, accountability is crucial in the development of relational norms (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Klijn, Steijn, & Edelenbos, 2010). Mainly to avoid allegations of corruption from close relationships between public and private managers (Ke et al., 2013; Ling et al., 2014). In sum, a high degree of relational norms provide a framework of references to guide firms to act in expected ways (Cannon et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2009). As both trust and relational norms can reduce opportunism behaviour, they are both regarded as important components of the relational contracting (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Liu et al., 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). On a final note, the two components operate at different governance levels. While relational norms relate to values and social rules informally shared by project coalition members and, thus, operate external to a single individual (Macneil, 1980), trust is a psychological state of individual members of the project coalition (Benítez-Ávila, Hartmann, Dewulf, & Henseler, 2018; Kadefors, 2004).

In order to fully grasp, the effectiveness of the two components described above, their underlying theories will forthwith be introduced. These are the social exchange theory and the relational exchange theory. Naturally, these two theories also have a considerable overlap with the theoretical roots of the NPG paradigm as a whole, as showed in Table 3.4. To start, according to the social exchange theory - maintaining trust is essential for stable social relations

(Blau, 2017; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Palmatier, Dant, & Grewal, 2007). As might be clear by now, the nature of relational contracts is not only economic but also sociological (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Here, the social exchange theory states that trustworthiness between exchanging parties is proven by regularly disclosing their obligations and investing in their relationships to show their commitment to the relationship (Lambe, Wittmann, & Spekman, 2001). Also, cooperative parties are required to follow the rules of reciprocity; otherwise, they will be punished by social relationships (Blau, 2017; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). In summary, according to the social exchange theory, trust is derived from social interaction and socially-embedded relationships, and could therefore be an effective instrument (Arranz & De Arroyabe, 2012; Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & Looy, 2008). Everything considered, it can be observed that the social exchange theory mainly describes the effectiveness of the trust component in relational contracting. The second principle of a relational contract - the relational norms - is more in conformity with the relational exchange theory. By all means, the social exchange theory also discusses norms but these are social norms such as cultural values. The relational norms (eg. flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity) on the other hand; remind cooperative parties that their relationship is whole, and they are expected to behave according to the shared relational norms (Heide & John, 1992). Also, implications of repeated encounters in combination with potential reputation effects are some sort of indirect enforcement mechanism (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). Hereby, safeguarding - albeit informally - against exchange hazards and facilitate the enforcement of obligations (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002).

On the whole, NPG focuses greatly on the interorganizational relationships and upon the governance of processes, stressing service effectiveness and outcomes that rely upon the interaction of public service organisations with their environment (Osborne, 1997). Osborne (2006) concludes that the NPG movement can be seen as both 'a product of' and 'a response to' the increasingly complex, plural and fragmented nature of public policy implementation and service delivery in the twenty-first century, something that should kept in mind throughout this report. At last, for clarifying purposes, Table 3.5 is supplemented from Osborne (2010) that summarize all the core elements of PA, NPM, and NPG paradigms.

Table 3.5 - Core elements of PA, NPM, and NPG (Osborne, 2010)

Paradigm/key elements	Theoretical roots	Nature of the state	Focus	Emphasis	Relationship to external (non-public) organizational partners	Resource allocation mechanism	Value base
<i>Public Administration</i>	Political science and public policy	Unitary	The policy system	Policy implementation	Potential elements of the policy system	Hierarchy	Public sector ethos
<i>New Public Management</i>	Rational/public choice theory and management studies	Disaggregated and regulatory	Intra-organizational management	Service inputs and outputs	Independent contractors within a competitive market-place	The market and classical or neo-classical contracts	Efficacy of competition and the market-place
<i>New Public Governance</i>	Organizational sociology and network theory	Plural and pluralist	Inter-organizational governance	Service processes and outcomes	Preferred suppliers, and often inter-dependent agents within ongoing relationships	Trust or relational contracts	Neo-corporatist (Dispersed and contested)

### Conclusion

Even though most literature in relation to the three addressed paradigms is neither normative nor that prescriptive, some clear distinction can still be recognized, especially when reviewing Table 3.5. Therefore, the progressively changing fundamental beliefs on how governmental organizations should operate - could still be a feasible factor for the changes in contract strategy from Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland. Presumably, the reader could have already drawn some parallels between the shifts in public paradigms and the changes in contract strategies discussed in the previous section. Though, some origination were relatively more apparent than others. For example, the link between the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm and the introduction of the DBFM model is reasonably distinct. Considering the emphasis on the NPM paradigm is on the service inputs and output, plus its main government mechanism could be described via 'neo-classical contacts'. Here, the outputs can be seen as 'checkable' goals whereon the focus is on trimming away unnecessary fat (i.e. far-reaching integration), aspects that are similarly recognizable in the DBFM

contract. Such relations put forward the relevance of discussing the different public paradigms in this chapter. Howbeit, as mentioned earlier, even the compendious summary from the paragraphs above, are arguably difficult to fully comprehend and moreover; potentially overwhelming for people who are not acquainted with the field of public administration. Most of all, it will be close to impossible to convey even the fundamentals - necessary in order to obtain a meaningful answer - in an interview of approximately 60 minutes. Nonetheless, completely disregarding the influence of the public paradigms on the changing contract strategies would be nonsensical. So, this is where the utilization of values in interview questions becomes useful. In this way, Interviewees can still consider the significance of different types of values as drivers for the changes in contract strategies. As already addressed in the theoretical framework from Kuipers et al. (2014), these values fall under the fifth category of change management factors; outcome factors. Here, bearing in mind that the traditional successfulness of a change is often little interested for this inquiry, compared to the actual drivers of change. In any regard, accordingly, these values are classified into three groups and will be further discussed in chapter 3.4. Though, before anything else, the contextual factors on the national level will be discussed.

### 3.2.2. National level: The DESTEP factors

As might be noted from the previous section, the societal contextual factors (the three public paradigms) are rather abstract. And arguably will be of little help when trying to obtain primary data in a later stage of this research. The contextual factors on the national level, though, are more concrete. To structure these macro external factors in an apparent manner, a DESTEP analysis is conducted. The theory has already been introduced in the literature reviews, but for a short recap; DESTEP is an acronym that stands for Demographic, Economic, Social, Technological, Ecological and Political/Legal.

#### *Finding secondary data*

There are numerous ways to inquire information for this type of analysis. In order to do so in an effective manner, the majority of the information comes from primary sources, such as the strategy department of Rijkswaterstaat, Water Authority Delfland, the Association of Water Boards, and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. In other words, these type of document collection method is, according to Saunders et al. (2009) – known as the multiple source secondary data method. To substantiate, due to the fact that the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Association of Water Boards are closely involved in the long-term strategy of both Rijkswaterstaat and the Water Authority Delfland – their sources have also been consulted. Examples of the closer involvement of both the Ministries and the Association of Water Boards can be found in strategy document such as the Policy Agreement Water (Dutch: Bestuursakkoord Water) or the Government-Wide Trend Explorations. Obtaining this data proved difficult as during the time of writing this report, the world is in the midst of the corona epidemic. Therefore, physically search through archives was impossible. More still, due to imposed governmental restriction, organisation were heavily understaffed and for this reason hard to reach. As a result, with limited outside help, finding the correct secondary data proved burdensome. In the end, this was mainly done via world-wide web by consulting governmental websites and using Google Scholar.

What is more, all the strategies departments of these organisations conduct annual surveys and interviews with academia, market parties, and even employers from the organisations. In turn, the generated data from these inquiries is analysed and openly published in governmental publications. The main advantage of employing this data is that both documentary and survey secondary is combined. Lastly, even within their initial compilation, the obtained has been further assorted by the researcher. Thereby, aiming to prioritize external factors that seem to be relevant for the changes in contract strategies. In any case, for this research, the following sources have been consulted:

- Waterwegen (2008)
- RWS 2020: toekomstbeelden voor Rijkswaterstaat (2008)
- Toekomst en zo (2010)
- Bestuursakkoord Water (2007 and 2011)
- Structuurvisie Infrastructuur en Ruimte (2012)
- Trendanalyse RWS NEXT (2013)
- Rijksbrede Trendverkenning Strategieberaad Rijksbreed (2013)
- Waterschapspeil (2013-2016)
- Rijnland in Vogelvlucht (2019)
- Trendboek Expeditie RWS2050 (2019)

### DESTEP factors

For reading clarity, the order of the letters in the acronym DESTEP will be respectively applied for the sequences of the subchapters. Thus, starting with demographic factors and ending with the Political/Legal. In total, more than forty factors have been found. For readability's sake, the entire list of factors can be found in attachment 5. Instead, a summary will be provided from each group of the DESTEP analysis. Though, **Error! Reference source not found.** Figure 3.5 is added down below, summarizing all the external macro factors that were taken into consideration in this analysis. Lastly, the term 'Dutch Water Authorities' (DWAs) has occasionally been used instead of the Water Authority Delfland. Thereby communicating that most of these macro (external) factors mainly apply to DWAs as a whole, compared to giving the false indication to only having applied on Delfland.




Figure 3.5 - DESTEP analysis

#### Demographic

In the upcoming 30 years, The Netherlands will presumably undergo several demographic changes. For example, although it is certain that the Dutch population will grow altogether, it is still rather unpredictable if the expenditure will be centralized in cities or more towards the periphery. Also, the current population pyramid will be shifting upwards, due to the overall aging of the society as a whole. In total, for the demographic component of this DESTEP analysis, four demographic factors are deemed relevant for the decision-making of future policies. The overall aging of the population – thereby affecting similarly affecting the demographic dispersion of the workforce – appears to be a pressing national contextual factor. A more concrete consequence is that the organisations will need to cope with an outflow of (older) personnel. On top of that, there appears to have been a continuous shortage on the labour market (Rijkswaterstaat, 2020).



## Economic

Economics is often referred to as a study with respect to how people make choices under conditions of scarcity. Presently, strongly fluctuating prices, increasing geo-political tensions, and apprehension surrounding the overall incorporation of sustainability in our economic model has increased our awareness surrounding the principle of scarcity. That is to say, the growing (world) population and increasing global welfare have accelerated our realization of finiteness - particularly with regards to the usages of raw materials, energy, water and land. New sustainable trends are challenging the customary inclination to use virgin materials over more sustainable recycled materials. What is more, an increasingly large group echoes that CO<sub>2</sub>-emissions and virgin materials ought to be taxed. This being the case, but at the same time, the growing pace of the Dutch economy is declining. For comparison, the current growth rate is roughly 2 to 3 times as low as it was in the fifties. Likewise, more second world countries are taking centre stage, confident by means of their sharply growing economies. On balance, gripping developments that often directly affect policies of governmental organisations. Considering these, several national economic factors have been found. Firstly the effort of the Dutch government to continuously strive to strengthen the competitive position of The Netherlands. Something that has been sparked by aftereffects of economic globalization that arose most strongly in the eighties. Moreover, for some years, the government is aiming for an innovation objective. This implies that roughly 2,5% of the Dutch GDP should be invest into innovation (Rijksoverheid, 2010b). This brought a new concept; innovation-oriented procurement. Next, concept of the entrepreneurial state becomes more widespread. For a long time, the market was seen as the metaphorical motor to push forward innovation. Over the past years, the tide is turning, and the common belief increases yet again that government should be responsible for the most important initiations – as only she is able to invest in exceedingly long-term new techniques where the return on investment is simply too uncertain. Furthermore, there have been two severe economic crises on the European continent the past two decades, the Lehman crises and the European Debt crises. All in all, national economizing can leave its mark on the overall functioning of public organizations. In relation to this, literature shows that organization which don't have sufficient financial resources have the tendency to adopt a more inward-oriented stance. With this, the emphasis is placed upon increasing internal efficiency and the focus of the organization shifts from exploration to exploitation (Van der Voet, 2019). Against this background, the organization loses its ability to implement innovatory policy or services. On the other hand, to minimize the effect of national economizing, (public) organizations can embrace external collaboration. Both management- and administrative sciences have extensively showed that external collaboration contributes to the innovative ability of an organization (Lassen & Laugen, 2017; Van der Voet, 2019; West, Salter, Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 2014). By external collaboration by means of networks, chains, or partnerships, organizations can use their shared capacity optimally. With this, they have a large diversity of knowledge, skills, experiences and solutions to their disposal. This will be further discussed in the chapter with respect to the inter-organizational contextual factors.

## Social

In 1987, the U.S. Army War College coined the term "VUCA" when depicting the situation after the cold war, a phrase that has become increasingly mainstream when describing current public discourses. The acronym stands for volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous. Lawrence (2013) provided a useful definition for the term. Volatile when describing the nature, speed, volume, and magnitude of change that is not in a predictable pattern. Uncertainty when depicting the difficulty in using past issues and events as predictors of future outcomes. Complexity for the numerous and difficult-to-understand causes and mitigating factors (both inside and outside the organisation) are involved in a problem. Lastly, ambiguity when outlining the lack of clarity about the meaning of an event. When reading through the social external factors listed in attachment 5, a similar perception might come to mind. For instance, the decreasing Institutional trust of the public. A concern that was already expressed in a notable document from the Board of Public Administration (RVOB, 2010). Albeit, that this does have to necessarily directly affect RWS - it was still taken along as an potential social external factor in the trend analysis from RWS in 2014 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2020; Van Cooten, Eenhoorn, & Legierse, 2014). Moreover, the Communal view concerning institutional legitimacy. For the DWAs, there has been an ongoing point of discussion with respect to the legitimacy of the DWAs. One that already started in 1968 with an appointment of the Study Commission Waterboard by the former Minister of Infrastructure and Water (H. Havekes, Koster, Dekking, & Peters, 2010). Ever since, fusion discussions bring continuous uncertainty on the future of some DWAs. Also, the Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation is often mentioned in strategic documents. For one thing, the increasingly individual and liberal-minded citizens want to make their own decisions that merely benefit themselves. Traditional communal values became more insignificant and instead, people demand more customization (Alders, 2019). More still, citizen participation becomes gradually more important when generating support and legitimacy for the government's work. Similar to the expanding belief of public participation, the dominate feeling under

citizen did arise that all information should be shared openly. Also, another frequently heard concept of the past decades is the term network society, as an alternative to the more traditional hierarchical society. One of the biggest obstacles of the hierarchical model - which in many ways could also be seen as strong points - were the rigidity and slow reaction time of the power scheme. Something that seemed to collide with the social implications of globalization, the individualizing community, and the role of electronic communications technologies in society. In the end, due to the increasing heterogeneity in society, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain arrangements with a high degree of universality. Herein, the current dilemma for governmental organization is to either administer collective schemes that take into account a greater diversity of individual circumstances or steer more towards simplification and uniformity considering the ongoing economizations (Rijksoverheid, 2013). In all of this, it remains fairly uncertain how public bodies will act upon the power position shifts and step into their new role of network facilitators.

#### Technological

Since the introduction of the PC in 1985 and the start of the internet for the public a decade afterwards, the world moved to a digital era. Ever since, companies, government, and citizens are constantly using and producing data. Similarly, the number of sensors in our surrounding and equipment has seen an explosive rise. Undoubtedly, technological advancement come with many advantages. One example of which is the start of TenderNed, that decreased the tender procedure time. Although technical development brings the necessary uncertainty with them and potential negative externalities. For instance, the availability of open data has grown significantly. In brief, open data are governmental data of public interest that are available without any restrictions and that can be easily found and accessed by the public (Veljković, Bogdanović-Dinić, & Stoimenov, 2014). Recently, more pressure is being placed on all kinds of public organizations to release their raw data (M. Janssen, Charalabidis, & Zuiderwijk, 2012). In greater measure still, increasingly often public organisation encounter citizens that have their own - sometimes even more precise - data sets. Other technological advancement are the increasing usage of artificial intelligence or the usage of blockchain. In sum, although the mentioned technological development mentioned may still sound abstract, the effect of them will be notable in the near future. Already, due to the enormous increase in complexity, cross-linking, and interdependences between digital systems, it is no longer possible to view these types of digital systems as merely complex machines. Where, according to the engineering logic, someone could exactly track down what potential caused an error. Instead, these machines should be seen as organism; on the outside one can notice something is off, but the inside is much too complicated to trace the exact cause. Thus, contrary to keep digging, IT professionals are trying to see what measurement are working. Because of that, the control of these machines becomes more dynamic and in all probability, IT professionals need to work outside the boundaries of the organisation (Rijkswaterstaat, 2020). Forcing public organisation to work closely together in networks.

#### Ecological

For some time, climate change is getting more visible in our daily lives. Both RWS and the DWAs include the conceivable effects in long-term strategy. On the basis of this, corresponding internal goals have been set. Namely, RWS opts to work fully circular and become energy neutral in 2030 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2015a). For the DWAs, the energy neutrality will most likely already be achieved in 2025 and the 100% circularity in 2050 (Elema, Lazaroms, & Romijn, 2019). Also, larger municipalities are acceleratingly taking steps in countering the consequences of climate change. These widely known consequences are the sea level rise, more extreme weather conditions, water scarcity, and the loss of biodiversity. Conceivably, these ecological factors might not be directly associated with the decision-making process surrounding the implementation of a new contract strategy. However, RWS is, for instance - measured by acreage, the biggest nature conservationist in The Netherlands. Hence, when the biodiversity decreases even more, the topic will rise on the political agenda. Or alternatively, when even the expectation of influential parties in the direct surrounding of RWS changes, it will be of significance for the organisation. The same applies to internal policies of the DWAs. Nonetheless, these factors do also affect the decision-making process of the two public bodies in a different way than potentially expected. For example, and as stated before, Rijkswaterstaat has the ambition to ensure the Dutch infrastructure sector gains ground as the specialist in the water management industry worldwide (Rijkswaterstaat, 2020). Alternatively stated, the knowledge about doing it 'the Dutch way' will become an export product.

#### Political and Legal

The political landscape surrounding the playing field of Rijkswaterstaat and the DWAs are constantly changing. These can be divided into macro political factors such as the nation-wide decentralisation effort of the past decades. But also more with respect to legislative factors, as national, international and EU laws are regularly being adopted and modified. Some of which resulted in a significant effect on RWS and the DWAs. Starting with the political factors, the

political transition towards more flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPPs. An ongoing endeavour of the past decades, surnamed 'neo-liberalism', strives for an ever more flexible and compact government (Rijksoverheid, 2011). A line of reasoning that corresponds with the New Public Management paradigm, as discussed previously in this report. Concretely, this translates into the desire of the government to push hard on the use of PPPs. This is closely tied to far-reaching privatization wave. In response to political ambitions to strive for efficiency and better performance, the most far-reaching measurement that can be undertaken is privatization. Organizations that qualify for privatization require by and large minimal political interference and little to none political responsibility. Examples of which are the NS, PTT, several energy companies, blast furnaces, and banks. However, the far-reaching privatization of the past decades of several governmental bodies could be seen as a political foreboding for organizations such as RWS. Already in 1985, an orientating research was conducted towards possible partial privatization of RWS and the future is so far ostensibly undecided (Hamer, 1985). Further, on the contrary are the political efforts towards more decentralisation, and more citizen participation. Concerning this, the fourth wave of decentralization legislation that effects the physical livings environment was approved by the senate. One that also directly affects RWS and the DWAs: The Omgevingswet. Due to difficulties, the new legislation has not been implemented yet, but likely will be in 2021 (Schrijnen, 2016). More still, the phenomenon of political interference is increasingly pressing on some public bodies. Van der Voet (2019) writes how MPs and administrators are interfering at a detailed levels with the task operation of agencies, that should essentially operate independently from politics. As a result, the autonomy of these public organizations is further reduced in situation of disappointing performances and crises. An example of this were the aftereffects from the Construction Fraud in 2002. Leaving the political macro external factors aside for now, many legislative factors were also obtained in the analysis. Many of which appear to have impact on several (semi-)public organisations. Most important of which seemed to be the new Procurement Act of 2012 and the Guide Proportionality. Other new legalisations that have been found were the new Spatial Planning Act, the new Water Legislation, and the Maintainable Government Finance Act. The latter is a new legislation that was passed that anchored European norms with regards to the maximum amount and the yearly growth rate of the government deficit. Among other things, this new legislation affected decentral governmental bodies such as provinces, municipalities, and water boards, as their debt and financial deficit were taken into the governmental balance. From that moment onwards, water boards are considering new financial constructions to spread the expenditure over a longer period and were looking at the private sector for ideas (P. J. M. Groot, Afrian, Suiskind, & Vrolijk, 2013). Lastly, new agreement between (semi-)public organisations, such as updated Water Plans or Policy Agreements Water could also have been influential national contextual factors.

### 3.2.3. Inter-organizational level: Contextual effects of external parties

The third level of contextual factors focuses on the inter-organizational level. Here, the literature study shows how the role of complex stakeholder networks, and their competing values, may affect not only the shape and occurrence of change but also, directly, the process of implementation (Grimshaw et al., 2002; Van der Voet et al., 2016). What is more, environmental characteristics not only affect network arrangements (T.-Y. Kim et al., 2006), but participation in the network also shapes the context of the change in which the organization is an actor (Downe et al., 2004; Grantham, 2001). Considering this, the inter-organizational analysis is subdivided into two sections; the relevant networks between (semi-)public organisations and secondly, the influences of knowledge institutes, consultancies, and thinktanks. Firstly, though, the method of data gathering will be briefly discussed.

#### *Finding secondary data*

To be brief, similar sources have been consulted for the inter-organizational factors as was the case with the national contextual factors. That is, the majority of the information comes from primary sources, such as the strategy department of Rijkswaterstaat, Water Authority Delfland, the Association of Water Boards, and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. Thus, the generated secondary data comes primarily from openly published in governmental publications. This proved a cumbersome process, even more so than that of the national factors. But, again, the ongoing pandemic brought forthwith undesirable research circumstances. To continue, particularly the second part of this analysis; the influence of consultancies, knowledge institutes, and think tanks proved difficult to obtain. For this reason, these factors should be primarily obtained from the interviews.

### *Networks with other (semi)public organisations*

To start, sources state that the collaboration between the Water Authority Delfland and Rijkswaterstaat have intensified in recent years, particularly concerning the procurement domain (Glas, 2012). In total, four network(programs) have been found in this analysis. To start, the High Water Protection Program (Dutch: Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma), one that is often named in documentation of both RWS and Delfland as a leading example for appropriate collaboration in a network structure. The HWPP is an alliance between Rijkswaterstaat and 21 water boards. Moreover, in P. Groot and Visser (2016), the program is mentioned as; 'a catalyst for the changing process within the water boards'. The report states that due to the considerable administrative attention and the significant amount of money that is involved, different forms of collaboration need to be adopted compared to the 'traditional' way of working.

To continue in this line, Hieltjes (2014) remarks another initiative that aims to improve the collaboration between the water boards and RWS; the 'Smart Collaboration' initiative. Here, directors of the water boards and of the regional directorates of Rijkswaterstaat meet, get to know each other better and gain inspiration to further develop cooperation in the region. What is more, the Space for the River (Dutch: Ruimte voor de Rivier) program is often mentioned as a successful collaboration between the provinces, the municipalities and Rijkswaterstaat. The execution started at 2006 and ended in 2019. The program is less mentioned in the documents from the Water Authority Delfland, but is often mentioned in documents from both RWS as well as that of the Association of Water Boards.. Examples are the Policy Agreement Water, the Waterspiegel, annual reports and business agenda. Furthermore, the KRW network(program) (Dutch: Kade Richtlijn Water) was found. In 2008, the Ministry of the Infrastructure and Water State announced the start of the program. The program runs from 2010 to 2027. Again, the KRW is a collaboration between the provinces, municipalities, the water boards, Rijkswaterstaat, and nature conservative organisations. The program is primarily mentioned in documents of the Water Authority Delfland (Delfland, 2009b, 2011) and to a lesser extent in the documents of Rijkswaterstaat.

### *Knowledge institutes, consultancies and think tanks*

According to Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), more consensus-based countries such as The Netherlands, are characterized by late involvement of think tanks, academics and knowledge institutes, but see a strong influence of consultants. Overall, secondary data collection method proofed the improper method to gather data related to the influence of these inter-organizational factors. Just a handful of findings were made. To start with the findings related to the consultancies. The influence of consultancies can be seen in documents such as Rijkswaterstaat (2019), where the main author was the McKinsey consultancies. This document was published in 2019. Other than that, little direct evidence could be found concerning the influence of consultancies. Moreover, concerning the think tanks, it can be noted that in later programs such as the different Market Visions and the start of Project DOEN – the number of parties involved was relatively large. For instance, for the second Market Vision of the water boards was drawn up with the help of over eight parties. Showcasing how the influence of inter-organizational influences appears to have been rising. This would be in-line with the gradual change from the New Public Management paradigm towards the New Public Governance paradigm. On the whole, whereas with the start of DBFM contract strategy, G. Verhees (2013) showed that knowledge institutes such as PIANOo, PSIBouw, and the RegieRaad Bouw were closely involved in the process – such findings were not found with newer contract strategies such as Project DOEN, alliances, two-phase contract, etc. Though, considering the overall lack of useful secondary data – the influences of these factors should be primarily questioned during the primary data collection method.

## **3.2.4. Intra-organizational level: Effects reorganisations and organisation culture**

Next, this inquiry narrows its focus further towards the intra-organizational factor. Differently put; conducting an internal factor analysis. Similarly to the external (contextual) factors, Kuipers et al. (2014) indicated prominent internal factors wherefrom the academic literature determined them significant for change at public organisation. The main intra-organizational factors that could trigger change were; the role of organizational culture (Holt, Armenakis, Feild, & Harris, 2007) and reorganizations (G. A. Boyne, 2006). Firstly, however, the method of finding this secondary data will be elaborated upon.

### *Finding secondary data*

Similarly to the external factor analysis, the internal factor analysis has primarily used secondary data from primary sources. Be it, that instead of directing the attention to published reports from isolated strategy departments, the

internal factor analysis made use of sources such; business agendas, annual reports, and policy reports – published by both organisations. For example, an indication of the long-term strategy of an organisation can, to a certain extent, be found in their published business agendas. Nevertheless, it proved difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the company's culture from solely conducting a document analysis. Hence, these types of internal factor need to be retrieved via the interviews. To begin with, this section sets off with the internal factor analysis of Rijkswaterstaat and thereafter, the various internal factors of Delfland will be considered. Lastly, the structuring of each section of the individual organisations, at the start; general information regarding the historical development of the organisation will be provided. Following that, the specific internal factor will be reviewed.

#### *Rijkswaterstaat: Reorganisations and organizational culture*

For the internal factor analysis of RWS, the following sources were consulted, all of which can be found in the bibliography:

- Business agenda 2004 – A new perspective for Rijkswaterstaat
- Business agenda 2008 – Onwards!
- Business agenda 2012 - Óne Rijkswaterstaat, improving every day
- Business agenda 2016 – Route 2020: Trusting, connecting, improving
- Marcel Metze: hanging tides
- Report Evaluation cost-benefit system at RWS.

Before the internal factor analysis of Rijkswaterstaat sets off, a brief historical evolution of the organisation is presented that showcases how this particular organization has seen some tumultuous times. From shift in their core duties, in due course tacitly resulted in a reconsideration of their authorization. Moreover, the (financial) magnitude of the organisation will be considered as well as the types of projects they typically execute. The last two are requisite in order to portray the differences with Delfland, and therefore; bring some nuances in the forthcoming conclusion. To start with the describing the core responsibility of Rijkswaterstaat, as the executive agency of the ministry of Infrastructure and Water State, they hold the social task of preserving and improving the Dutch infrastructure network to the utmost standard. Wherein the infrastructure sector (Dutch: GWW sector) forms the largest domain of their procurement portfolio. These tasks, however, changed significantly over the past decades. During the reconstruction period right after the war, the government was working in overdrive to restore the country to its former state. Before, during and after German occupation, large parts of the Dutch infrastructure were completely destroyed. Bridges were purposely demolished, dikes were pierced, rivers system were filled with sunken ships and mines. Worse still, most infrastructure projects were forcefully stopped during the war. All of this needed immediate attention after the war. None surprisingly, from 1945 to 1958, RWS mainly executed an ad-hoc policy. Meaning policy planning was none existing, since spatial planning was nothing but a tool to sort out the budget between the provinces and the national government (Ligtermoet, 1990). Moreover, besides the somewhat chaotic early years, RWS got their direct orders from the central government (Top-down). At last, after 1958 the economy started to slowly recover. The population started to buy more cars, which indirectly meant the national roadwork required substantial improvement. From 1945 to 1965, the national road network grew from 100km to 600km (Rijkswaterstaat, 2015b). Also, early estimation in 1946 concerning the total amount of cars in 1975 was wildly wrong: actually 3.399.000 cars in 1975 instead of the estimated 450.000 (Ligtermoet, 1990). Somewhat understandably, looking at the massive increase in prosperity and the women emancipation in the seventies. Then, in the beginning of the eighties, RWS undergoes a significant change in policy. No longer is the organisation an all-determining power in the construction of infrastructural projects. Here, the effects from the New Public Management paradigms show through. Or how RWS puts it: the organisation went from a constructor to a maintainer and from creator to a manager (Rijkswaterstaat, 2015b). This change was a result of economic recession, downsizing the organisation, economization, privatisation, but also: societal dissatisfaction surrounding infrastructure projects. The latter for numerous reasons. The increasing car mobility lead - besides an alarming number of traffic casualties - to environmental pollution, especially with respect to the surface water. The final blow, coming from the public, arose from the decentralization and resistance against the influence of the European Union (Soltani, 2008). Nonetheless, the decentralization process was temporarily interrupted by the high-water events in 1993 and 1995. Suddenly, an emergency Major Rivers Delta Plan (Dutch: Deltaplan Grote Rivieren) to reinforce weak dikes and build emergency defences along the rivers was drafted and passed at lightning speed. Despite that, the plan proved to be a temporary revival of the traditional approach within a trend towards greater public involvement (Winnubst, 2011). The market indicated a strong need for participation in infrastructure projects and more freedom in the design and execution of them; the start of integrated contracts. One of the earliest large experiments of RWS to utilize the

integrated contracts was in 1986 with the construction of the Maeslant flood defence. For this project, a design & construct contract model was used. Throughout the years, the trend continued to leave more and more responsibility to the market. The procurement mindset from RWS became: "The market, unless...". From that time onwards, the usage of integrated contracts rose significantly. In order to understand what this transition towards integrated contracts entailed, the influence of RWS should be elucidated. Simply put, RWS is a vitally important contract authority in the infrastructure sector. As a matter of fact, the only contracting authority for large projects. Seeing that from 2012 to 2018, RWS publicly procured 100 percent of the projects on the Dutch market with valuations greater than 250 million euros (TenderNed, 2020). Besides these hefty projects, the organization is also accountable for tendering approximately 40 percent of projects with a value between 10-250 million euro. In accordance, the precise measurement reveals that RWS is responsible for procuring in total 65% of all projects in the GWW sector (Rijkswaterstaat, 2019). RWS establishes all of this solely from their main income source provided by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water State. In turn, their budget is accommodated from the Deltafonds and Infrafonds (Rijksoverheid, 2020b). Resulting in a total of annual budget of around 2,3 billion euros (Rijksoverheid, 2020b). Resuming to the type of contractors that work for RWS. The GWW sector itself is mainly controlled by the top 10 biggest contractors in that industry, together holding around 50% of the total revenue in the sector from 2014 to 2017. For projects above the 250 million euro mark, those ten contractors are - whether or not as an alliance - even exclusively bidding on these projects. Thus, Rijkswaterstaat frequently works with biggest contractors in The Netherlands. To conclude, two things are important to acquire from this historical analysis; the fact that RWS has seen enormous reforms, both in their core responsibilities as well as in their overall authority. Again, parallels can be drawn, similar to the shift between the public administration paradigm (hierarchical government mechanism) towards the new public management paradigm (Neo-classical government mechanism). Besides this paradigm shift, it is important to recognize the sheer size of the organisation compared to Delfland, as will become even more clear shortly. With these two aspects in mind, the specific factors from the internal factor analysis can be introduced.

Reorganisations: From 2003 to 2015

Rijkswaterstaat has seen several reorganisations over the past years. Metze and Franssen (2010) introduces these reorganisations in his book in the following way; *'Six years ago, the Water State went into crisis. The image was tarnished by the Construction Fraud, shortages threatened, the administration were shaky, and hundreds of civil servants appeared to be doing unnecessary or unclear things. Politicians began to think aloud about dismantling this once powerful institution. To counter this threat, Rijkswaterstaat decided on a metaphorical surgical intervention in its own flesh, which even silenced the most critical politicians'*. As can be derived from the passage above, the reorganisations went through were considerably large. In order to illustrate this in a comprehensive manner, the reorganisations are split into three groups; the situation before 2003, the reorganisation of 2003, and the last reorganization of 2012.

#### *Situation before 2003*

Before 2003, the head engineer directors (HIDs) were in charge of the regional departments, the (former) centres of excellences, and the project organizations. During that time, the organization was controlled in a highly hierarchical manner. Together with the Board of Directors, the HED's formed the top management of RWS. In turn, every regional HED had its own direction team that managed the regional services. An investigation from Metze and Franssen (2010) showed that the HED were practically in charge of their own department. The expression for this unofficial management position of HIDs within RWS was expressed by saying: *de HED's dragen zowel de pet als de hoge hoed*. Overall, Metze and Franssen (2010) describe a multitude of respondents argued that RWS completely lost contact with the 'outside world'. Contacts were fragmented and the services within the regions were only busy with their own task and there was no collaboration. As a result, there was little overview of what different departments were doing. A former HED of RWS describes the following in Metze and Franssen (2010); *'if there would be a problem with the gate of a sluice, I would get a call from three different department. None of them knew that the other departments were also calling'*. This 'island'-culture will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent paragraph. On the whole, this working approach wasn't something from the last years, as multiple reorganisations had already taken place. To start, in 1998, with the inter-departmental Policy inquiry trajectory (Dutch: Interdepartementaal Beleidsonderzoek) IBO trajectory 'innovative procurement', significant steps have been taken towards a more business-like working method by establishing a link between resources and products. Furthermore, in 2002, the separation of policy, implementation and inspection led towards a more apparent division of tasks within Traffic and Water management. Then, in 2002, Rijkswaterstaat announced their transition towards the agency model. These steps marked, in the words of the former DG; *'The transition towards a public-oriented, clearly managed and commercial Rijkswaterstaat'* (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). With this

last sentence in the introduction of the business agenda 2004-2008 of Rijkswaterstaat, several new reorganisations were announced. These will be discussed down below.

### *Situation between 2003 and 2006*

The most drastic (recent) reorganisation began in 2003. To start, the top management of RWS got restructured in an effort to control the organization from one central point. From that time onwards, the organization became centrally controlled by an executive board and below that the senior management board, followed by a senior management advisory unit. The executive management board containing three functions: the DG, the deputy DG and a new function of Chief Financial Officer (CFO). In other words, a classical triumvirate<sup>1</sup>. All of these three functions together fulfilled the former function of DG. The senior management board and the senior advisory unit together form the staff<sup>2</sup> of the DG. Herein, the senior management board included the HIDs of the regional departments, that where now fully accountable to the executive board. (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). Next, the remaining HIDs (national services and projects organizations) were placed in the senior management advisory unit. Meaning that indirectly, they had to take two steps back, as they were officially placed below the senior management board in this regard (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). According to the business plan from RWS of 2004-2008, the change of scheme should bring about a more apparent distinction between administrative tasks and corporate innovation impulses and shared services (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). Concretely this means that the administrative supporting tasks of DG will be handed over to the staff DG. In essence, this results in three core tasks of the staff of the DG: Orientation towards the external environment (Anticipating capacity), priority and framework statement (Political/administrative antennas), and lastly securing the performance of both the networks and the organization (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). The remaining supportive tasks are transferred to a new centre of excellence: Corporate Operations. This centre of excellence assists the organization department on the basis of business operations; communication, HRM & organization development, administrative legal affairs and real estate, financial services, and customer contact. This new centre of excellence still remains today. Although, the HED responsible for this department doesn't belong to the new executive board, whereas HIDs from other national services do so. Moreover, besides the addition of the new CFO function in the top structure, another function was assigned to every director in the staff management team in 2003: a director business operation (DBO). These DBOs were personally appointed by the new CFO. In short, the DBO had authority over legal affairs, information technology and human resources. Metzke and Franssen (2010) argue, however, that an important underlying reason for the appointment of the DBO was to essentially oversee the practice of the HED, as they were placed on the same level as the HIDs and had direct excess to the executive board. With the appointment of these new functions, RWS showed at the time that their main priority was to ensure an efficiency boost and sorting out the business operations, especially out the regional departments. These functions of directors' business operations remained occupied from 2003 onwards. What is more, the centres of excellence were renamed to national services, again illustrating Rijkswaterstaat's ambition to centralize the organization. There new task description was providing specialty knowledge and innovations to the regional departments. Thus, the national services received a more influential role in the project preparation phases Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). On the whole, the six former centres of excellence got bundled into four new national services. With the new corporate operations department, this became five national services in total. The number of regional department remained the same; 10 in total. The last significant change that occurred within the reorganization of 2003, was setting up a new Expertise Centre Commissioning. The main task for this department was professionalizing the procurement process within the former national service *Infrastructure Services*. Hereto, the primary challenge was to bundle all of RWS's procurement expertise into one centralized national department. A task difficult to achieve, considering that at the time, knowledge regarding procurement was scattered all over the organization. Concludingly, these steps would be undertaken from 2003 to 2006, whereafter the actual introduction of the cost-benefit scheme and the endorsement of the agency status could be undertaken in 2006 at Rijkswaterstaat. The organization chart of Rijkswaterstaat from 2003 to 2007 can be seen in Figure 3.6.

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<sup>1</sup> A group of three people who are in control of an activity or organization.

<sup>2</sup> A line-staff organization, in management, approach in which authorities (e.g., managers) establish goals and directives that are then fulfilled by staff and other workers. A line-staff organizational structure attempts to render a large and complex enterprise more flexible without sacrificing managerial authority.




Figure 3.6 - Organization chart Rijkswaterstaat between 2003 and 2006

Besides the reorganisations of the organizational structures for the purpose of efficiency, there were also significant lay-offs of personnel. In the period of 2002 – 2009, the formation has decreased by 2.012 fulltime employees (fte). Additionally, in the years 2009-2011, the decision was made for an additional reduction of 221 fte. Thus, in total, almost 20% of the personal has left, in comparison with the reference year of 2002. In the period 2002-2005, a fairly significant number of employees left, largely due to the 'Remkesregeling'. With this, employees from 57 years old could leave with retaining 70% of their salary (AEF, 2010a). Overall, a consequence of the large outflow of employees was the fact that much of the knowledge and experience – among which a great deal of implicit knowledge from employees of regional departments – has been flowed out of the organization. Although, according to AEF (2010a), the effect of this outflow has been relatively limited, mainly because the knowledge included primarily expertise that RWS 'no longer needed', as certain responsibilities were handed over to the market.

#### Situation between 2007 and 2015

Again in 2007, as a result from a critical report from the commission Wijffels earlier (Wijffels & Grosfeld, 2004), the responsibility of the national services was again redivided and changed names. Then, the business agenda 2012-2015 announced that triumvirate was lifted, and the organization became once again a one-headed leadership. Further, the function of deputy director general was now fulfilled by a HED. From that time onwards, the executive board consists of the HED from the national services – among which the deputy director general – and the CFO. As of 2013, RWS expanded its current role of operator of the Dutch infrastructure network with a new undertaken, becoming the implementation organization in the field of environment, sustainable mobility, and spatial sustainability. In order to succeeded in these duties, a new national service with a corresponding managing board was established: The Water, Infrastructure and Living Environment national service. This new department isn't solely working for RWS, as it also works for 20% for other governments, businesses (mainly branch organizations) and the EU. Also, the department should not be seen as a fourth RWS network (the other ones being; the main water systems, main road network, and main fairways). Better would be to view the new as an 'underlayer' in which the three mentioned networks are located. That makes that new department is not only involved around the physical networks of RWS, but also within other domains where RWS is not the manager (such as urban areas). In addition, the living environment also includes non-physical aspects and sustainability aspects (such as behaviour influence and process collaboration). Lastly, RWS expects that the directors board of the Living Environment can make a contribution with their knowledge and expertise in providing the political-desirable quality of the living environment (Rijkswaterstaat, 2013). Similarly, to the reorganization of the national services, the regional departments also has undergone a significant change in 2013. Where in 2006, the regional departments were subdivided into ten departments, the reorganization of 2013, bundled and renamed some departments. Since that time, there are now seven regional departments. Lastly, in 2013, the department Infrastructure Service was subdivided into its contemporary form, namely the national services Large projects & Maintenance and the



national service Programs, Projects, and Maintenance. To this day, Rijkswaterstaat has 7 national services. The organizational chart is depicted in Figure 3.7. Again in 2014, a sweeping mobility process was launched within Rijkswaterstaat. In an organization-wide replacement operation, 7,900 people moved in the course of the year to another position in the new organizational structure. The goal was not only to put the right people in the right position within the new structure but also to make Rijkswaterstaat an overall smaller organization. In the period up to 2018 the number of employees would be reduced by 1,500 FTEs (Rijkswaterstaat, 2014). However, the annual report from RWS of 2017 showed that the number of employees was still 9.200fte in 2017.



Figure 3.7 - Organization chart of Rijkswaterstaat between 2007 and 2015

Everything considered, the numerous reorganizations within RWS of the past few decades have been rigorous. In implementing the staff-line organization, the organization strived to become more centralized, work more systematically, and in the end, operate more public-oriented. On the other hand, partly due to the Remkes-regulation, the number of fte. within the agency dropped significantly. Unpropitious as concurrently, there was already a scarcity on the labour market. Resulting in the fact that the output per employee was expected to increase by 30% in the period from 2008 to 2012 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). To this day, it remains difficult for RWS to attract young talent. In the business agenda of 2016-2020, RWS states that newer generation of employers choose their career paths more on personal motives. The report continues; young professionals want to work on real and urgent problems, averse procedures and rules, and aspire working informally in networks (Rijkswaterstaat, 2016b). In closing, seeing all the listed changes in a bird's-eye view, RWS is still in an ongoing process in transforming itself to a modern and flexible organization in the present-day network society.

#### Organizational culture

To categorize the organisational culture of both organisation, the four factor model of Heritage et al. (2014) will be adopted; OCAI model. This is an acronym that stands for 'organisation culture assessment instrument'. The four different organisation cultures are classified along two bisecting continua; stability versus flexibility in work approaches, and internal versus external focus of the organization. An overview is given in Figure 3.8. Starting with the left-upper corner, the Clan culture archetype is delineated by the flexibility and internal focus aspects of the OCAI's continua. It is considered to be representative of a family-style organization, wherein members of the organization are involved in decision making, and teamwork is an important aspect of work (Cameron & Quinn, 2011; Heritage et al., 2014). Next in the upper-right corner is the Adhocracy culture, which is delineated by the flexibility and external focus aspects of the bisecting continua of the OCAI. In turn, this is based on innovation as a means of organizational functioning. Here, one aspect of the Adhocracy culture is the emphasis on specialisation and rapid change within the organization. Generally, employees will often come together to work on specific projects and then disband at completion. Notably, an organization with an Adhocracy culture is not limited by a lack of guidelines when approaching a task, and instead appears to be provoked into productivity when presented with a lack of boundaries (Cameron & Quinn, 2011; Heritage et al., 2014). Moving on to the aspects of the Hierarchy culture, generally marked by a delineation on internal focus and stability aspects of the OCAI continua. The concern of these types of cultures are mainly on safeguarding the stability in organizational functioning, and has clear guidelines regarding the manner in which organization should approach certain tasks. Moreover, this type of culture is typified by a vertical approach to the levels in the organizational hierarchy,

and focuses largely on smooth running efficiency (Cameron & Quinn, 2011; Heritage et al., 2014). Lastly comes the Market culture, in the lower-right corner. Generally, delineated by the external focus and stability aspects of the OCAI continua, where the interest is largely in the realm of competitiveness and winning. Overall, the market culture is driven by the need to create transactions with external bodies as a means of gaining an advantage in their organizational niche (Cameron & Quinn, 2011; Heritage et al., 2014).




Figure 3.8 - OCAI model from Heritage, Pollock, and Roberts (2014)

Although normally an organization culture would be difficult to identify via secondary data collection methods, for Rijkswaterstaat - it has been explicitly stated in several business agendas over the past years. On the whole, the organisation culture of Rijkswaterstaat can be primarily described as mostly a hierarchical culture, with some aspect of the clan culture. Here, a specific aim of the top management of the organisation appear to strive for a more externally oriented approach, or with respect to the OCAI model; the adhocracy approach. This can be observed in, for instance, the business agenda of 2004-2008, where the following passage is stated; *'Our focus should be shifted towards the user of the networks that we manage. The new keywords that belong here are: user-oriented, connectivity, approachability, agility and innovatively. [...] The [existing] island culture must be broken; we are an organization were we help, support and motivate each other. More still, we will have to grow towards a culture in which we make clear and realistic agreements, and dare to address each other on them'* (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). This same message is largely repeated in the business agenda of 2008-2012, where the following was stated; *'Working as a company means that we should become more user-focussed. Thereby, knowing and listening to our [external] environment'* (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). On the whole, these statements show a clear aspiration to become a more flexible and externally-oriented organisation, where the current culture appears to be internally-oriented with aim on stability. Put differently, the aspiration of the top management appears to complete 'flip' the existing organizational culture.

#### Delfland: Reorganisations and organizational culture

Whereas the internal factor analysis of RWS is mainly obtained from documentation published by the organisation itself, the analysis of Delfland also based on documentation that is released from the Association of Water Boards (AWB). Considering that the AWB represents every single water board in the national and international playing field and aim to stimulate knowledge exchange and collaboration between the water boards, their sources should be included in the internal analysis of Delfland. Lastly, the released documentation from the Economic Institute of Construction (EIB) showed itself useful. In sum, the following documentation is consulted:

- Delfland: Water Management Plan 2010 – 2015 and 2016 – 2021
- Delfland: Regional Water Plans Delft and Rotterdam
- Delfland: Annual Report 2015 to 2016
- AWB: National Policy Agreement Water 2011
- AWB: Water Level 2012 and 2014
- AWB: Water Point 2010
- EIB: Hydraulic engineering and Water Boards till 2020
- EIB: Evaluation Market Vision Water Boards

Similarly to the introduction Rijkswaterstaat had in the previous section, the historical development of Delfland should also be covered in chief. Although, for the purpose of this document analysis, the focus for this particular introduction is on the historical development of the Dutch Water Authorities (DWA) as a whole. Here, the main intention is bringing to light the difference in the governance models and responsibilities between the water boards and Rijkswaterstaat, along with the divergence in magnitude. Starting with the first, in 1848, the core task of the DWAs was constitutionally established. The water management became the responsibility of the DWAs and no longer that of the municipalities (J. Van den Berg, 1998). Since then, the DWAs are in charge of maintaining the quality and quantity of the surface water in The Netherlands (Warner, Winnubst, & Roth, 2008). Currently, there are 21 individual waterboards. For comparison, in 1950 there were over 2600. Also, the DWAs have a 'functional governance system'. Meaning that the task of a DWA is bounded to a single functional area: Water management. A water board is theoretically split into; the administrative organisation (Dutch: Bestuurlijke organisatie) and the official organisation (Dutch: Ambtelijke organisatie). The first one consists of the general management (Dutch: Algemeen Bestuur) and the daily management (Dutch: Dagelijks Bestuur). In turn, the members from the general management are elected from the 'united conference' (Dutch: Verenigde Vergadering). These functions are depicted in Figure 3.9. The united conference consist of 30 individuals, 21 of them are elected in the water boards elections once every 4 years. The remaining 9 individuals defend the interests of companies, farmers, and nature conservationists. From the united conference, the daily board is chosen. Consisting of four 'hoogheemraden' and the dike count (Dutch: Dijkgraaf). The function of a 'hoogheemraad' is comparable to that of an alderman in a municipality. They are in charge of a number of subjects, often called a portfolios. Further, the dike count is the chair of the general and daily management. Formally speaking, the dike count is appointed by the Crown for a period of six years. In the meetings of the general management, the dike count has voting rights, in the meetings of the daily management, the dike count has no voting rights. Though, the dike warden is authorized to take decisions independently in urgent situations (Delfland, 2012). The general and the daily board are officially responsible for making the decisions concerning the action of the water boards. These are; setting the vision, mission and long-term assumptions, strategic targets of the organizations, concrete short-term policies, the short- and long-term budgets, and lastly provide a yearly justification (Mostert, 2013). All of these function depict the upper part of the diablo in Figure 3.9.




Figure 3.9 - Governmental system Delfland

In the main, all of the function from the upper part of the diablo diagram are, in one form or another - democratically elected. This is decided upon in the Water Board Act. Then, below the administration board comes the top management that functions as a switching position between the administration function and the official organizational function. Essentially, the secretary general director is secretary of the general and daily management, but also general director of Delfland. The secretary general is in the end accountable for the organization and in achieving the pre-arranged targets. The secretary general is being advised by the direction management team (DMT). A team of five individuals that belong to the concern control and the strategy and innovation. Essentially, the concern control functions as a staff that is charged with various organisation-wide frameworks, auditing, and planning and control. The members of the DMT, on their part, manage the teams, and those successively control the employees. This organizational management system of Delfland is, similar to that of Rijkswaterstaat - known as a line-staff structure. In Figure 3.10, an overview is provided from the organizational structure of Delfland described above.




Figure 3.10 - Organisational structure of Delfland

So, a DWA cannot execute any other task inside their territory. This is different than for instance the municipalities or the provinces, that similarly are public bodies, but have a general form of government. In fact, those public organisations can perform various tasks, solely because their task is not fixed in advance (Landman, 2019). For the DWAs, however, Article 1 from the Water Board Act declares the tasks that are attributed to them (Rijksoverheid, 2020a). In short, their task are arranging the water level of inland waterways, purifying wastewater, dike maintenance, nature conservation in and by the water, and controlling the quality of the surface water (Rijksoverheid, 2017). Moreover, the water boards are accountable for keeping the flood defences (Mostert, 2013). Since 2014, the DWAs are also partly financially contributing some flood defences. In order to pay for those cost, the DWAs charge water board taxes to the population. As a result, DWAs are almost fully financially independent from the central government. This is where the DWAs differ greatly from the municipalities and provinces, and for that matter Rijkswaterstaat (Wensink & Havekes, 2014). In total, the DWAs have a total market share of 1.15 billion euros in 2016 (P. J. M. Groot et al., 2013). Note, however, that this is the summation is the common budget of 21 individual DWAs. Further, as in all sectors of public administration, the water sector has shifted from hierarchical and highly institutionalized forms of government rule towards a more collaborative approach (Fliervoet & Van den Born, 2017; Termeer, Dewulf, & Van Lieshout, 2010). Now, DWAs are increasingly more collaborating with individual water users, communities, private actors and non-profit organizations to reach their policy goals (Pahl-Wostl, Jeffrey, Isendahl, & Brugnach, 2011). A considerable change, seeing that traditionally the DWAs had hold a substantial role in the preparation and execution of plans for water projects (P. J. M. Groot et al., 2013). Especially during these former times, the DWAs have gained vast technical knowledges and capacity. Both of qualifications are still being used in the preparation, design, operation and maintenance phases of water works. Mostly when project is procured via the design, bid and build method. Nonetheless, the DWAs are opting to use more integrated contracts. Overall in 2012, 30% of the total investing volume was procured via integrated contracts (P. J. M. Groot et al., 2013). In 2015, this number increased to roughly 35% (P. Groot & Visser, 2016). Although the actual usage of integrated contracts varies greatly between individual DWAs and also between different types of projects. For example, the integrated contracts are most often used in flood defence projects and water purification works, whereas traditional contracts are most used for water system projects (P. Groot & Visser, 2016). Two driving forces behind the more frequent use of integrated contracts are the DWAs' market vision document of 2014 and the program Flood Protection (Dutch: Hoogwaterbescherming) (Van Meer, 2016). Interestingly enough, some DWAs stated

that RWS's procurement approach (market, unless...) was not preferable as a procurement strategy (P. J. M. Groot et al., 2013). According to them, individual projects have individual tasks and contract model should reflect that. Indirectly stating that the integrated contracts should not become the standard. In practice, this would typically lead to a higher level of involvement from the DWAs compared to RWS (P. Groot & Visser, 2016). Moreover, besides the diverging use of integrated contracts by different types of projects, a similar phenomenon occurs at DWAs in different stages of a project. For instance, the operation and maintenance of hydraulic engineering works are marginally outsourced to the market in the form of integrated contracts. Even tasks in the plan and preparation phase are less commonly sourced out to the market (P. Groot & Visser, 2016). Continuing to the next characteristic of the DWAs: the type of contractors that are working for them. Mainly, small and medium-sized hydraulic engineering companies have the DWAs as biggest contracting authority with a turnover share of 40% (P. J. M. Groot et al., 2013). In this example, small to medium-sized companies have an annual turnover between 5 and 30 million euros. Surprisingly, roughly half of the total hydraulic engineering turnover comes from project below the 1 million euro mark (P. J. M. Groot et al., 2013).

### Reorganisations

In general, reorganizations for water boards are nothing new at all. As the oldest democratic governing bodies in The Netherlands, over the years, they have seen significant organizational changes. For those interested, H Havekes (2009) has written an extensive dissertation on this topic, showing the complexity of 50 years of new legislation and fusions. For this inquiry, this falls far outside of the scope of this research. Instead, this inquiry starts to focus on the period from 2006 onwards. On a final note, considering the fact that the reorganisations of Delfland have been less extensive than those of Rijkswaterstaat – these will be covered all at once. To start, in the period 2006-2009, Delfland implemented several reorganisations, mainly on with respect to the business operations. There were mainly due as a result of the revision of the Water Board Act and the Water Act (Delfland, 2009b). These updated legislation aimed at reducing the 'administrative pressure' on the water boards (Delfland, 2009b). An example of a change that resulted from these legislations was a new focus on business operations. More specifically, the implementation of the INK model as Delfland's new management system. The model is based on five hallmarks; courageous leadership, result-oriented approach, continuous improvement, transparency, and collaboration. In the Water Management Plan 2006-2009, the main driver appears to be the 'professionalisation of the organisation' (Delfland, 2006). By choosing the IMK model, Delfland follows the path of other water boards and governmental organisation. For instance, Rijkswaterstaat already implemented this system in around 2001. What is more, the two legislations seemingly resulted in changes in cost allocation, the multi-year budget calculations, and regularity (Delfland, 2009b). Where improvements with regard to internal and external communication appear to be significant desirability. Furthermore, around 2009, in an effort to become a more decisive organization and oversee the challenges Delfland faced - the organization introduced the new 'program management approach'. With this program, the water board expected to react more adequately and integrally on the changes that were occurring in its external environment. This program management approach is an addition to the line control system, that was already in place in the organisation. This is formulated in Delfland (2009b) as; *'both systems are part of the hierarchical, integrally responsible line-organisation'*. Essentially, the line control system is focussed routine and cyclical work processes, where the program management approach is focused on obtaining cross-project and cross-sector targets that are set for the organization. Put differently, the line control system mainly handles short-term routinely work processes, but program management concentrates on the realization of targets that are long-term focused. The program management approach is one of the pillars of the 'Road from Initiation to Execution'-initiative. By which an effort is made to change the working culture of Delfland towards a more project-based approach, that is summarized in the following key words: *'Together, discuss, agree on, address'* (Delfland, 2016). Lastly, in contrast to the changes of Rijkswaterstaat, Delfland noted in 2006 that it needs to attract more employees to their organisation, or in their words; *'more employees are needed to be able to realize the expansion of the activities and further professionalization of the task execution'* (Delfland, 2006). As a result, the number of personnel increased from 465 fte in 2006 toward 560 at the end of 2009 (Delfland, 2009b).

### Organizational culture

When discussing the organisational culture of Rijkswaterstaat, the OCAI model of Heritage et al. (2014) was introduced. The four factor model is illustrated in Figure 3.8. In the course of analysing published documents from Delfland, it can be derived that the organizational culture of Delfland primarily fits within the 'clan culture'. And similar to RWS, these documents showcase a desire from the top management to change this existing working culture. For instance, in the strategy document 'Samenspel: Delfland op weg naar de Toekomst', the following observation is made; *'Here at Delfland, there truly is 'family culture', with the necessary positive aspects, but also lesser ones. Positive aspects is*

*the tendency to care for each other and the fact that people are focused on interacting harmoniously with each other. Though, the family culture also leads to less desirable aspects such as conflict-avoiding behaviour, talking about each other instead of with each other, difficulty to address negative behaviour, etc.'* (Delfland, 2018). Though, the desire to become more externally-oriented was also outspoken in the Water Management plan of 2006-2009, where *'the organisation in its functioning should become a learning organization that wants to continuously improve on the basis of signals from its [external] environment and evaluation of its own functioning'* (Delfland, 2006). Later in the Water Management Plan 2010-2015, it is communicated that the innovatively in the existing organisational culture should be expanded upon (Delfland, 2009b). On the whole, the aspiration of the top management to transform the existing family/clan culture towards an adhocracy culture can be clearly recognized.

In conclusion, for the intra-organizational factors of Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland, both the reorganisations of the past years and the organizational culture have been analysed. When comparing the observed intra-organizational factors of both public organisations, a few key differences can be noticed. First and foremost, with respect to the reorganization – RWS has seen far more rigorous reorganizations than Delfland. Though the Water Board Act and the Water Act Planning have compelled Delfland to collaborate even closer with the provinces and municipalities and moreover; change adopt a new management system, the organisation could was still growing significantly between 2006 and 2009. In contrast, Rijkswaterstaat has downsized significantly in that period, letting go almost 20% of its work force. More still, the entire top management structure has been changed; with several large-scale reformation with concern to the management board, the national services and the regional services. On the whole, it appears that both Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland have considerably focused on investing in the business operation department, both in an effort to 'professionalize' their organisation. Although, the exact time periods of these reorganisation appear shifted. To clarify, where Rijkswaterstaat started with their effort to centralize and professionalize the organization with their first large-scale reorganization between 2002-2006, Delfland underwent a similar movement but some years later. Mainly between 2006 and 2012. In any case, the basis of these reorganisations are also recognized in the aspiration of both top management to change their organizational culture. By and large, both public organisation showcase that they aspire to adopt a more externally-oriented and flexible organizational culture. Lastly, for these intra-organizational, the main focus of the reorganization was on the organizational level. The next sub section will zoom in further and focus on significant reorganization on the actor level. In this inquiry terminated; the changes in leadership.

### 3.3. Leadership: Role of the leader

In this sub section, the changes on the actor level will be expanded upon. These changes belong to the third general change management factor; the leadership factors. For this inquiry, the leadership factor is split into three subfactors; the role of the leadership, the individual vision of the leaders, and the changes in leadership. In general, the first two of these are difficult to determine via a secondary data collection method. Nonetheless, specific changes in leadership can be retrieved via this method. On a final note, the number of top management function in both organisations is substantial. For instance, the number of HEDs, the DG, the CFO, the deputy DG exceeds already sixteen individuals. Covering the changes related to these functions over a period of more than a decade would be overly extensive. Therefore, in this sub section, the changes concerning the top of the management board will exclusively be mentioned, starting with those of Rijkswaterstaat.

#### 3.3.1. RWS: Changes in Leadership

For the changes in leadership at Rijkswaterstaat, individual changes in the following function functions will be covered; the Director-general, the deputy Director-general, and the Chief Financial officer. These three function form the core of the board of Rijkswaterstaat. Further, the exact hierarchy between these three function has changed throughout the years, that is similarly depicted in the table . For instance, the first in Table 3.6 show the period wherein the triumvirate was active, marked by the 'X' symbol. Lastly, for the full list of HEDs, DGs, Deputy DGs, and CFO of the past 50 years – Hoogland (2010) wrote a comprehensive book providing an entire historical analysis. Also, the changes on the actor level depicted below are primarily obtained via this source.

Table 3.6 – Changes of three boards function from 2003 to 2015 at Rijkswaterstaat (Hoogland, 2010)

	Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	Triumvirate					X	X	X	X	X	X			
Function	Names													
DG	ir. L.H. Keijts													
	mr. ing. J.H. Dronkers													
Deputy DG	drs. L.H.M. Kohsiek													
	ir. Th.J. van de Gazelle													
CFO	drs. M.C.J. van Breukelen													
	drs. J.H. Slootmaker RO													

### 3.3.2. Delfland: Changes in leadership

Similar to those of Rijkswaterstaat, the changes in leadership for Delfland will likewise not encompass every managerial function. As became clear from the intra-organizational factors, Delfland is governed by a multitude of managerial functions. Though, these can be divided into the administration board and the official organizational management board. Where the dike count is the head of the administration organisation and the secretary-director is head of the official organisation. Thereby, changing in these two functions are seemingly important to consider.

Table 3.7 – Changes of two board functions from 2003 to 2015 at Delfland

	Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Function	Names													
Dike count	drs. P.H. Schoute													
	mr. M.A.P. van Haersma Buma													
Secretary director	A. Boomsma													
	mr. drs. P.I.M. van den Wijngaart													

The next chapter will introduce the third change management factor - that will simultaneously assist the researcher with measuring the influence of the public paradigms discussed earlier; the outcome factor.

### 3.4. Outcomes: Three types of public values

The framework from Kuipers et al. (2014) underlined five factors that ought to be considered when studying change at public organisations. So far, the contextual and content factors have already been covered in this chapter. Here and now, a third change management factors will be considered; the outcome factor. To bring to the recollection, considering that the reviewing the successfulness of the change is not part of this research - the main focus will be on the (predetermined) outcomes. Moreover, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) stated that the focus on public values, seems to be appropriate mechanisms for examining the changes that are occurring in the contemporary public sector. In

addition, focussing on (public) values has two additional benefits. Firstly, it enables the effects of the shifts in public paradigms to be assessable. Considering that, even a compendious summary of every public paradigms is arguably difficult to fully comprehend and moreover; potentially overwhelming for people who are not acquainted with the field of public administration. Most of all, it will be close to impossible to convey even the fundamentals - necessary in order to obtain a meaningful answer. The (predetermined) outcomes expressed in values, can contribute to overcome this problem. Given that, values could be seen as a universal language, meaning interview items become readily communicable. Secondly, and not less important, values can be put to use by way of circumventing prejudice of interviewees. To clarify, a challenge in every interview is obtaining authentic answers. Circumventing subliminal prejudice and - where possible subjectivity - is delicate work. Nonetheless, by purposely bypassing particular terms such as new public management and neoliberalism, the interviewer could already come closer to the truth. These terms can have a negative connotation, especially in some sectors. As a result, interviewees might precipitately point towards the repercussions of, for example new public management, while possessing substandard knowledge on the topic of public administration theory. Effectively resulting in an empty claim. Of course, any output from an interview guarantees a certain level of prejudice and seeking to fully eradicate this would be pointless. However, minimizing the likelihood of occurrence, could be deemed sensible. This immediately puts forward the purpose of this chapter; providing three categories of public values most associated with the different public paradigms: sigma, theta, and lambda values. The three classification of values are initially used in Hood (1991) and since then widely used by the scientific community. Respectively they represent; economic and parsimonious values, values in the spirit of honesty and fairness, and values that relate to security and resilience.




Figure 3.11 – Three values types from (Hood, 1991)



### 3.4.1. Sigma Values: Keep in LEAN and Purposeful

The sigma family are in described as principles that seek to strictly match resources to defined tasks, all in a competent and sparing fashion. In conformity with sigma values, frugality of resource used in relation to given goals is the criterion of success, while failure is counted in terms of instances of avoidable waste and incompetence (Hood, 1991). Emphasize is generally on 'trimming fat' an avoid 'slack'. On account of this, the principal 'coin' in which success or failure to realize sigma-type values is measured is mainly time and money. For the purpose of completeness, down-below are three typical manifestations of these values listed, as also adopted in Hood (1991):

- 'just-in-time' inventory control systems: Avoid stocking up unnecessary resources and ensure;
- payment-by-results reward systems: Minimizing circumstances where one has to pay for what is not delivered;
- administrative 'cost engineering' Using resources sparingly to provide public services of no greater cost, durability or quality than is absolutely necessary for a defined task, without excessive concern for 'externalities'.

In general terms, the sigma family indirectly demands fixed and 'checkable' goals that in turn must be central to any design. Typically, the fewer incompatible objectives are included, the more readily can unnecessary fat be identified and removed. Equally, the more that the control emphasis is on output rather than on process or input, the more unambiguous the waste-finding process can be (Hood, 1991). As might already be apparent by now, the sigma values are closely associated with the NPM paradigm.

### 3.4.2. Theta Value: Keep it Honest and Fair

The second category of values are the theta values that seek the pursuit of honesty, fairness and mutuality through the prevention of distortion, inequity, bias, and abuse of office (Stange, 1988). By the same token often associated with the traditional public sector ethos. Contrary to the sigma values, the design-focus of theta values prioritizes process controls, instead of focusing mainly on output controls. In turn, this concern with process may cause the emphasis to go on the achievement of maximum transparency in public operations (Hood, 1991). What is more, the equivalent goals are less likely to be less single in nature. In essence, 'Getting the job done' in terms of aggregate quantities is likely to be supplemented by concerns about how the job is done (March & Olsen, 2010). At the bottom line, theta values are most closely related to the PA paradigm.

### 3.4.3. Lambda Value: Keep it Robust and Resilient

Principles that embody lambda values are, for example, reliability, robustness, adaptivity. By and large, values that relate to resilience, redundancy, endurance, robustness, survival, diversity, and adaptivity (Hood, 1991). In broad terms, lambda values are often concerned with the capacity to cope with equivoque and weak environment, to learn from problems and catastrophes, to adapt rapidly in a crisis, notably by means of improvisation, the attitude of wisdom, respectful interaction, and virtual role of system (Pyun & Gamassou, 2018). In light of this, success is counted in terms of resilience and reliability, while failure is measured in terms of catastrophe, breakdown and learning failure. Further, from the perspective of the literature, an organizational design which maximized lambda-type values would need to embrace; a multiple-objective that provides a relatively high degree of 'slack'. For the reason of providing spare capacity for learning or deployment in crisis. Moreover, a control framework that is focused on input or process rather than measured output in order to avoid building up pressures for misinformation; management focuses on cohesion rather than merit system, mistakes and errors are admissible (Hood, 1991; Pyun & Gamassou, 2018). Ultimately, lambda values are most closely tied to the NPM paradigm.

Table 3.8 - Three sets of core values in public administration (Hood, 1991)

	<i>Sigma-type values</i> <i>KEEP IT LEAN AND PURPOSEFUL</i>	<i>Theta-type values</i> <i>KEEP IT HONEST</i>	<i>Lambda-type values</i> <i>KEEP IT ROBUST</i>
<i>Standard of success</i>	Frugality  (matching of resources to tasks for given goals)	Rectitude  (achievement of fairness, mutuality, the proper discharge of duties)	Resilience  (achievement of reliability, adaptivity, robustness)
<i>Standard of failure</i>	Waste  (muddle, confusion, inefficiency)	Malversation  (unfairness, bias, abuse of office)	Catastrophe  (risk, breakdown, collapse)
<i>Currency of success and failure</i>	Money and time  (resource costs of producers and consumers)	Trust and entitlements  (consent, legitimacy, due process, political entitlements)	Security and survival  (confidence, life and limb)
<i>Control emphasis</i>	Output	Process	Input/ Process
<i>Slack</i>	Low	Medium	High
<i>Goals</i>	Fixed/ Single	Incompatible 'Double bind'	Emergent/Multiple
<i>Information</i>	Costed, segmented (commercial assets)	Structured	Rich exchange, collective asset
<i>Coupling</i>	Tight	Medium	Loose

For clarity's sake, Table 3.8 is added down below wherein the core elements of the three types of values are summarized. Before this chapter closes, however, an important issue needs to be elucidated: no single core value belongs exclusively to a certain public paradigm. Isolating, for example, the argument that theta values are *most* often associated with the public administration paradigm. This doesn't necessarily mean that this particular value is solely represented in the PA paradigm. For this case in point, some aspects of theta values can also be recognized in, for example, the NPM paradigm. These could include; institutionalized in appeal mechanisms such as public reporting requirements, adversary bureaucracies and independent scrutiny systems (Hood, 1991). Fact of the matter is, categorically speaking, the three values are not perfectly interchangeable with the three public paradigms. Rather, some values are merely more observable in certain paradigms. Or how Hood (1991) formulates this issue ; *"If NPM is a design for putting frugality at centre stage, it may at the limit be less capable of ensuring honesty and resilience in public administration."* These statement will be considered in the upcoming paragraph. At last, before this chapter draws to the end conclusion, for illustrative purposes, a timeline added at the end of this chapter. This timeline provides a comprehensive view on all of the contextual and content factors that were discussed in this chapter. Herein, showing the different public paradigms; critical events concerning the development around contract strategies; intra-organizational factors of RWS and Delfland; as well as the inter-organizational macro factors. Following this, this chapter will close with answering the second sub question. On a final note, Figure 3.12 illustrates the new scheme of change management factors that could be drawn up after this chapter.




Figure 3.12 - Final scheme of change management factors




Diagram illustrating the evolution of public administration and governance from 1950 to 2050, showing the transition from traditional public administration to new public governance across four dimensions: Social, Economic, Political, and External.

### 3.5. Results of the three cases: Secondary data collection

A preparatory note for the reader's comprehensibility, up until this point - this report has undertaken a moderately holistic approach. As has been substantiated in the research methodology, this was deemed advisable in view of the exploratory nature of this research. Essentially, the holistic approach up until now was valuable considering that it withhold the research from precipitately converging towards a singular change in the contract strategy. Still, although this holistic approach was realizable when gathering the raw data for the document analysis, this approach simply isn't achievable when one aspires to find concrete answers for the sub questions. For this reason, specific changes in contract strategies need to be chosen. Essentially, these time periods will serve as an exemplification and will evidently contribute in answering the main research quest. Also, these exemplifications will from here on be referred to as 'cases'. Bearing in mind that the word 'case' (in a case study research strategy) can refer to either an individual, group, organization, event, belief system, phenomenon or other real-life contexts (Saunders et al., 2009). In the matter of selecting these cases, the documents analysis of this chapter proofed useful, considering it granted a comprehensive overview of recent changes in contract strategies of public authorities. On a final note, with the intention of conducting a (holistic) multiple case study, these cases will, naturally, include both Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland. Up until this point, the document analysis has distinctly outlined the different levels of contextual factors, content factors, leadership factors, and outcome factors. Yet, this sub section seeks to connect these different factors into a more multiconnected change process by linking them to these three cases. Thereby, forming an undefined explanation for the plausible (theoretical) drivers of public authorities to change their contract strategy. Key in this sentence is the word 'plausible'. As could be remembered, the nature of this research is exploratory. Hence, producing a comprehensive causality structure won't be achievable for this particular research, this would be more fitting for a research with an explanatory nature. Furthermore, the concretization of the theoretical drivers obtained in this sub section will subsequently serve as the basis for the interview protocol. The protocol that will enable the gathering of primary data in the subsequent chapter. At this point, it is important to underline the limited available time per interview. In light of this, establishing an efficient and effectual interview protocol is mandatory. Consequently, filtering in this stage between plausible, less plausible and unlikely factors on the basis of the gathered document analysis is instrumental. Lastly, as could be noticed when reviewing the document analysis – the exact process of change and the some aspect regarding the leadership factor could not be obtained via this secondary data collection method. For this reason, the influence of these factors remains in this stage of the research indecisive. Mainly, the influence of these factors will be attained in the subsequent chapter when conducting the primary data collection method. Given these circumstances, this section will now continue with considering the funnelling process towards the three – in the author's opinion - most fitting cases.

#### 3.5.1. Determining time periods for cases

The funnelling process will be done in two-fold. First, a rough selection will be made that curtails the potential cases on the basis of the theoretical outline that has been established in this chapter. Thereafter, remaining will be further reduced by the help of the information that was – or better still: was not found. To start, in view of the argument from Buchanan and Bryman (2009) considering that interviews are interaction that can influenced by lapses of memory from the participants, trying to obtain primary data with regards to changes in contract strategies that occurred many years ago might not be unproductive. More importantly still, for practical purposes – it might unattainable to find individuals that held a managerial position, considering the average age of a managerial public administrator and acknowledging the destined faith of elderliness. Resulting from this, trying to obtain primary data for changes in contract strategy by choosing the design, bid, build (DDB) contract type as a case would arguably be less fruitful. The exact same argument can be made when considering the 'non-dialogue' procurement methods. This type of procurement method even surpasses the publication of the European Commission's white paper for '*Completing the Internal Market*' from 1985. Another potential case that would not be productive when considering the time aspect would be the emergence of the two-phase contract. Be it in a different stance than the argument to renounce the DDB contract type or 'non-dialogue' procurement procedure. To elaborate, the two-phase contract type has been formally implemented in May 2019 by RWS. In light of this, attaining the factual drivers for this change in contract strategy would be implausible, given the political environment both organizations are situated in. It could well be that some information is still too politically sensitive. Even more so, personnel that currently hold positions in the board or other prominent roles, might feel less inclined to speak plainly. Next in line is the alliance contract type. Although this contract type marked a notable change in the overall stance towards the relation between the contract authority and the contractor, it remained relatively

unused in practise. Hence, for this particular research, it was deemed less worthwhile to further explore. After this relatively speedy funnelling process based on several data quality issues, a further curtailment can now be made on the basis of the document analysis, beginning with, the 'dialogue' procurement method. When reviewing the secondary data that has been obtained, it becomes apparent that all the changes with regard to dialogue procurement methods (competitive dialogue, innovation partnership, etc) came about due to changes in the European directives. Naturally, the introduction of the Directive. 2004/18/EC and Directive 2014/24/EU can be seen as the prime drivers for these changes and hence, won't be explored further. Next in line comes the design and construct (D&C) contract type. When reconsidering the findings of the document analysis, the change towards the D&C contract mainly seems to have a political footing, large in conformity with large-scale public system reforms that marked the governmental focus of Kok II. To briefly elaborate on this further, the 'Innovative Procurement' programme was officially sent to parliament in 1999. To a considerable extent, undertaken by the significant cost overruns during the Oosterschelde barrier project. As discussed before, the 'innovative procurement' programme was implemented to increase the use of integrated contract forms, among which the design & construct contracts (Boes & Dorée, 2009). In essence, the programme aimed at shifting activities from the public sector to the private sector and direct the public sector to work in a more market-oriented manner (Boes & Dorée, 2009). Following these macro external factors, some internal factors ushered the start of contract type at organisations such as RWS and Delfland. Beginning with RWS, the transformation towards an governmental agency model started in 2002. Where in a sequence of events, an effort was made to drastically downsize and reorganize the public organisation. This eventually led in 2007 to the wide-scale adoption of the design and construct model at RWS, ProRail and the Rijksgewestelijke Dienst. All in all, this illustrates that for RWS – a company subject to the volatility of the ministries – the implementation of the D&C contract type can be seen as a third-order reform that was intentional and designed (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). Or put differently; a planned top-level process of change that was characterized by driving political leaders. Notably is the fact that this top-level political driving force had initially little effect on more local authorities, such as Delfland. Those organisation took longer to implement the contract type. Presumably, there the change followed a slower, bottom-up patterns of reform that is more common in consensus-based systems. In conclusion, sufficient information was found regarding the drivers of the D&C contract, which were most importantly; the cost overruns of the Oosterschelde barrier, construction fraud. Many factors that affected the decision to implement D&C contracts, also influenced the progression of the DBFM model. For instance, the comparable origination out of intentional, designed, large-scale reforms with the ambition to create more efficiency. That consequently, resulted in an overall tendency towards far-reaching privatization and market forces. In other words, the contextual factors behind the DBFM model were mainly economic and political. Also, the internal factors are practically similar. There are, however, some critical differences between the process of change. Or to put it differently, divergences between the actual adaptation of D&C model and the DBFM model. For one thing, when observing Koppenjan and de Jong (2018), it seemed if the DBFM model has been pushed harder and for a seemingly longer period of time by political leaders, compared to the D&C contract. To elaborate on this further, on the account of Koppenjan and de Jong (2018), it can be seen that the Dutch Ministry of Finance held an prominent role in the wider initialization of the DBFM model. Conceivably, this was done because of the potential the Dutch government recognized in privately funded infrastructure, which isn't included in the D&C contract type. Regardless, the numerous new knowledge institutes (Knowledge Institute PPS, PIANOo, etc.) and extra policy instruments, such as the public-private comparator and the public sector comparator, show that significant political effort was undertaken to institutionalize DBFM models. On the whole, both the D&C and DBFM contract types can be seen as contractual outcomes of the New Public Management paradigm. Where the emphasis was on outputs (sigma value) such as lower transaction cost and the standard of success was frugality. These findings are further substantiated by extensive studies from Koppenjan and de Jong (2018), Stellinga (2012), and Van Den Brink (2009). What is less certain, however, are the actual decisive change management factors behind the implementation of DOEN, and the Best Value Approach (BVA). Particularly, the process of change and the role of the leadership seems less straightforward than that of the D&C and DBFM models. Also, as both BVA and DOEN can be seen as 'hybrid models', they similarly entail many other interesting implicit changes with regard to the different types of contract types, procurement methods, and award mechanisms. Thus, by appointing BVA and DOEN as cases in order to obtain primary data for this research, these changes can be studied in an effective manner. In consideration of this, both BVA and DOEN will be further investigated in this stage of the report. Of course, Delfland has never adopted the DOEN philosophy. Hence, the exact cases for this stage of the report will be: Best Value at RWS (2007-2009), DOEN at RWS (2013-2015), and Best Value at Delfland (2012-2015). The results of which will be discussed in the subsequent section.

### 3.5.2. Case 1: Best Value Approach (RWS)

#### *Context factor during BVA at Rijkswaterstaat*

When reviewing the key elements of the two paradigm, it appears that BVA is a combination of the New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG) paradigm. To start with the theoretical roots, the dissertation of Van Duren and Dorée (2008) illustrates how the BVA (and PIPS) has a significant overlap with the theoretical roots of the NPM paradigm. Specifically, the three theories underlying the 'new institutional economics'. These are; the transaction costs theory, agent theory, and the property rights theory. With respect to the property rights theory, a key principle of the BVA is that ownership affects behaviour and by fully transferring the risks to the contractor (risk owner), this consequently leads to increasing 'commitment'. Thereby, the client can, according to the BVA, expect constructive behaviour with regards to the management of these risks. In other words, an underlying assumption from the Best Value Approach is that when a party is 'risk owner' of a certain property, that party will act different then when there is an absence of this ownership (Williamson, 1993). Considering this, this particular rationale of the BVA appears to be more in line with the property rights theory. The second theory– the agent theory - is less clear cut for the BVA. To start, when reviewing some underlying assumptions from the BVA - several aspects from the agent theory can be recognized. To clarify, a key assumption in the agent theory is that – due to 'imperfect information' and 'information asymmetry' - the principal (the public authority) doesn't know if the agent (the contractor) is performing on his maximum level. For this reason, the agent theory is mainly concerned with the cost of monitoring and bonding. It follows that, after the contract has been awarded to the contractor, it is important that the client (principal) gets guaranteed that the contractor (agent) acts as expected and agreed. For this, the principal undertakes effort; resulting in an increasing monitoring costs. In turn, the agent incurs bonding costs, as that party ought to make an effort to convince the principal that he is working in the principal's interest and will not engage in and/or refrain from activities that may serve that interest harm (Eisenhardt, 1989; Van Duren & Dorée, 2008). Present in the BVA/PIPS, a multitude of bonding 'costs' – called 'safeguards' – can be recognized. Van Duren and Dorée (2008) concretize the purpose of these safeguards in the following fashion '*[they] reduces uncertainty, narrow the leeway for propensity and exhibiting of opportunistic behaviour and reduces the consequences of bounded rationality*'. This statement largely illustrates the influence of the agent theory on the BVA – particularly the assumption of 'bounded rationality' and 'opportunistic behaviour'. Another, more concrete one example of the BVA being the 'performance data', as bonding costs in the control phase. Largely, for the BVA, this results in the event that the contractor measures and reports to the public authority on a regular basis in respect to the schedule, budget, and if everything is in accordance with quality expectations as agreed. Though, the above mentioned are some examples of the seeming influence of the agent theory on the BVA, some authors argue that the BVA is largely based on the stewardship theory (Snippert et al., 2015). Though, this seems – from the authors point of view – not fully fitting. To clarify, the core assumption of the stewardship theory is that people are intrinsically motivated to work for others or for organizations to accomplish the tasks and responsibilities with which they have been entrusted (Menyah, 2013). Fundamental in this assumption is the word 'intrinsically'. This conflicts with assumption of BVA that ownership affects behaviour. Considering that according to the stewardship theory - stewards do not have ownership of what they have responsibility to take care of (Menyah, 2013). That being said, there are also some overlaps with the BVA and theoretical roots from the NPG paradigm, primarily that of the social exchange theory. To elucidate on this further, social exchange theory states that trustworthiness between exchanging parties is proven by regularly disclosing their obligations and investing in their relationships to show their commitment to the relationship (Lambe et al., 2001). Here, implications of repeated encounters in combination with potential reputation effects are some sort of indirect enforcement mechanism (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). This can be observed in the 'performance rating' after delivery (control phase) and consequently in the 'past performance information safeguard' (contact phase). Both reward or punish the contractor on their (ex-post) performance, increasing the chance that a respectable contractor will win again in the future (Van Duren & Dorée, 2008). In conclusion, on the basis of the theoretical roots of both paradigms, in combination with the time period wherein the BVA was first utilized - a plausible assumption would be that either the BVA was part of the 'late' New Public Management (NPM) thinking, or an early New Public Governance (NPG) thinking.

Moving on to the emphasis that are discernible for the paradigms, the BVA has, again, overlap with both the NPM and the NPG paradigm. In terms of the first, the BVA phases emphasis on inputs and output control and evaluation, and upon performance management and audit (Osborne, 2010). Essentially, it models the production of public services as a process that turns inputs into outputs (services) within a mediating environment, and with an emphasis upon the economy and efficiency of these processes in producing public services (Osborne, 2006). Here, efficiency can loosely be defined as a process wherein more output is achieved with less input. For the BVA, these outputs appear to be checkable goals such as lowering the transaction cost and shorten the procurement procedure (Kashiwagi, 2011). More

still, the awarding mechanism comes still down to a price criteria (output), be it that during the award procedure – a significant ‘fictive discount’ is given for a priori quality of the offer. That being said, some safeguards of the BVA place an emphasis on the process that stresses effectiveness and outcomes (NPG). For instance, this can be recognized in safeguards such as the ‘performance rating after completion’, where the public authority can rate ex-post the quality of the design. By all means, this blend between paradigms can similarly be recognized in the key resource allocation mechanism. This appears to be more in line with relational contracts than (neo-) classical or mere contractual contracts. Something that is similarly argued by Van Duren and Dorée (2008). Though, the BVA is most often used in combination with performance-based contracts and design & construct contracts (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011b). Both are more in keeping with the market or (neo-)classical contracts, these being the key resource allocation mechanisms evident in the NPM paradigm. Everything considered, the influence of the contextual factors on the societal level – the NPM and NPG paradigms - can be both observed in many aspects and safeguards from the BVA. In relation to the interview protocol in the subsequent phase of this inquiry, the influence of the paradigms cannot be directly questioned. Instead, the values that will be specified in the outcome factor will be used to indirectly measure the influence.

Moving on to the national contextual factors, starting with the demographic factor. The most significant demographic factor for this case appears to be the *shortage on the labour market*. As the RWS Business Agenda from 2004-2008 states; ‘... *the shortage in the labour market, particularly technical and business economics disciplines- places RWS in front of a significant personnel challenge*’ (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). Considering the promise that BVA of reduces the management capacity on the side of the public authority with 80% (Van Duren & Dorée, 2008), the influence of this demographic factor on the change process surrounding BVA seems plausible. For this reason, the shortage on the labour market, specifically in combination with RWS’ aspiration in wanting to attract younger employees to the organisations – will be questioned during the interviews.

Moreover, with regard to different economic factors from the DESTEP analysis, several scenarios are conceivable. To clarify, the Urgent Approach Roads program started in October 2008 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011a). Nevertheless, the exact time when the idea of the BVA took hold at RWS remains (in this stage of the inquiry) unknown. So, depending on that latter, four economic factors might be plausible, where two of them are contrasting. The contrasting two are; the *economic crises* and the *booming economy*. Starting with the first, the American housing crisis started in the summer of 2007. Meaning that around of the start of the Urgent Approach Roads program, the effects of the crisis could already be felt. For instance, these uncertain times could have resulted in the situation that the organisation was preparing for more budget cuts or at the bare minimum; tried to keep projects within budget. When comparing these to the promises of the BVA, mainly; ‘98% of projects are delivered within budget and schedule’ and ‘lowering of transaction costs’ (Van Duren & Dorée, 2008), the possible effects of the economic crisis might be credible. Secondly and in contrast, before the economic crisis - the Dutch economy and the construction sector were booming. Following that, if the Urgent Program Roads or the BVA was initiated well in advance of the crisis, it is plausible that there had been, for example - more budget to explore different (new) contract strategies. Thirdly, considering the fact that the BVA promises that it will give rise to more innovation, the ‘*Competitive position of The Netherlands*’ economic factor might also be plausible as a driver. The pressing need for innovation, reaffirmed by Wijffels and Grosfeld (2004) - became a driver for the second cabinet of the Dutch prime minister Balkenende. This did had its effect on RWS, most notably in 2007 with the reorganizations of the national services. But also earlier, in the business agenda of 2004-2008 from RWS, were it was mentioned that RWS wanted to transition from ‘*creating innovation internally to stimulating innovation in the market*’. More still, RWS would, according to the report become the ‘*leading innovator in 2008*’ (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). Particularly the ‘specialistic service’ (nowadays the national services) were supposed to undertake a significant part in this commencement. On the whole, the pressing need for innovation could have been a driver to start with BVA, as according Kashiwagi (2003) - the utilization of the BVA should promote innovation. Lastly, the ‘*future economy*’ and ‘*the entrepreneurial state*’ are less recognized in the overall BVA. On the whole, bearing in mind the connectivity between several economic factors and the BVA, the impact of the economic factors at large are deemed plausible. Accordingly, all of these three factors will be included in the interview protocol for the primary data collection. Particularly, the two contrasting economic factors should be underscored during the interviews.

Continuing to the social factors, firstly, the ‘*Decreasing institutional trust of the public*’ might have been possible factor for the start of the BVA at RWS. Considering that a core assumption of the BVA is that the contractor is the expert and the public authority primarily ought to listen (Kashiwagi, 2003). This assumption can, secondly, also be linked to the social factor ‘*Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation*’. For instance, stakeholder management did become more difficult and RWS might have been interested in transferring these risk to the contractor, something that had similarly been done with the DBFM contract strategy. More still, the same aspect can be recognized in the third social



factor; *'transition towards a network society'*. Where citizens or contractors are expecting a less hierarchical attitude from an organisation such as RWS. Though this has a more direct link with the organizational culture that will be discussed shortly. At last, other social factors such as the *'Citizen participation and total transparency'* and the *'Strong government and unifying vision'* are less recognized in the BVA and therefore less likely to have been influential in the change process. On the whole, when considering the linkage between several social factors and the BVA, the influence of the social factors at large on the change process could be deemed plausible. In consequence, all of the three social factors will be queried during the primary data collection stage of this inquiry.

Turning to the technical national factors from the DESTEP, these are less recognizable in the aspects of the BVA. If any, due to the enormous increase in complexity, cross-linking, and interdependences between digital systems - RWS would need to strengthen their technical expertise internally instead of outsourcing it to the market. The only technical factor (or political) factor that might be conceivably be influential - is the start of TenderNed in 2004. Resulting in the fact that tenders became settled digitally, which could have reduced the personal contact between the public authority and the contractors. In turn, the dialogue procedure that BVA brings might be an outcome to improve the contact between the parties. Nonetheless, by and less, the influence of technical factors is deemed less plausible, especially when comparing it to the previously mentioned national factors. For sureness sake, this technical factor will be incorporated in the interview protocol.

Furthermore, with concern to the ecological factors, when reviewing the Business Agenda 2004-2008 the word *'climate'* is mentioned twice whereas, in the Business agenda 2012-2016 – the same word is mentioned seventeen times. Though this is not all that conclusive - the ecological factors appear to be a less plausible factor in the change process. For this reason and efficiency's sake, the ecological factors will not be included in the interviews.

Moreover, in view of the political factors – numerous factors from the DESTEP analysis are recognizable. Needless to say, many of these political factors on the national level have a significant overlap with the public paradigms discussed earlier. For instance, the *'Flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPP'* and *'Far-reaching privatization'* factors. Though, some political factors are still worth mentioning. Particularly the *'Dwindling authority and political interference'* appears to have been relevant for the start of BVA. Mainly, the trend towards *'internal corporatization'* in agencies where the ministerial responsibility reigns at all time, did not pass RWS. According to Van der Voet (2019), ministers are interfering more often interfering at a detailed levels with the task operation of agencies, that should essentially operate independently from politics. Secondly, the Parliamentary Survey 2002/2003 as a result from the construction fraud might have affected the decision to start with BVA. Or how it is stated in the business agenda 2004-2008; *'The Parliamentary Survey in 2002/2003 has led to the realization that the government needs to thoroughly review its relationship with the business community. Rijkswaterstaat will continue to develop into a commercial, professional client for the market'* (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). This chain of events resulted in a decrease of trust between the public authorities and the contractors. With regards to BVA, the approach solely relies on *'calculus-based'* trust (instead of relational trust). Considering the breach of trust from the construction fraud, this could have been a conceivable reason to start with the BVA. Fourthly, the European Directive 2004/24/EU was adopted by the European Commission in 2004. With the introduction of this Directive, among other things, different procurement procedures were added and made legal. In turn, this could have inspired to start with the BVA. At last, political factors such as the *'Decentralisation, and more citizen participation'*, *'Political instability'* and *'Governmental transparency'* are less recognized in the BVA. Concludingly, the influence of the political factor as a whole seems plausible, chiefly in consideration of all factors mentioned above. Accordingly, all of these four factors will be included in the interview protocol.

Altogether, observing the contextual factors on the national level mentioned above, it can be derived that these factors had plausibly a significant influence on the change process surrounding the BVA. Because of this, a significant part of the interview protocol will be set aside for the contextual factors on the national level.

Moving on to the inter-organisational contextual factors, around the start of the Urgent Approach Roads in 2008, Rijkswaterstaat appears to have been less involved in networks with other public authorities than they are now. Foremost at the time appears to be the *'Space for the River'*-program, were the first steps were undertaken in 2006. In this program, Rijkswaterstaat collaborated with the Ministries of Infrastructure and the Environment; the ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation; various water boards; provinces, and municipalities. Other (alliance) programs such as the High Water Protection Program and the KRW program followed some years later. With this in mind, the results from the document analysis show little evidence with regards to (early-on) reciprocity between Rijkswaterstaat and other public organisation in this program. Therefore, making the influence of inter-organisational factors of working in networks less plausible.

Despite the seeming absence of influence from working in networks, several other public institutions were

initiated around that time. For instance, the 'RegieRaad Bouw' in 2004, as a response to the Parliamentary Survey of 2003, with the main task of '*initiating and maintaining the process of change in the construction sector*' (Regieraad, 2009). Besides that, PIANOo was also started some time before by the ministry of Economic Affairs, with the main task of '*professionalizing procurement and tendering at governmental organisations*' (PIANOo, 2004). Further, the innovation program PSiBouw started in 2004, which was focused on stimulating innovation in the construction sector. On the whole, these institutes were simultaneously working together with Rijkswaterstaat. Thereby making their influence in the process of change towards the BVA plausible. Lastly, the influence of Dutch consultants and think tanks is less apparent from the document analysis. Though, naturally, the influence of Kashiwagi on the process is, in some form or another – highly plausible, perhaps almost unmistakable. For instance, Kashiwagi has given numerous lectures in The Netherlands, starting at least from 2004 (de Koning, 2020). That said, via the document analysis, no mentions were found from influences of other Dutch consultants and think tanks in the start of BVA. Concludingly, on the whole - the influence of working in networks with other public authorities and the influence of institutes; Dutch consultancies; and think tanks is deemed less plausible. For absolute sake, however, these will be shortly questioned in the interview protocol.

Continuing to the intra-organizational contextual factors, these were split into role of reorganizations and that of the organisational culture. Starting with the first, reviewing the considerable reorganisations Rijkswaterstaat underwent in the years before the start of BVA, it would be highly plausible that the reorganisations had a significant influence in the change process. To clarify, the lay-offs resulting in the circumstance that the output per employee was expected to increase by 30% in the period from 2008 to 2012 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). With respect to this, the promise that BVA of reduces the management capacity on the side of the public authority with 80% (Van Duren & Dorée, 2008) would be welcoming. Besides that, there were several large-scale realignment from the regional and national services. Overall in an effort to centralize the organisations. Particularly, the initiation of the new Expertise Centre Commissioning in 2003 seemed a plausible intra-organizational factor in the BVA change process. Besides the organisation-wide reorganisations, there had been reorganisations in the top-management. In an effort to control the organization from one central point, a triumvirate was implemented in 2003, consisting of the DG, the deputy DG and a new function of Chief Financial Officer (CFO). In all of this, the HEDs – that before practically were in charge of their own 'kingdom' (Metze & Franssen, 2010) – were now formerly subordinated to the executive management board.

Furthermore, in consideration of the organizational culture, the business agenda of 2004-2008 is wholly specific; '*We [RWS] cannot realize our objectives without working on a renewed culture, ... the "Island culture" needs to be dismantled*' (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). Already at this time, Rijkswaterstaat aspires to become a more externally-focussed and flexible organisation. Showing a desire to internalize the 'adhocracy culture' (Cameron & Quinn, 2011; Heritage et al., 2014). In consideration of this, Kashiwagi (2003) claims that the BVA contributes to the 'professionalisation' of the working culture. Everything considered, the collective influence of the intra-organizational context factors appears to be highly plausible. Therefore, both sub factors will be questioned during the primary data collection.

All of the context factors that are covered above are summarized in Table 3.9. Here, green is deemed plausible, orange is deemed less plausible, and lastly, red is deemed unlikely to be influential. Given all of the plausible factors that are enumerated above, a significant part of the interview protocol will be attributed to the contextual factors as a whole.

Table 3.9 - Theoretical contextual factors during the BVA process of change at RWS

Factor			Plausibility
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	<i>NPM (Agent theory + property right theory) and NPG (social exchange theory)</i>
	National	Demographic	<i>Shortage on labour market</i>
		Economic	<i>Lehman crisis + Competitive position of The Netherlands + Booming economy</i>
		Social	<i>Decreasing institutional trust of the public + Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation + transition towards a network society</i>
		Technical	<i>TenderNet</i>
		Ecological	<i>/</i>
		Political	<i>Flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPP + Far-reaching privatization + Dwindling authority and political interference + Parliamentary Survey 2002/2003 + European Directive 2003/2004</i>
Inter-organizational		Network	<i>'Space for the River'-program</i>
		Institutes, consultancy, and think tanks	<i>RegieRaad Bouw + PIANOo + PSiBouw + Kashiwagi</i>
Intra-organizational		Organisation culture	<i>Moving away from 'Island-culture'</i>
		Reorganisations	<i>Lay-offs + Realignment from the regional and national services + New Expertise Centre Commissioning + Start of triumvirate</i>

#### Content factor during BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

In terms of the content factor, the BVA could be influenced by other contract strategies, for better or worse. Making this remark clear, if there would be dissatisfaction with the overall functioning of a specific contract strategy, potentially even negative publicity – this could have driven the start of the BVA. Though, the opposite could also be the case. For instance that a rationale behind a particular contract strategy formed as an inspiration to start with the BVA. All in all, in the document analysis- four components within a contract strategy have been considered. From these, the most plausible appear to be the institutionalization of the integrated contract – particularly that of the DBFM. Similar to the BVA, the DBFM contract strategy is largely based on the 'new institutional economics' (Koppenjan et al., 2018). Considering that Rijkswaterstaat's focus was heavily on the utilization of the DBFM model, the influence of this particular content factor on the BVA process of change could be conceivable.

Furthermore, corresponding to the rise of the DBFM, the competitive dialogue procedure became more often used as a procurement procedure. In view of the fact that the BVA also uses a dialogue-form in the procurement procedure – the competitive dialogue procedure could have influenced the change process of the BVA.

Next to this, the increasing implementation of the MEAT awarding mechanism from 2005 onwards - could have inspired the start of BVA. Considering that both contract strategies advocate the inclusion of the quality-component during tenders.

In consideration of the potential influence of the foregoing two contract strategies, by and large – the effect of the content factor are deemed plausible. That being said, the content factor will, on the whole, be an insignificant part in the interview protocol. The two plausible content factors are listed in Table 3.10.

Table 3.10 - Theoretical content factor of process of BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

Factor			Plausibility
Content		Contract strategy	<i>Integrated contracts (DBFM) + competitive dialogue + MEAT awarding mechanism</i>

### Leadership factor during BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

Though at this stage of the inquiry, the role of the leadership cannot be determined, the vision of top management and the specific changes in the top management can to an extent be identified. Starting with the vision of the top management, after the document analysis, it became apparent that the term 'Best Value Approach' is rarely mentioned in public published documents. These include the business agenda and annual reports – but also the reviewed strategy documents. Thereby, questioning on the basis of this theoretical evidence - the overall significance of the BVA for the top management. Instead, the overall vision of the top management, articulated in the Business Agenda of 2008-2012 – was largely build around the unchanged dogma of the DG that had been in service since 2003. Mainly, the 'Market-unless'-principle. In the document, it is phrased as; *'Our society wants a government that does more and better work with fewer people. Mainly due to this, Rijkswaterstaat is developing into a professional client. Meaning that if market parties are capable in doing the same job, potentially even better – these tasks should be left for the market. Essentially, Rijkswaterstaat becomes more of a director and less of an implementer; more procuring, less construction'* (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). Though not explicitly stated, the principles of BVA fall in line with the 'Market, unless.'-principle. Therefore, for the purpose of certitude, the prior vision of the top management on the BVA as a new contract strategy, will be audited during the primary data collection.

Lastly, with respect to the changes of the top management on the individual/actor level – the director general (DG), deputy director general (DDG), and the chief financial officer (CFO) remained occupied by the same person. Essentially, the (former) DG hold position from 2003 to 2009 and the DDG from 2002 to 2008. This shows that changes on the actor level with regard to the functions DG and DGG can be excluded as plausible factor. In 2007, however, the function of CFO was formerly added in 2007. For this reason, the appointment of a (new) CFO could theoretically be of influence in the change process. This will be questioned in the interviews. Three sub factors that belong to the leadership factors are listed in Table 3.11.

Table 3.11 - Theoretical leadership factor during the BVA process of change at RWS

Factor		Plausibility
Leadership	Role of leadership	Unknown
	Vision of top management	'Market, unless.' + BVA rarely mentioned in strategic documents
	Changes of Leadership	Individual change of CFO

### Outcome factor during BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

In the beginning of this case, the influence of the public paradigms was discussed. Here, it was found that the BVA appears to have a significant overlap with the NPM paradigms, including the resemblance in theoretical roots. Hood (1991) states that the sigma value category is predominantly discernible in this paradigm. Several characteristics from the sigma value category can also be observed in the BVA. To start, the sigma value stresses the matching of resources to defined objectives, the setting of fixed and 'checkable' goals must be central to any design (Osborne, 2006). This can be observed in the "objective and factual" performance data of the BVA. To elaborate on this further, with the BVA, contractors are expected to send a "weekly risk number" that provides an abstract indicator of threats. This weekly risk number shows the public authority if the contractor complies with the planning and budget as well as if there is a risk for quality concerns (Van Duren & Dorée, 2008). This is an example where the 'check-able' goals are noticeable, with an extensive focus on performance control. Or how Hood (1991) states it; *'Good public management [according to the sigma value] requires de-emphasis of overarching externalities and emphasis on running services within given parameters'*. Something that is similarly observable in the business agenda 2004-2008 of RWS, stating *'We[RWS] will work according to the "plan-do-check-act" principle. This means that management and employees must have the right competencies for simplification and clear management. We must accept the agreements, new frameworks and standards that go with them'* (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004). Next to that, both the usage of performance data and the early on transfer of all the risks to the contractor are in line with the following sigma-assumptions. That *'Accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for action, not diffusion of power'* and *'Accountability requires clear statement of goals and efficiency requires "hard look" at objectives'* (Hood, 1991). Having said all this, the examples above is mainly concerned with the overall rationale of the BVA. Though, when shifting the focus to the assurances of the BVA, it appears that lowering the transaction cost and shorten the procurement procedure were important pledges (Kashiwagi, 2011). More

still, although the BVA is also concerned with the quality concerns of the project. The standard of success is expressed by the creator Kashiwagi in 'value for money' (Kashiwagi, 2003). Or as; 'best value is the best value for the lowest price' (Kashiwagi, 2011). On the whole, this appears to be more in line with 'frugality'. Frugality is alternatively put by Hood (1991) as; 'using resources sparingly to provide public services of no greater cost, durability or quality than is absolutely necessary for a defined task, without excessive concern for "externalities"'. Though, this definition of Hood (1991) appears to be more in line with in the actual process of BVA than the concern for the output, considering the overall process of change can be seen as efficient or frugal. Compared to the process of DOEN, which leans heavily towards a through relational process - the BVA process can be depicted as transactional process.

Everything considered, the output control of the BVA appears to be notable, both in theoretical roots as in the promises that the approach makes. Therefore, making the overall (indirect) influence of the outcome factor on the change process plausible. This will be questioned during the interviews.

Concludingly, the theoretical influence of the factors mentioned above have been summarized in Table 3.12 below. The colour scheme, again, behind used in the table is as follows; Green is deemed plausible, orange is deemed less plausible, red is deemed unlikely to be influential, and lastly; grey is indeterminate. The factors mentioned in this table will form the groundwork of the interview protocol of the ensuing phase.

Table 3.12 - Theoretical drivers of the first case (BVA at RWS)

Factor			Plausibility	
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	<i>NPM and NPG</i>	
		National	Demographic	<i>Shortage on labour market</i>
			Economic	<i>Lehman crisis + Competitive position of The Netherlands + Booming economy</i>
			Social	<i>Decreasing institutional trust of the public + Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation + transition towards a network society</i>
			Technical	<i>TenderNet</i>
		Ecological	<i>/</i>	
		Political	<i>Flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPP + Far-reaching privatization + Dwindling authority and political interference + Parliamentary Survey 2002/2003 + European Directive 2003/2004</i>	
	Inter-organizational	Networks	<i>'Space for the River'-program + RegieRaad Bouw + PIANOo + PSiBouw</i>	
			Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	<i>Kashiwagi</i>
		Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	<i>Moving away from 'Island-culture'</i>
Reorganisations			<i>Lay-offs + Realignment from the regional and national services + New Expertise Centre Commissioning + Start of triumvirate</i>	
Content		Contract strategy	<i>Integrated contracts (DBFM) + Competitive Dialogue + MEAT awarding mechanism</i>	
Process	Process of change	<i>Unknown</i>		
Leadership	Role of leadership	<i>Unknown</i>		
	Vision of top management	<i>BVA rarely mentioned in strategic documents</i>		
	Changes of Leadership	<i>Individual change of CFO</i>		
Outcome		<i>Sigma value: Output control (frugality) Frugal (transactional) process + emphasis on running services within given parameters + clear accountability</i>		

### 3.5.3. Case 2: DOEN philosophy (RWS)

#### *Context factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat*

The first DOEN project started in 2013 with the renovation of the Nijkerkerbrug. In consideration of this time period, it would be expected that the DOEN philosophy falls in line with the NPM and this appears to be the case. When reviewing the theoretical roots of the paradigm and those of the DOEN philosophy, a considerable overlap can be observed. To clarify, both DOEN and NPG are built upon the relational exchange theory and the social exchange theory. This being said, a disclaimer for comprehensive purposes – the BVA and the DOEN philosophy have a similar substantial overlap in theoretical roots, but there are some key differences. Particularly those differences will be highlighted in this paragraph, thereby showcasing how DOEN fits better with the NPG than BVA does. On a final note, though, there is a considerable limitation to this inconclusive juxtaposition – the DOEN Guideline provides incomplete information on the elucidation of the execution phase, whereas the BVA does so. For this reason, it remains unclear how the DOEN approach, for instance, will guarantee the ‘trustworthiness’ of exchanging parties during the execution phase. A notable aspect, considering that authors such as Lambe et al. (2001) argue how obligations need to be regularly disclosed throughout the execution phase in order to maintain trustworthiness. Leaving these remarks aside for now, this paragraph continues with elaborating more on the first of the theoretical overlap between DOEN and NPG paradigm; the relational exchange theory. In the main, the essence of this theory – that is similarly deflected in the resource allocation mechanism of DOEN – is that relational norms such flexibility, solidarity, participation in decision-making, communication and problem-solving through consultation – remind cooperative parties that their relationship is whole, and they are expected to behave according to the shared relational norms (Heide & John, 1992). Overall, these informal rules rely heavily on informal structures and self-enforcement of each party. Something can be observed in the ‘no-contract’ approach (relational norm: Flexibility) from DOEN, where instead – a guideline would be drawn up together with the contractor (DOEN, 2016). Another type of relational norms is to emphasize the need to openly discuss and involve different perspectives for addressing project issues. Relating to the promise that risks are mutually divided after extensive consultation and the public authority feels mutually responsible for supervision of the contractor’s risks (DOEN, 2016). Next to the relational exchange theory, some aspect of the social exchange theory can be observed in the DOEN Guideline. For instance that trust is critical for stable social relations. Which according to the theory, is derived from social interaction and socially-embedded relationships. Particularly via the team assessment in the ‘after-selection’ phase, a significant effort seems to have been implemented to boost the trust component between the parties. Generally speaking, both BVA and the DOEN approach are based on trust. Though, for the BVA approach this is primarily done on the basis of ‘calculus-trust’ (Kashiwagi: “No [relational] trust needed”). Essentially, parties should trust (or have confidence) in the BVA/PIPS system. Whereas DOEN focusses on mainly building relational trust. Interestingly, when reviewing the DOEN Guideline – there appears to have been consideration for the fact that trust takes place on a different level than the relational norms. While relational norms relate to values and social rules informally shared by project coalition members and thus, operate external to a single individual (Macneil, 1980) – trust is a psychological state of individual members of the project coalition (Benítez-Ávila et al., 2018; Kadefors, 2004). The latter can be recognized throughout the DOEN Guideline, numerous paragraphs have been contributed to the principle that ‘*there is continuity in staffing teams*’, meaning that ‘*the persons that participate in the tender, should also be in charge for the execution of the project*’ (DOEN, 2016). Or how the DOEN philosophy phrases it; ‘*The basic principle is that the cooperation does not only start after award, but immediately with at the start of the procurement process*. Another notable aspect of the DOEN philosophy is the award mechanism, particularly in the ‘after-selection’ phase. Here, the five vendors go through a second qualification round towards three remaining vendors, solely on the basis of an EQ-I test and a team assessment. In this, vendors are judged on their abilities to work together with Rijkswaterstaat. Leaving aside the effectiveness (and legality) of this selection criteria, these measures are primarily based on relational criteria. Also, the third phase (the pre-award phase) is largely based on relational aspects, where the attention is establishing a relational process for the execution phase, initially through the usage of a competitive dialogue. Although, the pre-award phase requires the vendors to hand in documents wherein topics are discussed regarding; engineering price, and risks. These components will be purely outline in qualitative manner and describing the process of how these components will be established *after* the final awarding phase. Then, the final award phase, where Rijkswaterstaat together with the last remaining vendor will refine the scope, establish the price, and collectively write the ‘contract’ concerning the agreements on proper collaboration, distribute the risks, etc. In relation to the social exchange theory and the relational exchange theory, this phase counts as the former establishment of relational norms and thus sealing trustworthiness. Essentially, the pricing will only come into play after the final vendor is selected and hence; isn’t directly part of the awarding process. Though, again, the legality issues (concerned with the EU law) are left aside in this research. In

conclusion, the DOEN philosophy has numerous overlaps with the theoretical roots of the NPG paradigm and the corresponding key resource allocation mechanism of NPG; relational contracts. The overlap in theoretical roots can also be recognized in how both view the nature of state; the recognition of the plural state. Or how Michie (2019) expresses it; *'problem solving is not the preserve of a central authority able to impose solutions on subordinate agencies and individuals, but the result of the interaction of a plurality of actors, who often have different interests, values, cognitive orientations, and power resources'*. Accordingly, Rijkswaterstaat under DOEN is expected to have an interorganizational focus. Moreover, the emphasis of both DOEN and NPG is on the processes and outcome, rather than outputs per se. Lastly, the plural and interorganizational focus rested on the usage of relational contracts - recognizes dispersed and contested values of between private and public parties. Therein, seems 'honesty' all-embracing term. Something that will be returned to when discussing the theoretical outcome factor related to DOEN. Ultimately, though this paragraph provided a theoretical basis of the influence of NPG on the emergence of DOEN - the direct influence cannot be directly measured during the interviews. For this reason, the outcome factor defined by a certain category of values - be utilised during the primary data collection to measure the indirect influence of the NPG paradigm.

In terms of the national factors, starting again with the demographic factors, two demographic factors are apparent; *the shortage on the labour market* and the *aging workforce*. The latter results in the phenomenon that Rijkswaterstaat wants to attract young people to their organisation. In the Annual report of 2011, it was already stated that Rijkswaterstaat wants to attract younger employees to the organisation, as *'relatively a lot of older personal will flow out in the coming years'* (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011a). Notably, the first DOEN project team was composed of solely younger personal. With this in mind, a plausible motive could be to show young professionals that RWS is an attracted organisation to work for. Accordingly, this particular demographic factor will be included in the interview protocol for the primary data collection.

Continuing to the economic factors, many possible national factors could have been influential in the process. For example, the cost-plus payment mechanism that DOEN utilizes has several plausible explanations. Firstly, the concept of *entrepreneurial state* appears to be in line with the cost-plus mechanism, as the general cost (8%) and the profit percentage (5%) is considerably higher than the industries average. Thereby, RWS could via DOEN see itself more as a director financier of, among other things; innovation. Thereby having overlap with the second economic factor; *the competitive position of The Netherlands*. Though, this seems in contrast with the second economic factor; the influence of the aftereffects of the *economic crises* earlier. DOEN started in 2013 when the Dutch economy productivity - and that of the construction sector - had been on its lowest since the start of the economic crisis of 2008. On the whole, the influence of these three economic factor on the national level could have plausibly influenced the process around DOE. Hence, these two economic factors will be included in the interview protocol.

Next are the social factors, starting with the *individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation*. A spearpoint of DOEN is that the 'customer should be determined' and that party should 'determine what has added value'. A plausible explanation could be that RWS wants to shift part of the stakeholder responsibility to the contractor, as the stakeholder management becomes too difficult to manage for Rijkswaterstaat in today's individualistic society. A similar argument can be brought forward for the second and third social factor; the possible influence of *'Citizen participation and total transparency'* and the *'transition to a network society'*. Particularly the latter is mentioned in the Business Agenda from 2012-2015, stating that; *'Rijkswaterstaat has the ambition to become a public-oriented network manager in an ever more dynamic and complex society'* (Rijkswaterstaat, 2013). Considering this, the influence of the societal factors on the DOEN philosophy is deemed plausible and therefore, incorporated in the interview protocol.

Moreover, with regard to the technological factors, there appears to be no direct link with the factors mentioned in the DESTEP. The technological challenges require a closer collaboration with other (semi-)public organisations. Though, in the previous section regarding the social factors, the transition towards a network society is recognized, this appears to be more in line with social developments than technological challenges. For this reason, the technological factors on the national level will not be included in the interview protocol.

However, with respect to the ecological factors; there appears to be a link ecological factors as a whole, mainly due to the new function RWS was appointed in 2011. To clarify, as of January 2013, RWS expanded its current role of operator of the Dutch infrastructure network with a new undertaken; becoming the implementation organization in the field of environment, sustainable mobility, and spatial sustainability. This new responsibility could have sparked the decision to start with DOEN. Accordingly, the influence of the ecological factors as a whole will be included in the interview protocol for the primary data collection.

Moving on to the political and legal factors, notably two legislative factor appear to be could conceivably have been influential; the Spatial Planning Act and the updated Procurement Act. Starting with the first, Environment Act, first

initiated in 2012 and yet to be approved - prescribed how the legislative boundaries wherein environmental services operate will be partly redistributed. This could have sparked Rijkswaterstaat to make change in their contract strategies. Possibly to get acquainted with a more network approach. Further, the second legislative change – the updated Procurement Act of 2012 – could have provided Rijkswaterstaat with more leeway to implement progressive procurement strategies. Thirdly, more in regard to the political factors, DOEN appears to have taken inspiration from the concept of the *representative democracy*, where organizations start to work more 'goal-orientally' or 'from the intention', instead of focusing on coordination and steering processes that are primarily based on structures, systems and rules. In other words, arguing that non-essential rules should be set aside and act more on the basis of the 'spirit of the law' (Van der Voet, 2019). Aspects that can be observed in the DOEN maxims such as '*Working from the intention*' and 'Recognize who the customer is' (DOEN, 2019b). On the whole, considering all of the political (and legislative) factors on the national level mentioned above, the possibility that these have influenced the process to start with DOEN – is deemed plausible. Altogether, remarking all of the mentioned contextual factors on the national level, that have been obtained via the DESTEP analysis, it can be derived that these factors plausibly had a significant influence on the change process surrounding DOEN. On that account, these national factors will hold a significant part of the interview protocol.

Moving on to the inter-organizational factors, prior to the start of DOEN, Rijkswaterstaat was involved in numerous inter-governmental programs. In general, it is expected that RWS was around the start of DOEN, working more in networks with other (semi)public organisations, compared to the time when BVA was started. Principally, with regard to the change in public paradigms; from an intra-organizational focus towards an inter-organizational focus. That said, via the document analysis, the following programs were obtained; the High Water Protection Program, the 'Smart Collaboration' work group, and the KRW program. Starting with the first, by the time DOEN started in 2013, the alliance in the High Water Protection Program started on their third term. P. Groot and Visser (2016) describes this program as; '*a catalyst for the changing process within the water boards*'. The report states that due to the considerable administrative attention and the significant amount of money that is involved, different forms of collaboration need to be adopted compared to the 'traditional' way of working (P. Groot & Visser, 2016). Moreover, in the Strategic and Innovation Agenda 2012-2016 of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, it was stated that the High Water Protection Program will be actively used to implement private innovative initiatives (MIM, 2012). Secondly, from the Waterschapsspiegel 2012 and 2014 and the Business Agendas of Rijkswaterstaat 2008-2012 and 2012-2015, it appears that the overall collaboration between the Rijkswaterstaat and the water boards is intensifying over the past years. A concrete example is the workgroup 'Smart Collaboration', where meetings are organized between the directors of the water boards and of the regional HEDs of Rijkswaterstaat. Where, among other things, discussions are held with respect to how proper collaboration and procurement ought to be concretized (Hieltjes, 2014). Thirdly and lastly, RWS in 2008 got the official start from the director general Space and Water of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, to start with the KRW program. A program that was first established by the European Commission to purify the polluted surface water in the EU. The program encouraged Rijkswaterstaat to further intensify the collaboration with other task partners such as provinces, water boards, municipalities and nature conservation organizations. All of these inter-governmental initiatives could have sparked reciprocity between Rijkswaterstaat and other (semi-)public organisations, plausibly influencing the process to start with DOEN.

Moreover, with regard to the influence of institutes, consultancies, and think tanks – particularly the influence of the think tanks appears to be a plausible factor. Particularly the role of the Opdrachtgeversforum voor de Bouw appears to have been prominent in the process of change. Especially, because DOEN has been officially launched there in 2013. Moreover, other industry associations such as MKB Infra, Bouwend Nederland, NLI ingenieurs, and Nederlandse Constructeurs – appear to have been involved much later in the process.

What is more, with respect to the intra-organizational factors, several factors were found. Starting with the reorganizations, firstly, the potential effect of the triumvirate that was lifted in 2012. Meaning that the organization became once again a one-headed leadership. Essentially, this put the DG formally in a higher position than the deputy director general and that of the chief financial officer. Considering the fact that DOEN appears to be primarily an undertaking of the (former) director general, this could have been a decisive factor. In addition, the role of Rijkswaterstaat was expanded in 2013, whereby an extra national service was added; the Water, Infrastructure, and Living Environment national service. Potentially, the broadening of the role could have forced RWS in adopting different contract strategies, such as DOEN. Lastly, in 2013, the department Infrastructure Service was subdivided into its contemporary form, namely the national services Large projects & Maintenance and the national service Programs, Projects, and Maintenance. The first DOEN project – the Nijkerkerbrug - was located at the new national service of



Large Projects & Maintenance. On the whole, considering the different reorganisations above - the influence of these could plausibly have influenced the process to start with DOEN. For this reason, the different reorganisations will be included in the interview protocol.

Additionally, as concerns the organizational culture, a significant overlapping is found between the principles of DOEN and those of the organisational culture the top management aspires to achieve. To clarify, the underlying intention of DOEN appears to evoke a more externally-oriented attitude. For instance, these can be observed in several questions that are repeated in vision of DOEN; *'who is your client?' or 'what is the meaning behind the rule?'* (DOEN, 2019b). In comparison, these fall in line with the flexible and externally-oriented organisation culture known as the 'adhocracy culture' (Cameron & Quinn, 2011; Heritage et al., 2014). Messages that have been repeated throughout the business agendas of 2004-2008, 2008-2012, and 2012-2015. Considering the theoretical overlap, the organizational culture appears an influence in the process of change towards DOEN.

In light of the factors above, the intra-organizational factors in the main can be seen as a plausible factor in the DOEN change process and therefore, ought to be reckoned with when gathering the primary data.

At last, all of the context factors that are covered above are summarized in Table 3.13. Here, green is deemed plausibly influential, orange is deemed plausibly less influential, and lastly, red is deemed unlikely to be influential. Given all of the plausible factors that are enumerated above, a significant part of the interview protocol will be attributed to the contextual factors as a whole.

*Table 3.13 - Theoretical contextual factors during the DOEN process of change at RWS*

Factor			Plausibility
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	<i>NPG</i>
		National	Demographic
		Economic	<i>Entrepreneurial state + Competitive position of The Netherlands + Economic crises</i>
		Social	<i>Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation + 'Citizen participation and total transparency' + 'transition to a network society'</i>
		Technical	
		Ecological	<i>All</i>
		Political (and legal)	<i>Spatial Planning Act + Procurement Act (2012) + Representative democracy</i>
	Inter-organizational	Networks	<i>High Water Protection Program + 'Smart Collaboration' work group + KRW program.</i>
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	<i>Opdrachtgeversforum in de Bouw</i>
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	<i>Externally-oriented: Who is your client? Work from the intention</i>
		Reorganisations	<i>Triumvirate lifted + new national service Water, Infrastructure, and Living Environment + Split off national service Programs, Projects, and Maintenance</i>

### Content factors during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

With regard to the content factor, DOEN appears to have been primarily influenced by two contract strategies. Plausibly, the success benefits from the British ‘Early contractor Involvement’ and dissatisfaction of the MEAT award mechanism. Starting with the first, DOEN has a significant overlap with the Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) strategy. The ECI strategy has three types of process, where DOEN appears to have the most overlap with the ‘Two Stages Open Book’ form. In fact, the structure the procurement process of the two strategies is nearly identical. However, the concretization of each phase is somewhat different. That said, both strategies are - again in structure - similar to the Dutch Bouwteam model, a strategy that has been used since the 1950s. For this reason, it is highly plausible that DOEN has been influenced by the rise of the ECI model in the United Kingdom in the 2010s.

Secondly, the potential dissatisfaction with the MEAT award mechanism appears to be a plausible factor. To clarify, the main aspect that DOEN did different than all of the contract strategies that came before, including the BVA – was to fully award the tender on relational or quality criteria. Even the standard BVA prescribed 25% of the award mechanism to the price component. For the MEAT criteria, this was on average much less. In light of this, the contractor could still submit extremely low prices in their offer with a precedence on enlarging their profit in a later stage of the project. For this reason, Rijkswaterstaat might have felt the urge to try a contract strategy with a different award mechanism such as DOEN.

Bearing in mind the potential relation with the foregoing two contract strategies and DOEN, by and large – the effect of the content factor on the process of change is deemed plausible. Nevertheless, in general - the content factor will be an insignificant part in the interview protocol. The two plausible content factors are listed in Table 3.14.

Table 3.14 - Theoretical content factor of process of DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

Factor			Plausibility
Content		Contract strategy	Early contractor Involvement (UK) + Dissatisfaction MEAT

### Leadership factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

Similar to the previous case, the DOEN contract strategy hasn’t been mentioned in the published documents such as the Annual reports and the Business Agendas of Rijkswaterstaat from that time. For this reason, the overall importance of the vision of the top management as a whole, with respect to a new DOEN contract strategy - can be questioned. That said, it is explicitly stated that the former director-general (DG) of Rijkswaterstaat felt the need for a contract strategy based on a ‘contract with a minimal amount of rules’ (DOEN, 2019b). In light of this, in relation with the individual changes on the actor level, the latest change of that particular DG was in 2010. Here, the former DG was replaced after seven years of service. Therefore, by all appearances - this particular change on the actor level appears to be highly influential in the process of change concerning DOEN. Be it, that this change occurred already three years before the start of the DOEN contract strategy.

Concludingly, the individual influence of the former DG appears to have been more influential than that of the top management as whole. Accordingly, these factors will be included in the interview protocol. For now, the exact role of the leadership remains largely uncertain. In sum, the sub factors that belong to the leadership factors are listed in Table 3.15.

Table 3.15 - Theoretical leadership factor of process of DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

Factor			Plausibility
Leadership		Role of leadership	Unknown
		Vision of top management	DOEN rarely mentioned in strategic documents + DG ‘contract with a minimal amount of rules’
		Changes of Leadership	New DG (2010)

### *Outcome factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat*

In the beginning of this case, the influence of the public paradigms was discussed. By doing so, it was constituted that the DOEN philosophy has a significant overlap with the NPG paradigm. On the whole, the NPG paradigm has both overlap with the theta and lambda values described in Hood (1991). Multiple characteristics of the DOEN philosophy fall in line with these two value categories. To start with the overlap with the lambda values, organisation that adopt the lambda values are concerned with; multiple objective thinking, enabling a relatively high degree of slack to provide spare capacity for learning, and a responsibility structure which makes mistakes and errors admissible (Van Gunsteren, 2018). Additionally, these type of organisations are concerned with multiple connectedness and information exchanges between different types of organizations (Pyun & Gamassou, 2018). With respect to DOEN, one of the four main principles 'Learning' expressed as follows; *'To bring about structural change in the construction industry, it is important to learn and share the lessons learned with others'* (DOEN, 2019b). In fact, the learning aspect is foremost included in the main objective of DOEN, as according to the DOEN Manual; it is to *'learn how to manage an infrastructural project execute in real collaboration with the market [...]'* (DOEN, 2016). With this, an apparent overlap with the lambda values can be observed.

Next to the lambda values, there is a similarly overlap with the theta values. These values connotes to the pursuit of honesty, fairness and mutuality through the prevention of distortion, inequity, bias, and abuse of office (Hood, 1991). Consequently, when honesty and fairness is a primary goal, the design-focus is likely to be on process controls rather than output controls (Hood, 1991). While goals are, again, less likely to be single in nature. Or how March and Olsen (2010) phrase is; *'Getting the job done' in terms of aggregate quantities is likely to be supplemented by concerns about how the job is done'*. These aspect can be observed in DOEN in numerous aspect. Firstly, the focus on the process instead of on the output, or even outcome can be observed in the reasoning of the DOEN manual. Quote; *'For a successful project, you need a good process (phase 3). For a good process you need proper cooperation (phase 2). And finally, for proper cooperation, you must have consistent visions (phase 1)'* (DOEN, 2016). Or in the following sentence; *'The key to success at Project DOEN is therefore not the ultimate package of purchasing choices, but the way of thinking that led to those choices'* (DOEN, 2016). Next to that, the concern for fairness can in, among other things – be observed in the second DOEN principle *Fair work for fair money*. More still, the 'mutuality' aspect of the theta value is recognizable in the third DOEN principle with aspiration for *Proper collaboration*. Here, according to the DOEN manual, *'Proper cooperation requires both hard and soft preconditions. Clear joint agreements, but also a good team composition and continuity in the team. [...]. Mutual expectations become apparent and this leads to far fewer corrections, disruptions and unnecessary discussion'* (DOEN, 2016).

Everything considered, it can be observed that DOEN steers heavily on a honest process with a concern for mutuality and with enough slack to incorporate a learning prospect. Herein, the relational process of DOEN shows through, in contrast to the more transactional process of BVA described earlier. On the whole, the outcome factor in the form of primarily theta and lambda values – appears to be notable in the majority of the DOEM principles. Thus, making the overall (indirect) influence of the outcome factor on the change process plausible. Thereby, these two values will be incorporated in the interview protocol.

In conclusion, the theoretical influence of the factors mentioned above have been outlined in Table 3.16 below. The colour scheme, once again, behind used in the table is along these lines; Green is deemed plausible, orange is deemed less plausible, red is deemed unlikely to be influential, and lastly; grey is indeterminate. Accordingly, the factors mentioned in this table will form the foundation of the interview protocol of the subsequent research phase.

Table 3.16 - Theoretical drivers of the second case (DOEN at RWS)

Factor			Plausibility	
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	<i>NPG</i>	
		National	<i>Shortage on labour market + Aging workforce</i>	
			Economic	<i>Entrepreneurial state + Competitive position of The Netherlands + Economic crises</i>
			Social	<i>Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation + Citizen participation and total transparency + transition to a network society</i>
			Technical	
			Ecological	<i>Sea level rise + decrease biodiversity + Extreme weather conditions + water scarcity</i>
			Political	<i>Spatial Planning Act + Procurement Act (2012) + Representative democracy</i>
		Inter-organizational	Networks	<i>High Water Protection Program + 'Smart Collaboration' work group + KRW program.</i>
			Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	<i>Opdrachtgeversforum in de Bouw</i>
		Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	<i>Externally-oriented: Who is your client? Work from the intention</i>
		Reorganisations	<i>Triumvirate lifted + new national service Water, Infrastructure, and Living Environment + Split off national service Programs, Projects, and Maintenance</i>	
Content		Contract strategy	<i>Early contractor Involvement (UK) + Dissatisfaction MEAT</i>	
Process		Process of change	<i>Unknown</i>	
Leadership		Role of leadership	<i>Unknown</i>	
		Vision of top management	<i>DOEN rarely mentioned in strategic documents + apparent initiation of DG himself</i>	
		Changes of Leadership	<i>New DG (2010)</i>	
Outcome			<i>Theta and lambda values: (relational) process Multiple objective thinking + relatively high degree of slack to provide spare capacity for learning + pursuit of honesty, fairness and mutuality</i>	

### 3.5.4. Case 3: Best Value Approach (Delfland)

#### *Context factor during BVA at Delfland*

The idea behind the BVA was commenced around 2012 at Delfland. With this in mind, the first remark that can be observed is that this commencement came 4 years later than it did at Rijkswaterstaat. With this timeline, the assumption that the BVA at Delfland was part of the 'late' New Public Management (NPM) or early New Public Governance (NPG) thinking doesn't hold. Something that was more plausible at Rijkswaterstaat. Differently put, the chance that the NPM paradigm, that in The Netherlands 'died in the water' around the 2000s, indirectly influenced Delfland around 2012 - becomes less plausible. Be that as it may, with regards to the theoretical roots of the BVA, these are still equivalent to those of the BVA at Rijkswaterstaat. That is; a combination of the NPM to the NPG. Fully elucidating these theoretical roots again would be redundant. So, to quickly reiterate, the BVA at Delfland would also have an emphasis on the output via a mainly transactional process. Specifically, the BVA assigns a significant consideration for overall efficiency of the process. Outputs appear to be checkable goals such as lowering the transaction cost and shorten the procurement procedure (Kashiwagi, 2011). These are in line with the economic theories underlying the NPM. Additionally, however, some safeguards of the BVA place an emphasis on the process that stresses effectiveness and outcomes (NPG). Examples of which are the 'performance rating after completion', where the public authority can rate ex-post the quality

of the design. These recognizable in the relational theories of the NPG paradigm. In relation to the interview protocol in the subsequent phase of this inquiry, the influence of the paradigms cannot be directly questioned. Instead, the values that will be specified in the outcome factor will be used to indirectly measure the influence.

Moving on the influence of the contextual factors, starting with the demographic factors. Both the 'aging of the personnel' and the 'shortage on the labour market' are recognized in several published documents of the Delfland, the Association of Water Boards, and the Economic Institute for the Construction (Dutch acronym: EIB). Already in 2009, Delfland wrote that; *'The shortage on the labour market for technically trained executive personnel is currently a major threat to the realization of the ambitions'* (Delfland, 2009a). Later, the EIB wrote that; *'The worker population in hydraulic engineering sector is ageing. The share of over-55s is between 2009 and 2015 increased from 17% to 20%. Representing employees under the age of 25 10% of the staff. This share has decreased slightly in recent years. The degree of aging is slightly higher in hydraulic engineering sector than average of the GWW (P. Groot, Meuwese, & Visser, 2016). Considering the promise that BVA of reduces the management capacity on the side of the public authority with 80% (Van Duren & Dorée, 2008) in combination with these two demographic factors, their influence on Delfland to start with a new contract strategy such as BVA - is plausible. Therefore, these two factors will be included in the interview protocol.*

Proceeding to the economic factors in relation to the start of BVA, firstly, during the start of BVA in 2012 at Delfland – the construction sector was undergoing the effects of two *economic crises*; the aftermath of the American Housing crisis and the European debt crisis. Regarding this, the EIB writes that; *'the year 2013 was the absolute lowest point in terms of productivity for the Dutch infrastructure sector, a lowering of 28 percent compared to 2008'* (EIB, 2013). These uncertain times could, for instance, have resulted in the situation that the organisation was preparing for more budget cuts or at the bare minimum; tried to keep projects within budget. Something that has indeed been written in the Water Management Plan 2012-2015, as; *'In the Voorjaarsnota of 2009, large budget cuts were announced for 2011, which will have their effect on all decentralized governments'* (Delfland, 2009b). When comparing these to the promises of the BVA, mainly; *'98% of projects are delivered within budget and schedule'* and *'lowering of transaction costs'* (Van Duren & Dorée, 2008), the possible effects of these economic crises might have been credible for Delfland. Secondly, the *competitive position of The Netherlands* might have influenced the decision of Delfland. To clarify, towards 2011, a new government involvement was revealed concerning the international status of the Dutch infrastructure sector, when the Netherlands Water Partnership<sup>3</sup> released a document stating their future vision, named *'Water 2020: Wereldleiders in Water'*. With this vision, the pursuit was expressed that by 2020; The Netherlands should become the place (*'Water Valley of the World'*) where integral solutions will be contrived for international water-related issues (Ten Brinke, Diepeveen, Van Oostveen, & Lamoree, 2011). On the whole, the competitive position of the Netherlands with respect to innovation could have been a driver to start with BVA, as according Kashiwagi (2003) - the utilization of the BVA should promote innovation. On the whole, bearing in mind the connectivity between several economic factors and the BVA, the impact of the economic factors at large are deemed plausible. Accordingly, all of these two factors will be included in the interview protocol for the primary data collection.

With respect to the social factors, firstly, the *'Decreasing institutional trust of the public'* seemingly as a possible factor for the start of the BVA at Delfland. In the Water Management Plan 2010-2015, the safeguarding the (institutional) trust of the citizens appears to be an significant ambition, as; *'Effective communication is important with regards to the achieving the objectives in this water management plan, as communication contributes to trust of citizens and other stakeholders in Delfland'* (Delfland, 2009b). In relation to this social factor- a core assumption of the BVA is that the contractor is the expert and the public authority primarily ought to listen (Kashiwagi, 2003). Thereby, the responsibility for proper communication and decision-making could with BVA be partly shifted to the contractor. The same rational can be argued for the second social factors; the *Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation*. Stakeholder management becomes too difficult, so responsibility for that could be transferred to the contractor. Thirdly comes the social factor *Communal view concerning institutional legitimacy*. As recently still as 2019, the Association of Waterboards stated how little is known about the core tasks of the DWAs among the public, described as a lack of *'water awareness'* (Rosenbrand, 2019). Potentially, again, contractors could with the BVA be used to communicate these core tasks to the public. By and large, when considering the linkage between several social factors and the BVA, the influence of the social factors at large on the change process is deemed plausible. In consequence, the three social factors will be queried during the primary data collection stage of this inquiry.

Next, concerning the technological factors, little to no technological challenges are explicitly stated in the

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<sup>3</sup> The Netherlands Water Partnership is a network of 181 internationally-oriented Dutch organisations working in the water sector. The members include private companies, NGOs, governmental organisations and knowledge institutes.

different Water Management Plans - let alone that these can be linked to the start of BVA. Accordingly, the technological factors will not be questioned during the interviews.

What is more, as regards to the ecological factors, all of the ecological factors mentioned in the DESTEP appear to affect Delfland directly. These are; *the sea level rise; weather conditions; decreasing biodiversity; water scarcity*, and perhaps many more. Considering the overall complexity of these factors in combination with the fact that Delfland as functional governance system is largely responsible for establishing effective (counter)measures to these factors – Delfland could have felt the urge to turn to the market for more ideas. In turn, the core BVA principle that the contractor is the expert might have been attractive in this scenario. On the whole, the interplay of all of the ecological are a plausible explanation why Delfland turned to a new contract strategy such as BVA. For this reason, the influence of the ecological factors as a whole will be included in the interview protocol for the primary data collection.

Then, in consideration of the political (and legal) factors on the national level, numerous factors have seemingly be influential. However, to start with the some political factors that seemingly are not; the *flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPP; Political instability; Dwindling Authority and political interference*. To clarify, in contrast to Rijkswaterstaat, the water boards in general are functional, decentral government bodies. Based on this, it would be expected that Delfland and other water boards are placed at a greater distance from the political arena. Differently put, Delfland appears to have been more affected by legislative factors than political ones. Firstly, the *Spatial Planning Act* that came into effect in 2008 forced the DWAs to operate more proactively in order to safeguard the position of water in the spatial planning and processes. Secondly, the first cabinet of Rutte passed the *Environment Act* – that to this day still hasn't been enacted. This new law, however, would have had significant effects on the water boards. In some form comparable to the effects of the Spatial Planning Act. Thirdly, another legislative factor was the *new National Policy Agreement* 2011, wherein the water boards agreed on becoming formally co-financers of the High Water Protection Program. Fourthly, later in 2013, the *Maintainable Governance Finance Act* was enacted, formally adding the debts and financial deficits of decentral public bodies such as the water boards on the national balance. According to P. J. M. Groot et al. (2013), water boards are considering new financial constructions to spread the expenditure over a longer period and were looking at the private sector for ideas. Potentially, this could have affected Delfland's decision to start with the BVA. Fifthly and lastly, a new *Procurement Act and the Guide Proportionality* were enacted in 2012. The EIB writes in P. J. M. Groot et al. (2013) that the average use of EMVI was 15% in 2009 to 2011. Then in 2012, this number increased to 33%. Considering this sudden increase around 2012, in relation to the start of a new procurement act in 2012 – the chance that this affected the decision for Delfland is highly plausible. In general, considering the relatively high number political and legislative factors, these appear seemingly important in the change process and will thus be included in the interview protocol.

Moving on to the inter-organizational factors, considering the fact that the start of DOEN at RWS and BVA at Delfland were initiated within one year of each other – largely similar inter-organizational factors are put forward. To start with networks Delfland worked in prior to the start of adopting the BVA, these were; the High water protection program (Dutch acronym; HWBP) and the KRW program. The 'Smart collaboration program, mentioned in the previous case, started after the initiation of the BVA at Delfland, therefore this is excluded as a plausible factor. Moreover, the *Waterschapspiegel* 2011 states that; a significant development in the field of procurement [for the water boards] comes from the National Policy Agreement where there is a strong cooperation with Rijkswaterstaat. In this, sharing (market) knowledge, knowledge development, coordination of purchasing schedules, making use of each other's contracts, and joint purchasing' (UVW, 2011). More still, P. Groot and Visser (2016) already describes the HWBP program as; '*a catalyst for the changing process within the water boards*'. And that, lastly, HWBP alliance-partner Rijkswaterstaat already started with the BVA in 2008, thereby also winning two prices at Dutch Sourcing Awards of 2012 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011b) – the chance is highly plausible that this affected Delfland's decision to start with the BVA. This ought to be questioned during the interviews.

With concern to the influence of other inter-organizational factors such impact of knowledge institutes, Dutch consultants, and think tanks – no explicit examples were found in the documents mentioned in document analysis. However, different then at 2008 when Rijkswaterstaat started with BVA – around the time that Delfland started with the BVA – numerous Best-Value specialised consultancies were sprouting up. Which, among other things – were providing training wherewith Best-Value certificates could be obtained. Hence, the possibility that these consultancies were involved in the process of change for Delfland is plausible. And, again, the influence of Kashiwagi himself is, in one form or another – similarly plausible.

Then, in view of the intra-organizational factors, some general observation can be made with regard to the reorganisations and organisation culture. To start with the reorganisations at Delfland, these appear to have been less rigorous than those preceding the start of BVA at Rijkswaterstaat. For Delfland, the only significant reorganisation was the adoption of the new Program Management Approach in 2009. Though, no apparent links can be found between that program and the BVA – making the influence of this less plausible.

In terms of the organisational culture, though, some meshing could be found. In the main, the 'professionalisation' of the organisational culture is a frequently mentioned item in the Water Management Plans. For instance in the Water Management Plan of 2012-2015, a desire for an adhocracy organization culture is expressed. Particularly in relation to the innovation aspect, as '*Innovation is recognized in the organization as a condition for achieving the policy objectives. Innovative and creative thinking is part of the corporate culture Delfland stimulates*' (Delfland, 2009b). In view of this, Kashiwagi (2003) claims that the BVA contributes to both the 'professionalisation of the working culture' and therein similarly promoting innovation. All things considered, the collective influence of the intra-organizational context factors appears to be plausible, specifically that of the organisation culture. Nonetheless, for completeness sake - both sub factors will be questioned during the primary data collection.

In sum, all of the context factors that are covered above are listed in Table 3.17. Here, green is deemed plausibly influential, orange is deemed plausibly less influential, and lastly, red is deemed unlikely to be influential. Given all of the plausible factors that are enlisted in this table, a considerable part of the interview protocol will be attributed to the contextual factors as a whole.

Table 3.17 - Theoretical contextual factors during the BVA process of change at Delfland

Factor			Plausibility
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	<i>NPM and NPG</i>
		National	Demographic
		Economic	<i>Economic crises + competitive position of The Netherlands</i>
		Social	<i>Decreasing institutional trust of the public + Communal view concerning institutional legitimacy</i>
		Technical	<i>/</i>
		Ecological	<i>Sea level rise + decrease biodiversity + Extreme weather conditions + water scarcity</i>
		Political (and legal)	<i>Spatial Planning Act + Environment Act + new National Policy Agreement + Maintainable Governance Finance Act + updated Procurement Act and the Guide Proportionality</i>
Inter-organizational	Networks	<i>High Water Protection Program + KRW program</i>	
	Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	<i>Different Dutch consultancy + Kashiwagi</i>	
Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	<i>'Professionalisation' towards adhocracy. Mainly promote innovatively behaviour</i>	
	Reorganisations	<i>Program Management Approach</i>	

### Content factor during BVA at Delfland

For the possible influence of the content factor, that is the influence of other contract strategies – no apparent theoretical findings were made. Though, in the Water Management Plan 2010-2015, it is described how Delfland per 2015 will have 'new, legally-responsible forms of cooperation and outsourcing in the field of research (innovation) and implementation' and also 'applying other forms of project execution, for example outsourcing to others governments or market parties, or tender as 'design and construct' (Delfland, 2009b). With this statement, a clear intention is expressed to make changes in their contract strategies. What is more, this could be compared with the state of RWS in 2008, during the institutionalization of integrated contracts and the use of the MEAT awarding mechanism. Specifically, as stated by the EIB in P. Groot et al. (2016); 'the application of the most distinctive MEAT criteria remains an ongoing search [for the water boards] , in which location-specific factors often play a role'. This illustrates a possible dissatisfaction with the MEAT criteria. Despite that, the effect of a specific content factors is not discernible. On the basis of this, the influence of the content factors is deemed less plausible. Howbeit, the possible dissatisfaction with the MEAT award mechanism will be inquired during the primary data collection. This content factor with its plausibility is included in Table 3.18

Table 3.18 - Theoretical content factor of process of BVA at Delfland

Factor			Plausibility
Content		Contract strategy	MEAT award mechanism

### Leadership factor during BVA at Delfland

Identical to the previous two cases, the BVA contract strategy hasn't been specifically mentioned in documents such as the Water Management Plans of Delfland, the Waterschapsspiegels of the Association of Water Boards, and National Policy Agreement Water. Thereby, again, questioning the overall importance of the vision of top management at Delfland in particularly choosing for the BVA as their new contract strategy. However, the general vision of the top management could be theoretically determined on the basis of the Water Management Plans. For 2012 these were, among other things; improving communication, change realisation of project execution, and knowledge and innovation development (Delfland, 2009b). Where the improvement of communication and knowledge and innovation development are already covered in the previous paragraphs, the change of realisation of project execution will be promptly explored further. Namely that 'During the execution of projects, the a priori risk analysis and risk management will become more important. [...] Herein, all works will be procured efficiently, effectively, creatively, innovatively and sustainably' (Delfland, 2009b). Though not explicitly stated, the principles of BVA fall in line with these ambitions. Therefore, for sureness sake, the foregoing vision of the top management on the BVA as a new contract strategy, will be audited during the primary data collection.

Lastly, with respect to the changes of the top management on the individual/actor level – the only apparent change has been that of the dike count. In any case, this change occurred already in 2008 – four years before the start of the BVA at Delfland. Due to this, the exact role of the leadership remains largely uncertain. In sum, the sub factors that belong to the leadership factors are listed in Table 3.15.

Table 3.19 - Theoretical leadership factor of process of DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

Factor			Plausibility
Leadership		Role of leadership	Unknown
		Vision of top management	Improve communication + promote innovation + change realisation of project execution
		Changes of Leadership	Dike count (2008)



### Outcome factor during BVA at Delfland

Considering the significance overlap with the theoretical roots of the NPM paradigm, the output values for the change process towards BVA at that time - would plausibly have to be in accordance with the sigma value. This, again, has already been extensively showcased at the first case. Specifically in relation to Delfland, however – the concern for efficiency is also observable in several strategy documents. For instance in the Water Management Plan of 2012-2015, where before 2015, Delfland aspires to achieve a 'further efficiency in the procurement phase of project' and a 'greater efficiency for the execution of projects'. All in all, this appears, similar to the first case - to be more in line with 'frugality' as used by Hood (1991). Though, frugality applies more to process than to output control. Where the overall process of the BVA can best be described as transactional, compared for the relational process of DOEN.

Everything considered, an overlap was found between the sigma value and some aspirations of Delfland – thereby making the overall influence of the outcome factor on the change process recognizable and hence; plausible. Nonetheless, this would have to be measured during the interviews.

In conclusion, the theoretical influence of the factors in the third case have been summarized in Table 3.20. The colour scheme, again, behind used in the table is as follows; Green is deemed plausible, orange is deemed less plausible, red is deemed unlikely to be influential, and lastly; grey is indeterminate. The factors mentioned in this table will form the groundwork of the interview protocol of the ensuing phase. Lastly, the three cases are combined in the cross-case table, illustrated in Table 3.21. Therein showing the average plausibility of the theoretical drivers of each of the three cases.

Table 3.20 - Theoretical drivers of the third case (BVA at Delfland)

Factor			Plausibility
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	NPM and NPG
	National	Demographic	Shortage on labour market + Aging workforce
		Economic	Economic crises + competitive position of The Netherlands
		Social	Decreasing institutional trust of the public + Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation + Communal view concerning institutional legitimacy
		Technical	/
		Ecological	Sea level rise + decrease biodiversity + Extreme weather conditions + water scarcity
		Political	Spatial Planning Act + Environment Act + new National Policy Agreement + Maintainable Governance Finance Act + updated Procurement Act and the Guide Proportionality
	Inter-organizational	Networks	High Water Protection Program + KRW program
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	Different Dutch consultancy + Kashiwagi
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	'Professionalisation' towards adhococracy. Mainly promote innovatively behaviour
		Reorganisations	Program Management Approach
Content		Contract strategy	MEAT award mechanism
Process		Process of change	Unknown
Leadership		Role of leadership	Unknown
		Vision of top management	Improve communication + promote innovation + change realisation of project execution
		Changes of Leadership	Dike count (2008)
Outcome			Sigma value: Output control (frugality) Frugal (transactional) process + emphasis on running services within given parameters + clear accountability

Table 3.21 - Cross-case table of three cases with theoretical factors in change process

Factor			Plausibility Case 1	Plausibility Case 2	Plausibility Case 3
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	Green	Green	Yellow
		National	Demographic	Yellow	Green
		Economic	Green	Green	Green
		Social	Green	Green	Green
		Technical	Yellow	Red	Red
		Ecological	Red	Green	Green
		Political	Green	Green	Green
Inter-organizational		Networks	Green	Green	Green
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	Yellow	Green	Green
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	Green	Green	Green
Reorganisations		Green	Green	Red	
Content		Contract strategy	Green	Green	Yellow
Process		Process of change	Grey	Grey	Grey
Leadership		Role of leadership	Grey	Grey	Grey
		Vision of top management	Red	Green	Yellow
		Changes of Leadership	Red	Green	Red
Outcome			Green	Green	Green

### 3.6. Conclusion: Answering second sub question

To begin with reiterating the purpose of this chapter; finding what motives can be recognized from theory that could conceivably results in a change in the contract strategy of public authorities. With reference to the framework of Kuipers et al. (2014) that originated from the first sub question; four of the five change management factors have been considered in this chapter. Respectively; the content factor, the context factor, in part the leadership factor, and outcome factors. Before answering the second sub question, and in view of the operationalisation of concepts necessary for any deductive research approach - the term 'contract strategy' had to be defined. On that account, a contract strategy is 'a set of institutionalized cooperative arrangements between public-sector actors and private-sector actors consisting of either a contract type, a procurement method and an award mechanism or any combination of those three. With this definition, a systematic analysis concerning recent changes in contract strategies of public authorities was obtained. However, outlining the theoretical motives – and later practically-obtained motives – to all of these changes was not achievable within the timeframe of a master thesis. Instead, the systematic analysis enabled a preliminary gathering of theoretical drivers, wherefrom more importantly - missing links between changes in contract strategies and their theoretical drivers could be revealed. Principally, on the basis of this preliminary analysis - three cases were picked as exemplifications. Therein, concretizing the research objective and thus, stepping away from the holistic research approach. What is more, with the intention of conducting a multiple case study, these cases naturally typify both changes in contract strategy at Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland. Ultimately, choosing for the best value approach (BVA) at Rijkswaterstaat in 2008, the start of DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat in 2013, and the commencement of BVA at Delfland. This enabled connecting the findings of the document analysis in a multiconnected manner to these three cases. In this process, forming an undefined explanation for the plausible (theoretical) drivers of public authorities to change their contract strategy. The word 'plausible' showcasing the exploratory nature of this inquiry. In consideration of the foregoing line of reasoning, and after a document analysis that mainly gathered secondary data

*from primary sources – several theoretical drivers were discovered. All of which are summarized in a cross-case table on the previous page, specified as*

Table 3.21. To start, for each case, four levels of contextual factors were examined. Respectively, the societal level, the national level, the inter-organizational level, and the intra-organizational level. With regard to the contextual factors on the societal level, on the whole - the influence of the paradigms on the three cases is plausible. For the first and third case, a significant overlap was found with the NPM paradigm, where the second case was more in step with the NPG paradigm. In particular, the theoretical roots of the paradigms were observable in the three changes in contract strategies. That, in turn, showed through in the organisations' focus, emphasis, and key resource mechanism. What is more, by means of the DESTEP analysis, several potential external factors on the national level have been found for each case. From the roughly total of forty national factors found via the DESTEP, on average 17 national factors could plausibly be recognized in the changes of contract strategies in the three cases. With this, showcasing the theoretical significance of the national factors as theoretical drivers. Particularly, the social, economic and political national factors seem to have been relevant in the change processes. Other than that, in reference of the inter-organizational factors, the theoretical effects from Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland working in networks with other (semi-)public organisations appear to have been noteworthy. Here, the High Water Protection Program, 'Smart Collaboration' work group, and KRW program – were frequently mentioned in documents from primary sources. The High Water Protection Program was by P. Groot and Visser (2016) described as; 'a catalyst for the changing process within the water boards'. Where, due to the considerable administrative attention and the significant amount of money that is involved - different forms of collaboration need to be adopted compared to the 'traditional' way of working. Another inter-organizational factors – the influence of institutes, (Dutch) consultancies, and think tanks was deemed comparably plausible. Besides the close to conspicuous influence of the BVA's creator Kashiwagi in the process, particularly for the second and third case – there is a reasonable likelihood to assume that Dutch consultancies firms and think tanks were involved in the process. The fourth and last level of the contextual factor – split into two types of intra-organizational factors – were moderately conceivable as theoretical drivers. Above all was the plausible influence of the organizational culture in the change process. At which point, all of the cases showed the organization aspiration to move from an internally-focus organizational culture towards an externally-oriented organisation. In Heritage et al. (2014) described as a 'adhocracy' organisation culture. Though, the exact interpretation of this differed moderately per case. The second intra-organizational factor – the influence of reorganisations – was deemed less plausible for the process in the three cases. Mainly on the account of the seeming lacking influence at Delfland, in contrast to the considerable potential influence these reorganisation had at the two other cases at Rijkswaterstaat.

Moving on to the content factor, that is – the influence of other contract strategies, for better or worse. In the main, the overall plausibility that different forms of contract strategy influenced the content of change of those cases is deemed plausible. Primarily, the potential influence of the MEAT awarding mechanism on the process is conceivable.

Next in line is the influence of the leadership factor. This factor is divided into three sub factors. Where one of which, the exact role of the leadership - couldn't be determined. With regard to the other two, starting with the vision of the top management, three identical findings were observed. Namely that all of the new contract strategies in the cases were rarely explicitly stated in the majority of the published documents. Making the overall influence, concerning the general vision of the top management on the specific changes in contract strategy – less plausible. Though, an exception was the individual vision of a top manager in the second case, that conceivably significantly inspired the principles of the DOEN contact strategy. The third sub factor for the leadership factor was the influence of individual changes within the leadership. That is, changes on the actor level. On average, though – the most notable individual changes in the top management occurred a considerable time before the start of these new contract strategies. Therefore, the chance that these individual changes within the top management resulted – based on of the available secondary data – in changes in contract strategies is deemed less plausible.

Lastly, the effect of the outcome factor in the change process was recognizable for all of the cases. For the first and third case, the sigma values – belonging to the NPM paradigm – were largely discernible. By and large, the sigma value describes economic values with an emphasis on efficiency and output. Defined by Hood (1991) as 'frugal'. Though, for the first and second case - this appears to be more in conformity with a concern for a (transactional) process. All principles that are correspondingly observable in the theoretical roots and the promises of the BVA. What is more, for the second case - the lambda and theta values were also noticeable. Predominantly by means of the multiple objective thinking, the relatively high degree of slack to provide spare capacity for learning, and the pursuit of honesty, fairness

and mutuality. Elements that are respectively evident in the DOEN strategy. On that account, the inclusive influence of the output factor on the process of change is believed to be plausible.

Concludingly, on the basis of the theoretical drivers indicated above – it can be observed that the context factor as whole appear to have been the most considerable factor in the change process of each case. Closely followed by the content factor and the output factor. By contrast, the overall influence of the leadership factor in the processes of change appear to have been less significant. With this, answering the second sub question. Though, again - all of these factors will be queried in the subsequent phase of this inquiry; the primary data collection. Where the findings of this chapter will form the basis of the interview protocol. Finally, the combined average plausibility of all the three cases is taken and illustrated in Table 3.22.

Table 3.22 – Combined average plausibility of all the three cases

Factor			plausibility
<b>Context</b>	Societal	Public paradigms	High
	National	Demographic	High
		Economic	High
		Social	High
		Technical	Medium
		Ecological	Medium
		Political	High
Inter-organizational	Networks	High	
	Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	High	
Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	High	
	Reorganisations	Medium	
<b>Content</b>		Contract strategy	High
<b>Process</b>		Process of change	Low
<b>Leadership</b>		Role of leadership	Low
		Vision of top management	Medium
		Changes of Leadership	Medium
<b>Outcome</b>			High

## Chapter 4 | Practical drivers of public authorities: primary data collection

The purpose of this chapter is uncovering the practical substantiations of public authorities in changing their contract strategies. Hereby, making an effort to answer to the third sub question. For this chapter, the three cases that were introduced in the previous chapter, will likewise be used for the sampling of this chapter. Not only was the funnelling towards these three cases requisite when determining the theoretical drivers. In similar manner, using three cases as an exemplification for studying changes in contract strategies – was predestined when considering the most adequate primary data collection method and corresponding desirable sampling strategy. In particular, when offsetting the data quality assurance of these two against the inescapable time constraints of a master thesis. Again, the why and wherefores of these, will be the topic of the chapter. By any means, this chapter is split into three sections. It starts off with section 4.1; collecting fundamental knowledge on primary data collection theory. In addition, section 4.2 will discuss the final design of the interview protocol, using the findings of the previous chapter as a basis. Then, section 4.3 will showcase the results from the primary data collection method. Lastly, the primary data of the three cases will be used to answer the third sub question.

### 4.1. Primary data collection theory

So far, the research has completed the documents analysis method for collecting secondary data. Thereby securing an important source on key events chronologies and records for arguments or justification behind certain changes in contract strategies (Buchanan & Bryman, 2009). This documents analysis has, by dint of the rapid growth of the internet – been a rich source of readily accessible secondary data. In any case, this readily accessible aspect of data gathering, inherently won't be applicatory to the collection of primary data. Considering that primary data collection methods are, on average, more time-consuming (Saunders et al., 2009). Mainly, this due to both the extensive preparation time and the time necessary to decipher the raw data. In that context, a key aspect for a practically-oriented research is selecting a primary data collection method that is both effective and apropos to the nature and purpose of the research. True to form, the consideration between these aspects will be the main focus of this section. The section is further subdivided into three sub sections. In the first section, a case is made to select a certain type of primary data collection method. In the second sub section, the foremost sampling strategy relevant for this type of research will be presented. Lastly, in the third section, the data quality issues – which are tied to the chosen data collection method and sampling strategy – will be highlighted.

#### 4.1.1. Data collection methods

Generally, three types of primary data collection methods are most often used for a case-study; observations, questionnaires, and interviews. Naturally, each of these three methods can be further subdivided in more specific methods. In this section, these three data collection methods will be, shortly, reviewed. Straight away one can conclude that, considering the nature of the research questions, the observation method would not be of interest. For the reason that observations are mainly concerned with what people do in a certain situation. Thus, the observation method allows the researcher to study them closely in such a situation, often by the systematic observation, recording, description, analysis and interpretation of people's behaviour (Saunders et al., 2009). Next in line would be the questionnaire method. Before anything else, there tends to be a great deal of confusion surrounding the exact definition of this method, even by scholars. Hence, firstly, the definition of a questionnaire this research uses comes from De Vaus and de Vaus (2013), which states; *'all methods of data collection in which each person is asked to respond to the same set of questions in a predetermined order'*. This is why questionnaires work best with standardised questions where the researcher can be confident that those questions will be interpreted the same way by all respondents (Robson & McCartan, 2016). Considering this, questionnaires tend to be used for descriptive or explanatory research, and not so much so for exploratory researches such as this one. To clarify, questionnaires obviously lack flexibility when questioning the research participant. As a result, when the researcher discovers during the questionnaire that some information was overlooked, it doesn't allow him to continue further on that topic. Further, the primary data collection method for an exploratory research requires, most likely, a large number of open-ended questions, as research participants need to be given the opportunity to explain, or build on their responses. This brings us to the preferred primary data collection

method for this research; interviews. With this data collection method, the researcher is able to understand the reasons for the decisions that the research participants have taken, or to understand the reasons for their attitudes and opinions (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012). Considering the adopted definition of a 'questionnaire', the questionnaire method can similarly be classified as 'structured interviews'. Thus, the only remaining typology are non-standardized interviews. Nonetheless, within this category, a further specification can be made between semi-structured of unstructured/in-depth interviews. The primary argument for conducting semi-structured interviews is the fact that an extensive document analysis has already been done. And moreover, the general change management theory has provided a clear framework with notable change management factors. Both these two aspects allow the researcher to draw up an interview protocol with themes and specifically curtail the focal point(s) of the interview. Lastly, the semi-structured interview method permits for certain questions to be omitted, depending, for example, on the response of the interviewee. This allows for a great number of questions to be covered while, moreover, providing welcoming flexibility when interviewing two different types of organisations. Altogether, the preferred primary data collection method for this particular research would be semi-structured interviews.

#### 4.1.2. Sampling strategies

In the previous section substantiated how the semi-structured interview method was deemed the most effective with regards to the multimethod methodical choice and the exploratory nature of this research. Apart from this, consideration with respect to the research approach are also crucial. To clarify, according to Saunders et al. (2009), any deductive research<sup>4</sup> should have a shared level of generalisation. Generalisation is the last of the four characteristics of a deductive research that advocates to '*select the sample carefully and for it to be of sufficient size*' (Saunders et al., 2009). Put differently, in order to gather primary data that is worthwhile, a certain amount of participants ought to be questioned as well as guaranteeing different perspectives on the matter (i.e. change) (Buchanan & Bryman, 2009). Naturally, these two considerations will affect the length of time required to complete the primary data collection method. Starting with the first; the research sample. Inherently, the reckoning of the sample size is dependent on numerous factors, such as; the research strategy, the research objective, the data collection method, the time horizon, etc. Patton (2002) paraphrases this to; "*what the researcher needs to find out, what will be useful, what will have credibility and what can be done within your available resources*". There are many different sampling methods and discussing all of them would be tedious and unproductive. Instead, this section forthwith presents the sampling method that was the most useful; the purposive sampling. Essentially, the judgement of the researcher is used to select a sample that best fits the research objective and thereby, is most often used when working with very small samples such as in case study research. With this, the research wants to select research participants that are particularly informative (Neuman & Robson, 2014). When choosing this technique, a relatively high response rate is expected. The second aspect with regards to obtaining generalisation is guaranteeing different perspectives on the case at hand. This aspect is in unison with the sampling strategy. To elaborate, in order to obtain the different perspectives necessary to infer the process of change<sup>5</sup>, a heterogeneous sample technique has been adopted. This strategy chooses participants with sufficiently diverse characteristics to provide the maximum variation possible in the data collected (Saunders et al., 2009). In relation to this research, it is key that both senior managers as team members are being approached. In conclusion, by adopting the heterogeneous purposive sampling strategy, a maximum variation in the data collection method can be achieved. More specifically, by adopting this strategy, both the process of change (planned vs emergent) as well as the role of the leader (driver vs facilitator) can be inferred.

#### 4.1.3. Data quality issues known in the literature

In consideration of the fact that both the primary data collection method and the sampling strategy have been determined, this chapter can continue with stating the primary data quality issues. Saunders et al. (2009) describes four of the main data quality issues with regards to conducting (semi-structured) interviews; reliability, bias, generalisability, and validity. Wherein the interview protocol will be discussed, these four data quality issues will be addressed. Forthwith, these four quality issues will briefly be considered, starting off with the reliability concern. By adhering to the principle of reliability, alternative researches should ideally reveal similar information when conducting interviews. Though, circumstances to be explored are complex and dynamic, and moreover – the essential value of semi-structured interviews is derived from the flexibility by which it can explore the complexity of the topic (Saunders et al., 2009). Also,

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<sup>4</sup> Essentially any type of research where a acknowledged theory is used and subsequently applied to a certain phenomenon

<sup>5</sup> The fourth change management factor from Kuipers et al. (2014)

Marshall and Rossman (2014) remark that semi-structured are not necessarily intended to be repeatable since they reflect reality at the time they were collected, in a situation which may be subject to change. The second quality issue is the bias aspect. Considering the fact that taking part in an interview is an intrusive process, three types of potential biases ought to be considered; the interviewer bias, interviewee bias, and the participation bias. The first regards the comments, tone or non-verbal behaviour of the interviewer – often because an (unconscious) attempt is made to impose the researcher's own belief or frame of reference. This type of bias can either come from the same origin as the interviewer bias, but moreover- it can also be the case that the interviewee is sensitive to the unstructured exploration of certain themes. As a consequence of the latter, interviewees can choose not to reveal and discuss an aspect of the topic that the researcher wishes to explore, because this would lead to probing questions that would intrude on sensitive information that they do not wish, or are not empowered, to discuss with the researcher (Saunders et al., 2009). The last type of bias, the participant bias, comes from the nature of the individuals or organisational participants who agree to be interviewed (Saunders et al., 2009). Nonetheless, considering this research adopts the purposive sample strategy, this is of little concern. Thirdly comes the generalisability concern, which refers to the extent to which the findings of a research study are applicable to other settings (Saunders et al., 2009). Evidently, though, the qualitative methodical approach this research undertakes is intrinsically less generalisable than a typical quantitative study. Fourthly and lastly comes the validity concern. In turn, this refers to the extent to which the researcher has gained access to a participant's knowledge and experience, and is able to infer meanings that the participant intends from the language used by that person (Saunders et al., 2009). In conclusion, mapping these four main data quality issues enabled to researcher to design an interview protocol where the majority of these data quality issues are taken in consideration and, to the extent feasible; overcome. The requirement of the interview protocol and the conclusive composition that resulted from that, will be discussed in the subsequent section.

## 4.2. Framework interview protocol

This section is structured in the following manner, at first; the data quality issues that were introduced in the previous section will be addressed. Thereby, providing the theoretical outset of the interview protocol. Thereafter, the definite design of the interview protocol will be concretized.

### 4.2.1. Overcoming data quality issues

By the contribution of Saunders et al. (2009), four data quality issues for (semi-structured) interviews were introduced. By all means, these should be addressed when devising a interview protocol. Like so, this section will progressively attend each of these concerns. To begin with the reliability concern associated with conducting semi structured interviews. In light of the mentioning from Marshall and Rossman (2014), the principle of reliability can never truly be obtained without undermining the strength of this method. Nonetheless, in order to offset this quality concern as far as possible; researcher are advised to safe the recordings of their interviews. Having said that, these records would – only for pressing academic purposes - be released on request only, assuredly consulting the interviewees in the process. Hereby ensuring the privacy protection of the interviews. Continuing to the second quality issue, the bias factor in an interview. As can be recalled, there are three types of biases, where the interviewer bias will be the first to be addressed. To overcome this, deliberate attention has been devoted to the approach of questioning, tone of voice, and behaviour during the interview. With regards to the approach to questions, there researcher will opt for open or probing question and avoiding leading questions. Another form of bias that needs to be considered is the interviewee bias. This bias is two-folded, first, because inevitably the interviewee has its own set of beliefs, the open and probing question will avoid popular phrases such as 'neo-liberalism' or to a lesser extent; 'new public management' (NPM). Instead, with the intention of measuring the influence of public paradigms (PA, NPM, NPG), the researchers harnessed the universal language of values. In this research grouped under the outcome factor. The final type of bias, the participations bias, is less of a concern for this particular research, largely owing to the fact that the purposive sampling strategy is adopted. Alongside this, a high participation percentage is expected regardless, meaning the chance that unanticipated bias will occur will be minimal. The third data quality issue is concerned with the generalisability of this qualitative research. In this regard, the framework that ensued from the general change management theory provides the necessary theoretical propositions, as advised by (Yin, 2009). To elaborate, although this research will focus on particular cases of contract strategies at RWS and Delfland, the framework enables the findings to be linked back to the theory. Lastly, the validity concerns is by drawing up apparent questions, to probe meanings, and to be able to explore responses and themes from a variety of angles (Saunders et al., 2009). The validity will be further addressed in the

upcoming section; designing the interview protocol. Moreover, after every theme, an open, affirmation question will be included. Providing the researcher with an extra conformation round to assure the utmost knowledge is obtained from the participant.

#### 4.2.2. Designing the interview protocols

Now that the general data quality issues are addressed and resolution for these are presented, this section further explore the design of the interview protocol. Here, addressing the interview themes and the approach to questioning. With regards to the interview protocol, it seems sensible to adopt the five change management factors from the framework of Kuipers et al. (2014). Those are; the context factors, the content factors, the process of change, the role of the leadership and the outcomes. This is a reasonable, considering that the set of themes should reflect the variables being studied and moreover, provide some focus and purpose for the questions (Saunders et al., 2009). What is more, a list of interview questions organized by judicious themes that will be supplied beforehand, will inform the interviewee on the type of information this research is interested in. Besides promoting the credibility of the researcher, this will ultimately boost the validity and reliability of the research. In this, the theoretical drivers obtained in the previous chapter - will form the basis of the interview protocol. Thereby, the determined plausibility per factor will ensure efficient and effectual interview protocol. An essential condition in view of the short available time per interview.

Continuing to the approach of questions, naturally, the main intention behind an approach to questioning should be to reduce the scope for bias and increase the reliability of the information obtained. With this in mind, when possible - questions should be grounded in real-life experiences of the research participants rather than being discussed as abstract concept (Saunders et al., 2009). For this reason, an objective introduction will be stated prior to the interview question. Considering the likelihood that participations will be questioned on events that occurred some time ago, these introduction will both refresh the memory of the participants as concretizing the question (Buchanan & Bryman, 2009). The information for this will be retrieved from the document analysis of chapter 3. Also, it remains important to consider that – especially with public organisations such as RWS and Delfland, some topics will be politically sensitive. Saunders et al. (2009) advises to leave these topics to the end of the interview. Furthermore, as already indicated in the previous section, when embracing the semi-structured interview approach, the main types of questions will be open and probing questions. Here, open questions allows the participants to define and describe an event or situation. They are designed to encourage the interviewee to provide an extensive and developmental answer, and may be used to reveal attitudes or obtain facts (Saunders et al., 2009). The latter being especially useful when trying to infer the influence of the outcomes and role of the leader. In addition, probing questions can be used to explore responses that are of significance to the research topic and thereby have a more particular focus or direction than open questions.

In conclusion, now that both the primary data collection theory and the framework for the interview protocol have been discussed. The results of the primary data collection method can be showcased in the subsequent section.

#### 4.2.3. Choosing individuals according to the purposive sampling strategy

In executing the purposive sampling strategy, consisting of a relatively small number of individuals - Neuman and Robson (2014) state to select research participants that are particularly informative. For this reason, for all three cases, individuals have been questioned that were closely involved in the processes of change. Meaning that, for all the cases – these individuals should have been involved from the beginning when the change took place or preferably slightly earlier. Thus, finding participants with a longer working experience at either Rijkswaterstaat or the Water Authority Delfland would be beneficial. Essentially, this means that individuals that hold position in either procurement or strategy departments should be invited. More still, functions such as policy advisors, general directors, or high-placed staff members are similarly desirable to interview. For all of these types of function, it is reasonable to assume that they have been involved in the decision-making or implementation processes of the particular changes in contact strategies. In contrast, interviewing individuals with function such as project managers would be less desirable as these were presumably later involved in the process. Further, by using LinkedIn, published documents, and consulting employees within the organisation – a final selection was made. When choosing this technique, a relatively high response rate is expected. In the following three paragraphs, a motivation will be provided for the selection of the individuals per case.

Concretely, to start with the first case, a director from the former national service Construction Service (Dutch: Bouwdienst) and the former national service Infrastructure Service (Dutch: Dienst Infrastructuur) was invited for the role of 'senior manager'. Currently these former departments are now known as the national service Large Project and Maintenance (Dutch: Grote Project en Onderhoud) and the Programs, Projects, and Maintenance (Dutch: Programma's, Projecten en Onderhoud) department. The director from these former departments was invited because the Best Value



contract strategy started around 2007 with the Urgent Approach Roads program. This national program was located under these former national services. Also, another high-placed staff member for the Procurement & Market department was approached that had been active in board meetings regarding this topic. Lastly, for the role of team member, a senior procurement manager was invited that was closely involved in concretization of the Best Value Approach at Rijkswaterstaat. On the whole, all of these members mentioned were at least active at Rijkswaterstaat between 2007 and 2009.

Furthermore, concerning the second case, the DOEN contract strategy started in 2013. The first 'Project DOEN' started under the national service Large Project and Maintenance. Unfortunately, this director was not available. Instead, for the role of senior managers – both a high-placed director and a senior advisor Public Private Partnerships and the Market was approached. Both were closely involved with the start of DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat. For the team members perspective, a manager Innovation & Market was invited. All of these individuals were at least active at Rijkswaterstaat between the period 2011 and 2014, the beginning of the DOEN contract strategy.

Lastly, concerning the third case at the Water Authority Delfland, both members of Delfland and the Association of Water Boards have been invited. To clarify the latter, Best Value at the water boards seem to have started in 2012 as part of creating an uniform contract strategy between all water boards. Herein, a particular member of the Association of Water Boards within the policy department was closely involved. Besides that individual, it was deemed wise to invite senior members from the strategy department, as these directly advise the general board. Unfortunately, the dike count and general director were not available as respondents. Next, for the team members perspective, an procurement advisor was approached that had the task to concretize the Best Value Approach at Delfland. All of these members were at least active at either the water Authority Delfland or the Association of Water Boards between the period 2011 to 2014.

In conclusion, though the overall sample size is with nine individuals relatively small – it was made sure by careful prior investigation that all of these individuals were highly informative on the processes of change of each case. Further, by adopting the heterogeneous sampling strategy were both senior members and team members were interviewed, a maximum variation in the data collection method could be achieved. At last, all of these members are listed in attachment 6.

### 4.3. Results of the three cases: Primary data collection

To briefly sum up what has been covered in the previous two sections, at first, a case was made to carry out semi-structured interviews as the primary data collection method. Herein, the heterogeneous purposive sampling strategy was embraced, that intentionally chooses participants with diverse characteristic in order to provide the maximum variation possible in the data collection. The motivation of these individuals have been explained in the previous section. Additionally, four data quality concerns were issued. Thereafter, these options were provided to overcome these quality concerns. Having said all this, this section can continue with establishing the categories for the primary data collection.

In general, these categories can either be developed in advance by consulting the literature (concept driven category) or from the data collected (data-driven category) (Saunders et al., 2009). Here, Dey (2003) states that these categories must have two aspects, an internal aspect (they must be meaningful in relation to the data) and an external aspect (they must be meaningful in relation to the other categories). Considering the use of the theoretical framework of Kuipers et al. (2014), in the next chapter – the data will be analysed using the concept-driven analysis procedure. With this in mind, the data categories for this chapter will already be pre-organized according to the standard of the concept-driven analysis. That is to say; results will per case be split into the five change management factors. Also, initially, a distinction will be made between the output from interviews of the team member positions and those the senior management. So, at first, the team members perspective will be provided and thereafter; that of the senior managers. It should be noted that, in an effort to avoid redundancy – the perspective from the managerial position will mainly be used to add-on or contradict the perspectives from the team members. For this reason, though, it could give the impression that the team members provided more output, which simply isn't the case. What is more, at every end of the three cases, the results from the perspectives of the team members and those of the managerial positions will be summarized in a final conclusion. In this conclusion, the main challenge was to distinguishing between the level of significance of each factor and moreover; pinpoint the triggering event(s). On the whole, the sub conclusion should ultimately make the answering of the third sub question more straightforward.

On a final note, when observing the interview protocol in the attachment, a large set of questions are included

per case, stating potential drivers for every change. These questions can be found in attachment 7, 8, and 9. In hindsight, though, a great deal of those questions were deemed irrelevant by the research participants. Naturally, for the sake of comprehensibility – most of these irrelevant answers are not included in the results below. Obviously, however, it should become clear for holistic purposes whether or not all the questions from the interview protocol are asked. For this reason, at the end of every case, a table is included that, next to the influence of the drivers – depicts which questions weren't covered in the interview. With concern to the latter, the general factors that belong to these questions are given a grey shade. What is more, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade – in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy. With the use of the three-color system, the distinction is made between the perception of the team members and those with the managerial function. Considering this, whenever a factor has a 'double-green', there is a significant likelihood that this particular factor indeed was a notable factor with regard to the change in contract strategy. Naturally, this three-color system is not thoroughgoing, but considering the ineluctable subjective (and qualitative) data of this primary data, it will be sufficient for the exploratory nature of this inquiry. Now that all is said and done, the summarized results from the cases are depicted below, starting off with the decision of RWS to start with the Best Value Approach. Herein, focussing on the time period between 2007 and 2009.

#### 4.3.1. First case: Best Value Approach (RWS)

##### *Team member*

##### Context factors during BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

Of the DESTEP factors, when reviewing the output of the interviewee; the social, demographic, and ecological didn't seem to play a role. However, numerous political and economic factors did. Starting with the first, respondent A states *'the minister of the Infrastructure and Water State (Camille Eurlings) had eminent ambitions to show some results in his cabinet period'*. He continues; *'One of the large dilemmas from any minister of Infrastructure and Water state is the fact that one always inherits the problems from the previous minister'*. He notes *'It should be stressed that this driver came from an individual minister and not necessary from the ministry itself. Additionally, the minister drew up several laws that enabled him to shorten the spatial planning decision process. That, in turn, gave him the authority to execute the Urgent Approach Roads (Dutch: Spoedaanpak Wegen) in 2007'*. Respondent A concludes; *'In my opinion, the minister linked his own success to the continuation of Rijkswaterstaat, and therefore Urgent Approach Roads.'* What is more, he remarked *'At the same time, some politically-embedded trust issue surrounded RWS at that time, especially concerning the reliability and performance of the organisation. Overall, RWS was often seen as a bureaucratic organisation'*. He notes; *'Personally I was of the opinion that if the Urgent Approach Roads would fail, it would have severe consequences for the organisation. For instance, scenarios where there would be a possible fusion with ProRail or withdrawing the independence of the board of RWS. All of these aspects combined resulted in the fact that the program could not fail.'* Another political factor was the aftereffects from the construction fraud. Team member A comments; *'The introduction of the Best Value Approach can and should be seen in the context of the changes that occurred after the construction fraud'. For example, this drove the fact that RWS started shifting away from the 'lowest price' criteria and opted to include the 'quality' aspect in their tenders'*. He notes; *'Later, the Best Value Approach formed one solution this ambition'*. Secondly was the influence of economic factors. At the time, there seems to have been an economic boom. Team member A explains; *'During the period between 2007 and 2009, the construction market sector was completely saturated, and the work portfolio of the main Dutch contractors were completely full'*. He continues; *'so when the idea behind the Urgent Approach Roads was presented at the market during several market consultations, the private parties replied that such a program could not be done via the traditional way, as it would simply cost too much time. Because of this, a new contract strategy had to be devised where a many projects could be procured, within a short amount of time'*. He notes; *'Before the Urgent Approach Roads, I tried to pitch the idea at several Head Engineer Directors (HEDs), but nobody saw fit for the Best Value Approach, as there was no urgency. After the reply from the private parties that the program could not be done via the traditional contract strategies, the urgency to find a new contract strategy rose sharply'*. The team member concludes; *'Eventually, the [new] HED of Infrastructure Service trusted our idea and gave permission to concretize the new contract strategy, otherwise it would probably never happened'*.

Besides contextual factors on the national level mentioned above, the inter-organizational factors weren't recognized by the participants. The effects from working in networks with other (semi-)public organisations was not recognized. Moreover, with regard to the other inter-organizational factor, respondent A says; *'Overall, in this process, there was little assistance from consultancies, think tanks or Dutch scholars'*. Though, a respondent acknowledges the influence from Kashiwagi himself. More information on this will be provided during the process of change section.

Moreover, several intra-organizational factors played role. Around that time, the procurement department of RWS went from a multitude of regional departments towards a predominant centralized national department. The former Expertise Centre for Procurement – now part the Procurement Management Infrastructure Sector - was a critical accelerating factor for the BVA approach. As team member A remarks *'The centralisation of the procurement departments resulted in the emergence of a single procurement director that was always present at the board meetings. This gave the procurement department a voice and a clear long-term strategy'*. The respondent says; *'if we had to convince directors from 5 or 6 regions, the Best Value Approach would have failed'*. Team member A argues that some internal factors should also be seen as influential factors, for instance; the reorganisations of other regional and national departments. As the team member observes; *'The downsizing of the national service Bouwdienst – and thereby the design capabilities of the organisation – made the organisation much more dependent on the market parties for their design'*. The team member infers *'The procurement department itself became much more important. The respondent states; 'When I started working there, procurement was seen as an administrative activity, after that reorganisations, it become a counter-prevailing power within the origination that rivalled the project management department. Herein, the Best Value Approach was seen as a tool whereby professionalisation of the procurement department could be achieved'*. In terms of the effects of the reorganization for the implementation of the Best Value Approach, the respondent confirms; *'There was an hour stop at Rijkswaterstaat, but it had simply been cancelled for the Urgent Approach Roads. If there was a shortage of people, we would immediately get extra people, and dare I say; the very best. Solely for the reason that the program had to succeed'*.

#### Content factor during BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

From the interviews, it seem that other forms of contract strategies influenced the course of the Best Value Approach, mainly the MEAT award mechanism and the DBFM contract type. As it shows, respondent A said that *'the BVA approach seemed in an unofficial competition with the DBFM model, be it that there was reciprocity between the two contract strategies'*. With concern to the influence of MEAT award mechanism, the respondent replies; *'the adoption of the MEAT system at RWS earlier did ease the implementation process of the Best Value Approach, as the organisation was already used to the partially awarding on tender on the 'quality' aspect'*. More still, though; *'the exact construction of this 'quality' aspect was still rather vague and the Best Value Approach gave a solution to that'*.

#### Process of change and the role of the leadership during BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

Team member A remarks that the director general at that time can be seen as a vital driver for the start of the Best Value Approach. The respondent remarks; *'The director general has been an exceptionally important person in this process. Personally I found him the most visionary director generals that I have come across during my time at RWS. His doctrine "The market, unless.." was an uncomplicated slogan that married perfectly with the philosophy of the Best Value Approach'*. He continues; *'Besides the director general, the Head Engineer Director (HED) of the Bouwdienst undertook a significantly important role. He was initially inspired by the concept of the Best Value Approach by Kashiwagi himself, when Kashiwagi gave a lecture for several important directors around 2005. And told me to investigate the concept further'*. Besides that, the (new) HED of Infrastructure Service (IS) seems to have been an important person, as a team member notes; *'The HED IS was an important sponsor in the process. This was important, considering the fact that the Urgent Approach Roads [and thus the Best Value Approach] would eventually be situated under his national department'*. The respondent adds; *'That HED of IS had already experience with alliance-like contracts, so that definitely helped'*. What is more, when reviewing the comments surrounding the process of change of the Best Value Approach, some interesting remarks were made. To start, *'the member of the boards didn't had a specific model in mind after the feedback from the market consultation days, besides the main requisite for a new contract strategy; a short tender procedure'*. He notes; *'Me and a another colleague have wrote the entire new contract strategy for that program. Our aim was to stay relatively close to the original philosophy of Kashiwagi, but we did want to adjust it to the European procurement laws and somewhat to the Dutch culture. After having finished that, we presented it to our senior management and they agreed. In the end, we managed to design the Best Value Approach is such a manner that it fitted within the standard procurement procedure of the European Directive'*.

#### Outcome factor during BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

In terms of outcome factors, respondent A answers; *'The Urgent Approach Roads was solely concerned with time, that was the number one priority'*. Second only was the costs aspect, as *'if the program would have costs much more, then people would utter that we simply bought time'*. In general, he adds; *'the promise was to shorten the procurement procedure, while also lowering transaction costs'*. After some consideration, the respondent concludes *'the change*

towards the Best Value approach was a coincidental confluence of a number of people, who were in a certain position, at a certain time and that the stars were right. It's a unique momentum and I don't think I've ever experienced it again'.

In sum, the practical drivers according to the team members perspective is summarized in Table 4.1. Herein, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy.

Table 4.1 - Practical drivers according to team members of first case (BVA at Rijkswaterstaat)

Factor			Team member
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	NPM
	National	Demographic	
		Economic	Booming economy
		Social	
		Technical	
		Ecological	
		Political	Ambitious minister + decreasing political trust in RWS + Construction fraud + Privatisation RWS
	Inter-organizational	Networks	
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	Kashiwagi
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	'Best Value Approach was seen as a tool whereby professionalisation of the procurement department could be achieved'
		Reorganisations	'There was an hour stop at Rijkswaterstaat, but it had simply been cancelled for the Urgent Approach Roads'
Content		Contract strategy	'Rise of integrated contracts made procurement department much more important'
Process		Process of change	Planned + Emergent
Leadership		Role of leadership	Driver + Facilitator (Director general + HED Bouwdienst + HED IS)
		Vision of top management	'The Director General's purchasing strategy (Market, unless..) was also a boost for Best Value' + 'I was send to the US by the HED of Bouwdienst' + 'The HED of IS had already experience with alliance-like contracts, so that definitely helped'
		Changes of Leadership	'The new HED of Infrastructure Service trusted our idea and gave permission to concretize the new contract strategy, otherwise it would probably never happened'
Outcome		Public paradigms	Time and money: 'Shorten the procurement procedure, while also lowering transaction costs'

#### Senior manager

Context factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

The senior manager B did underline the influence of the political and economic factors, and specified the political factors mentioned by the team member further. The individual states; 'Two drivers that foreshadowed the changes in the contract strategies of RWS were the parliamentary inquiry of 2002 and a national program called 'A different government' (Dutch: Een andere overheid). These two aspects do indicate the political context at the time, namely that there was an belief that the market could do things better than the government could'. Though, the respondent B adds; '..but that

actually all came about 3 years before the Best Value Approach started. In fact, these drivers resulted already in 2004/2005 in changes within the overall contract strategies of RWS, such as the D&C, DBFM, and performance contracts'. The interviewee infers 'The primary reason was the fact that 'during the market consultation, the private parties simply said that there project portfolios were already full for the upcoming year, and they would struggle fitting in extra work. Nonetheless, due to the time constraints for the program, we couldn't afford the longer procurement procedures. Thus, funnelling towards a single contracting parry had to be done quickly. Interestingly enough, normally you would get intense discussions with the market parties – "Can you judge a tender offer that quickly?" or "When is it reasonable to continue one-on-one?". Now, those market parties didn't care as much, because they had enough work and they were not waiting for reasonably long tender procedures'. Still, the political pressure of the minister in particular was eminent, as a interview remarked; 'The [former] director general thought that starting off with a new contract strategy such as the Best Value Approach would have a substantial risk. However, the director general noted "If we say 'no' to the minister, that will be an even greater risk, so let's go on with it". With respect to the social factors, it appears that the Best Value Approach was more of an additional problem than indeed a solution for this, as one respondent remarked; 'In terms of the social factors, there actually was a risk, because people wanted security and influence in the decision-making process from RWS. Precisely what the Best Value Approach doesn't allow, as the contractor is responsible for those interest. So you could almost say the social aspect was low in that regard'.

Also, in matters of the inter-organizational (contextual) factors, RWS appears to not have been affected by working in networks with other public organisation, as interviewee B explains; 'Rijkswaterstaat was, especially at that time, leading the way in terms of innovative contract strategies and the rest would mostly follow'. The influence of institutes, consultancy, and think tanks wasn't recognized by the senior respondents. Next to, the influence of Kashiwagi on the process of change.

Turning to the influence of the intra-organizational factors, a minor contradiction with the answers from the team members was found. Senior member B notes that; 'the centralisations process for the procurement department was done in incremental steps. However, the largest step was done in 2012, and there played less of a role for the Best Value Approach specifically. What did play a role, though, was the centralisation of the project management department due to the establishment of the new national department Infrastructure Service (IS). The [new] HED of IS at the time wanted RWS to adopt a more centrally-focus attitude. As it turned out, the Best Value Approach fitted better with the centralization of the project management, compared to the centralization of the procurement department'. Though, he adds; 'The Best Value Approach did enable the procurement department to work closer together with the project management department, much closer than before'. He concludes; 'At the start of a new board of directors, you often see more open-mindedness to work in a new way and to adapt to it. So here too the opportunity presented itself, without it being a conscious policy'. A supplementary remark was made by another senior manager that argued 'the centralization of RWS as a whole enabled us to understand that we as an organisation were part of the problem – as similar problems were now occurring nation-wide instead of occurring on specific regional locations. Meaning we couldn't blame specific regional contractors or interest groups. So with concerns to that, the centralization helped us see though that and accordingly; respond much more professionally. On the whole, I think that if we hadn't done this, the Best Value Approach would never have happened the way it did'. Another remark was made by respondent C that argued 'the centralization of RWS as a whole enabled us to understand that we as an organisation were part of the problem – as similar problems were now occurring nation-wide instead of occurring on regional locations. Meaning we couldn't blame specific regional contractors or interest groups. So with concerns to that, the centralization helped us see though that and accordingly; respond much more professionally. On the whole, I think that if we hadn't done it this, the Best Value Approach would never have happened the way it did now'. Another intra-organizational factor that was mentioned was the organizational culture, as interviewee C notes 'The phenomenon that we as Rijkswaterstaat "know it better" was extraordinarily persistent that we at Rijkswaterstaat; know better. I personally that the "market party is the expert"-philosophy from Best Value Approach would encourage to break that tradition'. Lastly, a remark was made that can be linked to the contextual changes on the societal level, as senior manager C remarks; 'For the Urgent Approach Roads program, we hosted several market consultation days, wherein we – more extensive than ever before – discussed possible solution on how we could relocating much extra work to the market within a short amount of time, and in market that is already saturated. Key in this quote is 'more extensive [collaboration] than ever before'.

Content factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

In terms of influences of different contract strategies, the answer from senior manager B seems clear, as was remarked; 'Best Value is merely an element that you can use in this [transition from DDB contracts toward integrated

contracts], but the major change for the organization was the switch from RAW to integrated contracts itself, as all the energy [from the board] was being put in here'. Also, the following statement showcases that the Best Value Approach seem to not have been an answer to dissatisfaction with the integrated contracts, as interviewee B remarks; 'Once a project gets more complex, best value is no suitable method for us. So it wasn't a sudden solution to a particular problem we had, especially because we were developing DBFM contracts in parallel. The DBFM contracts were for the extremely complex contracts, in which a great many aspects played a role. Here, the philosophy of the Best Value Approach simply wasn't suited for this.

Process of change and the role of the leadership during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

In terms of the process of change and the role of the leadership, the perspectives of team members and senior managers started to differ. Senior manager B states; 'the Best Value Approach wasn't perceived by the board as a split with the strategy of RWS with the market. Also, the Best Value Approach wasn't necessary needed to overcome the aftereffects of the parliamentary inquiry' in 2004/2005. Instead, the board was mainly concerned with the transition from DBB contracts towards integrated contracts. Such transition in core strategies often take six to ten years to implement, so there was all the energy geared towards. Meaning that in 2007/2008, we were still in the early stage of that transition. Thus, although there was great political attention for the Best Value Approach, the board – generally speaking - was mainly concerned with the implementation of the D&C or performance contracts. Greater still, on the board level, the Best Value Approach has hardly been discussed, it came every so often from the HED who was responsible for the Urgent Approach Roads. That is why the Best Value Approach is hardly ever stated in the [strategy] documents from that time'. Add this point, an opposing view is brought to light; senior manager C notes; 'Although the Best Value Approach fits the slogan "Market, unless..", the method of Kashiwagi could never fully been implemented in the organisation. To clarify, in the second business agenda was written that RWS wanted to become a 'professional contract authority'. This is directly in contrast with the philosophy from the Best Value Approach that argues that contractors are the experts – so they would know what to do'. This last citation shows how the general focus from the top management was elsewhere, but what about specific HEDs? Indeed, the candidate notes; 'The HED of the Bouwdienst was already searching in 2005 for new contract strategies that fitted with the "Market, unless.."-principle'. More still, another senior manager remarks that 'securing and maintaining the trust component in the collaboration with the market party was quite important. Therefore, I placed great importance on safeguarding the quarterly meetings between members of the board of RWS and those of the contracting parties. Respondent C deduces; 'Personally, I think that without that relational aspect, more of the Urgent Approach Roads projects would have failed'. What is more, with regards to the actual process of change, respondent B adds 'The [team member] group that concretized the Best Value Approach was a bottom-up initiative after all, and they indeed took the opportunity of that Urgent Approach Roads very nicely to apply the combination of their system at the moment that the organization needed it. The respondent argues; 'Moreover, as said before; the Best Value Approach fits well in the "Market, unless.."-thinking. Though, it does not fit that well with Rijkswaterstaat's entire work volume, only with parts of it, and what the employees have done well is that they started to adapt the methodology to better suit the "Market, unless.." philosophy and that, as a result - there was little resistance from the board. In view of this, they have never truly implemented the Kashiwagi system one-to-one. So, until this day, Rijkswaterstaat's best value approach is its own variant on Kashiwagi's philosophy'. In the end, he concludes; 'Evidently it was the unification of a number of developments that were actually not planned. That's sometimes the fluke you have with things. Every so often, you have an especially good idea, but then no one is open to it. Yet, here, there was an idea [the Best Value Approach] while at the same there was an organisation in great need for a solution.

Outcome factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

With regard to the outcome factors, the senior managers didn't seem to be concerned with lowering the (transaction) cost as an output, but solely with the time-bound output. Senior manager B remarks; 'In 2007/2008, we were confronted with problems that are somewhat comparable to the Nitrogen-Problem we have in today's times [in 2021]. Subsequently, this caused a significant delays of projects. In turn, when those delays were solved, we had a backlog that we had to get rid of. This became known as the so-called 'Emergency Approach Roads'. Besides the time-bound output, senior manager C expressed that 'guaranteeing safety was vitally important in the Urgent Approach Roads'. He continues; 'With the Best Value Approach, we were able to safeguard the safety component centrally during the tender and construction phase, and we surely made use of that'.

In summary, the practical drivers according to the senior management perspective is outlined in Table 4.2. Herein, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors

with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy.

Table 4.2 - Practical drivers according to senior management of first case (BVA at Rijkswaterstaat

Factor			Senior manager
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	NPM → NPG
		National	Demographic
		Economic	Booming economy (+ Traffic jam costs)
		Social	'Best Value was socially (in terms of stakeholders) a risk, not a solution'
		Technical	
		Ecological	
		Political	Ambitious minister
Inter-organizational	Inter-organizational	Networks	'RWS was at that time leading the way and the sector would mainly follow'
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	Kashiwagi
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	'I personally that the "market party is the expert"-philosophy from Best Value Approach would encourage to break that [the Rijkswaterstaat-knows-best] tradition'
Content		Reorganisations	Centralisation project department
		Contract strategy	'So it [BVA] wasn't a sudden solution to a particular problem we had, especially because we were developing DBFM contracts in parallel!'
		Process of change	Planned + Emergent
Leadership		Role of leadership	Driver + Facilitator (HED Bouwdienst + HED IS)
		Vision of top management	'The HED Bouwdienst was initially looking for new contract strategies in the context of the entire 'Market, unless..' doctrine' + 'Best Value is right tool to adopt a more centrally-focus attitude' (HED IS)
		Changes of Leadership	'The [old] HED of the Bouwdienst was already searching in 2005 [...]'
Outcome			Collaboration and safety 'Without a relational aspect, many more of the Urgent Approach Roads projects would have failed' + 'the Best Value Approach allows to centrally safeguard the safety component'.

## Conclusion

In summary, to start with the (national) contextual factors, both teams members and senior managers underline the influence of several political and economic factors. Nonetheless, whereas the team members has remarks the influence political factors such as decreasing political trust in RWS, the aftereffects of the Construction Fraud, and the exposure of RWS to become privatized – the senior managers note that the main triggers came from the economic state at the time in combination with the ambitious of the minister. Other national contextual factors such as demographic, social, and technical were deemed irrelevant for the adoption of the Best Value Approach.

In terms of inter-organizational factors, reviewing the outputs of the interviews, RWS didn't seem to have been influenced by working in networks with other public organisations at that time, to start with the Best Value Approach. Moreover, with respect to the intra-organizational factors, the results show that the influence of the organizational culture was deemed irrelevant. Another intra-organizational factor – the influence of the earlier organization culture – was, however, considered reasonably relevant. Howbeit, the team members indicated that the professionalization of the procurement department was a driving factor, whilst the senior managers proclaimed that the centralization of the project department was more important. Further, with regard to the process of change, this appears to be an emergent process, though this will be further discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Moving on to the role of the leadership, the leadership is with both perspectives recognized as an important driver of change, mainly the role of the HED of the Bouwdienst. A similar remark was made concerning the (later involvement) of the HED of IS. Yet, the team members also appear to remark that the (doctrine of the) General Director was a significant driver, whereas the senior manager don't seem to recognize that.

Also, it appears from the interview if the (predetermined) outcome factor from the team member's perspective was mainly focussed on achieving certain output; lower transaction costs and shorter procurement procedure. Nonetheless, senior managers did add the (relational) collaboration and safety component did in their concern serve as (predetermined) outcome factors in the change process. Lastly, all the results from this case have been summarized in Table 4.3. Herein, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy. Thus, whenever a factor has a 'double-green', there is a significant likelihood that this particular factor indeed was an notable factor with regard to the change in contract strategy.



Table 4.3 – Practical drivers of first case (BVA at Rijkswaterstaat)

Factor			Team member	Senior manager
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	NPM	NPM → NPG
	National	Demographic		
		Economic	Booming economy	Booming economy (+ Traffic jam costs)
		Social		'Best Value was socially (in terms of stakeholders) a risk, not a solution'
		Technical		
		Ecological		
		Political	Ambitious minister + decreasing political trust in RWS + Construction fraud + Privatisation RWS	Ambitious minister
	Inter-organizational	Networks		'RWS was at that time leading the way and the sector would mainly follow'
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	Kashiwagi	Kashiwagi
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	'Best Value Approach was seen as a tool whereby professionalisation of the procurement department could be achieved'	'I personally that the "market party is the expert"-philosophy from Best Value Approach would encourage to break that [the Rijkswaterstaat-knows-best] tradition'
		Reorganisations	'There was an hour stop at Rijkswaterstaat, but it had simply been cancelled for the Urgent Approach Roads'	Centralisation project department
Content		Contract strategy	'Rise of integrated contracts made procurement department much more important'	'So it [BVA] wasn't a sudden solution to a particular problem we had, especially because we were developing DBFM contracts in parallel'
Process		Process of change	Planned + Emergent	Planned + Emergent
Leadership		Role of leadership	Driver + Facilitator (Director general + HED IS + HED Bouwdienst)	Driver + Facilitator (Director general + HED IS + HED Bouwdienst)
		Vision of top management	'The Director General's purchasing strategy (Market, unless..) was also a boost for Best Value' + 'I was send to the US by the HED of Bouwdienst' + 'The HED of IS had already experience with alliance-like contracts, so that definitely helped'	'The HED Bouwdienst was initially looking for new contract strategies in the context of the entire 'Market, unless..' doctrine' + 'Best Value is right tool to adopt a more centrally-focus attitude' (HED IS)'
		Changes of Leadership	'The new HED of Infrastructure Service trusted our idea and gave permission to concretize the new contract strategy, otherwise it would probably never happened'	'The [old] HED of the Bouwdienst was already searching in 2005 [...]'
Outcome		Public paradigms	Sigma value 'Shorten the procurement procedure, while also lowering transaction costs'	Theta and lambda value 'Without a relational aspect, many more of the Urgent Approach Roads projects would have failed' + 'the Best Value Approach allows to centrally safeguard the safety component'.

#### 4.3.2. Second case: DOEN philosophy (RWS)

##### Team member

Context factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

From the different external contextual factors, the influence of the different social, demographic and economic factors seems the most notable. Besides those, the (political) aftereffects of the construction fraud appears to be notable as well. Respondent D substantiates this with an anecdote; *'For me personally, it was perfectly clear that since the construction fraud, RWS has become agitated and suspicious in their relation towards the contractor. To make this statement more concrete, I would like to provide an example from my personal experiences. In the preliminary stage of the implementation of performance contracts, we wanted to organize session with contractors where we could explain our philosophy – and they could subsequently ask question. Nonetheless, when we pitched this idea for these session at the headquarters in The Hague, the senior management immediately remarked; "You're not going to ask contractors questions from which you don't know what to expect, don't you?". In the end, the contractors were requested to write down their question two weeks in advance. Whereafter RWS would eventually decide which question would and wouldn't be answered. That was around 2003. It was madness, there was such a breach of trust. We were afraid to start a conversation. But, naturally, this also affects the rest of the staff. Perchance, you shouldn't give the impression that you were too friendly for a contractor, because that might have helped you. The interviewee infers; 'At that time, the main steering mechanism was on contracts and as RWS, you were not allowed to say too much'. Team member D concludes; 'When the contractor asked a question, the immediate suspicion arose that there must be something behind that question. This can also be read in the memorandum of information from that time. Each question stated; "see specification report, see specification report". In my opinion, this environment resulted from the construction fraud and was an important driver for the start of DOEN (and the Market vision)'. Besides the construction fraud, gradual changes in society also appear a notable driver for the start of DOEN. A respondent appraises; 'When I started at Rijkswaterstaat, it seemed as if we didn't have a customer. Of course, there is infrastructure, but the impression at the time was; "This is our road, right?" And we will maintain that road whenever we see fit. Essentially, the nuisance experienced by the road user seemed almost secondary. Respondent B notes; 'The traditional attitude of RWS slowly started to change with the appointment of the new director general in 2004. From then on, dubiety gradually arose and the term "customer experience" became more frequently used. Putting aside the fact that the term "customer" is an interesting term in itself, since we also have to deal with the region, the administrator, etc. In any case, defining the social task of RWS and realizing who as interest in that, those social factor were eminent at that time'. Interviewee D notes; 'Overall, the increasing importance of stakeholder management - combined with the phenomenon that these stakeholders tend to become more vocal - was a key driver for DOEN'. Another important accelerant seemed to be the economic factors, specifically the economic crisis that started from 2008. Interviewee B explains; 'In an economic downturn, contractors would on average decrease their tender offer, but accordingly – would turn into fighting mode to limit their risks. This happened especially frequent for maintenance projects. Considering that these risks couldn't be inclusively be managed for that offer'. She remarks; 'As an exemplification, similar to today's uncertain times - you immediately notice hardening of the attitudes between the contractor and RWS in contemporary tenders. This is largely due to the fact that RWS is currently unable to provide a reliable procurement plan due to various factors such as budget problems, corona, the nitrogen-problem, etc'. The next external factor that was recognized was a demographic factor, specifically the desire to continue attracting young people to the organisation. Participant D elaborates; 'We consider presence of young employees a vital part of well-functioning organisation. Here, a nice intentional bonus is that starting progressive contract strategies as DOEN, RWS would ideally become a more attractive organisation for young people'.*

In terms of the influence of the inter-organizational factors, specifically the water boards are mentioned with concern to DOEN, as respondent D says *'there was considerable reciprocity between the board of RWS and the boards of the different water boards. That were, in turn, working on their first Market Vision'*. Moreover, the influence of the scientific community and consultants has been discussed. With concern to the first, scholars seemed to be involved in the change process but much later, as a team member describes; *'Later in the process, we as RWS also approached a professor in Management of Cultural Change at VU University Amsterdam, but in the earlier stage, the main discussion were held with the market parties'*. Team member B adds; *'In the run-up to Project DOEN, DBFM or other matters, we simply brought in foreigners and consultants to occasionally think along with us. Generally speaking, we always have had a pretty strong tradition that we bring together elements from different perspectives and combine them in our way'*.

Next, some intra-organizational factors seem to have sparked the change. The organisation culture was already mentioned by implication in the anecdote mentioned above, but B interviewee adds; *'The old hierarchical relationship*

that we as a contract authority had with our contractor was ready for renewal. Viewed from the situation at that time, the realisation arose that the future societal task we had, was not achievable with that particular working culture. Thus a change in working culture was needed. The team member continues; *'In light of this, it was already recognized that these culture changes take a considerable amount of time. Especially when this (distrusting) working culture is ingrained in the organisation. So, opting for something different then the established procedures and the common perception of the employees, requires some concrete endorsement and this become the DOEN contract strategy'*.

*Content factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat:*

During the interviews, it seems that the start of the DOEN was, to a certain extent, driven by unwanted issues with other contract strategies. The DBFM was briefly mentioned, as interviewee B says; *'around that time, the DBFM contract frequently experienced bad publicity and there was also general difficulty with contractor claiming extra work'*. Arguably more pressing seems the role of the D&C contract. Though, not necessary with the contract type itself, but rather the less ideal execution of them. The respondent states *'More frequently than not, when tendering via a D&C contract, we would pan out the design to such an extent and merely wanted the price from the contractor. To elaborate, ultimately we had already solved the problem to such an extent, but still we would procure it using functional specifications'*. The team member infers; *'Naturally, this isn't according to the principles of the D&C contract, as indeed; the D&C describes that it is desirable to work together with the market in finding solutions'*. Also, interviewee D indicates the common belief at that time, by stating the following anecdote; *'In 2010, our idea came for a 'variable maintenance contract' that focused on cooperation. In this, it became quite clear that we had to develop this concept solely with the existing contracts (DBFM, D&C, E&C, performance contracts) and not to "let a thousand flowers bloom". In other words, there was a fixed contract budget'*. The last statement was also remarked by another respondent, that describes *'For the A2 Hooggelegen project in 2006/2007, we used our first major alliance contract type. It turned out to be deemed successful by many people who were directly involved in it. Despite this, there have been a number of occasions since then where it could have been possible, but which ultimately were dismissed. From my point of view, the alliance contract was never adopted widely, since during its launch, RWS was simultaneously working on the implementation of the DBFM contract model'*. The interviewee continues; *'The DBFM had the endorsement of the board. For this implementation, a separate PPP-knowledge pool consisting of approx. 15 experts was already put together'*. The team members reasons; *'Naturally, as an organisation, you can only effectively implement a certain number of change at the time'*.

*Process of change and the role of the leadership during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat*

Early on in the interviews, the role of the senior management was acclaimed. Interviewee B notes; *'The role of the former director general was absolutely crucial at the start of DOEN. He provides the necessary legitimacy behind the new concept. A sign of true leadership, if you ask me'*. The team members concludes; *'DOEN took off when the director general got behind it'*. Equally interesting is the take of a participant on the role of the top management, as the participant affirms; *'In some cases, true leadership might be less presented then one would initially hope. From time to time, it seems that there tends to be an exorbitant risk aversion in the top managerial positions'*. The team member adds; *'In my opinion, leadership is not only needed to start something new, but also to purposely continue certain principles if they are deemed necessary. This is the core task of the head of an organisation'*. Interviewee B concludes; *'Now and then, I have the idea that a new leader wants to leave its own mark. Something that appears to be the case with the release of the McKinsey report and the corresponding two-phase contract. Personally I am of the believe that, with regard to the essence; the change between Project DOEN, the Market Vision, and the McKinsey report is part of the same continuation'*. What is more, in terms of the actual process of change, respondent D elucidates *'the first initiative for the DOEN philosophy came from the general director himself. As he wanted to break with the working culture. Nonetheless, after some initial instructions by the director general, the actual refinement of the plan was done by employees from different departments, where, in turn, the common denominator was that they were all relatively young. In the end, concretizing this process turned out to be quite an undertaking that took more than just some months'*.

*Outcome factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat*

With regard to the outcome factors, several remarks have already been mentioned. To enumerate the most apparent of which, interviewee D remarks *'A true conversation irks whenever each other's interest are vocalized. Nonetheless, without respectively considering each other's interest, true collaboration will never come to pass'*. Others talk about *'the cooperation necessary to achieve the societal task'*. Participant B states *'the need to restore trust between contractor and contract authority' and 'opt for a less hierarchical relationship'*.

In sum, the practical drivers of behind the DOEN strategy at Rijkswaterstaat according to the team members, has been outlined in Table 4.4. Herein, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees - was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy.

Table 4.4 - Practical drivers of second case according to the team members (DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat)

Factor	Level		Team member
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	NPG
	National	Demographic	<i>'DOEN makes RWS ideally more attractive for young people'</i>
		Economic	<i>'Economic down-turn hardens relation between the contractor and RWS'</i>
		Social	<i>'Increasing importance of stakeholder management'</i>
		Technical	
	Ecological		
	Political	<i>'Procurement act 2012 was not restricting for RWS'</i>	
Inter-organizational	Networks	<i>'Reciprocity RWS and different water boards (first Market Vision)'</i>	
	Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	<i>'...much later in the process, but mainly market parties'</i>	
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	<i>'The old hierarchical relationship was ready for renewal'</i>
Reorganisations		<i>'More and more links in the process, exacerbate the change process'</i>	
Content		Contract strategy	<i>'True principles of the D&amp;C contract weren't followed'</i>
Process		Process of change	Planned + Emergent
Leadership		Role of leadership	Driver + facilitator (Director general + HED Market & Innovation)
		Vision of top management	<i>'The need to restore trust between contractor and contract authority'</i>
		Changes of Leadership'	
Outcome			Trust and collaboration

## Senior manager

### Context factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

The first minor difference comes from the influence of the demographic factor. For what it seems, senior manager E discerns it more as a tool than depicting it as an actual driver and states; *'The reason for this new contract strategy was actually quite trivial. We had a project and it actually went pretty well, on time and on budget. It turned out that this project was solely done by young people. Thus, arguably those with little cultural ballast. From personal experience, I am of the opinion that anyone who has worked for a considerable amount of time, knows what time of behaviour is expected from him. In light of this, I thought to myself - I need young and fresh people to develop different behaviour, that might eventually help to change the relationship between the contract authority and the contractor'*. With this last statement, it shows that young people are the tool, to get to the objective (a better relationship between the two parties). The participant concludes; *'The existing repertoire of the client/contractor is in my view completely conditioned, in terms of contracts, purchasing provisions, opinions, the way in which one should deal with differences, etc.'*. Moving on to the economic factors, respondent E explicitly states that this was one of the biggest drivers to start with DOEN, and says; *'In economic down turn, the competition between contractors is fierce and if you don't watch out [as RWS], you end up with nothing. Put differently, the Dutch infrastructure market would in that case be completely taken over by foreign contractors. Bouwend Nederland frequently warned us for this and within Rijkswaterstaat too. The senior manager continues; 'In general, people did not find that a particularly attractive perspective. This prospect certainly played a significant role in looking at the fair-price-for-fair-work principle'*. The last mentioned national factor was social aspect, specifically relating to the individualisation of society. Respondent E remarks; *'If you want to increase customer-value, question one is; "what is the customer value of such a project?" That does concern social-value. I believe that, a proper contract strategy should give that space and if that process doesn't make that space realizable, the product [or project] will be less accepted in general. So indeed, those social factors did play a role'*.

Moving on to the inter-organizational factors, there appears to have been exchanges with other public organisations, senior manager F remarks; *'Water boards and municipalities were already working in accordance with the alliance-principles. This was certainly noticed by RWS at the time'*. Besides that, the institute Opdrachtgeversforum Publiek opdrachtgeverschap seems to have been involved early on in the process. Next, with regards to the influence of knowledge institutes, consultancies, and thinks tanks. Starting with the first, the senior management did appear to have been influenced by the warnings of Bouwend Nederland. Next, with respect to consultants, the reaction of the participant was evident; *'Personally, I am not too exited of a possible role of consultants in organisations such as RWS. The senior manager continues; I am of the believe that if you have over 9000 employees working for your organisation, you could basically handle everything internally. Especially if it concerns your core business. I found this particularly important with DOEN. During the concretization process, employees from RWS worked together with market parties in the most realistic set-up achievable. Letting consultancies do this for you, would merely be a catalyst, considering they'll eventually leave. Instead, by developing it in your own company, the DOEN philosophy remains vibrant within the organisation'*.

Turning to the influence of intra-organizational factors, a senior manager brings up the organisational culture, and states *'A common expressing is that culture sits within walls. Wanting to bring about a change in organizational culture is more than just renewing the people. There are examples where they have replace a multitude people in an organization, but even after those attempts - the same behaviour was observed once again. Participant E concludes; 'For me, it was important after two-thousand years of experience in the construction - based on certain cultural traditions - to just do it differently this time. Hence, replacing staff particularly with younger employees – without cultural ballast – is a requirement to produce a shift in this stubborn situation'*. Lastly, with concern to the influence of the reorganizations, a managerial observes; *'The centralization of an organisation almost automatically results a loss of sensitivity, customer focus, or customization. So in a way, those reorganization in the early days could have contributed to the process to start with DOEN'*.

### Content factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

An aspect that wasn't brought to light in the interviews with the team members but appears to be an notable driving factor for starting with DOEN was the influence of the MEAT award mechanism. Respondent E affirms *'the use of the MEAT awarding system is – particularly with regard to implicitly stressing the importance of awarding on the basis of (ex-post) quality - in my humble opinion; fiction. To clarify, by using the MEAT awarding system, the construction process simply starts with indirectly procuring on the basis of 'lowest price'. Be it, that this is a fictive lowest price. But in the end it's not what you promise to offer, but what you actually offer. Whereas with DOEN, though, the price is not the prime*

*principle in the first stage, but only comes into play in the second stage. The contractor is awarded on their collaborating skills. Here, the underlying assumption is – also illustrated by a research from the EIB – that the contractor with the most clever (ex-ante) collaboration skills will ultimately execute the project for the lowest (ex-post) price' The respondent continues 'The MEAT awarding system still prompts the contractor to concentrate on the lowest (fictive) price, and adversely, drive that price up again in a later stage with the old mechanisms. So, in reality, nothing truly happened, as the same unwanted working culture is encouraged'. Also, within DOEN, many aspects from the British 'early contractor involvement' (ECI) launched in 2010 might at this time be observed. This is indeed confirmed by the respondent, considering that 'the ECI model was at that time in my mind, because I had quite frequent contact with my English colleague and there they were experiencing with the 'open book approach' and the ECI - so that played a role'. Another indirect driver for DOEN was the alliance model. Respondent E argues 'In general, the alliance approach – "you build together" - was at odds with the idea of the DBFM approach – "Let the market do it". At that time, though, the alliance approach didn't fit in with the current zeitgeist. Ultimately, the DBFM trend – set out by the government – was stronger than the alliance approach. Nevertheless, during the time of DOEN and the Market Vision, we took another attempt to reintroduce this 'you build together' approach'.*

Process of change and role of leadership during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

From the citation above, it already becomes apparent that the senior management had significant effect on the change process surrounding DOEN. With regards to the process of change, the following citation from a senior manager seems interesting; *'In the end, the resistance within RWS for the DOEN philosophy turned out to be significantly greater than that of the contractors'.*

Outcome factor during DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat

In the interviews, an anecdote was recounted that touched on the outcome factor in this change process, as senior manager E describes; *'When I was young, the RAW contact was on the rise. At the time, that was exciting news and quite an improvement in fact. Later on, many more contracts were devised (DC, DBFM, BVA)', you name it. But actually these are all developments that don't say that much about the working culture. In my opinion, the proper working method actually precedes a good contract. Notably, this mistake was made recurrently; a new contract, or new type of contract gets drawn up and then we expect things to get better. But, in reality, it didn't get any better, everyone saw the same behaviour over and over again. Therefore, I thought that more needs to be done than simply devising another contract'. Respondent E continues by pointing out unfavourable circumstances in the working culture 'If someone with a little technical substantive knowledge looks at a bridge that has been construction and is himself satisfied, then I – as the client - am sure that we paid a fair price for it. Maybe a little too much or a little too little, but it's about right. This aspect was completely lost that in the collaboration process, because everything was completely rationalized'. He adds 'Repeatedly, we changed our contracts, but across all these changes, we generally fostered the same working culture throughout'. At last, he concludes 'From my point of view, a different contract doesn't necessarily equals a different working culture, looking at the recent history - that is the lesson that should be drawn from this'.*

To sum, the outlined of the results regarding the practical drivers according to the senior managers, are enlisted in Table 4.5. Herein, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy.

Table 4.5 - Practical drivers of second case according to the senior managers (DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat)

Factor	Level		Senior manager	
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	NPG	
		National	Demographic	<i>'I need young and fresh people to develop different behaviour'</i>
			Economic	<i>Economic down-turn hardens relation between the contractor and RWS' + 'Dutch infrastructure market could be completely taken over by foreign contractors'</i>
			Social	<i>'Proper contract strategy should provide space [to align with social demands]'</i>
			Technical	
			Ecological	
			Political	<i>'Procurement Act 2012: 'You don't have to worry about anything'</i>
	Inter-organizational	Networks	<i>'Waterboards use of alliance-like contracts'</i>	
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	<i>'Organization should handle core business internally'</i>	
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	<i>'...to just do it differently this time'</i>	
		Reorganisations	<i>'With centralization, you tend to lose personalization'</i>	
Content		Contract strategy	<i>MEAT: '...unwanted working culture is encouraged' + ECI model: 'I had quite frequent contact with my English colleague...'</i>	
Process		Process of change	Planned + Emergent	
Leadership		Role of leadership	Driver + Facilitator (Director general)	
		Vision of top management	<i>'The proper working method precedes a good contract' [DG]</i>	
		Changes of Leadership'		
Outcome		Public paradigms	Trust and collaboration	

## Conclusion

Conclusively, beginning at the contextual factors on the national level, the results show that predominately the demographic, economic and social factors were deemed meaningful by the interviewees. The demographic factor – making RWS more attractive for young peoples - was mostly declared from the team members' perspective as a driving factor. The senior managers, however, appear to depict the role of the young people in the change process more as a tool, rather than a driving factor. What is more, with consideration of the economic factors, these considered as highly relevant from both function descriptions, especially the aftereffects of economic down-turn that appears to have hardened the relation between the contractor and RW was referenced. Though, the senior managers were prior to the change process also concerned about the unwanted influence of foreign contractor in the Dutch infrastructure sector if nothing would be done. Speaking of the social factors, the heterogenic and increasing vocal community was affirmed by both perspectives as a significant factor. Other than that, technical and ecological factors weren't discussed in the interviews. Nevertheless, the potential inducement of political factors was questioned and seemingly; was discredited as an uninfluential factor.

Moving on to the inter-organizational factors, in the start of the change process of this case, it appears from the results that RWS was affected from working in networks with other (semi-)public organisations. Particularly the reciprocity between RWS and different water boards was recognized, as board member from both types of public organisations would routinely connect for the 'Smart Collaboration' initiative and the High Water Protection Program. Next to that, from reviewing the primary data - the influence of knowledge institutes, consultants, and think tanks was evidently portrayed as inconsiderable. The only considerable institute was the Opdrachtgeversforum voor de Bouw.

Putting aside the inter-organizational factors, some intra-organizational factors were deemed relevant by the respondents. Mostly, the (undesirable) organisational culture was consequential in the change process. Apart from that, the reorganizations that bevel RWS weren't considered – mainly by the team members - as significant factors in the change process. Though, some senior managers reckon that the reorganizations that started in 2004 with the purpose of centralizing RWS, evidently – regressed RWS ability for customer focus and personalisation. In turn, steadily inciting the need to start with a different type of contract strategy. Moreover, with regards content factor, the seemingly critical stance on the MEAT awarding mechanism appears - from the senior managers' perspectives - to have fuelled the search towards a new DOEN-like contract strategy. Also, some senior managers affirmed the inducement of a contract strategy that was adopted by a (Anglo-Saxon) country; the Early Contractor Involvement. To a lesser, indirect extent – the questionable adaptation of the D&C principles was mentioned, though this seems more related to the organizational culture.

Turning to the role of the leadership, both perspectives accredited the role of the senior management of pivotal significance in the change process. Altogether, the vision of the top management was mainly concerned with the 'improving' the relation between contractors and RWS. Also, the top managers had a strong vision on how public authority and contractor ought to work with each other.

From this, the (predetermined) outcome factor could arguably best be described as value-based outcome factor centring around the trust and collaboration components. At last, all the results from this case have been summarized in Table 4.6. Within this table, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy. So, whenever a factor has a 'double-green', there is a significant likelihood that this particular factor indeed was an notable factor with regard to the change in contract strategy



Table 4.6 - Practical drivers of second case (DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat)

Factor	Level		Team member	Senior manager
<b>Context</b>	Societal	Public paradigms	NPG	NPG
	National	Demographic	'DOEN makes RWS ideally more attractive for young people'	'I need young and fresh people to develop different behaviour'
		Economic	'Economic down-turn hardens relation between the contractor and RWS'	Economic down-turn hardens relation between the contractor and RWS'+ 'Dutch infrastructure market could be completely taken over by foreign contractors'
		Social	'Increasing importance of stakeholder management'	'Proper contract strategy should provide space [to align with social demands]'
		Technical		
		Ecological		
		Political	'Procurement act 2012 was not restricting for RWS'	'Procurement Act 2012: 'You don't have to worry about anything'
	Inter-organizational	Networks	'Reciprocity RWS and different water boards (first Market Vision)'	'Waterboards use of alliance-like contracts'
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	'...much later in the process, but mainly market parties'	'Organization should handle core business internally' + Warning Bouwend Nederland
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	'The old hierarchical relationship was ready for renewal'	'...to just do it differently this time'
		Reorganisations	'More and more links in the process, exacerbate the change process'	'With centralization, you tend to lose personalization'
<b>Content</b>		Contract strategy	'True principles of the D&C contract weren't followed'	MEAT: '...unwanted working culture is encouraged' + ECI model: 'I had quite frequent contact with my English colleague...'
<b>Process</b>		Process of change	Planned + Emergent	Planned + Emergent
<b>Leadership</b>		Role of leadership	Driver + facilitator (Director general + HED Market & Innovation)	Driver + Facilitator (Director general)
		Vision of top management	'The need to restore trust between contractor and contract authority'	'The proper working method precedes a good contract' [DG]
		Changes of Leadership'		
<b>Outcome</b>			Lambda and theta	Lambda and theta

### 4.3.3. Third case: Best Value Approach (Delfland)

#### Team member

Context factor during BVA at Delfland

The results of the interviews appear to underline the importance of the political contextual factor on the national level, a lower proportion the social and ecology factor, and no significant recognizing the economic factor. Starting off with the consideration of the political factors, as respondent G describes; *'Before 2012, you only had the European directives, but from 2012 that European directive was also transformed in Dutch legislation. What was particularly special about this law, was that before; there has been reasonably large space below the tendering threshold. But with the arrival of the Public Procurement Act and also the Proportionality Guide - which was not a law, but was viewed as one - there was much less manoeuvrability before that threshold was reached.* The interviewee continues; *'We had to suddenly argue certain decisions, for example; whether or not to utilize the MEAT award mechanism or keep with the 'lowest price' criteria. Before this, the lowest price was standard for the "Works-department" [the core business of Delfland], but not for 'Deliveries and Services'.* Team member G concludes; *'Though, if you would look at the data, it could already be observed that the MEAT award mechanism was already used much frequent for 'Deliveries and Services, compared to the core tasks of Delfland'.* Also, on the basis of the interview, it seems that ecology and social factors from the team member's perspective had a minimal role, as a team member remark; *'The impact of the social and ecology factors was mostly secondary in the change process'.*

Continuing to the inter-organizational factors, working in a network with RWS – specifically during the High Water Protection Program (HWPP) – appears to have been notable in the process, as team member G recalls; *'RWS, too, had an major task in reforming there organisation and obtain a closer integration with the market parties. On the whole, RWS much further in this process than Delfland. Little by little, though, this similarly became the intention of Delfland.* The interviewee concludes; *'The collaboration with RWS within the HHWP definitely served as inspiration to also start pursuing new contract strategies'.* Moreover, from the interview it appears that knowledge institutes, consultants and consultants had a negligible role in the change process, but much later, as respondent G states *'By having the policy vision and the granted claim on the innovation budget, we did say; if we do it, we're going to do it right. Thereafter we approach some certified consultants that could assist us in the process'.*

Moreover, with regard to the intra-organizational factors, in the interviews it was remarked that the reorganisations from Delfland due to the financial situation was of relevance in the process, as respondent G describes; *'The financial problems were discovered at Delfland in 2010 and at that time, they were technically bankrupt. Eventually, it took several years before there were finally some positive figures again. This resulted in the fact that budget cuts had to be made'.* The respondent continues; *'One of the drivers to adopt the Best Value philosophy was the reason that there was a common believe that this contract strategy could result in lower project costs, and thus expenditures'.* Moreover, organizational culture – specifically with respect to 'professionalizing' the procurement of Delfland – was also noted, as team member G states; *'To portray the general situation, all of the water boards have relatively small purchasing departments, but many of these wanted a more professional purchasing policy, as a large number of them was experiencing similar problems'.* Some background information, several employees from the procurement department of Delfland had applied for an 'Innovation budget' to professionalize the procurement policy and organisation. In light of this, team member G recalls; *'After we received the innovation budget to professionalize the procurement policy, there was general sense that "something truly effective should emerge from this". Hereafter, we started to effectively look for project were the Best Value Approach could be used for'.* In other words, the Best Value Approach was already chosen.

### Content during BVA at Delfland

During the questioning, there didn't appear to be another contract strategy that drove the need to start the new Best Value Approach. One could argue that this could have been the dissatisfaction with 'lowest price' criteria. However, when reading the previous section on the contextual factors, the desire to move away from the 'lowest price criteria' was predominately driven by the passing of the Procurement Act of 2012. For instance, when considering the influence content factors at the second case with DOEN, it can be observed that there was an intrinsic motivation (from the senior manager) to try something different than the MEAT award mechanism without the trigger from new legislation.

### Process of change and the role of the leadership during BVA at Delfland

To start, the role of senior management appears was underlined in the interview, as team member G notes; *'The dike warden (Dutch: Dijkgraaf) had an incredibly strong focus on innovation and always said; "we want to be the most innovative water board". That was a huge motivation, that ultimately gave a lot of incentives to find something new. At that time, the dike warden also focussed on how we should position the procurement department of Delfland. However, it soon became apparent that the ambition of the dike warden was in itself greater than what the purchasing department could achieve. The interviewee continues; 'For me, that was the starting signal to start the professionalization process of the procurement department. We have been working on this for four years, but that initial vision from the top management has given us good sense of direction'. Team member G adds; 'Eventually, the VNG came up with a purchasing policy. Afterwards, some colleagues of mine and myself, in collaboration with someone from the Union of Water Boards - wrote the first procurement policy for all of the water boards. Essentially, we translated the most recent coalition agreement and Delfland's policy vision in this professional and uniform procurement policy. However, that procurement policy was still rather abstract and had to be further concretized. At this point in time, the decision was made that Delfland should use more innovative contract strategies'. The interviewee concludes; 'From this, the decision to adopt the Best Value Approach essentially arose'. Notable in the search for more innovative contract strategies was the involvement of the market, as team member G remarked; 'Information for possible innovation should mainly come from the market parties'. In terms of the process of change, a respondent explains; 'The vision is set out by the board and department below thereafter works towards reaching that vision'. Another noteworthy factor regarding the process of change, was the supposed resistance from the project department. Team member G notes; 'Initially, the search for a new contract strategy was examined at various levels. But, from the start, the project department had a bit more trouble with the ambition of the top management'. Later in the interview, this is being linked back to the organizational culture, when the team member states 'I do recognize the family culture, but also a very traditional culture wherein little innovation took place. That's why I think opting for innovation was such a high aspiration; not just to act differently – but to think differently as well'.*

### Outcome factor during BVA at Delfland

From the previous section, the main outcome driver became quite clear; increasing innovation. Or in the words of the dike warden *'Become the most innovative water board'*. That was confirmed by the team members. Besides this factor, some economic values also appears to be discussed in the change process, as team member G remarks; *'We ourselves had the idea that by adopting the Best Value approach, the whole process would become faster and above all; cheaper. The latter in particular had to do with budget deficits [technical bankruptcy in 2012], so that trigger was certainly there'*.

In summary, the outline of the above mentioned results is depicted in Table 4.7. For this table, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy.

Table 4.7 - Practical drivers of third case according to the team members (BVA at Delfland)

Factor			Team member	
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	NPM	
		National	Demographic	
			Economic	
			Social	'Increasing stakeholder management was a secondary factor'
			Technical	
		Ecological	'Ecological factors were secondary factors'	
		Political	Procurement Act 2012: 'There was much less manoeuvrability before the [MEAT] threshold was reached'	
	Inter-organizational	Networks	The collaboration with RWS within the HHWP definitely served as inspiration to also start pursuing new contract strategies'	
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	'[Consultants] only in a much later stage'	
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	'We wanted a more professional purchasing policy'	
Reorganisations		Financially bankrupt: 'The Best Value Approach could result in lower project costs and thus expenditures'		
Content		Contract strategy		
Process		Process of change	Emergent	
Leadership		Role of leadership	Driver + Facilitator (Dike warden)	
		Vision of top management	'Dike warden: Most innovative water board'	
		Changes of Leadership'		
Outcome			'... the whole process would become faster and above all; cheaper' + 'Innovation should be increased'	

### Senior manager

Context factor during BVA at Delfland

During the interviews, the influence of several contextual factors on the national level have been questioned. Where the demographic and social factors were deemed irrelevant, and the ecological factor inconsiderable - it appeared that the political factor was the most prominent of all, senior manager I affirms; 'If the Procurement Act of 2012 had not been introduced, the Best Value Approach would probably never have been introduced'. The interviewee substantiated this further by stating 'Until 2012, the Water Boards tried to hold off the implementation of the MEAT criteria in their organisations – mainly for concerns regarding the a priori formulation of functional awarding criteria and the quality issues that potentially resulted from those. After all, how can one describe a priori the 'quality' that will still be 'satisfactory' in 75/100/150 years. More still, if one can do so, what would be the control mechanisms, for instance, with respect to biodiversity?'. Respondent I continues 'After the Procurement Act of 2012, the procurement departments started demanding – by making us of the requisite pre-advise principle that was stated in the Proportionality Guide – that the MEAT award mechanism should be followed. Thus an effort was made to use the UAV-GC 2005, but that did not work either. The respondent concludes; 'After a lengthy, the Best Value Approach was brought forward'. Another political, seemed to be the introduction of the (political) party system at the water boards in 2008. Respondent I remarks 'The introduction of the party system politized the executive committee. In my opinion, this changes the subject matter of the board meetings, as instead of adopting a technical lens on certain matters, political framing became more apparent. The interviewee concludes; 'Therefore, I personally always have been of the believe that this eventually enabled the sizeable shift towards completely different contract strategies possible'. Lastly, interviewee H notes; 'The urgency and complexity of the Climate Agreement did, to an extent, drove the water boards to establish a uniform contract strategy. As a director from a water board once told me; "If the exigency of the external factors becomes to pressing, we are forced as water boards to work together".

Moving on the inter-organizational factors, senior manager I did mentioned the influence of RWS, stating; *'On a certain point in time, the eyes shifted to RWS as a source of inspiration, considering they already had experience with legislation affecting their contract strategy'*. The interviewee adds; *'As an organisation, you don't want to reinvent the wheel. Moreover, the success of the Urgent Approach Roads of RWS in 2008 didn't stay unnoticed. They even won the innovation price for that program'*. Lastly, the senior managers confirm that no scholars or consultants – besides Kashiwagi himself – were involved in the early stages of the change process.

At last, with concern to the effects of the intra-organizational, none were recognized by the senior managers as significant factors in the change process.

#### Content factor during BVA at Delfland

From the paragraph it can already be observed that the hesitance towards compulsorily adopting EMVI – and perhaps the UAV-GC 2005 as a whole – fuelled the change towards the Best Value Approach. Repeating the comment of senior manager I made earlier; *'... how can one describe a priori the 'quality' that will still be 'satisfactory' in 75/100/150 years. More still, if one can do so, what would be the control mechanisms, for instance, with respect to biodiversity?'*. Potential influences of other contract strategies were deemed irrelevant. Besides, of course, the Best Value Approach that was earlier executed by RWS for their Urgent Approach Roads project.

#### Process of change and role of leadership during BVA at Delfland

On the account of the team member's perception, the process of change seemed already quite clear. However, the missing link was by whose virtue the team members were introduced to the Best Value Approach. Luckily, senior manager I could answer that, stating; *'Early on in the build-up of the Best Value Approach in The Netherlands, I was already personally closely involved in the process and via me, the Best Value Approach has been introduced at Delfland'*. Interviewee H adds; *'Although the executive committee members are increasingly professional administrators, the innovative ideas of a water board often emerge bottom-up. Heads of departments – for example those of Market and Strategy – come up with certain things, whereafter the board can vote on these things. It almost never happens that the board comes up with a visionary idea of its own accord'*. Interviewee H adds to this; *'More often than not, the civil service set out the main lines, in which the general director has the leading role. Though, as a general director you could, for example, set a dot at the horizon. However, you need money for this idea and that again is determined by the executive commission'*. Respondent I underlines the point that *'the dike ward at the time indeed had a strong opinion concerning the path Delfland should take'*. Moreover, an anecdote from an interviewee that illustrates the disagreement around that time *'Many administrators felt that we should also let the market take its course and outsource as much as possible. "Back to the core tasks" was always shouted. In contrast, many people who previously worked at RWS during the reorganisation rounds – generally older personnel – said that; "No, we should try to hold on to that knowledge". So, in any regard, there were plenty of disagreements'*.

#### Outcome factor during BVA at Delfland

The economic values as (predetermined) outcome factors that were mentioned by the team member, are recognized less from the senior managers' perspective. The senior managers do add another interesting point concerning the exact reason why specifically the Best Value Approach was chosen and that for the reason that *'we did had a substantial innovation budget, but we ran into trouble with the former procurement policy. Mainly because of the following dilemma; to what extent can you truly innovate, if – according to the procurement policy - you have to know everything in advance? Of course, this is a simplification, but this was essentially what we experienced. Because of this, we started looking for new innovative contract strategies, that ultimately led to adopting the Best Value Approach'*.

In sum, the findings from the primary data collection concerning the senior members – are listed in Table 4.8. For this table, What is more, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy.

Table 4.8 - Practical drivers of third case according to the senior members (BVA at Delfland)

Factor			Senior manager	
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	/	
		National	Demographic	
			Economic	
			Social	'Although the network society was evolving, it was irrelevant for this change process'
			Technical	
			Ecological	'Urgence and complexity of the Climate Agreement drove uniform contract strategy'
		Political	'If the Procurement Act of 2012 had not been introduced, the Best Value Approach would probably never have been introduced' + Introduction Party system: "... eventually enabled the sizeable shift towards completely different contract strategies possible'	
	Inter-organizational	Networks	'The success of the Urgent Approach Roads of RWS didn't stay unnoticed'	
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	'No consultancies were approached early in the process'	
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture		
		Reorganisations	Introduction Party system: "... eventually enabled the sizeable shift towards completely different contract strategies possible'	
Content		Contract strategy	MEAT: '.... how can one describe a priori the "quality"?'	
Process		Process of change	Planned + Emergent	
Leadership		Role of leadership	Driver + Facilitator (Dike warden)	
		Vision of top management	'Most innovative water board' (Dike Warden)	
		Changes of Leadership'		
Outcome			Innovation	

### Conclusion

In summary, beginning with the contextual factors on the national, the demographic, social, and ecological appear to have been irrelevant in the change process. The indirect influence of the ecological factor was remarked by a senior manager, but appears inconsequential for the start of the Best Value Approach. Leaving only the political factors, that appears to be highly relevant. More still, even imperative according to one senior manager. When it comes to the inter-organizational factors, the influence of RWS seem to have meaningful in the change process. Though, the team members emphasize the High Water Protection Program, but from the senior managers' perspective the success of the Urgent Approach Roads was deemed more relevant. Moreover, with concern to the intra-organizational factors, there was some divergence in the results. To clarify, the team member highlighted the organizational culture as an significant factor, whereas the senior managers didn't seem to recognize this. The budget-cuts mentioned by the team members, didn't become apparent in the interviews with the senior managers. A similar phenomenon occurred in relation to defining the significance of the introduction of the party system, but vice versa. In addition, in respect of the content factor, the senior managers specifically stated the initial hesitance in adopting the MEAT award mechanism (enforced by the Procurement Act of 2012) was a significant driver to continue the search to an alternative. Moving on to the process of change factor, after having reviewed the results of the interviews, it appears that both function descriptions depict little importance to the role of scholar and consultants – besides the influence of Kashiwagi. Drawing the attention to the role of the leadership, the strong opinion of the dike warden ('Most innovative water board') was mentioned in the majority of the interviews. Lastly, with concern to the (predetermined) outcome factors- next to the 'innovation'-aspirations of the dike warden – the team members emphasize the economic values, whereas the senior managers mainly highlight the conditions that are imperative when one is truly innovating. Taking everything into account, all the

results from this case have been summarized in Table 4.9. In this, the degree of influence is depicted via a three-color system. Red states that the influence of the factor was deemed by the research participant as irrelevant or minimal. Further, yellow states an average influence by this factor, where factors with a green shade - in the perception of the interviewees – was a considerable factor for the change in contract strategy. That is to say, whenever a factor has a 'double-green' - there is a significant likelihood that this particular factor indeed was an notable factor with regard to the change in contract strategy.

Table 4.9 - Practical drivers of third case (BVA at Delfland)

Factor			Team member	Senior manager
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	NPM	/
	National	Demographic		
		Economic		
		Social	<i>'Increasing stakeholder management was a secondary factor'</i>	<i>'Although the network society was evolving, it was irrelevant for this change process'</i>
		Technical		
		Ecological	<i>'Ecological factors were secondary factors'</i>	<i>'Urgence and complexity of the Climate Agreement drove uniform contract strategy'</i>
		Political	<i>Procurement Act 2012: 'There was much less manoeuvrability before the [MEAT] threshold was reached'</i>	<i>'If the Procurement Act of 2012 had not been introduced, the Best Value Approach would probably never have been introduced' + Introduction Party system: "... eventually enabled the sizeable shift towards completely different contract strategies possible'</i>
	Inter-organizational	Networks	<i>The collaboration with RWS within the HHWP definitely served as inspiration to also start pursuing new contract strategies'</i>	<i>'The success of the Urgent Approach Roads of RWS didn't stay unnoticed'</i>
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	<i>'[Consultants] only in a much later stage'</i>	<i>'No consultancies were approached early in the process'</i>
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	<i>"We wanted a more professional purchasing policy'</i>	
		Reorganisations	<i>Financially bankrupt: 'The Best Value Approach could result in lower project costs and thus expenditures'</i>	<i>Introduction Party system: "... eventually enabled the sizeable shift towards completely different contract strategies possible'</i>
Content		Contract strategy		<i>MEAT: '... how can one describe a priori the "quality"?''</i>
Process		Process of change	<i>Planned + Emergent</i>	<i>Planned + Emergent</i>
Leadership		Role of leadership	<i>Driver + Facilitator (Dike warden)</i>	<i>Driver + Facilitator (Dike warden)</i>
		Vision of top management	<i>"Dike warden: Most innovative water board"</i>	<i>"Dike warden: Most innovative water board"</i>
		Changes of Leadership'		
Outcome			<i>Sigma value</i>	<i>Innovation</i>

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Table 4.10 – Results of three cases with regards to the practical drivers

Factor	Case 1: BVA at RWS			Case 2: DOEN at RWS			Case 1: BVA at Delfland		
	TM	MI	MI	TM	MI	MI	TM	MI	MI
<b>Context</b>	NPM	NPM → NPG	NPM	NPG	NPG	NPG	NPM	NPM	/
	Public paradigms								
	National								
<b>Content</b>	Integrated contracts			D&C		MEAT			MEAT
<b>Process</b>	Planned + Emergent			Planned + Emergent			Planned + Emergent		
<b>Leadership</b>	Driver + facilitator			Driver + facilitator		Driver + facilitator	Facilitator		Facilitator
<b>Outcome</b>	Sigma			Lambda and theta		Lambda and theta	Sigma + innovation		Innovation

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#### 4.4. Conclusion: Answering third sub question

To begin with reiterating the purpose of this chapter; discovering the driving factors that were recognized in practise by public authorities that ultimately resulted in a change in their contract strategy. By means of conducting semi-structured interviews, primary data could be obtained with regards to the three cases from the previous chapter. On the whole, considering the use of the theoretical framework of Kuipers et al. (2014), the data categories for this inquiry will be concept-driven and accordingly; the results of the cases were ordered among the five change management factors. To be precise; the context factors, content factor, process of change, role of the leadership, and the outcome factor. In view of this, the findings from the primary data collection method will forthwith be consecutively presented by adhering to this framework. Finally, with concern to the data quality issues for the collection method, both the perspectives of team members as well as senior managers were collected. In any regard, when reviewing the primary data from the three cases above, numerous findings were produced. To start with the most general finding, the perspectives of the team members and the senior managers seems to be relatively consistent. Besides some minor differences, the presumed influence concerning the five factors was per case comparable, thereby promising an acceptable amount of generalisation. What is more, in constructing a more considered analysis; the contextual factors on the national level proofed reasonably significant in the processes of change. Largely, the economic and political factor were mentioned most often as a driving factor, and thereafter the social factor. The demographic, ecological and technical factor were deemed relatively insignificant by both perspectives. What is more, the inter-organizational factors – more specifically the reciprocity that arose from working in networks with other public organisation – was frequently used, particularly in the second and third case. More still, when reviewing the results with respect to the influence of the knowledge institutes, consultancies and think tanks – these parties apparently didn't take on a considerable role in the change process. By the same token, the intra-organizational factors are repeatedly acknowledged as notable factor in the change process, especially the dissatisfaction with the organisational culture. What is more, the content of change factor was predominately deemed important by senior managers and less so with team members. Other than that, the process of change is comparatively similar between all cases; all being a combination of a planned and emergent process of change. Yet, with respect to the leadership factor, the role the top management was (implicitly) recognized by all function descriptions and within all cases as a notable role in the change process. In the majority of the case, the leadership was mainly described as a combination of a driving and a facilitating role. Lastly, the (predetermined) outcome factors differed reasonable between the three case. Here, the results show that team members' perspective is generally more concerned with economic values, whereas the senior managers place greater emphasis on the trust, collaboration, and innovation component. In conclusion, from all of the five factors, the influence of the leadership factor on the process of changes was, on average – the most considerable. Followed by the political and economic context factors and the outcome factor. Finally, the compressed version of the cross-case Table 4.10, showing the combined average of the practical drivers – illustrated in Table 4.11.

Table 4.11 – Average influence of the practical drivers

Factor			Practical drivers
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	
	National	Demographic	
		Economic	
		Social	
		Technical	
		Ecological	
		Political	
	Inter-organizational	Networks	
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	
		Reorganisations	
Content		Contract strategy	
Process		Process of change	<i>Planned + Emergent</i>
Leadership		Role of leadership	
		Vision of top management	
		Changes of Leadership'	
Outcome			

## Chapter 5 | Analysis: Patterns between theoretical and practical drivers

The purpose of this chapter is identifying patterns between the theoretical drivers and the practical drivers of public organisations to change their contract strategy. For this, comparing per case - the secondary data from the document analysis with the primary data obtained from the semi-structured interviews. Thereby, in due course - finding an answer to the fourth sub question. Before this, it should be reiterated that the theoretical drivers were initially obtained on basis of the indications from the meta-analysis of Kuipers et al. (2014). What is more, with concern to the reading guide of the three (individual) analysis, for consistent purposes - every sub analysis will be structured on the basis of the concept-driven approach. Concretely, this entails that the five change management from Kuipers et al. (2014) will subtly form the structure of each analysis. In which case, each case starts with the (four levels of) contextual factors, thereafter covering the content factors, subsequently discussing the process of change, then the role of the leadership, and lastly considering the outcome factor. More specifically, concerning the reasoning of the (sub) analysis, firstly, the foremost drivers according to the interviewees will be reconsidered and summarized. Thereafter, assessing if the apparent significance of these drivers match with the plausibility level of the theoretical drivers. Then, equally important, reviewing the factors that were largely deemed irrelevant by the interviewees, but on the basis of the theoretical findings - were estimated to be probable. Lastly, by reasoning of these two findings - a (sub) inference will be made with regards to the applicability of the correlation from the meta-analysis of Kuipers et al. (2014). After all three analysis are completed, a final conclusion will be presented at the end of this chapter. By doing so, providing an answer to the fourth sub question. On final note, a quick mentioning with regard to the contextual factors on the societal level. That is, the implicit influence of the public paradigms. Here for, referring to the simplified description of public paradigms according to Hartley et al. (2002), - '*public paradigms are the model and menus that shape, constrain and facilitate structures and actions at lower levels*'. Alternatively put, one cannot discuss the hallmarks of the paradigms without already discussing the contextual factors on the lower levels. Which are; the national, inter-organizational, and intra-organizational levels. In view of this, in an effort to avoid redundancy, each analysis will end with examining the influence of the societal contextual factors. Instead of discussing it at the beginning of each (sub) analysis.

### 5.1. First case: Best Value Approach (RWS)

When comparing the results from this case to the theory, a few observation can be made in relation to the five change management factors. To begin with the observations in relation to the contextual factors on the national level. From both the perspectives, it became clear that the conjunction of a political and an economic factor initially triggered the change process. To clarify, at the outset of the change; the eminent ambitions of the former minister of Infrastructure and Water State to show some results in his cabinet period. Consequently, this increased the political pressure on RWS. Concurrently, the economic state of affairs resulted in the phenomenon that the portfolios from the market parties were completely full. These two events were in incongruity with the existing contract strategies as thus '*a new contract strategy had to be devised where a many projects could be procured within a short amount of time*'. In turn, both the *Booming economy* and the *political interference* were recognized on the basis of the document analysis as plausible drivers. Just as interesting is the apparent absence of the majority of national (external) factors in the change process that were deemed plausible on the basis of the documents analysis. To start, with the political factors; the *construction fraud* wasn't recognized by the senior manager as '*the Best Value Approach wasn't necessary needed to overcome the aftereffects of the parliamentary inquiry in 2002/2003*'. What is more, the '*uncertainty concerning the continuation of RWS*' and the '*politically-embedded trust issues*' mentioned by the team member, were also discredited by the senior managers. More still, political factors as for example the *Flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPP* and the *Far-reaching privatization* were completely discerned by both functions. Further, none of the changes in legislations, such as the introduction of the *European Directive 2004/24/EU* - were found considerable. With regards to the economic factors, besides the *booming economy* - the *Lehman crisis* and the *Competitive position of The Netherlands* weren't perceived by the two functions as considerable factors. Meaning that, with regards to the BVA, the supposed impactful report of the commission Wijffels that in 2004 sounded the alarm for 'more innovation' in the infrastructure sector was disclaimed as a significant factor. Further still, essentially all of the social factors - three mentioned in the interviews - weren't perceived as notable factors. From the perspective of the senior member; '*Best*

*Value was socially (in terms of stakeholders) a risk, not a solution*'. Also, the demographic factor (*the shortage on the labour market*) and the technological factor (*start of TenderNed in 2004*) were renounced as considerable factors. Concludingly, with regard to the start of BVA, a significant absence of theoretical national contextual factors can be observed. Essentially, from the 14 plausible theoretical drivers, only two proofed according to the interviewees of significance. In this, from the meta-analysis, only the changes in competitive pressure (A. D. Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990) and political involvement (Weissert & Goggin, 2002) were applicable for this case.

Moving on to the inter-organizational factors, the focus seemed to be primarily on the intra-organizational management, meaning the influence of working in networks with other public organisations was largely deemed absent. In the words of a senior manager; *'Rijkswaterstaat was, especially at that time, leading the way in terms of innovative contract strategies and the rest [of the public organisations] would mostly follow'*. Alternatively stated, national programs such as the 'High Water Protection Program' or 'Space for the River' programs were largely deemed irrelevant by the respondents on the start of the Best Value Approach. Thereby, the statement of Downe et al. (2004) that *participation in networks shapes the context of the change in which the organization is an actor*, cannot be proven via the results of the interviews. What is more, the influence of knowledge institutes such as the PSiBouw (2003), PIANOo (2004), RegieRaad Bouw (2005) appear to not have influenced the change process. Lastly, as was similarly established in the document analysis, consultancies and think tanks were less important in the change process. Apart from the expected influence of Kashiwagi himself. Concludingly, the overall influence of the inter-organizational contextual factor on the change process was deemed insignificant. When comparing this to the theory, though the late involvement of academics was observed by Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) - both authors also argued for the strong influence of consultants and think tanks, which was not observed in this case.

Furthermore, with respect to the intra-organizational factors, these would from the documents analysis and the meta-analysis initially appear to be considerable in the change process. Starting with the reorganisations, at the outset - the influence of the *lay-offs*, the *realignment from the regional and national services*, the *new Expertise Centre Commissioning*, and the *start of triumvirate* were considered plausible drivers for the start of BVA at Rijkswaterstaat. For instance, the reoccurring lay-offs - closely related to the aftereffects from the Remkes Arrangement in 2004 that resulted in the fact that employees had to increase their productivity by 30% (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008) - weren't seen as significant factor. In fact, quite the contrary, when considering the following statement of a team member; *'There was an hour stop at Rijkswaterstaat, but it had simply been cancelled for the Urgent Approach Roads'*. With respect to other reorganization, such as the centralisation of the procurement department - that was noted by senior managers as largely inconsiderable for the start of the Best Value Approach. What was remarked from the senior management perspective, however, was the influence of the centralization of the *project* department on the process. By way of; *'The Head Engineer Director (HED) from the newly establishment of the national department Infrastructure Services (IS) wanted RWS to adopt a more centrally-focus attitude. As it turned out, the Best Value Approach fitted better with the centralization of the project management, compared to the centralization of the procurement department'*. Though, this relates more to the leadership factor that will be discussed shortly. In addition, in terms of the driving role of a (undesirable) organizational culture; this was according to the respondents mostly secondary. Though, a senior manager mentioned that *'The Best Value Approach would encourage to break the "we-know-it-better" tradition of RWS'*. Thus, the plausible aspiration obtained in the document analysis to *move away from the island-culture* was, by and large - not recognized by the respondents. Thereby, the remarks from the meta-analysis that organizational culture (Holt et al., 2007) and reorganizations (G. A. Boyne, 2006) can affect changes at public organisations - doesn't seem to apply for this particular case.

Next in line is the influence of the content factor. To start, two plausible content factor that could have drove the decision to initiate the BVA at Rijkswaterstaat were *Integrated contracts (DBFM)*, the *competitive dialogue procedure*, and the *MEAT awarding mechanism*. Where the shift from the 'lowest-price'-criteria towards the MEAT award mechanism was recognized from the team member's perspective. Stating that; *'The adoption of the MEAT system at RWS earlier did ease the implementation process of the Best Value Approach, as the organisation was already used to the partially awarding on tender on the 'quality' aspect'*. This was not confirmed from the senior management perspective. Thus, the influence of the MEAT award mechanism can be seen as a secondary factor in the change process. A similar conclusion can be made with concern to the steadily increasing usage of negotiation and competitive dialogue procedures from the 2000 onwards. Theoretically speaking, this would have made RWS more acquainted with the use of dialogue forms of procurement methods. But, again, in the interviews this wasn't recognized as a considerable factor of influence. Also, the *rise of integrated contracts* was by neither function recognized as a direct driver for the change process.

Moving on to the process of change, on the basis of the primary data – it can be concluded that the start of the Best Value Approach at RWS came about via ‘bottom-up’ initiative. In view of the fact, there was no nation-wide effort from political leaders to institutionalize the BVA model in the public sector. Instead, the role of the administrative leadership was more visible. Thus, this process is different then, for example, the initiation of the D&C and DBFM model - where political leader (the Ministry of Finance) heavily pushed their ideas in a top-down fashion. Although, the ambitious minister can be seen as a direct trigger in the process of change, the objective was not precisely formulated in advance. Such as was the case with the D&C and the DBFM mode. By thus, the lack of political leadership for the start of the Best Value Approach at RWS is in line with the findings from Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) which state that - changes in consensus-based systems such as the Netherlands are often bottom-up innovations, involving informal and voluntary reform cooperation, where their major driving forces are administrations themselves. Lastly, within the Rijkswaterstaat, the process of change should be seen as a combination between a planned and emergent process. Firstly, resembling a planned process in the sense that it was clearly initiated by the top management executives and that communication about the vision of change was mainly top-down. Essentially, the concrete change objective was set for a shorter procurement procedure. Next to that, the process of change also had some of the incremental character and the absence of a-priori highly specified formulated change objectives. Considering that after the initiation of the top management, the content of change was mainly formed by active employees (or team members).

In terms of the leadership factor, Kuipers et al. (2014) already argued that the leadership factor was an important factor to consider in the change process. Despite that, little evidence of this factor could be found in the document analysis that proofed a direct influence of members of the top management. Mainly, as the BVA was rarely mentioned in public and strategic document. Thereby initially questioning the overall significance on the role of top management on the start of the BVA. Nonetheless from the primary data, from both perspectives – it was noted that the senior management had both a (initial) driving role, whereafter it became more facilitating. At this point, in order to understand the exact roles of the (individual) leaders, the process of change concerning the start of BVA at Rijkswaterstaat should be cut into two phases. At first, a member from the senior management – the HED Bouwdienst – mainly undertook a driving role. Already, the HED Bouwdienst was inspired by the dogma of the former director general (Market, unless..) and was looking for new contract strategies that fitted that dogma. Then, as remarked by a team member; *‘The HED of the Bouwdienst became inspired by the concept of the Best Value Approach by Kashiwagi himself, when Kashiwagi gave a lecture for several important directors around 2005. And told me to investigate the concept further’*. Thus, the HED Bouwdienst (pro-actively) send some employees to the U.S.A. in 2005, in order to get acquainted with that contract strategy. Though, when this team member eventually came back, little was done with the new contract strategy. As the team member describes; *‘Before the Urgent Approach Roads, in 2005, I tried to pitch the idea [Best Value Approach] at several Head Engineer Directors (HEDs), but nobody saw fit for the Best Value Approach’*. After this, roughly two years had to go by before the second phase of the process started. That is, the Urgent Approach program was announced. As a team member explains; *‘Eventually, [after pitching the idea of the BVA, the [new] HED of IS trusted our idea and gave permission to concretize the new contract strategy, otherwise it would probably never happened’*. Subsequently, the employees from the procurement department concretized the actual content of the Best Value Approach. Illustrating how the HED of IS primarily had a facilitating role, instigating the active participants in the change process (Russ, 2008). Thus, the change of a member from the senior management was a critical factor in the process. Though, the change of CFO, that was deemed a less plausible factor – wasn’t recognized. Furthermore, with regard to the vision of the leadership, this differed between the two leaders (HED Bouwdienst and HED IS). The vision of the HED Bouwdienst already became apparent, this was in correspondence with that of the former DG. However, the (facilitating) vision of the HED IS was different. How the senior manager phrases it; *‘Securing and maintaining the trust component in the collaboration with the market party was quite important’*. And *‘Personally, I think that without that relational aspect, more of the Urgent Approach Roads projects would have failed’*. Extendedly due to his belief system, the Best Value Approach appears to have been modified from its traditional scheme. Lastly, the vision of the former DG (Market, unless..) proofed of significance in the process. Essentially, this vision started the entire process. In conclusion, all of these citations show that the personal believe system of the (individual) senior management appear to have been of considerable factor in the process of change. This is also recognized in theory were the importance of top management support for a change initiative is often highlighted (Holt et al., 2007). Strikingly, however, when reviewing the literature on leadership - the main attention is focused on the roles, activities and behaviours of individuals, rather than an orientation that highlights the personality, character or traits of the leader (Burke, 2017). Rather, attention seems to be given to the different types of leadership, such as distributed, shared, or team leadership (Jackson & Parry, 2011).

Furthermore, with concern to the fifth change management factor (the outcome of change), the emphasis – from the team members perspective – appeared to be primarily on the service inputs and output. That is to say, concretely, promising to shorten procurement procedure (time) and lowering transaction costs (money). When comparing this to the three groups of values, these correspond with the sigma-value. Essentially keeping 'Keeping it lean and purposeful' where the standard of success is frugality. This corresponds with the theoretical output factor that was established on the basis on the document analysis, where the focus was on frugal (transactional) process, emphasis on running services within given parameters, and obtaining clear accountability. However, the outcome factor of the senior manager (HED of IS) proofed to differ from the theoretical expectation. As, besides the time component – both values with regards to safety and (relational) collaboration were mentioned as driving factors. Here, the focus on the safety component can largely be observed in the lambda value. That is, 'keeping it robust' and where the standard of success is resilience. With concern to the relational collaboration component, these mostly fall in line with the theta value. Particularly recognizable in the 'mutuality' as a standard for success.

After having considered all of the factors mentioned above, the implicit influence of the public paradigms can be discussed. First and foremost, however, it remains difficult and perhaps inconceivable for a master thesis to exactly determine the influence of these paradigms. Where a case could be made for the theoretical influence, it proofed difficult to obtain concrete proof of this during the primary data collection. Hence, an exact analysis cannot be made. Nonetheless, some global observation can be established. Primarily with concern to the focus, the emphasis, and the governance mechanism that Rijkswaterstaat utilized at the time. Ultimately, the output of the team members' and the senior managements' perspectives showcase that around the start of the BVA – both the NPM and NPG to have been influential. To start, from the interviews, it was attained that Rijkswaterstaat had a mainly intra-organizational focus. With seemingly, little influence of other (semi-) public organisations. Therein, leaning towards the NPM paradigm. Though, in terms of the emphasis, aspects from both paradigms are recognizable. To clarify, although the team member's perspective was mainly concerned with the output control. That is, lowering transaction costs and shortening the procurement procedure via the use of a transactional process. The senior manager, however – placed a greater emphasis on the relational components of the process. These emphases comes together in the Rijkswaterstaat interpretation of the BVA. A combination of contractual and relational components as their resource allocation mechanism, that can be recognized in the theoretical roots of both the new public management as the new public governance paradigm.

At last, an overview of the theoretical drivers and the practical drivers is provided in the table on the next page. Within this table, a four-color system is used. Though, those colours illustrate a different unity, depending if they are depicted in the theoretical driver column or the practical drivers column. For the practical drivers, the colour schema illustrates the degree of influence according to the interviewees. Where, red reveals that the influence of the factor was deemed irrelevant or minimal by the research participant. Yellow states an average influence and a factor with a green shade was a regarded as a considerable factor in the process of the change. However, for the theoretical drivers – the colours showcase the degree of plausibility. As these factors were already obtained prior to the interviews. Regardless, red is deemed unlikely to be influential, orange is deemed less plausible, green is deemed plausible, and lastly; grey is indeterminate.

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Factor		Practical		Theoretical
<b>Context</b>	Societal	Team member	Senior manager	
	National	NPM and NPG	NPM and NPG	NPM and NPG
	Economic	Booming economy	Booming economy (+ Traffic jam costs)	Shortage on labour market
	Social	'Best Value was socially (in terms of stakeholders) a risk, not a solution'		Lehman crisis + Competitive position of The Netherlands + Booming economy
	Technical			Decreasing institutional trust of the public + Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation + transition towards a network society
	Ecological			TenderNet
	Political	Ambitious minister + decreasing political trust in RWS + Construction fraud + Privatisation RWS	Ambitious minister	/
	Inter-organizational		'RWS was at that time leading the way and the sector would mainly follow'	Flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPP + Far-reaching privatization + Dwindling authority and political interference + Parliamentary Survey 2002/2003 + European Directive 2003/2004
	Intra-organizational	Kashiwagi	Kashiwagi	'Space for the River'-program + RegieRaad Bouw + PIANOo + PSiBouw
	Reorganisations	Hour-stop was cancelled for the Urgent Approach Roads'	BVA encourage to break that [the Rijkswaterstaat-knows-best tradition']	Kashiwagi
<b>Content</b>	Contract strategy	Rise of integrated contracts	Centralisation project department	Moving away from 'Island-culture'
<b>Process</b>	Process of change	Planned + Emergent	BVA not a solution for a particular problem we had	Lay-offs + Realignment from the regional and national services + New Expertise Centre Commissioning + Start of triumvirate
<b>Leadership</b>	Role of leadership	Driver + Facilitator (HED Bouwdienst + HED IS)	Driver + Facilitator (HED Bouwdienst + HED Bouwdienst + HED IS)	Integrated contracts (DBFM) + Competitive Dialogue + MEAT awarding mechanism
	Vision of top management	Director general + HED Bouwdienst + HED IS	Director general + HED Bouwdienst + HED IS	Unknown
	Changes	new HED of IS		Unknown
<b>Outcome</b>		Sigma, Lambda, Theta	Lambda and theta	BVA rarely mentioned in strategic documents
				Individual change of CFO
				Sigma value: Output control (frugal)

## 5.2. Second case: DOEN philosophy (RWS)

When reviewing the results from both perspective, several observation can be formed with regards to the change management factors. First and foremost, where for the previous process of the BVA, the conjunction of two national factors evidently commenced the start of the BVA. For the second case, the conclusion is less apparent. Though, the economic and social were seemingly the most important factors that triggered the start of the DOEN contract strategy. To start with the economic factors, both the team members and the senior managers underlined the importance of the economic state at that time. However, there is a subtle difference between the remarks from the team member and that of the senior manager. The latter did reaffirm the increasing unpleasant working culture in economic down turns, leading to lawsuits and uptight relationship between client and contractor. However, the senior manager was also notably concerned with the bigger picture that eventually would result from the economic downturn. That in the words of the senior manager; *'...if you don't watch out [as RWS], you'll end up with nothing'*. This aspect can be recognized in the cost-plus financial system that Project DOEN advocate, the percentage for the overhead cost are 8% and the profit percentage is 5% (DOEN, 2017). Considerably high, compared to a roughly averaged percentage of 2,5% from 2005 to 2017 (Visser & Bolt, 2019). When taking in consideration the theoretical drivers that were deemed the most plausible, all of the three economic factors can be recognized. These were the *entrepreneurial state*, the *economic crisis*, the *competitive position of The Netherlands*. What is more, with respect to the social factors – all of the three plausible social factors were confirmed by the respondents. For instance, a team members states that; *'Generally speaking, the increasing importance of stakeholder management - combined with the phenomenon that these stakeholders tend to become more vocal - was a key driver for DOEN'*. Aspects that were already recognized when reviewing the DOEN model, where RWS recognises that the wishes of the client are not purely theirs to determine. Instead, RWS also invites the contractor to establish the genuine wishes of the client. This finding corresponds with the statement of By and Macleod (2009), remarking that social complexity can be seen as a relevant contextual characteristic of a public organization. Continuing to the overall significance of the demographic factor. Where the team members stated that *attracting younger employees* to Rijkswaterstaat was an notable driver to start with DOEN. From the perspective of the senior managers, however - the utilization of young people to compose the DOEN philosophy appears to have been mainly a mean to achieve the goal. Next to these factors, some other national factors that were deemed as plausible drivers – were not accredited. For instance, the second demographic (*Aging workforce*) was not perceived as a primary drivers. Also, all of the political factors were deemed insignificant by the interviewees. For instance, the primary data showed that the two plausible legislative factors, the Spatial Planning Act and the updated Procurement Act – were not important for the start of DOEN. Here, the new Procurement Act was deemed 'not restricting for Rijkswaterstaat' by the respondents. Where a senior member adds; *'... and even if it was, I told the employees that they could cross it'*. Lastly, the respondent were not familiar with concept of the representative democracy, excluding that as a driving factor. Overall, the lack of notable political factors is surprisingly. That said, the political aftereffects of the construction fraud were recognized by both perspectives as a considerable driver. However, when reviewing the results closely, it can be observed that not necessarily the construction fraud itself, but rather the (distrusting) organizational culture that resulted from the construction fraud arguably seems the most notable driver. This will be discussed in the intra-organizational factors. Lastly, with concern to the ecological factors, though it was deemed plausible that DOEN was a reaction of the new ecological role Rijkswaterstaat was appointed – no ecological factors were mentioned by the respondents. Questioning their overall relevance. On the whole, when reviewing the influence of the national contextual factors, it appears that comparatively little contextual factors on the national level where recognized. Deriving from this, the general influence from Rijkswaterstaat's strategic departments – such as the 'Strategic Explorations' with their 'Early-warning system' – don't appear to have been a direct source of input. As a significant portion of the national factors in the DESTEP, came from their published documents.

Moving on to the influence of the inter-organizational factors, during the primary data collection - it was found that Rijkswaterstaat was inspired by different public organisations when starting with the DOEN contract strategy, Specifically the water boards were mentioned frequently, as a team member remarked; *'there was considerable reciprocity between the board of RWS and the boards of the different water boards. That were, in turn, working on their first Market Vision'*. This was also deemed plausible from the document analyse, were numerous sources stated that the collaboration between Delfland and RWS has intensified in recent years (Glas, 2012) (P. Groot & Visser, 2016) (Hieltjes, 2014). On the whole, the observation from Downe et al. (2004) that participation in the networks shapes the context of the change in which the organization is an actor, was identifiable in the interviews.

Moreover, with respect to the influence of knowledge institutes, consultancies, and think tanks – this wasn't recognized as much. The team members stated that *'in the earlier stage, the main discussion were held with the market*

parties'. And only later in the process; 'we as RWS also approached a professor in Management of Cultural Change at VU University Amsterdam'. Herein, the late involvement of academics that is, according to Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), characteristics for the Dutch culture – was recognized. Additionally, inducement of consultants in the process was discredited by the senior members, stating that; 'I am of the believe that if you have over 9000 employees working for your organisation, you could basically handle everything internally. Especially if it concerns your core business'. In regard to this, the expected strong influence of consultants in changing process, as stated by according to Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004)- doesn't appear to hold for this case.

Then, in terms of the influence of the intra-organizational factors, most notable of which was the deemed-undesirable organization culture. Both perspectives recognized the distrusting-character of the organisation culture at that time as an important driver to start with a DOEN-like project. Team members stated that; 'the realisation arose that the future societal task we had, was not achievable with that particular working culture. Thus a change in working culture was needed'. And again by the senior management, 'it was important after two-thousand years of experience in the construction - based on certain cultural traditions - to just do it differently this time.' Linking this back to the theory, the 'island-culture' or hierarchy culture (Heritage et al., 2014) that was deemed plausible on the basis of the document analysis - was indeed recognized. As the organizational culture was seemingly a significant driving factor – the statement from Holt et al. (2007) that organizational culture are important to consider – proofed to be correct for this case. Apart from that influence of the organization culture, the reorganizations that bevel RWS were not by the team members considered as significant factors in the change process. Though, some senior managers reckon that the reorganisations that started in 2004 with the purpose of centralizing RWS, evidently – regressed RWS ability for customer focus and personalisation. In turn, steadily inciting the need to start with a different type of contract strategy. Though, the centralization effort of Rijkswaterstaat was established as a notable factor, the specific factors mentioned as plausible drivers were not. These were; the abolishment of the triumvirate; the official role of RWS that was expanded in 2013 to becoming the 'implementation organization in the field of environment, sustainable mobility, and spatial sustainability'; and lastly, the split of the split off national service Programs, Projects, and Maintenance. By and large, for this particular case, the organizational culture (Holt et al., 2007) was found to be more recognizable than the influence of the reorganizations (G. A. Boyne, 2006).

Further, with reference to the content factor; some other contract strategy appear to have been a significant factor in the change process. To elaborate, particularly the senior managers were reserved on the use of the MEAT award mechanism. Primarily because in their words; 'The MEAT award mechanism still prompts the contractor to concentrate on the lowest (fictive) price, and adversely, drive that price up again in a later stage with the old mechanisms'. Also, inspiration seems to be have taken from the Anglo-Saxon 'Early Contractor Involvement' contract strategy. Additionally, the remarks of the team member on the use of the D&C contracts mainly seem to relate to the organisational culture, rather than the contract strategy itself. While also Rijkswaterstaat' initial use of the alliance contract strategy appears to be an inspiration factor for a senior manager. Thereby, both of the plausible drivers were indeed confirmed during the interviews.

Moving on to the process of change, the most general conclusion is again that the start of DOEN – is characterized by an absence of political leaders. Thereby, DOEN can be seen as a bottom-up initiative in an emergent process. No nation-wide effort from political leaders to institutionalize the DOEN model in the public sector. Instead, the primary influence came from administrators. The 'bottom-up' initiative for the start of the DOEN at RWS is in line with the findings from Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) which state that - changes in consensus-based systems such as the Netherlands are often bottom-up innovations, where their major driving forces are administrations themselves. Finally, within the Rijkswaterstaat, the process of change should be seen as a combination between an planned and emergent process. Though, compared to the previous case – this leans more towards a planned process of change. Characterized by an seemingly intrinsic motivation from the top management, as will be discussed shortly. The preferred way of combining planned and emergent change is to have managers provide direction from the top, and have employees create the content and meaning of organizational change from below (Van der Voet, 2014). For this case, the active role was commenced by the younger employees.

More specifically with reference to the (administrative) leadership; both perspectives acknowledge that the senior management undertook an initial driving and later a facilitating role. Both significantly influenced the process of change. Here, the change process resembled planned change in the sense that it was clearly initiated by an individual member from the senior management department and that communication about the vision of change was mainly top-down. Particularly the leading role of the DG appears to have been significant in the process. As a team member expressed it;

*'the DG brought the necessary legitimacy behind the new concept'*. In consideration of a comment the DG made with concern to the Market Vision, a closely comparable code of conduct to the DOEN philosophy, the DG stated; *'That's why I've always said, It's not so important what the Market Vision or DOEN contract strategy exactly says. More importantly is the fact that you are working on vision and consider each other's interest. That is the essence of both. Not so much about the exact definition of the concepts and the starting points. Rather, the making process in itself determines whether you have a vision'*. This statement clearly shows the DG's driving vision; the process of a change is more important than the outcome of a change. At the same time, it also shows how that DG later transitioned to a facilitating role; leaving the employees responsible for concretization the content of change. Here, the process of change shows the incremental character and the absence of a-priori highly specified formulated change objectives. Moreover, when reviewing additional literature, the process that the DG aims to achieve with this is called *'the institutionalization of a public organisation'*. This can be viewed as the process in which assumed ideas are transformed into operational programmes that are accepted as effective ways to achieve the agreed objectives (Hjelmar, 2021). Institutionalization, according to this view, is a form of automation; when ideas and workflows become institutionalized they become entangled in formal organizational structures that automate our actions (Powell & DiMaggio, 2012). That said, with regard to the vision of the leadership, the vision of the former DG, besides the one just mentioned - became apparent from the interviews. Stating that; *'the proper working method precedes a good contract'*. Ultimately, the citations above illustrate the characteristics of a driving role a senior members undertook. That is according to Van der Voet (2014); *Envisioning the content of change, creating a sense of urgency, communicating change, and role modelling*. More still, it shows how the personal believe system of the (individual) senior management appear to have been of considerable factor in the process of change. As his believe system can be directly observed in the principles of the DOEN strategy. Herein, again – showcasing that significance of the driving role the DG initially undertook. Repeatedly, this is recognized in theory were the importance of top management support for a change initiative is often highlighted (Holt et al., 2007). Though, the critique of Burke (2017) applies again to this case, that more focus should be on the orientation that highlights the personality, character or traits of the leader

Furthermore, turning to the outcome factor, from the interviews it became clear that members from senior management had the ambition to change the intra-organizational and sectorial organization culture when starting with DOEN. To a large extent, a value-base that largely corresponds with the personal believe system of the leader (the general director). In this, confirmed by both the team members and senior managers – the output factors closely match the lambda and theta values. The two categories of values that were deemed plausible as theoretical drivers. From the interviews, the key principles of the lambda values - multiple objective thinking, creating a relatively high degree of slack to provide spare capacity for learning, and a responsibility structure which makes mistakes and errors admissible could be recognized. Moreover, the pursuit of honesty, fairness and mutuality, characteristic for the theta values – was also observable. These show an emphasis on a relational process, that will be further touched upon in the next paragraph.

Where the previous case had an overlap with both the new public management and that of the new public governance paradigm – this isn't correct for this case. The DOEN strategy appears to embark the key characteristics of the new public governance paradigm. Though, again, demonstrating the direct influence of any paradigms on a specific change – is inconceivable for a master thesis. Some global observation can be formulated. Mainly with regard to the focus, emphasis, and resource allocation mechanism. Starting with the first, both perspectives showcase the inter-organizational perspective of Rijkswaterstaat around the start of DOEN. Overall, the focus is mainly upon interorganizational relationships. Therein, acknowledging the plural nature of the state. Among other things, this can be seen when considering closer collaboration between RWS and Delfland, and specifically for this case; the reciprocity between choosing new contract strategy. Moreover, the emphasis of DOEN and NPM is primary on (relational) processes. Herein, stressing service effectiveness and outcomes that rely upon the interaction with public organisations with their environment (Osborne, 2010). Something that was already acknowledged earlier by the senior managers. Moreover still, the attention on the relational component addressed by both perspectives, falls in line with the preferred governance mechanism that belongs to the new public governance paradigm; steering on trust and relational contracts. The concern for the relational aspect of the collaboration between the contractors and Rijkswaterstaat was illustrated by an answer of a senior member; *'This [relational] aspect was completely lost in the collaboration process, because everything was completely rationalized'*. On the whole, Greve and Hodge (2010) summarizes the trend in the following fashion; *'public organisations have used public-private partnerships (PPPs) to build relationships with the private sector and to reach public goals through private means. PPPs grew out of the privatization era, but PPPs could also be seen as a genuine new way of bonding between public-sector and private-sector organizations that would allow for more*

*sophisticated use of private-sector expertise*’. On a final note, the following citation from a senior manager depicts the indefinite but sure influence of the public paradigms on public organisation such as RWS with regard to choosing a contract strategy; *‘The DOEN contract strategy is deeply in harmony with the Market Vision. It can be seen as a [governance] pendulum that swings back towards the joint collaboration of government and market. Inherently, a DOEN-philosophy in, let’s say 2007 - would never have been possible’*.

At last, an outline of both the theoretical and practical drivers is provided in the table on the next page. Within this table, a four-color system is used. Though, those colours illustrate a different unity, depending if they are depicted in the theoretical driver column or the practical drivers column. For the practical drivers, the colour schema illustrates the degree of influence according to the interviewees. Where, red reveals that the influence of the factor was deemed irrelevant or minimal by the research participant. Yellow states an average influence and a factor with a green shade was regarded as a considerable factor in the process of the change. However, for the theoretical drivers – the colours showcase the degree of plausibility. As these factors were already obtained prior to the interviews. Regardless, red is deemed unlikely to be influential, orange is deemed less plausible, green is deemed plausible, and lastly; grey is indeterminate.

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	Practical			Theoretical		
Factor		Team member	Senior manager			
<b>Context</b>	Societal	NPG	NPG			NPG
	National	Young employees	Young employees			Shortage on labour market + Aging workforce
	Economic	'Economic down-turn hardens relation between the contractor and RWS'	'Economic down-turn hardens relation between the contractor and RWS'			Entrepreneurial state + Competitive position of The Netherlands + Economic crises
	Social	'Increasing importance of stakeholder management'	'Increasing importance of stakeholder management'			Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation + Citizen participation and total transparency + transition to a network society
	Technical					
	Ecological					Sea level rise + decrease biodiversity + Extreme weather conditions + water scarcity
	Political	'Procurement act 2012 was not restricting for RWS'	'Procurement act 2012 was not restricting for RWS'			Spatial Planning Act + Procurement Act (2012) + Representative democracy
	Inter-organizational	Reciprocity water boards	Reciprocity water boards			High Water Protection Program + 'Smart Collaboration' work group + KRW program.
	Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	'...much later in the process, but mainly market parties'	'...much later in the process, but mainly market parties'			Oprachtgeversforum in de Bouw
	Intra-organizational	'The old hierarchical relationship was ready for renewal'	'The old hierarchical relationship was ready for renewal'			Externally-oriented: Who is your client? Work from the intention
	Reorganisations	'Only exacerbated the change process'	'Only exacerbated the change process'			Triumvirate lifted + new national service Water, Infrastructure, and Living Environment + Split off national service Programs, Projects, and Maintenance
<b>Content</b>	Contract strategy	'True principles of the D&C contract weren't followed'	'True principles of the D&C contract weren't followed'			Early contractor Involvement (UK) + Dissatisfaction MEAT
<b>Process</b>	Process of change	Emergent	Emergent			Unknown
<b>Leadership</b>	Role of leadership	Facilitator (Director general + HED Market & Innovation)	Facilitator (Director general)			Unknown
	Vision of top management	Retorting trust between contractor and public authority'	'The proper working method precedes a good contract' [DG]			DOEN rarely mentioned in strategic documents + apparent initiation of DG himself
	Changes					New DG (2010)
<b>Outcome</b>		Trust and collaboration	Trust and collaboration			Theta and lambda values: (relational) process





### 5.3. Third case: Best Value Approach (Delfland)

In the evaluation of the results for this case, several observations could be made. At the outset, it seems that the most notable external context factors were the political factors. On the whole, the initial (political) trigger seemed to be the Procurement Act that came into being in 2012, as a member of the senior management stated; *'If the Procurement Act of 2012 had not been introduced, the Best Value Approach would probably never have been introduced'*. This truly appears to be the (external) event that set the change process in motion, 'prohibiting' from there on Delfland use the 'lowest price' award mechanism without further consideration. Another apparent political factor seemed to be the introduction of the (political) party system at the water boards in 2008. As a senior manager remarked *'The introduction of the party system politicized the executive committee. In my opinion, this changes the subject matter of the board meetings, as instead of adopting a technical lens on certain matters, political framing became more apparent. The interviewee concludes; 'Therefore, I personally always have been of the belief that this eventually enabled the sizeable shift towards completely different contract strategies possible'*. Besides these two political factors, the ecological factor as a whole appears to have been notable drivers. Particularly, the pressing urge of the Climate Agreement was influencing the change process. Though this was not recognized from the team members' perspective, the senior management expressed that *'The urgency and complexity of the Climate Agreement did, to an extent, drive the water boards to establish a uniform contract strategy. As a director from a water board once told me; "If the exigency of the external factors becomes too pressing, we are forced as water boards to work together"*. In total, just three national contextual factors were believed to be significant in the process. For comparison's sake, twelve national factors from the documents analysis were initially considered plausible drivers. Meaning that, for instance, other political – or rather legislative – factors such as the Spatial Planning Act, the Environment Act, the new National Policy Agreement Water, the Maintainable Governance Finance Act – were all deemed irrelevant by the respondent. Though, the Maintainable Governance Finance Act was mentioned by a team member, especially in combination with the harmful financial situation of Delfland at the time – but this wasn't confirmed by members of the senior management. Making the actual influence of this particular factor indeterminable. All in all, the findings of De Boer, Enders, and Leisyte (2007) and Reichard (2003) that policy changes and new regulations implemented by central governments contribute to changes of public organisation – was only moderately recognized in the results of this case. Remarkably, all of the three plausible social factors were presumed to be secondary. Including the fear regarding the legitimacy and continuation of the water boards as independent administrative bodies. That could potentially result in unwanted fusions for Delfland with other Water Boards or more still, that water boards would lose their special governmental status. This concern was pressing at the time, considering that, the Provincial Executive of South Holland made another effort to fuse several water boards in 2010 by requesting setting up an evaluation report. Nonetheless, these insecurities weren't recognized as significant factors in the change process. Thereby, making the statement of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that the organization's legitimacy brings about changes at public bodies – was similarly not discerned in the results. Further, both perspectives deemed the third social factor, the Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation – secondary. With that, By and Macleod (2009) remarks on the possible effects of the environmental complexity in the stakeholder field was not observable for this case. Further, the economic factors were also not recognized. Though the economic crisis of that time appeared to have been a significant driver for Rijkswaterstaat when starting with DOEN in 2013, it wasn't accredited as an eminent factor in the process of change from Delfland. That similarly evolved around the same time. Thus, the assertion of Hendriks and Tops (2003) that financial crises initiate changes at public client – isn't applicable for this case. Lastly, the two demographic factors – *the shortage of the labour market* and *the aging workforce* – were thought of as irrelevant by the interviewees.

Further, when it comes to the inter-organizational factors, the influence of RWS seems to have been meaningful in the change process. Herein, the team members emphasize the High Water Protection Program, but from the senior managers' perspective the success of the Urgent Approach Roads was deemed more relevant. Overall, from the interviews it could be retrieved that Delfland had been adopting a more inter-organizational stance. Something that was also found in the document analysis, when reviewing the documents from the Economic Institute for the Construction sector (EIB). Stating that; *'The water boards taking steps forward with regards to improving the dialogue between themselves and the market parties'* (P. Groot et al., 2016). While also indicating that; *'These past years, there seems to be intensification of existing structures, such as the Stuurgroep Samenwerking Waterschapswerken, Platform Waterschapswerken, Taskforce Deltatechnologie. Organizational structures that, among other things, were involved in the establishment of the first Water Board Market vision from 2014'* (P. Groot et al., 2016). The latter influence from the last mentioned organisation couldn't be confirmed in the interviews. In the main, it can be argued that the findings from Downe et al. (2004) concerning the observation that; *'participation in the networks shapes the context of the change in*

*which the organization is an actor'* – indeed seems applicable for this case. With respect to the influence of consultancies, knowledge institutes, and think tanks – the answers from both perspectives was uniform. Consultancies were only involved much later in the process. Linking this back to the plausible factors – it was expected that due to the increase in consultancies that specialized in training and certification with regard to the BVA, there influence would have been more prominent. On the whole, Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) statement with regard to the strong influence of consultants – doesn't hold for this case.

More than that, in terms of intra-organizational factors, varied answers were given during the primary data collection. That is to say, these three factors were not mutually recognized from the two perspectives, thereby questioning their actual influence. Starting with the influence of the reorganization, the team members stated that the near financial bankruptcy of Delfland was a significant driver to start with the BVA. However, the senior members couldn't confirm this statement. However, it remains reasonable to assume, although not proven in the interviews, that the financial situation of Delfland – specifically in combination with the introduction of the legislation Maintainable Governance Finances of 2013 – affected at least partly the decision to start with BVA. Considering that the financial deficit of Delfland would have evidently negatively affected the Dutch EMU balance. On the other hand, as already mentioned earlier, the senior members pointed at the introduction of the party system in 2008 as an indirect driver for the change process. This could technically be seen as a possible influential reorganisation, therefore it is mentioned here again. However, the introduction of the Program Management structure that was deemed plausible – was not recognized. Then, with respect to the role of the organisational culture – there was again difference between the answers from the team member's and senior management's perspective. Where the team member stated that the aspiration for the professionalizing the procurement department's culture was a driving factor, something that was deemed plausible on the basis of the document analysis – the senior management rejected that plausibility. On the whole, statement of Holt et al. (2007) and G. A. Boyne (2006) that organizational culture and reorganizations can give rise to changes – isn't applicable for this case.

Next, with regards to the influences of different contract strategies, from the interview, it could be observed that the hesitance towards compulsorily adopting EMVI – and perhaps the UAV-GC 2005 as a whole – fuelled the change towards the Best Value Approach. Particularly, in combination with the former procurement policy, as stated by the senior members; *'that we ran into trouble with the former procurement policy. Mainly because of the following dilemma; to what extent can you truly innovate, if – according to the procurement policy - you have to know everything in advance? [...] Because of this, we started looking for new innovative contract strategies, that ultimately led to adopting the Best Value Approach'*. Nonetheless, as could be inferred from the interviews, this was predominately driven by the passing of the Procurement Act of 2012 (context factor), and not an intrinsic motivation to intentionally depart from an existing contract strategy. Such, for instance – occurred during the second case (DOEN). Lastly, the enactment of the Procurement Act of 2012 does indeed explain a findings of the document analysis. That is; how in the years from 2009 to 2011, MEAT was incorporated in 20% of public procurements from other public clients, the water boards still had an average of 15% (P. Groot et al., 2016). Whereafter, from 2012 onwards, the waterboards the number of MEAT tenders increased to 33% (P. Groot et al., 2016). Herein, even overtaking municipalities and the provinces.

Moving on, in terms of the process of change, it appears to be, again, a combination of an planned and emergence change process. Something that is, according to senior members from Delfland, more common. As; *'although the executive committee members are increasingly professional administrators, the innovative ideas of a water board often emerge bottom-up. Heads of departments – for example those of Market and Strategy – come up with certain things, whereafter the board can vote on these things. It almost never happens that the board comes up with a visionary idea of its own accord'*. The interviewee adds to this; *'More often than not, the civil service set out the main lines, in which the secretary director has the leading role. Though, as an secretary director you could, for example, set a dot at the horizon. However, you need money for this idea and that again is determined by the executive commission'*. Though, another underlines; *'the dike ward at the time indeed had a strong opinion concerning the path Delfland should take'*. Something that will be discussed in the next paragraph.

Back to role of the leadership in the process of change, the senior management – in this case particularly the dike warden – argued for an initial change and providing directions from the top. Herein, focussing on the presumable lack of innovation. Whereafter the employees – mainly the strategy and the procurement departments – created the content and meaning of the organisational change. That is; the Best Value Approach. Unfortunately for this research, the dike warden was not available for an interview. Meaning his exact role remains difficult to determine. Nonetheless, from the interviews it can be inferred that the dike warden had an initial driving role. As the change objective ("more innovation")

was expressed in the beginning of the process. His vision – to strongly promote innovation at Delfland – was one of the three ambitions that was already found in the document analysis. Particularly this case is in line with a statement from Cepiku and Savignon (2012) that *'crises are considered to be opportunities for reform, creating a state of shock, which facilitates bolder intervention'*. Although the initial trigger came from a new national legislation, the opportunity was taken to change the water board in a bolder manner. Hence, it is notable to reiterate that the change process towards the BVA has to a significant extent been influenced by the personal belief system of one individual in the senior management. As one could imagine, without the dike warden's aspiration to become 'the most innovative water boards' – the concretization might have been completely different. Finally, this is recognized in theory were the importance of top management support for a change initiative is often highlighted (Holt et al., 2007). Yet, the critique of Burke (2017), similar to the previous two cases - applies again to this case. Mostly, that researchers should focus should focus more on the personality, character or traits of the leader. s

This brings us to the fifth and final factors; the outcome factor. From both the team member's as the senior management perspective - the primary focus was on innovation. However, the team member's view was also concerned with a secondary focus on lowering project costs and promoting efficiency. Seeing that, the assumption was that by closely involving the market with the Best Value Approach, the construction could be lowered. This presumption closely resembles the sigma-value category. Nonetheless, the focus on lowering project cost by utilizing the Best Value Approach was not recognized by members of the senior management. On the whole, the value-driven (predetermined) outcome factor concerning the wish for innovation is difficult to position within the three categories.

Actually, this finding touches on the last subfactor that needs to be addressed; the influence of the public paradigms. For this particular case, there doesn't seem to be a notable bearing on the effects from switches in public paradigms. To elaborate, where between the first and the second case, a seeming 'transition' could be observed between, for example, Rijkswaterstaat's focus, emphasis, and their desired resource allocation mechanism. Therein shifting the accent from the new public management paradigm towards the new public governance paradigm. To briefly reiterate, from intra-organizational management towards an inter-organizational focus. From an emphasis on output via a transactional process in the direction of emphasizing the outcomes in a relational process. From contractual resource allocation mechanism towards using relational contracts. And so on and so forth. To come to the point, suchlike transition appears to have been less notable at Delfland, or at any of the water boards for that matter. Take for instance an anecdote that was shared by a senior member from Delfland with regard to the DOEN contract strategy. Quote; *'I once invited a project leader from the DOEN Project to a platform meeting to give a presentation about the DOEN Project philosophy. During the break, a department head of a water board came up to me and said: "I don't get it, that DOEN-philosophy as they explain it here, I don't grasp why this is new or special. In fact, this is about the working method we have with every project of ours. Isn't this just normal?"*. A similar comment was made with regards overall focus of the water boards; *'Personally, I think that the concept of the network-society will continue to such an extent that at a certain point it no longer matters whether the client is a water board, municipality or provincial project, it will be a project with a specific flow of funds, but with a composed project team'*. Both of these statement illustrate an overall difference in attitude. Of course, one could argue that in view of the average project size both organisation execute, this juxtaposition wouldn't be plain-spoken. And they'll be right. But that would be missing the point. The matter at hand is that Delfland, as well as all the other water boards - are as independent governance system conceivably much further situated from the political arena than RWS is. This can, for instance, be observed in the seeming absence of wide-spread reforms (lay-offs, reorganisation, centralisation, etc). Essentially Delfland kept its expertise internally. By all means, the Water Act prescribes that this has to be the case. Though, in contrast stands the situation of Rijkswaterstaat, in view of the rigorous reorganisation of recent years. In this regard, a senior member of RWS shared some thoughts; *'DOEN can be seen as a pendulum that swings back towards the joint collaboration of government and market'* Sticking to this metaphor, the pendulum at Delfland didn't have to swing back, because it never swung (that much) forward. To expand on this further, Delfland presumably hasn't experienced the top-down effort of political leaders to adopt integrated contracts or MEAT-like awarding systems, such as Rijkswaterstaat did. This could explain why the Procurement Act of 2012 was mentioned in the this case by Delfland as momentous event, while the same Procurement Act wasn't deemed inconsiderable by Rijkswaterstaat in the second case. Case in point, after an extensive document analysis and a several interviews – it appears that the changeover from the paradigms is less measurable at Delfland than at Rijkswaterstaat. Therefore, this inquiry will refrain from composing a definite conclusion in regard to the effect the different paradigms had on Delfland.

At last, a summary of both the theoretical and practical drivers for the third case is illustrated in the table on the next page. Within this table, a four-color system is used. Though, those colours illustrate a different unity, depending if they are depicted in the theoretical driver column or the practical drivers column. For the practical drivers, the colour schema illustrates the degree of influence according to the interviewees. Where, red reveals that the influence of the factor was deemed irrelevant or minimal by the research participant. Yellow states an average influence and a factor with a green shade was regarded as a considerable factor in the process of the change. However, for the theoretical drivers – the colours showcase the degree of plausibility. As these factors were already obtained prior to the interviews. Regardless, red is deemed unlikely to be influential, orange is deemed less plausible, green is deemed plausible, and lastly; grey is indeterminate. Thereafter, the conclusion of this section will be presented.

Factor			Practical			Theoretical
Context	Societal	Public paradigms	Team member	Senior manager		
	National	Demographic	NPM	/		NPM and NPG
		Economic				Shortage on labour market + Aging workforce
		Social	'Stakeholder management was a secondary factor'			Economic crises + competitive position of The Netherlands
		Technical				Decreasing institutional trust of the public + Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation + Communal view concerning institutional legitimacy
		Ecological	'Ecological factors were secondary factors'			/
		Political	Procurement Act 2012: 'There was much less manoeuvrability before the [MEAT] threshold was reached			Sea level rise + decrease biodiversity + Extreme weather conditions + water scarcity
	Inter-organizational	Networks	The collaboration with RWS within the HHWP definitely served as inspiration to also start pursuing new contract strategies'			Spatial Planning Act + Environment Act + new National Policy Agreement + Maintainable Governance Finance Act + updated Procurement Act and the Guide Proportionality
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks	'[Consultants] only in a much later stage'			High Water Protection Program + KRW program
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture	"We wanted a more professional purchasing policy'			Different Dutch consultancy + Kashiwagi
Content		Reorganisations	Financially bankrupt: 'BVA could result in lower project costs and thus expenditures'			'Professionalisation' towards adhocracy. Mainly promote innovatively behaviour
		Contract strategy				Program Management Approach
Process		Process of change	Planned + Emergent			MEAT award mechanism
Leadership		Role of leadership	Driver + Facilitator (Dike warden)			Unknown
		Vision of top management	"Dike warden: Most innovative water board"			Unknown
		Changes				Improve communication + promote innovation + change realisation of project execution
Outcome			Sigma + innovation			Dike count (2008)
						Sigma value: Output control (frugality)



## 5.4. Conclusion: Answering the fourth sub question

The purpose of this chapter was identifying patterns between the theoretical drivers and the practical drivers of public organisations to change their contract strategy. To concretize the drivers, three cases were used as exemplification of changes in contract strategy. In turn, the theoretical drivers were obtained from the secondary data analysis in the form of a document analysis. And the primary data was gathered by conducting semi-structured interviews. Afterwards, the sub analyses of these drivers per case was done via a concept-driven approach. Hence, the same structured will be adopted for this conclusion. Concretely, this entails that the five change management from Kuipers et al. (2014) will subtly form the structure of each analysis. In any case, for this cross-case analysis - the following patterns became apparent. To begin with the most global finding, when reviewing the cross-case Table 5.1- there appears to be a significant difference in the a priori determined plausibility of theoretical factors and the influence according to the interviews. This mismatch can particularly be observed in Table 5.2 **Error! Reference source not found.**, where the overlap of the theoretical and practical drivers is depicted via a three-colour scheme. For this table, green illustrates a significant overlap, yellow showcases little overlap, and red depicts barely any overlap. Essentially, Table 5.2 portrays the degree of preliminary surmise. Besides this general deduction, specific findings in relation to the five change management factors and sub factors can be recognized. To start, the moderately small number of contextual factors on the national level that were deemed relevant by the respondents. By and large, three contextual factors on the national level per case. These being mainly in relation to political and economic factors, and to a lesser extent; social factors. In comparison, the a priori estimation on the basis of the document analysis found, on average - fourteen national factors to be plausible drivers for the specific changes in contract strategy per case. Meaning that merely 20% of the national factors was eventually recognized by the respondents as influential. Having said that, although the number of national factors was relatively low - their influence on the change process was, according to the respondents - significant. For instance, in view of the first case, the evident impact of the booming economic state of affairs in the construction sector at the time, combined with the personal objective of the minister - essentially triggered the change process. A similar finding was discovered at the second case, where the change was (intrinsically) set in motion by an economic downturn. That, in turn, caused the relation between contractors and the contract authority to worsen. Next, the third case where essentially - stressed by the managerial individual - the enactment of the Procurement Act of 2012 induced the search for a new contract strategy that eventually resulted in the utilization of the Best Value Approach. Important to note, almost all of these specific plausible national factors were based on the correlations portrayed in Kuipers et al. (2014). In view of the fact that there was significant diversity between the exact national factors per case, counterintuitively - almost all of the correlation mentioned in Kuipers et al. (2014) that could theoretically result in changes at public organisations were recognized. Namely, the effects of financial crises (Hendriks & Tops, 2003); changes in competitive pressure (A. D. Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990); political involvement (Weissert & Goggin, 2002); policy changes, changes in financing, and new regulations implemented by central governments (De Boer et al., 2007; Reichard, 2003); and lastly environmental complexity in the stakeholder field (By & Macleod, 2009). However, considering the fact that the influence of specific national factors differed significantly between all the cases - this inquiry will refrain from appointing a single of these correlating factors as the most notable influential one.

What is more, with regard to the inter-organizational factors, the exact influence differed somewhat between the cases. Whereas with the first case, there appears to be little reciprocity between RWS and other organisations, the result from the second case do show that RWS, at least to some extent - was inspired from working in networks with the water boards and municipalities. Moreover, the reoccurring meetings between board members of RWS and those of the water boards, similarly appear to have been a source of inspiration. Especially with regard to the alliance-philosophy the water boards were already adopting in their contract strategies. A similar finding was done with respect to the third case, where the success of the Urgent Approach Roads and the High Water Protection Program seemed to have influenced Delfland in adopting the Best Value Approach as a new contract strategy. Overall, one can on the basis of this results conclude working in networks with other (semi-)public organisations did inspire both organisations to search for new contract strategies. Which means that the finding from Downe et al. (2004) that participation in the networks shapes the context of the change in which the organization is an actor - was recognized in these cases. Apart from the first case - the a priori theoretical drivers overlapped with the drivers found in practise. Moreover, with respect to the influence of knowledge institutes, consultancies, and think tanks - the three cases appear to have moderately comparable results. In terms of the influence from consultants, beginning with evident finding - the influence of Kashwagi on the first and third case was apparent. For both of the two case, members of the senior management from RWS and Delfland seem to have been influenced by Kashiwagi when he was giving lectures in The Netherlands. Besides that, however - there appears to have been an absence of consultancies in the processes of change with respect to the three cases. Something that was - particularly for the second and third case - not expected beforehand. So, on the basis of these results, one can conclude that the findings of Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) concerning

the strong influence of consultants is only partly recognized. Moreover, for all cases, there was a seeming absence of knowledge institutes and think tanks. Thus, on the whole, the role of the inter-organizational factor on the process of change was considerable, though not necessarily expected on the basis of the document analysis.

Turning to the influence of intra-organizational (contextual) factors, these were mainly recognized in the second case. Here, the distrusting and hardened organizational culture appears to have been a notable drivers for the change. This finding would be in keeping with the statement of Holt et al. (2007), arguing that organizational culture can trigger changes at public organisations. However, on average – the role of the organisation culture was deemed less significant. Particularly by the senior management. Again, differing from the drivers that were deemed plausible beforehand. Too, the findings with concern to the reorganisation on the change process. In all three cases, the plausible theoretical drivers did not overlap with the practical findings. Though, for the first and second cases it was expected that the reorganisations of Rijkswaterstaat would be of influence – where eventually this did not appear to be the case. A notable finding, considering the significant reorganisations Rijkswaterstaat underwent in recent years. However, for the third case, the overlap between theoretical and practical drivers was opposite. Meaning that certain types of reorganisations could not be found in the documents analysis, but proofed to be significant on the change process. On the whole, the relationship between reorganisations and changes at public organisation, expressed by reorganizations G. A. Boyne (2006) – was only partly evident.

With respect to the influence of second change management factor; the 'content' factor. Primarily the second case, and to a lesser extent the third case - shows existing contract strategy as a direct driving factor to changes in contract strategy. Hereby, reservation and dissatisfaction with MEAT award mechanism proofed the most considerable. Besides this, for the second case, the expected influence of the Anglo-Saxon contract models was confirmed during the interviews. Notable, the rise of integrated contracts and new procurement procedures such as the competitive dialogue – were note considered meaningful content factors by the respondents. Whereas, from the document analysis – these were plausible factors.

When it comes to the third factor – the process of change – all of the cases show uniform results. On the basis of the primary data – it can be concluded that the three cases came about via 'bottom-up' initiatives. In view of the fact, there was no nation-wide effort from political leaders to institutionalize new types of contract strategies model in the infrastructure sector. Instead, the role of the administrative leadership was more visible. Thus, this process differs from for example, the initiation of the D&C and DBFM model - where political leader (the Ministry of Finance) heavily pushed their ideas in a top-down fashion. The 'bottom-up' initiative for the start of the Best Value Approach at RWS is in line with the findings from Reichard (2003) and Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) which state that changes in consensus-based systems such as the Netherlands are often bottom-up innovations, involving informal and voluntary reform cooperation, where their major driving forces are administrations themselves. Lastly, with concern to the internal processes, all the process of change should be seen as a combination of a planned and an emergent process of change. Meaning, resembling a planned process in the sense that it was initiated by the top management executives and that communication about the vision of change was mainly top-down. Next to that, the processes of change also had the incremental character and the absence of a-priori highly specified formulated change objectives of an emergent process. Lastly, the process of change could not be determined via the document analysis. Hence, a comparison between the preliminary plausibility and the actual practical process cannot be made.

Fourthly, the role of the leadership in the process of change. Once again, consistency throughout the three cases. The leaders(top managers) were in the interviews mainly depicted as having both a driving and a facilitating role. Naturally, the exact function description of these leaders differed between the cases. Where the first case, it appears to have been a combination of an initial driving role, whereafter it transitioned towards a facilitating role. Here, the change was initially set into motion by the Head Engineer Director (HED) of the Bouwdienst, when that person send several employees in 2005 to the U.S.A. The HED of the bouwdienst was inspired earlier by the BVA and wanted employees of Rijkswaterstaat to get acquainted with Best Value Approach. As the team member recalled *'The HED of the Bouwdienst became inspired by the concept of the Best Value Approach ... and told me to investigate the concept further'*. Here, the driving role of the leadership could be recognized. Though, when this team member eventually came back, little was done with the new contract strategy. As the team member describes; *'Before the Urgent Approach Roads, in 2005, I tried to pitch the idea [Best Value Approach] at several Head Engineer Directors (HEDs), but nobody saw fit for the Best Value Approach'*. After this, roughly two years had to go by before the second phase of the process started. That is, the Urgent Approach program was announced. As a team member explains; *'Eventually, [after pitching the idea of the BVA, the [new] HED of IS trusted our idea and gave permission to concretize the new contract strategy, otherwise it would probably*



*never happened*'. Subsequently, the employees from the procurement department concretized the actual content of the Best Value Approach. Illustrating how the HED of IS primarily had a facilitating role, instigating the active participants in the change process (Russ, 2008). With the second case, the primary force came from the (former) general director, as a team member marked *'the director general brought the necessary legitimacy behind the new concept'*. From all of the cases, the top management in the second case showcased the strongest driving role. Intrinsically acting on a problem, and herein; envisioning the content of change, creating a sense of urgency, communicating change, and role modelling (Van der Voet, 2014). Lastly, the dike warden in case three, according to the team members and the senior managers did *'indeed had a strong opinion concerning the path Delfland should take'*. Here, I should be remembered that the difference between a driving and facilitating role of the leadership do not necessarily consist of different activities. Rather, change leadership activities in emergent processes of change are performed in a different way and on different organizational levels (Van der Voet, 2014). For instance, although both roles give an initial sense of direction - the facilitating role requires providing a sense of direction and thereafter devolving responsibilities. Essentially, stimulating participation and then taking a step back but showing support Van der Voet (2014). As a result, the content of change originates from employees, rather than the apex of the organization. In view of this, the facilitating role of the leadership could be observed. What is more, with reference to the influence of the vision of the leadership – this was by the respondents regarded as a considerable influential factor in the change process. Kuipers et al. (2014) already argued that the leadership factor was an important factor to consider in the change process. Despite that, little evidence of this factor could be found in the document analysis that proofed a direct influence of members of the top management. Mainly, as the new contract strategies were rarely mentioned in public and strategic documents. Thereby initially questioning the overall significance on the role of top management in the processes of change. Greater still, it can be observed that in all the three cases, the individual believe system of the leader played a significant role in the process of change – and the ultimately on the concretization of the content of change. Remarkably, taking into consideration that in view of the second case, one could even argue that the intrinsic moral principles of the leader (the director-general) could be seen as a direct trigger to the change in contract strategies. Or in the words of a team members; *'I have always wondered if a new leader [always] wants to leave its own mark [on an organisation]'*. Essentially, this vision started the entire process. In theory, the importance of top management support for a change initiative is often highlighted (Holt et al., 2007). Strikingly, however, when reviewing the literature on leadership - the main attention is focused on the roles, activities and behaviours of individuals, rather than an orientation that highlights the personality, character or traits of the leader (Burke, 2017). Rather, attention seems to be given to the different types of leadership, such as distributed, shared, or team leadership (Jackson & Parry, 2011). Lastly, specific changes in leadership that heavily influenced the change process were, besides the second case – not recognized in the interviews. Something that was, on average – also not deemed plausible on the basis of the document analysis.

Fifthly, in the main, the influence of the outcome factor in the three cases - showed in the interviews to have been of great significance. Something that was already deemed plausible on the basis of the document analysis. Mainly as Grimshaw et al. (2002) argued that public sector values often become an explicit factor in addressing change. That said, the exact interpretation of these values differed significantly between the cases. For the first case, the predetermined outcome factor largely rested on all three value categories; the sigma, lambda, and theta values. For the second case, the process of change was impelled by an appraisal of the relational and trust component in a collaboration with the market parties. Essentially, the theta and lambda values. For the third case, the outcome factor was less straightforward. Both the sigma value and another private value were mentioned. The latter being a concern for more innovation. Where, former contract strategies appear to have been limiting the innovation capabilities of Delfland. In turn, when comparing these to the categories of values that were deemed plausible drivers – a significant divergence can be found. Especially, when considering the outcome factors of the third case - the three adopted categories of values from Hood (1991) aren't encapsulating the initial intension. Lastly, but notably, when comparing the answers of from both function – the team member were mentioning the principles of the sigma value more often than the senior managers. In turn, the senior managers were more concerned with relational and safety component. Essentially, overlapping with the lambda and theta values.

Lastly, concluding with the indirect influence of the public paradigm. The implicit influence of the public paradigms could be recognized, but primarily in relation to the first and second cases at Rijkswaterstaat. Both mainly in the focus, the emphasis, and key resource allocation mechanism. For the first case, this meant starting to shift from an intra-organizational focus towards an inter-organizational focus. Where the emphasis became an amalgamation of a transactional and relational process. Which could similarly be recognized in the assemblage of both contractual and relational components as a key resource mechanism. For the second case, these three aspects had fully shifted to the new public governance paradigm. Herein, stressing service effectiveness and outcomes that rely upon the interaction with public organisations with their environment. That are controlled via relational-types of contracts. However, these three characteristics didn't seem as notable in the third case at Delfland. Also, generally speaking - it proved difficult to obtain concrete proof of this during the primary data collection. For all that, irrespectively, the recommendation from By and Macleod (2009) and Wise (2002) to consider changes in public paradigms when studying changes at public organisation – was useful to establish a general picture, but not all concluding.

Table 5.1 - Cross-case analysis of theoretical and practical drivers

Factor	Case 1						Case 2						Case 3						
	Practical		Senior manager		Theoretical		Practical		Senior manager		Theoretical		Practical		Senior manager		Theoretical		
	Team member		Team member		Team member		Team member		Team member		Team member		Team member		Team member		Team member		
Context	Societal	Public paradigms																	
	National	Demographic																	
		Economic																	
		Social																	
		Technical																	
		Ecological																	
		Political																	
	Inter-organizational	Networks																	
		Institutes, consultancies, think tanks																	
	Intra-organizational	Organisation culture																	
		Reorganisations																	
Content		Contract strategy																	
Process		Process of change																	
Leadership		Role of leadership																	
		Vision of top management																	
		Changes																	
Outcome																			

Table 5.2 – Overlap between theoretical and practical drivers

Factor		Case 1	Case 2	Case 3
Context	Societal			
	National			
	Public paradigms			
	Demographic			
	Economic			
	Social			
	Technical			
	Ecological			
	Political			
	Networks			
	Inter-organizational			
	Institutes, consultancies, think tanks			
	Intra-organizational			
	Organisation culture			
Content	Reorganisations			
	Contract strategy			
Process	Process of change			
	Role of leadership			
Leadership	Vision of top management			
	Changes			
Outcome				

## Chapter 6 | Discussion

Before the main conclusion will be presented, the limitation of this inquiry will be touched upon. These have been subdivided into five paragraphs. For some of these deficiencies, specific suggestions will be provided in the chapter Recommendation.

### 6.1. Limitation of research design

Considering the exploratory nature of this research and the assumed complex and interconnectedness of a change process – the decision to adopt a multi-method qualitative methodological approach proved fitting. The same conclusion can be drawn from evidently choosing the holistic multiple case study, specifically by purposely aiming for theoretical replication. Here, the juxtaposition of Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland resulted in notable findings. Having said that, choosing a holistic multiple case study with the intention of theoretical replication has its downsides. First and foremost, the main conclusion would – clearly by definition – be less unilateral than a single case study with the intention of literal replication. By all means, this would not necessarily be an adverse aspect. In fact – it is the strong suit of that research strategy. However, for the time horizon of a master thesis – this combination proved overmuch. Naturally, performing research within any given timeframe means striking a balance between expanding the scope for inquisitive purposes and safeguarding the quality concerns of the research design. For this particular research, however, even with an extensive document analysis – obtaining the necessary level of knowledge with regard to both Rijkswaterstaat and Delfland over an extensive period of time – proved too ambitious. Hence, in the author's opinion – this disadvantageously affected the richness of both the secondary as well as the primary data.

### 6.2. Limitation of theory

Retrospectively, the endorsed theory of Kuipers et al. (2014) has its shortcomings. That is, naturally - not faulty of the cited authors. Instead, as already noted by Van der Voet (2014) – both the change management theory and the institutional theory are extensive and can be internally incoherent. For reasons that will be introduced shortly. The limitation with concern to both the theory of Kuipers et al. (2014) and their underlying theories – is in this section divided into three paragraphs; the cultural bias, the role of ontology and epistemology, and the lacking data in the meta-analysis.

#### 6.2.1. Cultural bias: Dominance of Anglo-centric perspective

The five factor change management framework suggested by Kuipers et al. (2014) has in this research been expanded with numerous sub factors as illustrated in the final scheme of change management factors (Figure 3.12). In turn, these subfactors are chosen on the basis of correlations that were found in the literature review. For instance, with concern to the contextual factor on the inter-organizational level – Grimshaw et al. (2002) argued that the role of complex stakeholder networks can affect the change process. Accordingly, the 'working in network' has been added as a sub factor for the contextual factors. Nonetheless, as noted by Pettigrew et al. (2001), in the change management literature it is generally suggested that the US/Anglo-centric perspective is dominant. Consequently, if mainly Anglo-centric are examined – a biases can be developed towards countries such as the UK and the USA. These countries often have a majoritarian system, in contrast to countries such as The Netherlands with a more consensus-based system. On the whole, this could have affected the data collection in this research.

#### 6.2.2. Ontology and epistemology: Philosophical assumptions underlying any theory

The limitation with respect to the ontology and epistemology of the change management theory itself, is in the author's opinion - the most considerable limitation of this research. To reiterate, the ontology is the researcher's own view of the nature of reality or being. Further, epistemology concerns what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study. Concerning this, it remains important to affirm that both the change management literature is informed by distinct academic disciplines and is therefore often studied based on different epistemological and ontological traditions (Van der Voet, 2014). To provide a concrete example; some authors focus on large-scale organizational turnarounds

and highlight the planned nature of organizational change (Burke, 2017; Todnem, 2005), whereas others focus on the incremental notion of change and its emergent characteristics (Kelman, 2005). In the main, the positivist approach appears to be dominant in the change management theory (Holt et al., 2007; Van der Voet, 2014). With respect to ontology, this means that the researcher's view of the nature of reality is external, objective and independent of social actors (Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, in relation to the epistemology, the researcher's view on what constitutes as acceptable knowledge - is the conviction that only observable phenomena can provide credible data (Saunders et al., 2009). Here, the subconscious (positivist) inclination in this research towards observable phenomenon explains itself. The same conviction resulted in the institutionalist theory, for an incuriousness for intra-organizational factors, specifically with respect to the role of the leadership. On the whole, this tendency for blind-spots is encapsulated in a quote from Werner Heisenberg, one of the founders of quantum mechanics;

*"What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning"*

- Werner Heisenberg

In hindsight, this research arguably leaned too far into the gathering objective data, compared to collecting subjective data. In the chapter Recommendation, with concern to this aspect, an advice will be included for future research.

### 6.3. Limitation of secondary data collection method

In the previous section, limitation concerning the theory were explicated. As well as their effects on the secondary data. Nonetheless, by executing the secondary data collection method, some more limitations were found. Primarily with respect to the focus and deficiencies eventuated when conducting the secondary data collection method. On the whole, the limitations of the secondary data collection largely affected the context factors. For structure's sake, the context factor was subdivided into four levels; the societal, national, inter-organizational, and the intra-organizational factor. From these, the limitations with regard to intra-organizational, inter-organizational, and the societal factors will be discussed forthwith.

#### 6.3.1. Intra-organizational factors: Effectuality of publicly published documents

First and foremost, when conducting any secondary data analysis – the quality of the output largely depends on the availability of the secondary data. In view of the fact that the multiple case analysis is conducted externally from the two organisation – gaining access to truly valuable data proofed difficult. For this inquiry, the majority of the secondary data that has been gathered, came from published annual reports and documents from strategic departments. Yet, these type of publicly-published documents rarely touch upon delicate issues. Against this background, the hindering of accessing truly authentic, internal documents – inevitably comprises the quality of the secondary data collection method. As a consequence, this seems to have particularly affected the mapping of the intra-organizational factor. This could, for instance, be observed in the eventuality that the financial troublesome time Delfland went through around 2010 was discovered via the secondary data analysis. Only by fortune of a respondent in the semi-structured interviews, this was eventually discovered.

#### 6.3.2. Inter-organizational factors: Overall lesser focus on think tanks, steering groups, market parties

Besides the deficiencies in the gathering of intra-organizational factor due to restrictions in accessibility, with regard to the fullness of the inter-organizational (contextual) factors – there is also scope for improvement. Mainly as for the role of specific think tanks, steering groups, universities, and market parties. Aside from the general difficulty of mapping the multitude of potential inter-organizational parties from the surface – the combination of a limited timeframe was overmuch. In hindsight, this research spent in proportion to the inter-organizational factor – too much time on the national factors. Therein, increasing the validity of the conclusion with regard to the national factors – but undermining the overall conclusiveness of the inter-organizational factors.

### 6.3.3. Societal factors: Public paradigms more useable for studying central government

The closing remark of the previous paragraph concurrently relates to a general resolution with respect to the societal factor. That is, the influence of the three public paradigm. Retrospectively, although comparing the theoretical roots of the public paradigms with those of the different contract strategies was insightful – delivering a definitive finding with respect to the influence of these paradigms would result in an inferior conclusion. There are a couple of reasons for this. To start, the literature on public paradigms is extensive and intricate, where an entire academic field (public administration) is engaged in. Moreover, ‘traditional’ paradigms such as the public administration (Weberian) paradigm are concerned with the study of the state. For this reason, the question can be raised if the complexity (and ambiguity) surrounding public paradigms could – or should - be directly applied on an executive organisation from a single ministry and a functional, decentral governmental body. Instead, the (political) contextual factors on the national level – such as the ‘*Flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPP*’, ‘*Dwindling public authority and political interference*’ and ‘*Far-reaching privatization*’ – would probably have sufficed. More still, even if the influence of public paradigms should be included – the question can be raised if the three paradigms form adequate premises. For instance, Pyun and Gamassou (2018) subdivided the public paradigms of the past half century into six paradigms. With, subsequently - different theoretical roots, emphases, focusses, and key resource allocation mechanism, etc.

## 6.4. Limitation of primary data collection

In spite of addressing the for four data quality issues with respect to primary data collection from Saunders et al. (2009) in advance, concern with regard to data quality still remain. Repeating these four quality concerns would be redundant. However, another inevitability comes with conducting (semi-structured) interviews. What is more, the execution of the sample strategy showed some limitations. These two limitations will be addressed in the two following paragraphs.

### 6.4.1. Sampling strategies: Essential individual didn’t participate

When this inquiry adopted the (heterogeneous) purposive sampling strategy from Saunders et al. (2009), it was expected that by select research participants that are particularly informative - data saturation could be achieved quickly. Thereby, this assumptions rest simultaneously on the bearing that a relatively high response rate is expected. This proofed correct for the first and second case. Though, with the third case – this assumption was not right. Here, regrettably – the dike count did not accepted the invitation for the interview. With this, the first-hand perspective of an essential individual in the process could not be verified. Thus, this could have negatively affected the quality of the primary data from the third case. Having said that, other senior management board members were approached instead, and accepted the invitation.

### 6.4.2. Sampling strategies: Purposive sampling results in only partly knowing the truth.

The purposive sampling strategy, combined with the semi-structured interview approach, did indeed result into data-condensed interviews. Thus, in hindsight – this proofed to be an advantageous sampling strategy for this type of research. Having said that, considering that only a handful of respondents are interviewed per case – this inevitably leads to drawbacks concerning the entirety of the primary data. Even though the respondents were carefully considered, they still only communicate their own vision on certain situations or events. More still, as was found in the results from the primary data collection method – precisely that subjectivity proofed to be decisive in the processes of change. At last, though the exploratory nature of this research already discloses limitations in itself, it should be reiterated that if certain changes wishes to be fully explained - more extensive explanatory research ought to be executed with, among other things – a larger sample size.

### 6.4.3. Primary data collection method: Respondent bias and interviewees don't have perfect memory.

Further, the intrusive process of interviews always results in some concern with respect to the data quality. The main limitation, as already addressed by Buchanan and Bryman (2009) – concerns the fact that interviews are interaction that can be influenced by lapses of memory from the participants. Though this could happen with all three cases – this

remains an especial concern for the first case. Where the change in contract strategy occurred in 2007, meaning fourteen years ago. Evidently, this conceivably had an effect on the output of the interviews.

## 6.5. Limitation of analysis

Before the main conclusion of this inquiry will be announced, the two following limitations are important to consider. These touch upon the inter-connectedness of the results and their consequences for future generalisability and generalisation.

### 6.5.1. Principle of reductionism versus findings

The deductive research approach this undertook required enforcing the principles of reductionism (Saunders et al., 2009). Essentially; assuming that problems as a whole are better understood if they are reduced to the simplest possible elements (Saunders et al., 2009). The principles of reductionism conflict with the assumption that change is an inter-connected and complex phenomena. Therefore, having applied the principles of reductionism in this inquiry, attentiveness is critical when interpreting the findings of the concept-driven analysis. At the outset, the concept-driven approach, based on the five change management factors from Kuipers et al. (2014) - enabled a well-structured analytical framework for analysing the results of the secondary and primary data. That said, by sticking to this analysing approach and purely concluding on the basis of individual factors - a notable aspect would be overlooked. To clarify by way of exemplification, a critical finding for this inquiry was the importance of the leadership factor. More specifically, that the vision of the leadership - can be seen as an influential driving factor in the process of change. Here, as will be again further elaborated upon in the subsequent chapter Conclusion - the vision of the leadership as a whole appears to be largely based on the individual belief system of an individual leader. However, solely attributing great influence of the leadership factor - would disregard the intricacy of the real world. That is to say, it is highly unlikely that any (individual) leader could be seen as an autonomous thinker. Or, someone that is completely detached from their contextual environment. More still, even if this was the case - the question can be raised how that individual arrived at that managerial position. For instance, E Schmidt, Groeneveld, and Van de Walle (2017) found that; *'One of the distinctive features of the public sphere is the political-administrative setting which may influence selection and recruitment of public managers'*. Lastly, a quote from the most prominent managerial individual in the second case should be restated; *'Inherently, a DOEN-philosophy in, let's say 2007 - would never have been possible'*. The bottom line is that; although the conclusion in the subsequent chapter deduces that, on the grounds of the three cases, the leadership factor appears to have been the most prominent in the change process. One should bear in mind the complex and multi-layered phenomena of change in the public sector. Ultimately, this inquiry, all the more in view of the exploratory nature - cannot evaluate the interrelationship between the five factors from the findings.

### 6.5.2. Generalisability and generalisation: Reflection of cases

The last limitation reflects on the selected three cases with concern to the generalisability and generalisation of the findings. At bottom; was the sample of sufficient size and to what extent can these findings be applicable to other settings? Considering the outcome that the cases were based on two different public organisations, these can generalisability concerns can be disputed. First and foremost, this inquiry mainly focussed on first or second order changes. For that reason, the findings from the analysis would already not be applicable for third-order (sector) changes. More still, the dynamic environment of the public sector could already be recognized in the results of the primary data collection method. To clarify, although the changes of the first and second case both occurred at the same organisation and were approximately of the same order of change - a significant difference can be observed in the results of the two cases. In view of the fact that there was a mere five years difference between the initiation of the two cases, the generalisability of this inquiry are debatable. In light of this, conceivably - the results of this analysis could best be paired with their specific time period. Instead of projecting them on time periods much earlier or later. What is more, specifically in view of the issue of generalisation, similar questions can be raised. Primarily in consideration of the fact that the findings show a significant influence of intra-organizational (contextual) factors and the role of leadership. Naturally, these factors are organisation specific. Notwithstanding that the cross-case analysis did show patterns among the organisations, due to the overall small sample size - future researchers should be thoughtful when applying these findings to other (Dutch) public organisations such as ProRail and the Rijkswaterstaat.



## Chapter 7 | Conclusion

The main objective of this research was contributing to better understand the concept of change, particularly in relation to the drivers of public authorities in the infrastructure sector to start with new contract strategies. The literature study showed, first and foremost – that changes in the public sector should be seen as a complex multi-layered phenomena, where the main assumption is an interrelatedness between multiple (starting) events. More still, by criticism of Pettigrew (1990), these *change should consequently be studied with regards to both the macro level and micro level, in order to minimize the possibility of drawing unintentional preclusions*. Too, in order to systematically study this complex process, finding a theoretical framework was imperative. In consideration of all the previous remarks, the framework from Kuipers et al. (2014) was adopted. Essentially, the authors argue that five factors should be taken into consideration when studying change at public organisations. Which are; the context factor, the content factors, the process of change, the role of the leadership and the outcome of change. After that, in order to concretize the inquiry, three specific changes in contract strategy were selected that served as cases. The start of the Best Value Approach at Rijkswaterstaat, the commencement of DOEN at Rijkswaterstaat, and the initiation of the Best Value Approach at the Water Authority Delfland. Then, after having gathered both secondary and primary data - a concept-driven analysis was conducted. In doing so, some central findings emerged. These findings will forthwith be listed below, by means of the framework of Kuipers et al. (2014). Notably, these findings are the median of all cases. Afterwards, on the basis of these findings a two-folded conclusion will be deduced, indicating the main discovery when studying change at public organisations.

Firstly, in all of the three cases, the influence of the context factors in the process of change proofed itself to be significant. For distinctness' sake, the context factor has been subdivided into four levels. Respectively, from macro to micro; the societal, the national, the inter-organizational, and the intra-organizational level. To begin with the societal level, although the theoretical roots, the emphasis, the focus, and key resource mechanism of the different public paradigms were observable in key aspects of the contract strategies of the three cases – a distinctly defined influence of the paradigms could not be tested. Moreover, in view of the contextual factors on the national level, on average - a comparatively small number of factors have been found per case. An a priori estimation on the basis of the document analysis appointed on average fourteen national factors per case as plausible drivers for the specific changes in contract strategy. However, by and large – only three of these factors were reaffirmed by the respondents. These factors were mainly in relation to political and economic factors, and to a lesser extent; social factors. Meaning that merely 20% of the national factors was eventually recognized by the respondents as influential. Having said that, although the number of these national contextual factors was relatively low, their influence on the change process as stated by the respondents was significant. Moreover, with respect to the inter-organizational level, the role of consultancies, knowledge institutes, and think tanks – were in the three cases seen as insignificant. Mainly, those groups were on average later involved in the process. What is more, the intra-organizational factors were seemingly influential, particularly the aspiration to recede from a former organizational culture and to a lesser extent the influence from aftereffects of reorganisations.

Secondly, with respect to the findings on the content factor – it was found that the influence of other contract strategy was less prominent. However, more recent changes saw greater influence of other existing contract strategy. In the main, the influence came from contract strategies from Anglo-Saxon countries.

Thirdly, from analysing the three cases, it was found that all of the changes occurred bottom-up initiatives, where the role of administrative leaders was more prominent than that of political leaders. Moreover with concern to the internal process of change, these were in all cases a combination between a planned and emergent process. Firstly, resembling a planned process as the changes were clearly initiated by the top management executives and that communication about the vision of change was mainly top-down. Though, next to that, the processes of change also had some of the incremental character and the absence of highly specified, a-priori formulated change objectives. Also, after the initiations of the top management, the contents of change were mainly formed by active employees.

Fourthly, the leadership factor was distinctly notable in all of the processes of change. Herein, the vision of the top management provided the momentum to change, mainly via a combination an initial driving, followed by a facilitating role. Most notably, in the second case, the intrinsic drive of an individual member of the senior management can be seen as a direct trigger of the change. In turn, predominantly based on the personal believe system of that individual. Though only the leadership factor was mainly reactive in first and third case, there too - the individual visions of a top managers heavily influenced the final interpretation of the content of change.

Fifthly, it was found that the driving force of the predetermined outcome factor was significant in the processes of change. However in measuring this value-based factor – the three categories of (Hood, 1991) were not all encompassing.

Linking these findings back to the existing theory, a two-folded conclusion can be devised that contributes to the existing academic field on studying change at public organisations. Succinctly put; changes in contract strategies at public authorities can be driven by extrinsic as well as intrinsic drivers. Depending on the orientation, different factors can be expected, as will be illustrated shortly. Also, in view of the fact that all of the changes in the cases were around the same order of change – it appears problematic to determine this beforehand.

For one thing, the finding in relation to the significance of extrinsic drivers was traditionally already known and corresponds with the institutionalist perspective. Arguing that organizational change is imposed by the organization's environment, as organizations pursue legitimacy by conforming to environmental pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kuipers et al., 2014). Essentially, this perspective prescribes that the effects of the (external) contextual factors should be seen as the only possible direct triggers in the process of change. In view of this, whilst this inquiry initially expected a complex and multi-layered environment with a multitude of triggering factors - the results show that the conjunction of these triggering factors were less intricated than priorly expected. Only one or two macro external factors per case. In this extrinsically driven process, the economic and political macro external factors were the most prominent, and to a lesser extent the inter- and intra-organizational factors. Thus, the extrinsic drivers were not provoked by proactive consultancies, think tanks and knowledge institutes. Lastly, although the role of the leadership was apparent in the process – it was largely reactive to the triggering macro external factors.

At the same time, the finding that an organisation intrinsic drive to change could also be seen a direct principal driver, is in keeping with change management perspective. The rational-adaptive theory that places significant attention the intentional actions of agents. Therein, the main attention of this perspective is focused on the roles, activities and behaviours of individuals, rather than an orientation that highlights the personality, character or traits of the leader (Burke, 2017). This research found, however – that the intrinsic drive from an organisation is primarily based on the personal believe system of an individual leader. Exactly what appears to be missing in the theory. Adding to this, in this intrinsically driven process, particularly the influence of the inter-organizational, intra-organizational, and content factors sparked the intrinsic motivation to start the change process. Respectively, the reciprocity from working in networks with other (semi-)public organisations, the aspiration to recede from a former organizational culture, and the dissatisfaction of existing contract strategies were notable drivers.

In sum, depending on the orientation of the drivers (intrinsic vs extrinsic), there is a significance divergence between the change factors. Though, the essential parallel is the influence of the leadership on the change, specifically the believe system of an individual leader. For the extrinsic orientation, this believe system considerably determines the outcome of the content of change. Or, how Cepiku and Savignon (2012) formulate this; *'crises are considered to be opportunities for reform, creating a state of shock, which facilitates bolder intervention'*. Moreover, for the intrinsic orientation – this credo can be viewed as the direct driver of change. Concludingly, the objectivistic-based positivism philosophy that predominately underlies both perspectives - should be complemented with more a subjectivistic-based research philosophies such as the social constructivism theory. Herein, future researchers that aspire to identify driving factors for specific changes at public authorities, specifically for first and second order changes – should focus on both the macro level and micro level, in order to minimize the possibility of drawing unintentional preclusions. Therein, striking a balance between subjective and objective (primary) data.

## Chapter 8 | Recommendations

In this chapter, specific recommendations are provided, that are in correspondence with some limitations addressed earlier. In total, five recommendations are provided for future research.

### 8.1. Recommendation: Social constructivism

In the limitations of the adopted theory in this inquiry, it was indicated that the change management theory predominately is based on the positivism perspective. Essentially, that the nature of reality is external, objective, and independent of social actors. Where only observable phenomena can provide credible data. However, regarding the main finding that the personal belief system of the individual leaders undertake a significant role in the change process – the future research on this topic requires a different research philosophy. The main critique of excessively leaning towards the positivism philosophy is the discreditation of the effects of subjectivism. Subjectivism asserts that social phenomena are created from the perceptions and consequents (Saunders et al., 2009). Here, social phenomena are in a constant state of revision, as social interactions between actors are a continual process, and thus – should be studied accordingly. This is where the social constructivism perspective becomes useful. This research philosophy, which views reality as being socially constructed. Where social actors, such as the individuals of the top management, may place many different interpretations on the situations in which they find themselves (Saunders et al., 2009). Consequently, these individuals may perceive different situations in varying ways as a consequence of their own view of the world (Saunders et al., 2009). Essentially, an (external) stimulus could provide diverging responses for different individuals. In relation to this inquiry, the different contextual factors are a fitting example of a stimulus. By adopting the social constructivism theory, future researches could explore how the same stimulus (such as an economic downturn) has an effect on different top managers. That is to say, investigating their personal belief system. Their belief system being an example of a social construct. This could, for instance – provide an answer to the fact that DOEN occurred as late as 2013. Where the economic crisis – the main indirect driver of DOEN – already started in 2008. The same question can be raised, but in terms of the construction fraud. Or how the UAV-GC 2005 – and thereby MEAT awarding mechanism – was basically ignored by the water boards, until a new non-binding procurement act appeared, that sparked significant changes for all the water authorities. Concludingly, by solely internalizing the objectivistic view of positivism, critical detail would be missed. As Friedrich Nietzsche once replied to the positivism argument;

*"No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations"*

In relation to this, another concrete recommendation for future research is the collective undertaking of different disciplines. For instance; sociology, psychology, public administration, political science, etc.

### 8.2. Recommendation: Division of secondary and primary data collection method

Similarly with regards to the previous recommendation, future research should focus more on gathering primary data. Naturally, secondary data is imperative to construct knowledge. However, even after an extensive document analysis – many a priori determined plausible drivers were in the fullness of time not correctly guessed. Therein, contesting the effectiveness of this data collection method in relation to this topic. More still, most of the content changes in the cases of this inquiry occurred via an emerging process. Meaning that, in general – the content of change are large opened and arise from an emerging process. Also, from the analysis it was indirectly found that, counter-intuitively – the strategic department mainly had a reactive or secondary role in the process. Thereby, in hind sight, fully analysing the organisations strategy documents – is not as worthwhile. Lastly, by investing more of the future research time into primary data collection – elements of subjectivity can be better scrutinized.

### 8.3. Recommendation: Different concretization of factors in secondary data collection method

After the concept-driven analysis, several findings were made concerning the effectiveness of certain sub factors. Firstly with respect to the contextual factors, focussing on the different paradigms proved largely ineffective, Particularly, as their influences could not be directly measured during the primary data collection method and hence; no distinct conclusion could be drawn. Naturally, public paradigms ought to be included when conducting an extensive inquiry on developments with respect to the functioning of a central government, but respectively – the contextual factors on the national level would have sufficed for this inquiry. Next, the insufficiency of the three public values of Hood (1991). Respectively, the sigma, lambda, and theta values. Where the three categories of values could just on encompass the divergence of all possible public values, the essentially fell short with respect to private values. In view of this, a concrete recommendation would be to include the organizational values of Van der Wal (2008) with respect to businesses and governments.

### 8.4. Recommendation: Longitudinal research

This research has been conducted on the basis of a cross-sectional time horizon. Meaning particular snapshots in time have been investigated, with the purpose of better understanding the concept of change. In turn, on the basis of the results found in this research, the framework of Kuipers et al. (2014) has been expanded upon. In doing so, however, an important finding was that, generally speaking - the subjectivity of particular individuals was decisive on the processes of change. Considering that these personal interpretations with respect to the change management factors could potentially change over a period of time – it would be interesting if future research would conduct a longitudinal research. Such a research can provide a richer data collection and potentially showcase how the influence of certain factors, such as the influence of the organizational culture or the role of the leadership – can change over time.

### 8.5. Recommendation: Types of projects

In this research, the start of the new contract strategies was not specifically linked to the nature of different types of projects in that initially intended for. That is, including the complexity and complicatedness of project as specific factor in the planned or emergent process. For instance, the need for changes in contract strategies could have evolved from specific shortcomings in the existing portfolio. For this reason, authors such as J. Arts and Faith-Ell (2012) distinction between simple, complicated, and complex project and their effects on contract strategies or governance mechanism.

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# Attachment 1 - Significant historical events from 1945 to 2010

In this chapter, a collection is composed consisting of significant historical events that evidently influenced the contemporary mindset of public organizations. For readability's purposes, every paragraph summarizes a decade. Starting with the fifties, the sixties and so forth, eventually ending in contemporary times. Despite the facts that this subchapter initially undertakes a moderately holistic view, the subsequent chapter (1.1.2.) will funnel from a national perspective towards the sector that will be the focus of this inquiry; the infrastructure sector.

To start, after the 2nd world war, The Netherlands - similar to many other countries around the globe - was in ruins and required desperate reorganization. Apart from the tremendous personal losses and material damage, the economy completely stagnated. This period from 1945 to roughly 1965 is marked as the post-war reconstruction period (Blom, Vermaat, De Vries, & Reid, 2016). In all of this, one of the biggest challenges for The Netherlands was to entirely rethinking the spatial planning - a harbinger for the next 15 years (Ligtermoet, 1990). Furthermore, in this period, Willem Drees and his democratic-socialistic coalition began constructing the welfare state. A key characteristic in this new movement was solidarity - propelled forward by a societal mentality of working hard for low salaries. Inevitably, people lived a relatively sober lifestyle (Mellink, 2020). Nonetheless, these temporary sacrifices lead to a significant decrease in unemployment, a tax collection surplus by the government due to low labour costs and a developing export market. In the years to come, The Netherlands started striving for the capitalistic model of the USA, with a guided wage policy and a strong industrialization of the economy. Meaning investing heavily in gas, oil, infrastructure, shipbuilding and harbours. All still under the slogan; no conflicts between employers and employees. Similarly, interesting for this period, the top-down philosophy between the state and the society started to emerge (Dutch: Vadertje Staat).

The economic prosperity continued in the sixties for The Netherlands. The country recovered arguably fast from the second world war. Even with a sharp increase in population, nicknamed the baby boomers - the unemployment rates were low and still the economy surged. Almost every Dutch citizen profited from the economic welfare at that time. Partly due to this, the compartmentalization (Dutch: Verzuiling) started to breakdown, paving the way for a shift in the social mindset. Namely throughout the advanced industrial society, a growing share of the public became more focused on individual improvement, freedom of expression and political participation (Inglehart, 2020). What is more, the increasing secularization nationwide started to make its entrance.

All these transformations mentioned laid the foundation for a major cultural revolution in the seventies: the sexual revolution. The increasing focus on individual improvement combined with the sexual revolution, closely followed by the second feminine wave - resulted in the event that marriages became of less importance (Van de Loo, 2005). Consequently, female emancipation was on the rise ones more. In this, dramatically increasing the Dutch workforce. Accordingly, the overall growth in income of households, strengthened by a growing consumerism, lead to a striking increase in car purchases. Besides the societal changes of the seventies, a new ideology gradually gained grip in the Dutch political landscape. Mainly triggered by the first and second Oil Crisis; respectively in 1973 and 1979. Until the seventies, the standard economic policy was according to the Keynesian School of Economics. In essence, this meant that the government conducted an anti-cyclic policy, where the economy required governmental stimulus in times of economic crisis (Bosman, 2014). Consequently, in reaction to the two oil crises, the Dutch government tried boosting the economy. Herein, performing a spending spree. As a result, due to massive governmental expense, the national deficit rose to 10 percent of the GDP and the inflation rose sharply (Den Bakker, 2012). Thus, the Keynesian policy had failed, and the western world fell in a worldwide crisis. Out of all of this turmoil, a new political ideology, based on the Chicago School of Economics, become popular (Van Horn & Mirowski, 2009). In more popular terms, this ideology is known as 'neoliberalism'.

So, the starting of the eighties are marked as a time of consolidation. The (neo)liberalism political view was adopted across the board in western countries. Under the lead of Ronald Raegon (USA), Tatcher (UK), Ruud Lubbers (The Netherlands), taxes were lowered, state owned companies were privatised, deregulation became more apparent and government spending was cut. From 1982 to 1994 onwards, de cabinets Lubbers (CDA-VVD) executed a strict austerity policy. Reformation (Dutch: hervormen) and economizing (Dutch: bezuinigen) became two frequently used terms, that to this day echo in the Chamber of Representatives. Also, the holy grail of liberalism: the market forces, became ever more evident in governmental systems. The Wassenaar agreement was signed and Dutch politics moved to the



famous Polder-model (PDC, 2008). Next to the significant changes in the political landscape, the topic of climate change was slowly coming to the foreground. Mainly, due to acid rain that ravaged large parts of Europe (Grennfelt et al., 2020). Unsurprisingly, the libertarian government remain faithful in the self-organizing ability and own responsibility of the population and companies regarding climate change. Nonetheless, at the time, optimism regarding Dutch climate policy prevailed under the population. In particular, the Natuur Milieubeleidsplan (1989) backed by Lubbers received a lot of attention and seemed feasible (Sierdsma, 1996). This plan is characterized as the first climate wave. An equally important event unfolded a few year before; the publication of the Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening (1988-1992). This document reinstated the use of public private partnerships (PPPs) on the political agenda (Bruinsma & Koomen, 2018). A development that will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter.

Enter, the nineties. From 1994 till 2002, The Netherlands was governed by the democratic-liberal cabinets of Kok I and II. From this point, the coalition stepped away from the previous ideological social-democratic course and decided adopting a new mainly liberal-economic policy. Meaning, even more focus on market forces, less government, privatization and deregulation. In 1990, the first IPCC report of the United Nation was published, warning for the potential effects of greenhouse gasses on the world's climate. For the first time, the world received an ominous and explicit alert that emissions of greenhouse gasses should be lowered in limited global warming: the now famous 2 degrees Celsius. Still, the neoliberal paradigm that both Kok I and II venerated that environmental problems should be tackled by the free market or societal organizations. Slowly, the optimism towards climate policy, that marked the eighties, disappeared. Measures to reduce climate change are being nullified by the expansion plans for the Rotterdam Harbour, Schiphol and farmers that want to realize their grow ambitions (Panhuysen, 1997). In terms of economic growth, the nineties were somewhat turbulent. In the beginning of the decade, the economic growth took a dive. From 4% growth in 1990 to a 0,5% shrinkage of the economy in 1993 (Van Ingen Schenau, 2001). The reason behind to economic downturn were the negative developments on the labour market. For instance, unemployment increased with 65.000 in 1993. Luckily, the Dutch economy prospered in the late nineties again with a yearly average of 4 percent growth that continued just before the change of the millennium.

The new millennium introduces itself with a relapse of the Dutch economy. In 2001, the volume growth of the GDP was with 1,3% far below the since the 1970 long-lasting average growth of 2,7%. Even more so than the average grow rates of the last five years, where the economy had grown with an impressive 3,7% (Van Noort, 2001). In the political landscape, shifts started to occur. The new coalition under the lead of Jan-Peter Balkenende meant that The Netherlands was governed by Christian-democrats once more. As a result, a (Christian) ideology made its entrance in the political landscape: communitarianism. Roughly speaking, this meant putting more emphasis on communities, social relations, and above all: cherishing societal traditions. A sharp contrast compared to focus on the individual person of previous decades. Then in 2002, a consequential and lasting event was exposed in the infrastructure sector; The construction fraud. Via parliamentary survey, it was eventually brought to light that in the period of 1990 till approx. 2000, over 344 construction companies were found guilty of secretly making illegal price agreements between them and their competitors who were also participating in a tender (Korsten, 2005). These illegal price agreements resulted in unfair price competition between the contractors and the government. Further, in 2006 to 2007, the perspective on climate change started to shift ones more: the second climate wave. This time from a negative connotation towards a more positive discourse. The movement was marked by more bottom-up initiatives, sustainable start-ups, and an increasing climate awareness of bigger multinationals and NGOs. Corporate Social Responsibility becomes the new norm. On the whole, the second climate wave largely consisted of ecological modernization and a yet more withdrawing government. In addition, the focus shifted to find solutions and more away from communicating problems (Bosman, 2014). Furthermore, the start of the second big worldwide financial disaster after the stock market crash of 1929: the housing crisis of 2008. Kickstarted by the fall of Lemman Brothers in 2008, this recession lasted long into 2013 and has to this day drastically changed society's view on the financial sector. In the middle of this economic turmoil, the (minority) cabinet of the Rutte I was formed in 2010. Till date, that liberal-oriented prime minister is still running and currently in his third term. The main intentions of the coalition was the remediate government spending, increasing public safety and reducing the size of the government (PDC, 2003). The closing events of this historical timeline will be the main targets for Rutte II (2012 to 2017). Again, sorting out government spending, dividing the financial burdens fairly, and enabling a sustainable grow of the economy (PDC, 2018).

In the main, there some take-aways from the text above. Besides the societal turbulent times that resulted in, among other things, a more individualistic and opinionated society - there have been considerable changes in the political landscape. To an extent, these were affected by the fluctuation in the economy. Considering that, when Western

economy was called to an abrupt stop as a direct result of the two oil crises - the political establishment moved away from the traditional public ethos administered by the anti-cyclic Keynesian economic policy, towards a public policy that started opting for more market forces in the public sector, less government, privatization and deregulation. Altogether, the effects of which are still evident on public organizations till this day. Here, several economic factors – such as the national unemployment rate, national debt, and annual economic growth – are plotted in graphs combined with notable political, societal, and economic events, providing an explicit overview. For this introductory section of this report, the established level of understanding will suffice for now, but many of these factors will be discussed in greater detail in the literature review of this report. Now this chapter will transition from a national perspective towards the sector-specific perspective of the infrastructure sector.

## Attachment 2 – Contract types

The contract types in this attachment are, for as much as possible, organized on the basis of their introduction dates. Herein, providing the reader with the consecutive development as to the conception of how a contract can be arranged. Moreover, the first paragraph of every sub section will firstly discuss what the contract type entails, whereafter the time of emergence in the Dutch infrastructure sector will be discussed. The first contract type that will be discussed is the design, bid, build contract.

### Design, Bid, Build

Traditionally, the Dutch government was fully responsible for the plan-making, design, maintenance and operation of the Dutch infrastructure network. The executive bodies or local authorities controlled the entire operation, from the start till the end. From setting out the agenda, to exploratory studies, to ultimately the operation of the delivered infrastructure. This is known as the design, bid, build model and was, until the 1990s, the conventional approach to procure infrastructure projects (E. J. M. Arts, 2007). For this, the contract authority was bound to create a detailed design, be it with the assistance of an engineering firm. Subsequently, this would be translated into an extensive tender documentation with, among other things, a separate material calculation (Dutch: 'RAW-bestek'). Thereafter, the project was at the start procured for the construction phase and then, again, for the maintenance phase. From a neo-classical perspective, that is; the 'new public management perspective' - this entire procurement strategy was thought to be inefficient with overall unnecessary high transaction and failure costs. In turn, this commenced the search towards other contract forms, which arguably gave rise to the design & construct contracts.

### Design & construct

The design & construct (D&C) contract is an integrated contract, whereby the contractor is responsible for the development of the design and the execution thereof. It also implied that, instead of providing an elaborated design in detail, the contracting authority during a D&C contract preferably only requests certain outputs to be delivered, based on the general demands and wishes of involved public parties (Lenferink, Tillema, & Arts, 2013). On the whole, this movement towards further integration resulted in a redistribution of risks between the principal and the contractor. At its core, the hypothesis is that D&C contracts give the contractor plenty of design freedom and that the contractor often gets a chance to apply process and product innovations (Priemus, 2009). Konings and Lourens (2004) add to this that D&C contractors have already invested in R&D. Remarkably, before the start of integrated contracts, the lack of innovation in the infrastructure sector was usually attributed to the relatively small size of the firms (EIB, 2003; Konings & Lourens, 2004) and the heterogeneity of the product [projects] (Priemus, 2009). In any case, advocates of integrated contracts argued that a better price/quality could be conceived by a tighter integration of design and construction expertise (Priemus, 2009).

In the Netherlands this new way became known as "Innovative Procurement" and was officially sent to the parliament in 1999 (Boes & Dorée, 2009). This programme resulted in the combining of policy to shift activities from public to private sector and to make the public sector work in a more market oriented manner (Boes & Dorée, 2009). What is more, after the parliamentary inquiry into collusion in the construction industry from 2002, national organisations such as the Regieraad (2005) and PSiBouw (2004) were formed to institutionalise and support the change of procurement policy and overall reform in the construction industry (Boes & Dorée, 2009; Dewulf & Noorderhaven, 2011). Later, initiatives were launched by, for example PIANOo<sup>6</sup> (2004) and Stadswerk (1990) to encourage a transfer of knowledge between the public clients responsible for tender procedures and purchasing (Boes & Dorée, 2009). And although RWS had its first large-scale experiment with the forerunner of the D&C contract in 1986 with the construction of the Maeslant flood defence, the D&C contracts was only truly integrated in their organisation in 2008 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008). Not much later, other large public organisation such as ProRail also changed their procurement strategy from design, bid, and build towards design and construct. Surprisingly, although local authorities – municipalities, waterboards, etc. – also declared their intentions to support the 'innovative procurement' program, around 2008; they have not as yet changed their procurement policy and have until now only experimented with integrated contracts on a

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<sup>6</sup> Professioneel en Innovatief Aanbesteden, Netwerk voor Overheidsopdrachtgevers

limited scale (Boes & Dorée, 2009). By all means, this was necessary for a successful widespread implementation of the new contract type, as local authorities are responsible for 85% of the funding in the country (A. Dorée & Boes, 2002).

## Design, Build, Finance and Maintain (DBFM)

DBFM(O) contracts are long-term integrated project delivery system. With this contract type, the responsibility for the design, construction, finance, maintenance, and - if deemed necessary - the operation, is all transferred to the private parties. Thus, altogether, the DBFM model brings about a considerable transfer of all sorts of risks to private parties. Consequently, due to the extensive liability, actors are forced to create consortia of developers, constructors, financiers and operators. In this process, necessary knowledge and resources are also brought together (Koppenjan et al., 2018; F. Verhees, Van Marrewijk, Leendertse, & Arts, 2015). Also, because this consortium finances the project themselves, the general assumption is that the partnership is encouraged to devise innovation that bring about further cost reduction and optimisation in later stages of the project (Stuiveling & Van Schoten, 2013). The rationale here is to invest relatively more in the early phases of the project, in order to afterwards safe costs in the maintenance phase. Overall, this results in a more efficient project flow (Lenferink, 2013). In this contract type, private parties receive financial encouragements to finish the promised deliverables on time and within scope (Lenferink, Verweij, Leendertse, & Busscher, 2017; Stuiveling & Van Schoten, 2013), as the Dutch government mainly structures the payments mechanism around the availability of the infrastructure (Koppenjan et al., 2018). Overall, the contractual agreements, payment mechanisms and possible sanctions should instigate sufficient stimulus for private parties to contribute to public projects and services (F. Verhees et al., 2015). Simultaneously, the involvement of banks ensures extra layer of confidence for the contracting authority that costs exceedances will be kept to a minimum, while the long project duration allows private parties to earn back their initial investment.

The text above states the contemporary form of the DBFM and might, by and large, suggest a seemingly smooth endorsement by both private and public parties. For completeness sake, however, it is important to understand the overall development of PPP throughout the years. In view of this, this paragraph will outline the path that the DBFM model took from initial concept towards a more broadly accepted contract strategy. To start, concurrently with the initiation of the D&C contracts, there were also plans for further integration between the market and public organisations. In fact, in the 1980s, under the second cabinet of Lubbers (1986-1989), the earliest plans for 'public-private partnerships' (PPPs) were already devised. During this period in time, many European countries were plagued by an economic downtime, that resulted in the economization of government spending. Still and all, infrastructure projects were seen as a solution to propel the economy forward. From this dilemma, the concept sprouted that private sector parties could finance the construction and maintenance of public buildings and infrastructure, an idea that later came to be known as public-private partnerships (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018). Originally, the second cabinet of Lubbers was inspired by the UK, where the Prime Minister Thatcher successfully designed the first PPPs. Thereafter, in the coalition agreement of 1986 and various other policy documents, new forms of public-private corporation were considered that would encourage private sector investment in public infrastructure (Klijn, 2009). In the period between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the first large-scale PPP were procured; the Wijkertunnel and the 'Nord' tunnel, both of which financed by private banks. Leaving out the details, the outcomes of these projects were close to disastrous and resulted in PPPs being discredited as an instrument for many years (Koppenjan, 2005; Van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). Then, in 1998, the PPP concept was rehabilitated by the Dutch Prime Minister Kok (Stuiveling & Van Schoten, 2013). Not much later, the Knowledge Centre PPP was established as a part of the Ministry of Finance. After orientating themselves by examining forms of PPP in other countries – mainly Anglo-Saxon counties - the Knowledge Centre started offering advice to the central government on specific PPP projects. In very short, the overall advice was strongly inspired by the UK's PFIs, promoting instruments such as market explorations, the public-private comparator (PPC)<sup>7</sup> and the public sector comparator (PSC), and contractual arrangements, more specifically a standardized DBFM(O) contract (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018). It is in this period where the Dutch version of PPP obtained his recognizable shape, be it that up until then; not so many PPP projects were procured. Eventually the turning point came around 2004, when institutional transplantation took off (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018). Largely owing to a report of 2005 from a newly established PPP taskforce set up by the Ministry of Transport. Herein, numerous barriers for proper PPP implementation were identified. One of these barriers was the fact that, due to the limited number of PPP projects, little experience had been gained

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<sup>7</sup> PPC is an ex-ante evaluation of the added value of a PPP compared to the traditional (public) realization of the project. If the PPC indicates that added value can be realized, a DBFM(O) contract should be used.

over the years (MIW, 2005). As a matter of interest, due to the extremely long contract duration, not a single DBFM(O) has been finished so far. The N31 will be the first, but only in 2022 (Duisenberg, 2017). So, in an effort to gain more figures from the model, a politically supported coalition led by the Ministry of Finance, started to force reluctant ministries to adopt PPPs. As for example, the obligation to perform PPCs for projects of a certain scope (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018). Interestingly enough, a later research from Eversdijk and Korsten (2015) concluded that, in practice, often other types of contract were adopted, despite the outcomes of the PPCs. Another acceleration came in 2007 following the Ruding Commission report, when the commission advised to lower the threshold for the implementation of a PCC from projects of 112.5 million euros towards 80 million euros (Koppenjan et al., 2020). Consequently in 2013, the Court of Audit could report that, at that time, 13 DBFM(O)-projects totalling 6 billion euros were procured, resulting in an 'added value of 800 million euros (Rekenkamer, 2013). All around this time, RWS and the Central Government Real Estate Agency (CGREA) started using the PPP model more frequently. That said, the CGREA adopted the most far-reaching model: the DBFMO. Thus transferring the operation accountability to the market. RWS, on the other hand, developed its own version of the PPP; DBFM model. For the purpose of keeping the 'operation' part internally, as it considers this its core business (Koppenjan et al., 2018). In total, from 2003 till 2020, RWS procured 21 projects using the DBFM contract (Koppenjan et al., 2020). Furthermore, the waterboards started adopting the DBFM model in 2002, where Delfland was the first waterboard to apply the DBFM with the construction of the Harnashpolder Waste treatment plant. Although the first waterboard PPP was viewed with some scepticism, the project was considered a success. Although, an evaluation executed by Hombergen and Hertogh proofed that the 'finance' component was in hindsight unnecessary expensive for Delfland. On a final note, the DBFM model has received quite some critique in the past years, especially publicly from the 'McKinsey report' (Rijkswaterstaat, 2019). Either way, RWS made its decision in 2019 to stop procuring by way of the DBFM model. Debate surrounding this topic persist to this day and leaves the future of DBFM unclear.

## Alliance

There are many definitions of an alliance model. Arguably, the comprehensive comes from Lahdenperä (2009), who states that *"[project] alliancing is a project delivery method based on a joint contract between the key actors to a project whereby the parties assume joint responsibility for the design and construction of the project to be implemented through a joint organization, and where the actors share both positive and negative risks related to the project and observe the principles of information accessibility in pursuing close cooperation"*. Key in this definition are the words; through a joint organisation. With an alliance model - officially referred to as a 'institutionalized PPP' - a new company is established with mixed capital from both public and private parties (Cruz & Marques, 2011). The principle behind the alliance model can perhaps best be demonstrated by juxtaposing it with a different public-private partnership. Momentarily, according to van Ham (2002), there are two types of public private partnerships; the concession model and the alliance model. Here, the concession model is recognized by a tight integration between the different project phases (design, maintain, operation, etc.). The added value of this model largely comes from lowering the transaction costs - often under the connotation 'extra value-for-money' - and the fact that the private party themselves can develop new and innovative ideas (Klijn, 2009). The motives and emergence of this contract type is already extensively discussed in the previous paragraph, under the name its most known for: DBFM(O) contracts. On the other hand, project alliancing is characterized by connecting public and private parties, and working in equal partnership on a joint project in which they share responsibilities (Eversdijk & Korsten, 2008). The added value evolves from the open, relational environment that is created by mainly focussing on interactive process management. With this, the relations between independent actors in alliance contracts are similar to those in network structures (Klijn & Van Twist, 2007) In contrast, the relation types of the concession model (DBFM) remains fairly hierarchical, as there remain a strict client-contractor relationship (Eversdijk & Korsten, 2015). Thus, the concession model limits the co-production to the procurement phase, whereafter the emphasis is mainly on monitoring. By comparison, the co-production in the alliance model persist for a longer period of time (Klijn & Van Twist, 2007). Similarly, it can be concluded that the concession model is more concerned with dividing the responsibilities and associated risks, whereas the alliance focusses on sharing responsibilities and risks (Klijn & Van Twist, 2007).

It is generally accepted that the alliance model started in 1992, when British Petroleum launched a collaboration process for an oil project in the North Sea (Bakshi, 1995). From there, as a result of positive experiences with this project, the alliance model was imported by Australia and remains widely adopted till this day (Manley, 2002). Subsequently, the model was adopted in the UK. Later in 1999, The Netherlands started adopted the alliance. Of the Dutch public sector agencies, ProRail has been the most frequent user of project alliancing forms (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018). In general,

alliance models are in The Netherlands more often used for area development, compared to larger infrastructure projects (Eversdijk, 2013). Important to note, however, up until 2015 - only five projects have been procured using the alliance model in the Netherlands. Those numbers are with regards to alliance model between private and public parties. With regards to merely public alliances; the High Water Protection Program is in the GWW sector arguably the most commonly known. For this program, RWS is collaborating with 21 water boards for the execution, finance, and knowledge development in order to improve the national water safety. Also, numerous private joint ventures have been created over the years for larger DBFM projects. Nonetheless, the truly widespread adoption of public-private alliances in The Netherlands never occurred. On this note, Eversdijk (2013) argues that the alliance model isn't well match with the risk aversion attitude of high-ranking public administrators. To elaborate, the Ministry of Finance aims to minimize the risks of large PPPs projects. With an DBFM model, for example, the usage of an extensive contractual agreement ties off risks and divides it between the parties beforehand. In contrast, the alliance PPP model holds no ex-ante risk allocation, as potential risks are shared. In practice, this leaves open that when risks occur, the Chamber of Representatives could insist an explanation of the responsible ministry. Considering this, a DBFM model would – on a governmental level – be favoured over an alliance model.

## Two phase contract

The name communicates rather unambiguously the intention of this contract type; the agreement behind the contracting authority and contractor is divided into two phases. In the first phase, the accent is on the engineering. The second phase only comes into force, when some suspensive conditions have been met. For example, when enough information is obtained by the client and contractor and the project risks and overall uncertainty have been reduced to acceptable levels for both parties. Thereafter, the second phase starts where the actual price determination of the execution phase comes into play. Overall, it can be said that the main function of the two phase contract is to minimize risks in an ex-ante manner. With respect to this, an older Dutch collaboration model already aimed at just doing that; called the 'Bouwteam model'. The main difference between the two contract types are the underlying terms and conditions that are being used. For starters, the classical Bouwteam model of 1992 includes provision of the 'VGBouw agreement'. This set of provisions is intended as a tool for the client and contractor to establish the legal form of the construction team under negotiation. Also, this agreement assumes that if the contracting authority and contractor agree on the project price, the UAV (at the time 1989, now 2012) will apply for the execution phase. For all that, an extensive empirical study from Chao-Duivis and Wamelink (2013) showed that the entire VGBouw 1992 is in a pressing need for a rigorous update. In fact, the study recommends to create an entirely new model that should regulate all relationships in the Bouwteam in a coherent manner. This is where the introduction of the two phase contract comes in. Where the bouwteam model is shaped for the terms and conditions of the UAV, the two phase contract will be set up on the basis of the UAV-IC (and the principal agreement). The basis of the UAV and the UAV-IC are fundamentally different in various ways. But concretely, this means that during the bouwteam (under UAV), the contracting authority takes on a coordinating role for the establishment of the design, while also having responsibilities during the execution phase. A role that is no longer appropriate for the set-up of the modern day RWS. In contrast, in the two phase contract (UAV-GC), the contracting authority is exempted from much of this coordinating role.

To provide some perspective; the 'classic' Dutch Bouwteam model was already introduced in the 1950s. At that time, the intention was to improve construction speed and decrease project costs (Chao-Duivis & Koning, 2001; M. A. M. C. van den Berg, 2010). Over time, the model was increasingly used, especially in 1998 during the standardization of the model in the VGBouw (Chao-Duivis, 2012). Then, in 2002, the bouwteam model momentarily lost popularity again after it had been associated with the construction fraud (PEC, 2002). After that event, it took years before the model gain momentum again. Before the recent revival of bouwteam/two-phase contracts in The Netherlands, however, the United Kingdom was already procuring with 'variants' on the two-phase contract. Or how these procurement strategies are collectively coined there; Early-contractor involvement. Examples of these early-contractor involvement models are; Two Stage Open Book (TSOB), Supply Chain Collaboration, or Integrated Project Insurance. Here, the TSOB collaboration model is practically identical to the Dutch , counterpart. Though, the UK models have already been in use since 2011. Moreover, an evaluation done by KCL (2015) showed that, among other things; TSOB resulted in lower cost, design optimisations, and improved risk control. This could have been the spark that revived the interest in bouwteam agreements in The Netherlands. The rebirth of the model began in the first place by an initiative the integral platform Duurzaam Gebouwd in collaboration with; Simmons & Simmons, Tauw, Witteveen & Bos and PRO6 - to develop a

contemporary version of the Bouwteam agreement for both the UAV and the UAV-gc in end 2018. In May 2019, the consultation document was published. Almost simultaneously with the announcement of RWS in the 'McKinsey report' to change their procurement strategy (Rijkswaterstaat, 2019). All these development resulted in a sharp increase of bouwteam models. Where in 2017, only six bouwteams were used, this number increased in 2018 to 55.

### 'No-contract'

Technically speaking, not a single project in the Dutch GWW sector will ever be procured without the use of a contract of some sort. Therefore, it goes without saying that the 'no-contract' model is not an official contract type. Nevertheless, in 2013, exactly the 'no-contract' mentality was expressed with the initiation of the first 'Project DOEN'. Project DOEN is in this research seen as a 'hybrid model', meaning it is a mix between a certain contract type ('no-contract'), procurement methods, and awarding mechanism. A full description of Project DOEN will be provided when discussing hybrid models. Although, in the meantime, the model will be occasionally appear elsewhere when discussing the following two component of a contract strategy. Also, the 'Project DOEN' contract strategy has been rather unfortunately named. Meaning, that one can, for example, confusingly speak of a 'Project DOEN project'. Thus, for readability purposes, 'Project DOEN' will from now on be termed 'DOEN'. In the template of DOEN, it was explicitly stated that the UAV-GC would not be applicable. That is to say, some aspects and processes of the UAV-GC might be used, but not necessary the standard document with the terms and conditions. The terminology that is used in the template is that DOEN doesn't use a contract, but rather a 'manual'.

## Attachment 3 – Procurement procedures

On this basis of this feature, the procurement method discussed in this chapter have been classified into two categories; procurement methods without a dialogue (traditional) or procurement method with a dialogue. These will be discussed in the subsequent two section.

### Non-dialogue procedure

On average, open procedures are the most common procurement method. They allow all interested contractors to submit a tender. Similarly to every other procurement procedure that will be discussed; open procedures involve strict requirement for international notification, clear and comprehensive tender documents, and fair and transparent tendering, evaluation and award practices (EIB, 2018). For this, the contract authority should possess a clear understanding of his planned objectives in order to present the extensive tender documentation with all the project technicalities. The method procedure enhances competition in the tendering process, as the number of participants are not being reduced through prequalification. Considering that, the open procedure only consist of one phase; the bid evaluation phase (Carbonara, Costantino, & Pellegrino, 2016). Continuing to the restricted procedure, this procedure has two phases; the prequalification phase and the bid evaluation phase. Meaning, only economic operators that have been invited by the contract authority after the prequalification phase can submit a tender. At the heart of the trade-off between these two procurement methods lays an economic predicament. To clarify, the prequalification phase requires the collection and evaluation of prospective bidders' performance, thereby increasing the overall transaction costs. That said, the greater ex ante information to be managed reduces the ambiguity on expected performance and thus reducing the amount of ex post information requirements and the probability of ex post adaptation and changes (Hensher & Houghton, 2004). Seeing that, the prequalification helps in narrowing the bidders to those with a wider experience in similar projects and stronger financial reliability, which in turn reduces the risk of non-compliance with the contract requirements (Al-Reshaid & Kartam, 2005). Put differently, the contract authority should assess the overall complexity of the project beforehand. Would the ex-ante transaction costs save trouble down the line and therefore reduce potential ex-post transaction costs? Already deciding between these two can be difficult, let alone including the second types of procurement method in this decision-making process: the dialogue procedure.

### Dialogue procedure

Up until the period of 2004, the negotiated procedure was increasingly being used as projects and project environments became increasingly complex (M. Hoezen & Doree, 2008). A handicap of this procedure, however, was that it leaves room for extensive post-tender negotiations. This left some concerns, in particular the risk of disclosure of confidential information amongst contenders and the possible discriminatory effects of the negotiations and scope alterations that happened after a preferred bidder had been chosen (M. Hoezen & Doree, 2008). All in all, extensive post-tender negotiations were therefore considered to harm fair and equal competition. The desire to negotiated in the procurement phase of complex projects, as opposed to the Europeans Commission's maxim of fair and equal markets, meant a compromise had to be made. From 1996 till 2004, after going back-and-forth between several European institutions, the adjustment of the negotiated procedure went to a fully-fledged procedure; the competitive dialogue (M. Hoezen & Doree, 2008). During the legislative process several objectives were suggested. For instance that competitive dialogue should not only preserve competition between economic operators, but also fill the need of the contract authority to discuss all aspects of the contract with each candidate (EC, 2004a). But besides that, herein also focussing on creating trust based collaboration and providing stimulus for innovation (EC, 2004a). Despite that, in the final objective of the competitive dialogue, these last two purposes aren't included. Simultaneously with the increasing complexity of project, the competitive dialogue was an answer to realize public-private partnerships more easily (EC, 2004b). As before the initiation of the competitive dialogue procedure, for procuring complex project, contracting authorities were forced to either use the restricted procedure that is often too inflexible. Or choose the negotiated procedure, which was intended to be an exceptional procedure with specific legal justifications (EC, 2015). Up until this point, besides being that the competitive dialogue is much more structured and regulated than the negotiated procedure, there seems to be a number of similarities between the two. Especially in the later phases of the tendering process. The biggest difference, however, is the fact that the competitive dialogue reduces the scope significantly after the preferred bidder is chosen (Soliño & Gago de Santos, 2010). For the reason that, during the preferred bidder



negotiations, parties are merely permitted to clarify, specify and fine-tune existing agreements (Soliño & Gago de Santos, 2010). Essentially, tenderers cannot substantially modify what has been agreed upon in the competitive phase, for the main purpose of not distorting competition. Though, to an even greater extent, in reality there is no 'universal' approach to conduct the dialogue procedure in public projects. Considering that, in addition to the two EU directive dialogue procedures, public owners from different countries have developed different dialogue procedures based on local necessities and circumstances (Wondimu, 2019). As a result, comparable approaches have different names depending on the country their being used in. With this in mind, another variant will forthwith be put forward, that can be seen as an expanded 'local' variant of the negotiated procedure; the dialogue procedure in the Best Value approach (Wondimu, 2019). The concept will be further explained in the section 'Hybrid model'. But for now, in very short, the Best Value Approach (BVA) is based on a rationale that assumes that the suppliers are the experts, and the client is the non-expert. Hereby transferring the majority of the risks to the contractor. In this regard, the emphasis of BVA is on finding the contractor's expertise and the proper selection of those, reflects how negotiations during the procurement stage are expanded (M. E. L. Hoezen, 2012). For this particular component, it is useful to highlight the dissimilarities between the line of reasoning of the BVA and competitive dialogue. Especially because both procedure aim to decrease post-contractual renegotiations of the contract, yet their approaches differ. Of course, on a closer look, many differences can be found, but here the most crucial will be discussed. So, at the outset, the competitive dialogue aims to reduce the complexity of the project, whereas the BVA intends to strengthen the confidence of the contract authority that the contractor with his skills can handle the complexity of the project (M. E. L. Hoezen, 2012). Also, during the dialogue phase of the competitive dialogue, the suppliers and a client work together to develop an optimal solution for a project, whereas in the BVA; the supplier that is selected for the clarification phase is considered as the expert (Wondimu, Klakegg, Lædre, & Ballard, 2018). Furthermore, in the competitive dialogue procedure, a minimum of three contractors should develop competition to ensure a sufficient level of competition. In contrast, with the BVA procedure only a single supplier will develop a project, since the selection phase is already over (Wondimu et al., 2018). Naturally, the losers need to be compensated for their costs. Therefore, the (ex-ante) transaction costs of BVA are also typically lower than those of the competitive dialogue (M. E. L. Hoezen, 2012; Siemonsma, Van Nus, & Uyttendaele, 2012). Lastly, next to the BVA, even more takes on the dialogue procedure emerged in the Dutch procurement sector. DOEN is an example of another hybrid form between the competitive dialogue and the BVA. For starters, although the third stage of the DOEN procedure is technically a (competitive) dialogue stage, in essence; the third stage is focused on finding the right contractor. Just in this case, the contracting authority is not searching for technical expertise (BVA), but more towards 'relational' know-how. Also, the contracting authority won't have a dialogue with the tenderer with regards to the final design of the project, as according to tendering guidelines of DOEN (2016); *"No selection will be made on the basis of the solution for the bridge [project]"*. This would normally be done in 'traditional' competitive dialogue. Instead, these negotiation take place in the fourth and last stage of the process – with a single contractor. Accordingly, this would be more in line with the negotiation procedure.

## Attachment 4 – Award Mechanisms

In terms of the award mechanisms, various alterations have been made over the years. Progressively shifting from being solely concerned with the price element, towards including a 'quality-component' in the evaluation procedure. In the main, these transition have been categorized into three different types of award mechanism; 'lowest price', 'MEAT', and '100% quality'. All of these three will be discussed below.

### Lowest price

Until roughly the beginning of the millennium, the 'standard award criteria of Dutch public authorities was solely based on 'lowest price'. In essence, this means that the contractors are receiving no additional credit for tenders that are above the required effort. In fact, 'extras' are – according to this award system - counterproductive as they only increase the bid of the tender. This leads to the fact that competition can purely occur on the basis of price (Crucq & Bossink, 2011). Also by the contract execution, the contractor will strictly limit itself to the minimum requirements. Basically, the object is to create a highly competitive market driven by one-dimensional cost competition. Whereby the focus is solely on regulating individual transactions and factors such as; the dynamics of a longer timeframe, the effects on innovation, technology development and welfare creation - are not explicitly taken into consideration (A. G. Dorée, 2004). SMO (1992) studied the overall economic power of the Dutch GWW sector and wrote in 1992 already that "there is no gain in innovating". Moreover, Maks and De Haan (1997) argue that these 'auction-type' market may end up suffering from the Bertrand paradox. To elaborate on this further, this paradox declares that in the event of a downturn, prices can be forced down to the level of variable costs (bidders cease to cover their fixed cost). As such, businesses in these situation have to dig deep into their resources leading to a 'race to the bottom'. Accordingly, these circumstances lead to vertical co-ordination through mergers and takeovers or horizontal co-ordination by collusion (van Waarden, 1996). With this in mind, another event can be introduced that had a drastic effect on the Dutch GWW sector from that time onwards: the construction fraud.

In the year 2002, the procurement of construction work in the public sector became a major issue in The Netherlands. Initially widely revealed by a documentary on a Dutch national television program, that publicly displayed evidence of collusive behaviour, bid rigging and corrupt practices among construction projects and civil servants. No much later, on the 12th of December 2002, the published report to this inquiry from the parliamentary inquiry, amounting to over 3000 pages, proofed that in 394 projects procured between 1996 and 2001 - collusion was committed (PEC, 2002). A significant detail in this turmoil is that during the in-depth investigation of the Dutch cabinet themselves, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water State was arguably disproportionated affected by this investigation, compared to the three other ministries that were also investigated. The underlying reason was that during this investigation, only larger projects were selected. Resulting 77% of the total investigated projects were infrastructure projects. Thus, in sum, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water state procured around 64% of all these fraudulent cases. Understandably resulting in a blow for the ministry and, in turn, for Rijkswaterstaat. Although the investigations typically focused on the procurement behaviour of national public clients, local public clients were also under suspicion (A. G. Dorée, 2004). Earlier research into the Dutch municipalities' procurement approaches had shown that client-contractor relationships were often recurrent, with reputation being an important criterion (Ferguson, Langford, & Chan, 1995). To continue, the collusion during this project occurred in such a way that the tender price was decided upon by the 'successful' bidder, after which 'unsuccessful' bidders would submit a higher offer. All on the predetermined agreement that the 'winning' company would compensate the 'losers'. As severe and sudden as this might have been portrayed in the media at that time, it is important to provide some perspective with regards to this case. Especially since as far back as four decades – it was known that such one-dimensional, highly competitive environments typically overlook the opportunities to improve an industry's performance and give rise to problems in project control. Moreover, every time contractors will file additional claims to minimize financial losses, they slowly shape adversarial relationships with the client and thus further break down the trust between them (Bowley, 1966; Emmerson & Emmerson, 1962). What is more, around the time of the Dutch construction fraud, this unfavourable outcome was already recognized by the international infrastructure sector. Numerous groups stressed to move away from adversarial relationships and low price selection (Courtney & Winch, 2004; Egan, 2002; Fisher & Green, 2000). Surprisingly, in the 1990s, a considerable time period before the construction fraud, the Dutch infrastructure sector already started to adopt more innovative procurement schemes and policies (A. G. Dorée, 2004). On the whole, this movement – in turn accelerated by the construction fraud – introduced, among other things, a new type of award system that would stress the need for

'quality-driven' competition in tenders (A. Dorée & Boes, 2002). One that similarly needed to (re)affirm the 'joint social task' of both the contract authority and the contractor; the MEAT criteria. A topic that will be further elaborated upon in the next paragraph.

## Most Economic Advantageous Tender (MEAT)

With the Guide MEAT 2005, the MEAT-philosophy was introduced at Rijkswaterstaat (Crucq & Bossink, 2011). MEAT is an acronym that stands for: Most Economic Advantageous Tender. The essence of MEAT is to award on the basis of 'added value'. The two main principles of the MEAT are the fictive price correction method and the ratio method. The price correction method means that the tender price will be corrected on the basis of the quality value of the offer. Moreover, the ratio method means that the ratio between quality and price will be determined. Here, the ratio illustrates how much quality per euro the tender offer provides. Rijkswaterstaat only uses the first method and Delfland. What is more, three award criteria that are used in the MEAT mechanism are the performance criteria, quality criteria, and price criteria. To further elaborate on each of them; the performance criteria is characterized by the fact that the quality of the tender can be measured in a standardized, quantitative fashion by way of a performance units. Thus, the fictive discount contributed by this criteria is readily calculated by multiplying the offered performance units with the corresponding performance unit value. Contrary to the performance criteria, the quality criteria is solely determined by qualitative reasoning. Examples of this are risk management, process management, and environmental management. Thirdly and lastly comes the price criteria factor, where the tender price is the only component. Overall, by assigning value for good anticipation of the desires of the contracting authority, it stimulates the tenderers to generate added value to achieve a better competitive position compared to their competitors. Thus, the biggest difference compared to the 'lowest-price' mechanism, it that with MEAT the competition takes place on the basis of price *and* quality (Crucq & Bossink, 2011). Furthermore, after the initial implementation of the MEAT mechanism at RWS in 2005, the method has seen numerous alterations over the years. Most important of which was in 2008, when representatives of CROW<sup>8</sup> and Rijkswaterstaat opted to combine the slightly different methods of both organisation in order to create a standard for the Dutch infrastructure sector (Crucq & Bossink, 2011). Ever since, the MEAT method was periodically updated, until the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 2016. At that time, the MEAT acronym changed meaning as a result of the updated Procurement Act 2012. From then on, MEAT became the catchall-term for the three award criteria; 'BPKV'<sup>9</sup>, lowest price, and lowest lifecycle cost (PIANOO, 2016). From these three, the 'lowest lifecycle cost' is a new award criterium that enables the contract authority to include another cost criterium then just the price. An example of this is including the expected costs that arise during the entire lifecycle of the project. Among other things, this enables the contract authority to more readily weigh in aspect such as 'sustainability' in the tendering procedure. By and large, the name modification didn't change the fundamentals behind the MEAT philosophy; creating competition based on price and quality. Be it that the 'quality-aspect' became somewhat differently defined.

As already indicated in the beginning of the previous paragraph, Rijkswaterstaat started to slowly adopt the MEAT awarding mechanism in 2005. For the water boards, however, it took some time longer to incorporate this into their procurement strategy. Where in the years from 2009 to 2011, EMVI was incorporated in 20% of public procurements from other public client, the water boards had an average of 15% (P. Groot et al., 2016). Nevertheless, from 2012 onwards, the waterboards began catching up with these public parties, as (with hydraulic engineering projects) the number of EMVI tenders increased to 33% (P. Groot et al., 2016). With this, they overtook municipalities and the provinces. This is depicted in .The next in 2013, this number was further increased to 60%, surpassing the EMVI percentage of the central government (S. Hardeman, 2013). This steep increase is likely due to the implementation of the Procurement Act in 2012. Still and all, the percentage of EMVI tenders says only so much of significance of this movement. Specifically for the reason that the ratios between price and quality vary widely, as well as the actual quality sub-criteria. What 'quality' in a tender offer actually entails, varies often between public clients. In 2013, the top three quality sub criteria were project duration (41%), planning (21%), and sustainability (17%) (S. Hardeman, 2013). Important to note, Rijkswaterstaat and the Government Buildings Agency isn't incorporated in this research, as these parties are less keen on sharing their quality sub factors. The only data available regarding this issue from the water boards, comes from 2012. From this years, the most important sub criteria for quality were environmental factors, process control, and construction logistics (P. J. M. Groot et al., 2013). Next to the quality subfactors, the price/quality ratio plays a significant role in the actual attribution of the EMVI philosophy. A sample study from the EIB shows that this ratio varies widely. In

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<sup>8</sup> Centrum voor Regelgeving en Onderzoek in de Grond-, Water- en Wegenbouw en de Verkeerstechniek

<sup>9</sup> Beste Kwaliteit Prijs verhouding

2012, an average of 42% was in the awarding mechanism attributed to quality. However, 2013 showed a substantial decrease towards 27% quality and thus 73% assigned to the price component (S. Hardeman, 2013). Another research from the EIB two years later, showed that from the 200 investigated projects in 2014; the average percentage ascribed to quality was only 35%. Moreover, not a single project was procured where the percentage of quality was above 80% (Hardeman, 2015). These types of researchers illustrate the overall fluctuation of the infrastructure sector in fully implementing EMVI in their procurement strategies. To a certain extent, this can be explained by a persistent, recurring comment; the fact that transaction costs of EMVI tenders are on average 80% higher for tenderers compared to tenders solely based on lowest price (S. Hardeman, 2013). Contractors have to provide their offer with a comprehensive plan of action, showing the quality of their offer. Subsequently, the contract authority have to evaluate those offers in an objective and transparent manner, conform with the European procurement legislation. All of which is costly. Still, a counter argument to this comment is that the increase in transaction costs can be 'reclaimed' in later phases by a potential decrease in failure cost. On the whole, results of EMVI tenders have been promising, but also surprising. To clarify, S. Hardeman (2013) states that the usage of EMVI criteria doesn't so much lead to offers of higher price and higher quality, or lower price and lower quality. Instead, winning companies often have a relatively high quality, but also a rather low price compared to their competitors. As a result, these companies win EMVI tenders more often than not. This also explains why the bids of EMVI tenders are barely higher then tender where the 'lowest-price' award mechanism was used (Hardeman, 2015). Thus, instead of selecting the most inexpensive contractor with a random quality factors, the EMVI awarding mechanism acquires the most economical offer with a legitimate quality aspect.




Figure - Changes in the use of open and restricted procedures and the use of MEAT (Hardeman, 2014)


### 100% Quality

After the revision of the Public Procurement Act in 2016, the term "MEAT" was designated as an umbrella term for all award criteria, consisting according to article 2.114 paragraph 2 out of solely three award criteria: lowest price, lowest price including lifecycle cost, and lastly the best price quality ratio. Consequently, according to the European procurement Act, these are the only types award criteria that can be legally be used. Here, the first two are purely price-based mechanism and the third also incorporates quality. With the later, however, as became apparent in the previous chapter, there is considerable variance in how the 'quality' aspect is assessed compared to the price component. Percentages range from 5% all the way to 75% (Hardeman, 2015). Needless to say, these two percentages can potentially result in significant difference in tender outcomes. With this in mind, a non-official EU award mechanism will now be introduced. One that indirectly sets itself apart by designating substantially more to the quality component compared to the price component. In recent years, two types of contract strategies have implemented this sub category award mechanism; the BVA and DOEN. Starting with the BVA, the award phase of this contract strategy consists of three award criteria; risk assessment, interviews with key figures, and the quality of the plan of action (van Duren, 2013). Perhaps more importantly than each of these individual criteria is the fact that the traditional Bes approach prescribes at least 75% of the award mechanism to quality, leaving only a maximum of 25% for the price component. With this, the BVA assigns significantly more value to the quality component than the average 'best quality price ratio' award

mechanism. By doing so, the BVA fends off 'price divers'. The second different award mechanism with regards to the actual value contribution of quality, comes from DOEN. During the first DOEN project in 2013, the renovation of the Nijkerkerbrug, the decision was made to base the award mechanism a 100% on quality, meaning the tender bid price wasn't explicitly taken into consideration. What is more, DOEN was initially planned as an one-use test and also differs in some regards to other types of contract strategies. Among other things, it has four different phases for the final selection of the winning contractor. For the first two rounds, selection criteria are more or less used, be it that they differ in some aspect from traditional selection criteria. In the third phase, however, the award criteria are explicitly stated. The actual sub award criteria used in this round are; the interpretation of the customer need, process engineering (mainly focussed on relational norms), value engineering, assessing of risks, and lastly performance substantiation (DOEN, 2017). Although the first DOEN project could award a 100% on quality, in hindsight, this proved difficult for future DOEN project (DECODE, DOENNU, etc.). For the reason that doing so, turned out to be against the European Procurement Act. Therefore, follow up DOEN projects had to lower the weight of the quality criterium from 100% to 95%, meaning the price component would count for 5% in the actual award mechanism (DOEN, 2019a). Also, the procurer can still conform to the European Procurement Act if that parties decides to procure on the basis a collaboration award criteria, as can be read in paragraph 2.3.8.4. of the procurement Act. On the whole, this minor change doesn't affect the ideology behind the DOEN award mechanism, since the emphasis remains heavily on the quality aspect.

# Attachment 5 – DESTEP Analysis

In this attachment, the entire DESTEP analysis depicted. In total, discussing 40 contextual factors on the national level. An overview of the entire analysis is illustrated below.



## Demographic

*Population growth:* The most recent prognosis is that in the upcoming 30 years, till 2050, roughly 1.9 million new citizens will be living in The Netherlands (CBS, 2020). Although a cautionary note, the uncertainty margins in this forecast are considerable. Nonetheless, a significant increase, but bear in mind that the population growth in a similarly long period between 1960 and 1990 was over 3.5 million people, twice the increase of what is now expected. Thus, even though the population will increase in the upcoming years - the speed of which will lessen compared to the years before.

*Aging:* A dominant and most assured factor in the demographic development is the aging of the population. The number of citizens over 65+ years olds will increase from 3 million in 2015 towards 4.4 million in 2050 (CPB, 2015). In the most extreme case, the highest scenario in the report, the number can even increase to 5 million.

*Dispersion and urbanization:* Another uncertainty component in the future demographic outcome is the actual spreading of the population over The Netherlands. In 2013, the country side covered two-thirds of the Dutch land mass, but hosted only 32% of the population (Steenbekkers & Vermeij, 2013). Still and all, it worthy to call to mind that densification of cities has its limit (Duinen, Rijken, & Buitelaar, 2016). For now, the question of the upcoming decennia remains if the government will focus on urbanization or put more effort into equally spreading housing and economic activities. Regardless, these decision will have consequences for future mobility and the living environment (DenkWerk, 2019). Besides the urbanization phenomenon, another contrasting trend is also taking place: sub urbanization. Individuals with a higher income, and more often than not highly educated, are moving from the cities towards the

country side (Hamers, Nabielek, Piek, & Sorel, 2009). These more articulate citizens buy their new house in the periphery with the intention of keeping that area as it is. When, for example, (unwanted) projects from RWS or the DWAs are planned for such a location, this can lead to more organized protest.

*Spatial planning:* In general, land management becomes increasingly difficult. Developments such as aiming for circular economy and agriculture, increasing sustainable energy sources, and the need for more housing all compete for land. In all of this, proper spatial planning is expected from RWS and the DWAs. Withal, the increasing pressures foster the need for more recreation areas and nature protection, further complicating the issues.

## Economy

*Competitive position of The Netherlands:* Under the influence of economic globalization, that arose most strongly in the eighties, the government became convinced to strengthen the competitive position of The Netherlands. During that time, a more active focus arose towards attracting and stimulating economic activity, with the underlying intension to preserve or better yet, enlarge employment opportunities and increase productivity of business (Stellinga, 2012). On the whole, the government adjusted their economic policies by concentrating more on wage moderation, lowering administrative expenses, enacting favourable tax rates, and aiming for proper market forces (SER, 2008). Flash forward towards 2011, a new government involvement was revealed concerning the international status of the Dutch infrastructure sector, when the Netherlands Water Partnership<sup>10</sup> released a document stating their future vision, named 'Water 2020: Wereldleiders in Water'. With this vision, the pursuit was expressed that by 2020; The Netherlands should become the place where integral solutions will be contrived for international water-related issues (Ten Brinke et al., 2011). More prominently, the endeavour became to create the 'Water Valley' of the world, hinting at the famous Silicon Valley in San Francisco.

*Economizing and GDP:* An important incentive of the past decades was economizing governmental spending. A motivation that on its own is nothing new but became once again a political precondition after every EU member state agreed upon signing the Maastricht Treaty in 1998. In short, the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, defined two criteria and reference values for compliance. These are the maximum deficit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio of 3%, and a debt to GDP ratio of 60% (Pennington, 2013). Besides that, a large portion of the budgetary institutional framework of the Eurozone is built on the concept of GDP. For example, the EMU balance and above all – a policy agenda were economic 'growth' is often seen as the holy grail (Verduijn, 2013). Accordingly, the inevitable economic cycles of the national GDP could be seen as an important provoker for policy changes. For this reason, the fluctuation of the Dutch GDP is important to take into account. Focussing on the established period of this research, in 2013 - after two years of steadily growth - the Dutch GDP started to decrease once again. This time, however, The Netherlands was one of the few Northern European countries that experienced a shrinkage of GDP, as France, Germany and Belgium were steadily increasing (CBS, 2014).

*Pressing innovation:* For some years, the government is aiming for an innovation objective. This implies that roughly 2,5% of the Dutch GGP should be invest into innovation (Rijksoverheid, 2010b). For RWS, that objective resulted into the creation of a new procurement strategy: innovation-oriented procurement.

*Economic crises and booms:* Starting from the 1970s, economic crises became more widespread than they were ever before. In attachment 1, the first and second oil crises were already introduced, that largely let to the financial crises of the eighties. In turn, these events sparked the rise of public-private partnerships (Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018). After some more local economic crises, the financial world took another big hit on August 2007 when the Lehman Brother's fell. It took some time, around two years, before this shock was felt in Europe. But when it did – the consequences were severe. The ripple effect from the American housing crises, sparked off the European debt crises. A crises that would heavily effect European countries, and downright crippling the Southern countries. For The Netherlands, the crises lasted till 2013. Up until that time, the government executed austerity measures. Potentially, this could have affected (semi-)public organisations, such as Rijkswaterstaat. After that, as often happens with economic crises, the Dutch economic recovered and an economic boom followed. During these high tide, government spending often increases.

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<sup>10</sup> The Netherlands Water Partnership is a network of 181 internationally-oriented Dutch organisations working in the water sector. The members include private companies, NGOs, governmental organisations and knowledge institutes.

*The future economy:* In recent years, a societal debate had been sparked concerning the outlook of our future economy. Generally, the argumentations and potentialities used in this debate can be described amongst the lines of the triple-P concept<sup>11</sup> (Planet, Profit, People). Presently, new economic ideals are expressed, such as the doughnut economy, the zero-growth economy and economy of joy. Specifying each of these economic models falls far outside the scope of this report. Nonetheless, the key take-away is that these economic are serious alternatives to the current growth-economy model. Adopting a different model such as the doughnut economic – as the city of Amsterdam already did - will have substantial repercussions on the societal outlook with regards to education, healthcare, income, energy and political voices.

*The entrepreneurial state:* The discovery of new inventions has in the past been strongly determined for economic dynamics (Rijkswaterstaat, 2020). For a long time, the market was seen as the metaphorical motor to push forward innovation. Over the past years, the tide is turning, and the common belief increases yet again that government should be responsible for the most important initiations – as only she is able to invest in exceedingly long-term new techniques where the return on investment is simply too uncertain. For initiations of this uncertainty level, even private venture capitalist is often not too willingly to invest. Notwithstanding that these unknown techniques can have thrilling consequences for society, examples of which are the iPhone, SpaceX, the GPS system, and the worldwide web. All of which received crucial funding and/or utilized open technology from several American governmental organizations (Mazzucato, 2011).

## Social

*Institutional trust of the public:* From 2012 to 2018, the CBS conducted a large-scale research on institutional trust and social cohesion, questioning over 54 thousand citizens of 15 years and older. The results were comforting; the institutional trust in, among things; the civil servants politicians, and the European Commission - was relatively stable over that period (Schmeets & Exel, 2020). Be it that the institutional trust of the respondents in the House of Representatives was considerably lower than that of the civil servants. A concern that was already expressed in a notable document from the Board of Public Administration (RVOB, 2010). Albeit, that this does have to necessarily directly affect RWS - it was still taken along as an potential social external factor in the trend analysis from RWS in 2014 (Rijkswaterstaat, 2020; Van Cooten et al., 2014).

*Communal view concerning institutional legitimacy:* For the DWAs, there has been an ongoing point of discussion with respect to the legitimacy of the DWAs. One that already started in 1968 with an appointment of the Study Commission Waterboard by the former Minister of Infrastructure and Water (H. Havekes et al., 2010). The commission was tasked with investigating the functioning and structuring of the DWAs. Ever since, the debate regarding the legitimacy of the DWAs persists, resulting in a constant uncertainty. Especially among the public, little is known about the core tasks of the DWA. The Association of Waterboards describes this as a lack of 'water awareness' and strives to improve this aspect (Rosenbrand, 2019). What is more, in 1977 during the fusion discussions at the time, the Province of South Holland argued that larger cities such as Rotterdam, Delft, The Hague, and Vlaardingen, should be controlled via a single water authority. Similarly, to their current position on the matter, the Water Board of Delfland opposed the fusion claim. Later in 2003, the Province of South Holland pressed the wish to substantially lessen the number of water boards in South Holland. Although as a consequence, eventually the water board Schieland and Krimpenerwaard fused, Delfland remained an independent organization (Schieland, 2018). Nonetheless, the Provincial Executive of South Holland made another effort in 2010 by requesting setting up an evaluation report, reviewing the (beneficial) effect of the fusions from the water boards in 2003. Everything considered, the independent status of Delfland has been challenged numerous times in the past and remains so today.

*Individualisation, informalisation and liberalisation:* Turning now to the key components of societal development of the past decades; the individualization and liberalization. Still, these trends bring numerous difficulties in attempting to establish governmental policy. For one thing, the increasingly individual and liberal-minded citizens want to make their own decisions that merely benefit themselves. Traditional communal values became more insignificant and instead, people demand more customization (Alders, 2019). In all of this, the prevalent higher education level, widescale mobility, and democratization of information availability in combination with the invention of the social media allows the public to

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<sup>11</sup> Public policy analysts first defined the idea of environmentally sustainable development by a triangular framework, which distinguishes economic, social and ecological aspects of sustainability (Serageldin et al., 1994).



more effectively vocalize their demands. On the whole, in this societal transition, the hedonism mindset has exceeded the traditional civility value as the most important value orientation. In fact, the hedonistic value orientation has become so influential in the past 30 years that individual self-enrichment has become the central cultural value of the Dutch society (Eisinga, Scheepers, & Bles, 2012). Lastly, according to some, the digitalization shall further accelerate the individualization process (Van Doorne, 2019).

*Citizen participation and total transparency:* At the turn of the millennium, citizen participation became gradually more important when generating support and legitimacy for the government's work. An early example was the Project Infralab, that was initiated in 1993 due to dissatisfaction surrounding the decision-making process of the Betuwe Railway project. The former ministry of Infrastructure and Water State came up with an interactive method to actively involve locals in thinking along with new solutions for infrastructure problems at the time (Edelenbos, Domingo, Klok, & Van Tatenhove, 2006). Beholding the King's speech of 2013, where he unofficially established the term 'participation society', it can be argued that little has changed. Moreover, with the expanding belief of public participation, the dominate feeling under citizen did arise that all information should be shared openly. Presently this has been made possible with recent technological developments. Although full transparency into governmental organizations is welcomed from the public's point of view, the extent in which governmental organizations should co-op with this last request is still ambivalent.

*Network society:* Another frequently heard concept of the past decades is the term network society, as an alternative to the more traditional hierarchical society. Sociologist Manuel Castells - arguably the foremost theorist of the concept - defines the network society in the following fashion; 'a society whose social structure is made up of networks powered by micro-electronics-based information and communications technologies' (Castells, 2004). One of the biggest obstacles of the hierarchical model - which in many ways could also be seen as strong points - were the rigidity and slow reaction time of the power scheme. Something that seemed to collide with the social implications of globalization, the individualizing community, and the role of electronic communications technologies in society. In any case, this resulted in a shift in how power operates. To reiterate, an often heard belief is that there is a complete absence of power position in a network - which is not entirely true. Castells (2004) argues that there are four different kinds of power in networks: networking power, network power, networked power, and network-making power. In short, the first is about inclusion/exclusion, the second is about structural factors that create inclusion/exclusion, the third is about who sets in motion those structural conditions and the fourth is about whoever can make the networks. Thus, in the concept of the network society, the chief form of power is control or influence over communication. In sum, although the social movement towards the network society is known for some time at Rijkswaterstaat and the DWAs, the exact effects the movement will have on the future of both types of public organizations remains uncertain.

*Strong government and unifying vision:* Seemingly contradictory to the previous external factor, is the societal desire for a more decisively government - one that focusses on establishing a unifying vision among the public. A claim that is based on recent distressing events such as climate change, the necessity for sustainable energy, the increasing spatial scarcity, and the collisions between societal values expressed with rising protests. The appeal for order and unification grows and moreover - citizens are eager for a resolute government that set a direction in, for instance the energy transition tasks. At the same time, some critics argue that the decision-making of the (national) government surrounding these heavy challenges, moderately stagnates (Alders, 2019; Van der Voet, 2019; Van Doorne, 2019). The present hyper sensitivity of the public only seems to worsen the effects of these shortcomings (Rijkswaterstaat, 2020).

## Technological

*Open Data:* In recent years, the availability of open data has grown significantly. In brief, open data are governmental data of public interest that are available without any restrictions and that can be easily found and accessed by the public (Veljković et al., 2014). Recently, more pressure is being placed on all kinds of public organizations to release their raw data (M. Janssen et al., 2012). To provide some context, public bodies are among the largest creators and collectors of data in many different domains (K. Janssen, 2011). Therefore, when complying with this increasing pressures, public bodies will inevitably give up some level of control when opening their data to the public (M. Janssen et al., 2012). In greater measure still, increasingly often public organisation encounter citizens that have their own - sometimes even more precise - data sets. For example, by the use of a mobile app that measures the sound level, flight number, time of day, and GPS coordinates of an overflying plane.

*TenderNed:* A specific of technological developments is the start of TenderNed in 2004. Made possible because of the widespread growth of the worldwide web. The website is an procurement announcement platform, where contracting authorities (mandatory) publish their projects that will be tendered soon. Moreover, the initial version was solely used by ProRail and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water state. Later, in 2010, the website was scaled up and was used on a larger scale, partly as a result of new European Legislation. In 2013, as a result of the new Procurement Act of 2012, it became mandatory for (semi-)public organisation to use TenderNed. Whereas TenderNed websites state that it brought time efficiency, there might have been some negative externalities. For instance, that the personal contact between public authorities and contracts took a hit

*Blockchain:* There is a wide spectrum of application where blockchain can be of potential use (Zheng, Xie, Dai, Chen, & Wang, 2018). In line with the previous external factor, blockchain technologies are essential in safeguarding the processing and origin of (open) data. Thereby, securing the overall trust of the stakeholders and data users. Moreover, blockchain benefits the headway towards a circular economy. Securing the origin, composition, and lifespan of products and materials. While simultaneously tracking the number and costs of repairs, as well as the quantity and quality of waste flows (Casado-Vara, Prieto, De la Prieta, & Corchado, 2018). It is therefore no surprise that the EU is investing 2 billion euros to achieve a solid data strategy that has to protect the sovereignty of European data (EC, 2020).

*Artificial intelligence:* Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have attracted great attention from researchers and practitioners and have opened up a broad range of beneficial opportunities for AI usage in the public sector (Wirtz, Weyerer, & Geyer, 2019). Essentially, AI is an umbrella term for concept such as Big Data, Machine Learning, Data Analytics, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), Cognitive Services, etcetera. Similarly, to the future usage of blockchain technology, the possibilities are endless. Although still very much abstract and debatable under experts, the conversion towards data-driven maintenance and procurement will most likely affect the current number of employees working at both public organisations (Wirtz et al., 2019). Moreover, when data-driven decision-making is in the near future incorporated in other emerging technological advancement such as digital twins in combination with the 'Internet of Things' concept, the impact will be even more significant (El Saddik, 2018).

## Ecology

*Sea level rise:* The most frequently named and formidable factor in the climate debate is arguably the sea level rise. According to the climate scenarios from the KNMI, by 2050 the sea level will have risen with 0.4 meter compared to 1995 and with 0,85m in 2100. Although recently, new research has been released, stating that an increase of 2 meter before the end of the century falls within a reasonable possibilities (Oppenheimer et al., 2019).

*Weather conditions:* In the immediate future, the chance of encountering more extreme weather phenomena increases. Respectively, strong winds, drought, extreme precipitation, and high temperatures (Rijkswaterstaat, 2020). Especially for The Netherlands, a country that typifies its name, this will have drastic consequences. Already, safely transporting extensive rainfall towards the sea becomes increasingly difficult. For this reason, national programs such as Space for the River were launched. Generally, plans that illustrate a widely endorsed acceptance that the pressing climatic circumstances require a different approach.

*Biodiversity:* In 2001, the European Council initiated legislation that designated specific protected nature areas for the benefit of maintaining the local flora and fauna. Since then, a significant part of national nature conservation is controlled via European legislation. These regions are named Nature2000 areas. The statutory of the Nature2000 areas are prominently affecting the decision-making of RWS and the DWAs. Despite this, biodiversity in The Netherlands is rapidly declining. Large-scale nitrogen emissions seem to be the primary cause of this phenomenon. In 2015, the national government established legislation to reduce the emissions of nitrogen near Nature2000 areas. In turn, that legislation was only four years voided by the Council of State. At the time of writing this report in 2020, the decreasing biodiversity gravitates towards an open socio-economic discussion wherein an apparent solution does not seem to be within reach. What can be concluded though, is that the Dutch infrastructure sector is heavily impacted by this and that the near future remains uncertain.

*Water scarcity:* Fresh water shortage is prone to happen during longer periods of droughts in the summer. Already in 2001, a national study (titled the Drought Study) was conducted by the government for the purpose of estimating the potential effect of water scarcity on the country. Primarily, the agriculture, shipping industry, and nature are affected by longer periods of droughts. For example, when the water demand of the agriculture stays more or less the same in

periods of drought, a direct consequence will be that water ways will be less sailable. Needless to say, this would a massive economic impact. At present, the national policy surrounding water scarcity is formulated in the Delta Program. A program that has been drawn-up by the DWAs, RWS, and other public bodies.

## Political and Legal

*Political instability:* In a system of representative democracy and primate of politics, it is up to the political administrators to translate societal interest into widely supported objectives. By that logic, inconsistent, obscure, and unsteady targets are an expression of political deficiencies to translate a wide range of societal interest into a coherent political course. As a consequence of suchlike political shortcoming, governmental organizations are limited in their development and implementation of democratic legitimate and effective policy (Van der Voet, 2019).

*Flexible public bodies, a compact government, and more PPP:* An ongoing endeavour of the past decades, surnamed 'neo-liberalism', strives for an ever more flexible and compact government (Rijksoverheid, 2011). A line of reasoning that corresponds with the New Public Management paradigm, as discussed previously in this report. Concretely, this translates into the desire of the government to push hard on the use of PPPs. In other words, handing assignments over to the markets. Besides that, the pursued for 'flexible' governmental organizations is founded on the thought that such organizations can ideally anticipate and react on the rapidly changing socio-economic values.

*Decentralisation, and more citizen participation:* When in 2015 the first three grand decentralization movement (Dutch: Jeugdwet, Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning, Participatiewet) were commenced, it marked the beginning of a new trend: decentralizing many public functions. In short, decentralization means that public tasks are transferred from a central governmental level towards a more local municipal level. With this, the ambition behind this governmental shift is to promote more social coherence. Municipalities – by means of their local administration - can effectively and efficiently deliver customization to their inhabitants (Van Nijendaal, 2014). Also, a fourth decentralization legislation effecting the physical livings environment was approved by the senate - one that also directly affects RWS and the DWAs: The Omgevingswet. Due to difficulties, the new legislation has not been implemented yet, but likely will be in 2021 (Schrijnen, 2016). In sum, the Omgevingswet expects considerable initiative from citizens and companies, and the legal responsibility is placed at the municipalities.

*Far-reaching privatization:* In response to political ambitions to strive for efficiency and better performance, the most far-reaching measurement that can be undertaken is privatization. Here, the responsibility regarding the fulfilment of a governmental tasks is in its entirety transferred to the market. This is done by completely selling off the former governmental organization. In substance, the political-ideological motives for privatization are in principal of a normative nature (Frissen et al., 1992). By this line of reasoning, the inclusiveness of the privatization can be seen as the outcome of a political debate regarding the core tasks of the government. Organizations that qualify for privatization require by and large minimal political interference and little to none political responsibility. Examples of which are the NS, PTT, several energy companies, blast furnaces, and banks. In closing, the far-reaching privatization of the past decades of several governmental bodies could be seen as a political foreboding for organizations such as RWS. Already in 1985, an orientating research was conducted towards possible partial privatization of RWS and the future is so far ostensibly undecided (Hamer, 1985).

*Dwindling public authority and political interference:* The phenomenon of political interference is increasingly pressing on some public bodies. To understand why there is a tendency for political interference, a brief history of the juridical organization of government structures should be sketched. In the beginning of the nineties, privatization, as discussed above, became less favorable and was temporarily wavered. Instead, corporatization (Dutch: Verzelfstandiging) became the desirable policy option (Stellinga, 2012). Corporatization means that a public organization is 'internally' privatized and is done with organizations that require still some form of strict political primate. By doing so, initially, the public body becomes fully independent from their former answerable ministry and minister. Corporatization is often seen as the first step towards (full) privatization. Accordingly, in the mid-nineties, many organizations were corporatized into so-called independent administrative institutions (Dutch: Zelfstandig bestuursorganen). All in an effort to create more efficiency and better-quality services. Nonetheless, some years later, the hope surrounding the independent administrative institution proved somewhat falsified, sparked off when the Court of Account presented sharp criticism on the actual results. In short, there was too much uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of the steering mechanisms. Moreover, from a political viewpoint, it proved difficult to determine what the

exact accountabilities of the answerable minister were. Therefore, an alternative for the independent administrative institutions was presented, called agencies (Dutch: Agentschappen). With this alternative for a 'internal corporatization', a ministerial responsibility reigns at all time, in contrast to the independent administrative institutions. But to clarify, agencies enjoy a greater degree of independency than 'normal' departments of the ministry. Now that this is made clear, we can flash forward to 2006 when the agency formation of RWS got approved by the former minister. From that time onwards, the policy, inspection and execution from the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water State are being separated (AEF, 2010b). Putting the theory aside for now, the practice showed that the political independency of the agencies is sometimes vague. Essentially, MPs and ministers are interfering at a detailed level with the task operation of agencies, that should essentially operate independently from politics (Van der Voet, 2019). Additionally, the autonomy of these public organizations is further reduced in situation of disappointing performances and crises. In such situations, an administrative reflex is often to increase external supervision on the organization, with clamping of centralization and formalization as a result. Unfortunately, for a successful task performance, these measurements often work counterproductive (Van der Voet, 2019). Another example of the dwindling authority, that will be mentioned later – was the approval of the Omgevingswet that bundles 26 laws into one single law. With the final entry into force of the Omgevingswet, the legislative boundaries wherein environmental services operate, will be partly redistributed. Present authored supervisions will likely develop more region-oriented policies, apply customization, and integrated assessments. This is simply one example on how public power continues to become distributed in the public sector. Overall, particularly in consideration of the dwindling authority of RWS of the past decades, Metzke and Franssen (2010) wrote an entire book on this topic.

*European integration, tensivity in Europe, and facts-free politics & populism:* Water management policy in The Netherlands is interwoven with neighbouring countries and, on a greater scale, with the EU as a whole. Examples of treaties are the Schelde Treaty, the Ems-Dollart Treaty, the Treaty towards the protection of the Rhine, the Treaty regarding the drainage of the Meuse, the Deed of Mannheim Treaty, the Treaty of Oslo and Paris (OSPAR), and many more. Withal, river and coastal commissions are constantly working towards concretizing propositions and guidelines. Forthwith, it is increasingly the case that individual treaties get more integrated in the European guidelines (DeltaExpertise, 2016). This means that public bodies in The Netherlands are by the same token evermore intertwined in geo-political discourses. For example, by discourses such as the rise of populism or Fact-Free Politics. Naturally, the same is true for national discourses regarding these trends.

*Political sensitive affairs:* In the year 2002, the procurement of construction work in the public sector became a major issue in The Netherlands. Initially widely revealed by a documentary on a Dutch national television program, that publicly displayed evidence of collusive behaviour, bid rigging and corrupt practices among construction projects and civil servants. No much later, on the 12th of December 2002, the published report to this inquiry from the parliamentary inquiry, amounting to over 3000 pages, proofed that in 394 projects procured between 1996 and 2001 - collusion was committed (PEC, 2002). A significant detail in this turmoil is that during the in-depth investigation of the Dutch cabinet themselves, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water State was arguably disproportionately affected by this investigation, compared to the three other ministries that were also investigated. The underlying reason was that during this investigation, only larger projects were selected. Resulting 77% of the total investigated projects were infrastructure projects. Thus, in sum, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water state procured around 64% of all these fraudulent cases. Understandably resulting in a blow for the ministry and, in turn, for Rijkswaterstaat. Although the investigations typically focused on the procurement behaviour of national public clients, local public clients were also under suspicion (A. G. Dorée, 2004). Earlier research into the Dutch municipalities' procurement approaches had shown that client-contractor relationships were often recurrent, with reputation being an important criterion (Ferguson et al., 1995). To continue, the collusion during this project occurred in such a way that the tender price was decided upon by the 'successful' bidder, after which 'unsuccessful' bidders would submit a higher offer. All on the predetermined agreement that the 'winning' company would compensate the 'losers'. The Parliamentary Survey 2002/2003 as a result from the construction fraud might have affected the decision to start with new contract strategies. Or how it is stated in the business agenda 2004-2008; '*The Parliamentary Survey in 2002/2003 has led to the realization that the government needs to thoroughly review its relationship with the business community. Rijkswaterstaat will continue to develop into a commercial, professional client for the market*' (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008).

*Governmental transparency:* Already for some years, transparency in accordance with good governance is situated highly on the political agenda. Starting from 2010, the Council of Public Administration brought the document 'Vertrouwen op Democratie' out. In here, the necessity for new connection between the political landscape and the

citizen was stated. In essence, the Council points at a crucial difference between the perception of the government and that of the citizen (RVOB, 2010). Thereupon, later in 2012, the Council sends-off another document, titled 'Gij Zult Openbaar Maken', with an akin message. This document focussed solely on the essential requirement of 'meaningful connections' between the vertical and the horizontal worlds (RVOB, 2012). In this example, the vertical world being the governmental one and the horizontal world being that of the citizen. From that point onwards, the central government adopted a new adage: "Public, unless.." (GEMEENTE.NU, 2013). Hinting at a former maxim from the government, and one similarly familiar in relation to RWS. Separately from these documents, however, the Association of Dutch Water Authorities launched a new project group already in 2006, named 'Transparatie en Verantwoording'. In 2008, this group persisted under a different nickname: WaterWegen. Ever since, the project group acts on behalf of all the 21 DWAs and engages in portraying what good governance should be like (Dekking, 2017). On the whole, the conception of transparency has been an open pursuit from the government and can in this regard be viewed as an external political factor.

*Representative democracy:* a representative bureaucracy derives democratic legitimacy from the reflection that its employees form of society (Van der Voet, 2019).. It is therefore an organization that is firmly anchored in society, with an extended observatory system that enable it to respond to social problems at an early stage, while doing justice to the plurality of interests and views in society (Van der Voet, 2019). Van der Voet (2019) argues to look for ways of directly providing substance to the preferences of citizens and social parties. Thus, instead of the citizens being the last chain in a top-down process of democracy, governmental organizations can give substance in formulating legitimate goals via a bottom-up manner. More concretely, an organization that works 'goal-orientally' or 'from the intention', instead of focusing on coordination and steering processes that are primarily based on structures, systems and rules. To some a somewhat obvious conclusion, but studies show that the practice of the public sector is often contrary (E. Schmidt et al., 2019). Staff members have often difficulties setting non-essential rules aside and act more on the basis of the 'spirit of the law' (Van der Voet, 2019). Here is when official leadership comes in, since working from the 'intention' doesn't simply mean letting go of the current rules, but rather change those rules and procedures to a different steering mechanism. Throughout this optimization process, leaders need to balance on a vision that is firstly inclusive and abstract, but secondly makes realistic and concrete behaving possible. By this means, leaders create the capacity to position the 'intention' of a project centrally, wherefore employees are in turn capable to utilize their own autonomy or instead if necessary, create it themselves (Van der Voet, 2019).

*(Municipal) Water Plans:* From the end of the nineties onwards, a new type of policy vision document was introduced, the so-called (municipal) Water Plans. Generally speaking, the national, provincial, and water board frameworks are in this document being translated into concrete measures on the municipal level. The Water Authority of Delfland strives to establish a water plan with every (sub)municipality. Important to note, this agreement is voluntary and specifies besides concrete measures, a desired form of collaboration between the municipality and her water partners. Initially, the agreement arose from a collective desire from responsible water authorities in the sector to improve collaboration between the water partners. By and large, the parties involved in the agreement insist that every water-linked affair should be approached in conjunction with each other. Thereby, describing opportunities, bottlenecks, and solution spaces. An essential part of this voluntary agreement is the division of roles between Delfland and the (sub)municipalities (Delfland, 2011). Or how Delfland phrase it; Delfland remains the co-pilot and in the water spatial planning and the (sub)municipality the pilot. In other words, Delfland is not the initiating party, but will contribute knowledge and take on a signalling role.

*National Administrative agreement Water sector:* In 2007, a new agreement for better collaboration was signed between governments and drinking water companies that should provide the water sector with an extra impulse to start working more transparently and goal-oriented (Cramer, Huizinga-Heringa, Franssen, & Hendriks, 2007). Moreover, the agreement was updated in 2008. With this update, the parties involved (all national, regional, and local governments) underlined once more the importance of transparent collaborations in achieving a sustainable and climate proof water sector.

*Spatial Planning Act:* The new Legislation Spatial Planning of 2008 had its effects on the division of tasks between different governmental bodies. Among other things, this new legislation provides instruments by which the government, provinces, and municipalities can better adjust the water policy and spatial planning to one another. With the new law, the approval authority of the provinces for municipal zoning plans expires. As a result, an important protection

mechanism of the DWAs regarding the impact of the water advice disappeared from that time on. In turn, forcing the DWAs to operate more proactively in order to safeguard the position of water in the spatial planning and processes.

*Water Act:* The new Water Act came into effect at the end of 2009. In essence, the legislation steers on a better collaboration between different public authority bodies, while also redistributing responsibilities and tasks among the parties. In practical terms this translates into the fact that water management rules will become more apparent, the relation between water management and spatial planning becomes stronger, and for the citizen it becomes easier to apply for permits. For the water boards this means, however, that the traditional responsibilities will change. Primarily, the legislation stipulates that water boards should operate from an integral water system perspective and as a result; operate outside their sectorial boundaries. Also, the municipalities will take over tasks concerning handling discharges and administering the water bottom (Rijksoverheid, 2010a). On the whole, the Water Legislation forces the water boards to put together agreements with the municipality, possibly by means of policy agreements.

*Procurement Act (2012):* On November 2012, a new procurement law was passed that translated new European Guidelines into national law. The new law affects the threshold value for public tenders, rules regarding the combination of projects, and the proportionality of public authorities. The Procurement Act of 2012 was later revised in 2016, in accordance with the new European Directive 2014/23, 2014/24 and 2014/25. Essentially, it encouraged (semi-)public authorities to increase the usage of the MEAT awarding criteria in tenders. For instance, the EIB wrote that; *the water boards have started to apply more integrated contract forms. In addition, within the framework of the Public Procurement Act and the Proportionality Guide, projects are often put out to tender on MEAT (P. Groot & Visser, 2016). Though the updated Procurement Act in 2016 made the usage of the MEAT criteria largely mandatory, it isn't entirely clear how strict the original Procurement Act of 2012 was. Especially concerning semi-public organisations.*

*Legislation Maintainable Government Finances:* In 2013, the a new legislation was passed that anchored European norms with regards to the maximum amount and the yearly growth rate of the government deficit. To be precise, the structural deficit in the public sector (EMU balance) can be at maximum 0.5% of the GDP (Europa-decentraal, 2013). The new legislation also affects decentral governmental bodies such as provinces, municipalities, and water boards. Consequently, their debt and financial deficit are taken into the balance and hence; the central government will, after administrative consultation, set an annual ceiling for those organisation. From that moment onwards, water boards are considering new financial constructions to spread the expenditure over a longer period and were looking at the private sector for ideas (P. J. M. Groot et al., 2013).

## Attachment 6 – List respondents for interviews

<i>Respondent number</i>	<i>Case number</i>	<i>Function</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Time period involved</i>
A	1	Senior advisor Procurement department	Rijkswaterstaat	2001 - 2011
B	1 + 2	Staff director Market & Procurement	Rijkswaterstaat	2005 -2012
C	1	Head Engineer Director (Infrastructure Service + Bouwdienst)	Rijkswaterstaat	2008 - 2012
D	2	(I) Head Contract and Procurement + (II) Manager Innovation and Market	Rijkswaterstaat	(I) 2000 - 2009 (II) 2013 - 2016
E	2	Director General	Rijkswaterstaat	2010 - 2015
F	2	Senior strategic advisor PPP and Market	Rijkswaterstaat	2002 - 2015
G	3	Senior Advisor Procurement	Water Authority Delfland	2009-2013
H	3	Policy advisor Public Procurement	Association of Water Boards	2012 - now
I	3	Head Strategy and Market	Water Authority Delfland	2012 - 2014

## Attachment 7 – Interview protocol case 1



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# Interview Guideline

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## *Introductie*

Ik studeer aan de TU Delft, in de richting van civiele techniek en ben nu bezig met mijn afstudeeronderzoek. Het onderzoek is gericht op het bestuderen van veranderingen in contractstrategieën bij publieke opdrachtgevers, waarbij ik mij voornamelijk focus op Rijkswaterstaat en het Hoogheemraadschap van Delfland. Het doel van dit interview is om een beter beeld te krijgen van de daadwerkelijke beweegredenen van Rijkswaterstaat om de Best Value methode door te voeren als contractstrategie. In dit interview ben ik vooral benieuwd naar uw perceptie over hoe deze initiatie tot stand is gekomen.

Voordat we kunnen beginnen, nog even wat praktische zaken:

- Alles is in het Nederlands
- Alles wordt anoniem verwerkt
- Het wordt opgenomen, zodat het achteraf beter verwerkt kan worden
- De resultaten zijn openbaar, dus als u wilt kan ik het verslag naar u toesturen.
- Het interview is semi gestructureerd, wat indirect betekent dat niet alle onderstaande vragen aan bod zullen komen

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## *Context - Externe factoren*

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Voor dit onderzoek heb ik de externe factoren in kaart gebracht doormiddel van een DESTEP analyse. DESTEP is een acroniem wat staat voor Demografisch, Economisch, Sociaal, Technisch, Ecologisch en Politiek. Het is een methode die vaak wordt gebruikt op strategisch niveau om de externe omgeving van een organisatie in kaart te brengen. Deze data kan daarna gebruikt worden om bijvoorbeeld verschillende toekomstige scenario's uit te schetsen. Van deze DESTEP analyse heb ik een selectie gemaakt van externe factoren en deze zou ik graag met u willen doornemen. Dit kan dus eigenlijk worden gezien als een validatieronde. Aangezien het over een periode gaat die al enige tijd geleden plaatsvond, zal ik voorafgaand aan elke vraag een korte introductie geven met wat voorbeelden uit die tijd.

### *Introductie*

(Demografie)

Tijdens de ontslagrondes tussen 2002 en 2007 heerste er krapte op de arbeidsmarkt. Daarnaast lees je in verschillende rapporten uit die tijd over de vergrijzing van Rijkswaterstaat. Als laatste is ook rond die periode de Remkes regeling inwerking getreden, waardoor er nog meer uitstroom was van (ouder) personeel.

### *Vraag*

*Heeft de krapte op de arbeidsmarkt - en wellicht m.b.t. het aantrekken van jongeren naar de organisatie – bijgedragen aan de keuze voor om BVP te starten?*

(Economisch)

BVP lijkt voor het eerst groot toegepast te zijn voor Spoedaanpak Wegen in 2007. Dit programma is gestart in een economische laagconjunctuur, namelijk aan het begin van de Amerikaanse huizen crisis. Deze economische crisis heeft flinke nadelige gevolgen gehad voor de Nederlandse economie, waaronder de bouwsector.

(Economisch)

Hierna brak er een tijd aan van nationale bezuinigingen. Vaak zie je dan dat organisaties op zoek gaan naar mogelijke (interne) efficiëntieslagen. Dit kan zijn weerslag hebben op het kiezen van een contractstrategie. Bij de BVP methodiek zien we bijvoorbeeld dat veel risico's worden afgedragen aan de opdrachtnemer, omdat eigendom van risico's het gedrag van de aannemer beïnvloed. Dit leidt tot de volgende vraag:

(Economisch)

Vlak voor de economische crisis daarentegen (2004-2007), groeide de Nederlandse economie voor een aantal jaar achter elkaar vrij fors, daarmee slonk bijvoorbeeld ook BBP/schuld ratio.

(Sociaal)

Het CBS heeft gemeten dat het institutionele vertrouwen van de burger al jaren matig afneemt. Een belangrijk speerpunt van BVP is dat de opdrachtnemer de expert is en dat de opdrachtgever tijdens de aanbestedingsfase vooral moet luisteren naar de expert

(Sociaal)

Er wordt steeds vaker gesproken over een heterogene maatschappij, wat ertoe kan leiden dat stakeholdermanagement moeilijker wordt

(Sociaal)

Tegenwoordig lijkt het de Nederlandse maatschappij in een maatschappelijke paradox te zijn; de burger wil een resolute overheid (bijv. bij klimaatdoelen), maar wil ook proactief deelnemen aan de gesprekken hierover

(Sociaal)

Er lijkt al een flink aantal jaren een maatschappelijk trend naar een meer egalitaire samenleving te zijn, waarmee meer hiërarchische bestuursorganen indirect worden aangespoord om meer via een netwerk aanpak te werken.

(Sociaal)

In 2013 is Project DOEN geïntroduceerd die aanspoort tot 'werken vanuit de bedoeling' en 'maximale klantwaarde'. Waarbij de aannemer direct medeverantwoordelijk wordt voor het goed interpreteren van de wensen van de klant.

*Heeft deze crisis een rol gespeeld in de uiteindelijke keuze voor het BVP model?*

*In hoeverre hebben de nationale bezuinigingen in die tijd effect gehad op de keuze om BVP te introduceren?*

*Is er in deze periode meer budget vrijgekomen om te zoeken naar nieuwe contract strategieën?*

*Heeft het geleidelijk afnemen van het institutionele vertrouwen van de burger een rol gespeeld bij de introductie van BVP*

*Hebben dit soort sociale aspecten een rol gehad bij de keuze om BVP te adopteren?*

*Hebben dit soort sociale aspecten een rol gehad bij de keuze om BVP te adopteren?*

*Heeft de sociale trend naar een netwerk samenleving een rol gespeeld bij de keuze om BVP te adopteren?*

*Waren er al rond 2007 geluiden dat de wensen van de eindgebruiker door RWS minder goed werden ingeschat? (en daardoor verantwoordelijkheden naar de markt worden overgedragen)*

(Sociaal)

Burgers/bewoners lijken steeds mondiger te worden en zich steeds beter te verenigen

*Heeft het feit dat burgers steeds mondiger worden een rol gespeeld in de keuze om met de BVP methode te starten?*

(Politiek)

Na de bouwfraude lijkt de relatie tussen de publieke organisaties en aannemers te zijn geschaad, het vertrouwen tussen beide lijkt daarmee te zijn afgenomen. BVP stelt dat er in principe geen (relationeel/blind) vertrouwen nodig is tussen de opdrachtgever en opdrachtnemer wanneer het model wordt gebruikt, oftewel ingecalculeerd vertrouwen. Daarnaast is een belangrijke aanname in het BVP model dat aannemers opportunistisch zijn en irrationeel handelen

*Is de bouwfraude (en de schade aan de relatie opdrachtgever-opdrachtnemer) van grote invloed geweest in het zoeken naar een nieuw model zoals de BVP?*

(Politiek)

In interne rapporten van RWS wordt geschreven over de afnemende autoriteit van de organisatie ten opzichte van een aantal decennia terug.

*Heeft dit een rol gespeeld in de keuze om BVP te adopteren?*

(Politiek)

In mei 2004 werd een zeer kritisch rapport vrijgegeven van de Commissie Wijffels, waarmee alarm werd geslagen over de achterblijvende innovatieopgave van Nederland. Dit heeft uiteindelijk ook geleid tot een vrij drastische herordening van de landelijke diensten bij RWS

*Heeft dit rapport een rol gespeeld bij de introductie van BVP?*

(Techniek)

Je ziet ook dat in 2004 bijvoorbeeld TenderNed is opgezet, waarmee aanbestedingen digitaal werden afgehandeld en er wellicht minder persoonlijk contact was.

*Heeft dit bijgedragen aan de keuze om BVP te starten?*

(Politiek)

Drie jaar voor de introductie van BVP is de European Directive 2004/24/EU aangenomen door de Europese Commissie. Met de introductie van dit Directive ontstond o.a. de concurrentiegerichte dialoog. Opnieuw kijkend naar de BVP methode, het vroegtijdig betrekken van de aannemer lijkt een belangrijk speerpunt te zijn bij deze methode.

*Heeft de totstandkoming van dit nieuw Europees voorschrift een grote rol voor de keuze van BVP?*

(Politiek)

In de drie jaar voor de introductie van BVP zijn een aantal nieuwe publieke instanties opgericht rondom het gebruik van PPS bij de overheid. Instellingen zoals PIANOo, PSiBouw, RegieRaad en PPP Taskforce.

*Heeft de totstandkoming van dergelijke instituten een rol gespeeld bij de keuze voor het BVP model?*

(Politiek)

Al sinds de jaren 80 heeft het Ministerie van Financiën sterk gestuurd op de institutionalisering van het DBFM model

*Wat is de rol van de regering geweest (of specifiek bijv. de ministeries) rond de implementatie van het BVP model?*

(Politiek)

Je ziet ook dat DBFM vanaf de periode 2004 steeds meer geïnstitutionaliseerd wordt.

*Heeft de institutionalisering van het DBFM – waar ook veel taken worden overgedragen aan de markt – bijgedragen aan de keuze om te starten met het BVP model?*

(Politiek)

Voorafgaand aan de periode rond BVP zijn veel overheidstaken geprivatiseerd (energie, zorg, jeugdzorg, etc.)

*Heeft dit een effect gehad op de keuze om BVP te starten*

(Politiek)

Quote uit Ondernemingsplan 2004-2007 RWS:

*"De Parlementaire Enquête in 2002/2003 heeft geleid tot het besef dat de overheid de relatie met het bedrijfsleven grondig moet herzien. Rijkswaterstaat zal zich verdergaand ontwikkelen tot een zakelijke, professionele opdrachtgever naar de markt. Als professioneel opdrachtgever zal RWS zich ook nog meer en beter richten op het actief waarborgen van de publieke belangen"*

*Heeft in uw ogen deze parlementaire enquête (of wellicht andere gelijkwaardige politieke middelen) bijgedragen aan de keuze om te starten met de BVP methode?*

(Slotvraag DESTEP)

Dit was een selectie van de externe factoren van de DESTEP analyse.

*Zijn er nog andere belangrijke externe factoren geweest die niet zijn behandeld in deze vragen, maar wel een belangrijke rol hebben gespeeld bij de introductie van BVP?*

*Samenvattend:*

Zoals u misschien heeft gemerkt zijn bepaalde onderdelen uit de DESTEP meer bevestigd dan anderen. Hierdoor kan het bij het analyseren straks onterecht lijken of meer bevestigde onderdelen belangrijker waren dan minder bevestigde onderdelen. Om deze reden zou ik graag nog even willen valideren wat vanuit uw perceptie de mate van invloed was van elk onderdeel.

Externe factoren	Mate van invloed
Demografisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Economisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Sociaal	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Technologisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Ecologisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Politiek	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed

Naast de externe factoren - die behandeld zijn in het vorige deel - kunnen ook interne factoren van invloed zijn op veranderingen bij publieke opdrachtgevers. Uit de literatuur blijkt dat de organisatiecultuur, de visie van het topmanagement en mogelijke reorganisaties, belangrijke invloedsfactoren kunnen zijn bij veranderingen. Voor dit deel zou ik graag uw perceptie willen horen over de invloed van deze factoren.

### *Introductie*

#### *(Organisatiecultuur)*

Er wordt soms geschreven dat RWS een eilandcultuur heeft. Om een stuk uit het Ondernemingsplan 2004-2007 te citeren: "Onze bedrijfsvoering en onze interne regelgeving zijn zo ingewikkeld en gedetailleerd geworden dat we door de bomen het bos niet meer zien"

#### *(Reorganisatie)*

Vanaf 2003 is een poging gedaan om RWS meer te centraliseren. Bijvoorbeeld door de invoering van het triumviraat, het combineren van diverse regionale en nationale afdelingen. En daarnaast heeft RWS ook een nog duidelijkere lijn-staf organisatie omarmt.

#### *(Reorganisatie)*

In 2003 en 2004 zijn het Expertise Centrum Aanbestedingen en de Corporate Dienst toegevoegd als afdelingen bij RWS

#### *(Reorganisatie)*

In 2002 is RWS omgevormd tot een agentschap, maar in 2006 is pas daadwerkelijk het kosten-baten systeem ingevoerd.

#### *(Proces)*

Een andere mogelijke aanleiding voor veranderend beleid komt vanuit de academische wereld. Soms wordt vanuit de wetenschap het maatschappelijk debat geagendeerd (huidige werkwijze in twijfel getrokken) of nieuwe mogelijkheden geschetst vanuit ervaringen elders. De academische link met het BVP gedachtengoed is heel helder (nml. Kashiwagi, VS).

#### *(Leiderschap)*

Kashiwagi is in 2004 al langsgekomen in NL om de BVP methode te presenteren.

#### *(Proces)*

Uit de literatuur blijkt dat consultancies een belangrijke invloedsfactor kunnen zijn bij veranderingen in publieke organisaties. Een voorbeeld is het 'McKinsey-rapport' uit 2019, welke van invloed lijkt te zijn geweest op de keuze voor het nieuwe twee-fasen contract.

#### *(Proces)*

### *Vraag*

*Speelde de organisatiecultuur toendertijd een grote rol in de keuze voor een nieuwe contractstrategie zoals BVP?*

*Hebben dit soort reorganisaties een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij de invoering van de BVP methodiek?*

*Hebben de invoeringen van dit soort nieuwe afdelingen een rol gespeeld bij de invoering van het BVP model?*

*Heeft de omvorming tot een agentschap met het bijbehorende kosten-baten systeem een belangrijke rol gespeeld in de uiteindelijke keuze voor BVP?*

*Is er ook nog een rol geweest van Nederlandse academici bij de introductie van BVP?*

*Waarom is dat toendertijd niet aangeslagen, maar wel in 2008?*

*Is er ook nog een rol geweest van consultancies tijdens de introductie van BVP?*

Aan het opstellen van de MarktVisie hebben o.a. de Stuurgroep Samenwerking Waterschapswerken, het Platform Waterschapswerken en de Taskforce Deltatechnologie meegewerkt.

(Proces)

RWS werkt steeds vaker samen met andere (lokale) publieke opdrachtgevers, zo ook in het HWBP. Hierbij komen inkoopmanagers, projectmanagers, en directeurs in aanraking met de werkwijze van andere publieke opdrachtgevers.

(Slotvraag)

Zoals vermeld stond aangegeven in de literatuur dat de visie topmanagement, organisatiecultuur en reorganisaties belangrijke interne factoren zijn voor veranderingen.

*Wat is de rol geweest van kennisinstellingen en/of denktanks bij de introductie van BVP?*

*Zijn er bepaalde allianties of netwerksamenwerkingen geweest die als inspiratie hebben gediend voor de keuze van BVP?*

*Hebben er naast deze, ook nog andere interne factoren een rol gespeeld bij de introductie van BVP?*

*Samenvattend:*

Ook ditmaal zou ik graag willen horen wat uw perceptie is geweest van de mate van invloed van de verschillende interne factoren.

Interne factoren	Mate van invloed
Visie topmanagement	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Organisatiecultuur	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Reorganisaties	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Overig, namelijk...	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed

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### *Content*

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Naast de context factoren (de externe en interne factoren) kan een verandering ook worden beïnvloed door andere veranderingen, soms ook van andere ordergroottes.

#### *Introductie*

*(Orde van verandering)*

BVP is uiteindelijk ook overgenomen door andere publieke organisaties, zoals het Rijksvastgoedbedrijf, waterschappen, gemeentes, etc.

*(Orde van verandering)*

Project DOEN is gestart met één enkel project, namelijk de renovatie van de Nijkerkerburg. Echter tijdens de introductie van de BVP methodiek is binnen korte tijd voor 800 miljoen aan projecten aanbesteed

#### *Vraag*

*Was het de bedoeling vanaf het begin af aan dat BVP zou leiden tot een sector-brede verandering?*

*Hoe kan het zijn dat daar zo'n groot verschil in omvang inzit?*

*(Orde van verandering)*

Een 'standaard' open aanbesteding - waarbij door de opdrachtgevers nog RAW bestekken worden gemaakt - wordt nog steeds toegepast op mindere complexe projecten. Daarentegen worden voor complexere projecten vaker intensieve aanbestedingsprocedures toegepast, bijv. een concurrentiegerichte dialoog.

*(Content of change)*

Met de 'Handreiking EMVI' is in 2005 de EMVI-filosofie 'gunnen op meerwaarde' en de bijbehorende EMVI-systematiek binnen RWS geïntroduceerd. Met de Handreiking EMVI versie september 2006 werd dit nog verder uitgewerkt.

Bepaalde aspecten van de EMVI methodiek zijn ook te herkennen in de BVP methode, bijvoorbeeld dat de kwaliteit van een aanbesteding veel belangrijker is dan de hoogte van het bod

*(Slotvraag)*

In 2007 heeft de samenkomst van omstandigheden uiteindelijk geleid tot de introductie van de Best Value methode bij RWS.

*Voor wat voor soort projecten was de BVP methode bedoeld? Projecten met een hoog detailniveau of sterk dynamische projecten?*

*Heeft de introductie van EMVI bij RWS een belangrijk effect gehad op de latere introductie van de BVP methodiek?*

*Zijn er nog andere nieuwe contractstrategieën overwogen?*

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### *Proces en leiderschap*

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Naast de contextuele factoren (Extern en Intern) en content factoren, kan ook het proces zelf en de rol van het leiderschap een grote invloed hebben op een verandering. Een bottom-up beweging bij een publieke organisatie is vaker gedreven door een ander soort waarden dan een top-down initiatief van het topmanagement. In dit deel van de interviews zou ik graag inzicht willen krijgen over het veranderingsproces rondom BVP en de rol die het (top)management hierin had.

*Introductie*

*(Top-down of bottom-up)*

Bepaalde initiatieven – zoals de introductie van de concurrentiegerichte dialoog – stonden al grotendeels vast toen deze werden geïntroduceerd bij publieke opdrachtgevers. Namelijk schriftelijk voorgeschreven in het Europese Directive 2004. Andere initiatieven lijken meer te zijn gevormd over tijd en door veel partijen te betrekken bij de verandering, bijvoorbeeld de introductie van Project DOEN.

*(Visie topmanagement)*

Om de vier jaar worden nieuwe kernwaardes en doelen opgenomen in het ondernemingsplan van RWS.

In het Ondernemingsplan 2004-2007 was dit:

“Markt, tenzij..., Netwerkmanagement, Huis op orde”

Maar in het ondernemingsplan 2008-2012:

“Resultaatgedreven, Aanspreekbaar, Dienstverlenend, Integer”

Dit lijkt een vrij grote omslag te zijn in waarden in slechts vier jaar.

*Vraag*

*Stond de uitkomst van het concept van BVP al grotendeels vast voordat het was voorgelegd aan het personeel?*

*Hoe belangrijk is de visie van het topmanagement geweest bij de invoering van de BVP methodiek?*

*Wat waren de strategische doelstellingen op het gebied van inkoop voor de introductie van de BVP methodiek?*

(Sturend of faciliterend)

Grofweg kan er gezegd worden dat een initiatief een top-down of een bottom-up traject kan doorlopen. Met andere woorden, een idee kan ontstaan bij bijv. de inkoopafdeling waarna het (top)management deze verandering faciliteert. Maar het kan ook zo zijn dat een idee ontstaat bij iemand van de directie, die vervolgens de inkoopafdeling aangestuurd om de verandering door te voeren.

(Sturend of faciliterend)

In het ondernemingsplan van RWS 2008-2012 (opgesteld in 2007/2008) staat niets specifiek over de BVP methodiek of de verandering in waarden die zij hiermee beoogden.

(Proces)

Projecten zoals de Zeesluis in IJmuiden heeft voor veel negatieve publiciteit gezorgd voor het gebruik van DBFM contracten. Niet lang daarna heeft RWS het DBFM model tijdelijk in de ijskast gezet en is bijvoorbeeld in 2019 begonnen met het twee-fasen contract. Een ander voorbeeld van verder terug is de bouw van de Oosterschelde, dat achteraf veel meer geld heeft gekost dan eerst was beraamd. Dit heeft bijvoorbeeld gezorgd dat de D&C contracten sneller zijn geïnstitutionaliseerd.

(Slotvraag)

Hierboven zijn een aantal voorbeelden genoemd van factoren die een mogelijk effect hebben gehad op het proces (rol academici, denktanks, consultancies, etc)

*Kijkend naar deze verschillende processen; hebben de werknemers van bijv. de inkoopafdeling een actieve rol gehad rondom de implementatie van de BVP methode? Of werden zij voornamelijk aangestuurd om BVP te gaan gebruiken?*

*Heeft het topmanagement een sturende of een faciliterende rol gehad rondom de implementatie van BVP?*

*In hoeverre speelde het bestuur (leiderschap) in die tijd een rol in het definiëren van de organisatiewaarde?*

*Zijn er bepaalde projecten geweest die van invloed zijn geweest om te zoeken naar een nieuwe contractstrategie zoals de BVP methodiek?*

*Zijn er nog andere factoren of organisaties die een rol hebben gehad bij de introductie van de BVP methode?*



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## Output

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Als laatste kunnen ook waarden zelf een belangrijke drijver zijn voor veranderingen. Soms kunnen deze waarden zelfs voortkomen uit grote geopolitieke gebeurtenissen. Een bekend voorbeeld is het aantreden van Margret Thatcher als PM van Engeland. Dit wordt gezien als een kritiek punt waarna de maatschappelijk en politieke kijk op overheden in de Westerse wereld is veranderd. De overheid zou meer moeten worden 'gerund als een bedrijf'. Dit kan als gevolg hebben dat de balans tussen private waardes (zoals verhogen van efficiency of 'winstgevendheid') en publieke waardes (zoals robuustheid, toewijding, etc) verschuift. In dit deel zou ik graag uw perceptie van de publieke waardes uit die tijd willen horen.

### Introductie

(Belofte)

De drang achter de implementatie van het DBFM model berust op het vinden van een nog efficiëntere vorm om infrastructurele projecten te ontwikkelen. Achteraf gezien past dit vrij goed in het tijdsbeeld van die tijd.

(Waarde)

Als we nog even blijven bij het DBFM model, dan zien we dat voor dit model, de projectkosten en projectduur de belangrijkste streeffactoren zijn geweest. Bij een ander voorbeeld, bijv. Project DOEN, was dit eerlijkheid en gelijkwaardige samenwerking tussen opdrachtgever en opdrachtnemer. Deze waardes kunnen ook worden gezien als 'succesfactoren' voor projecten die één van deze contractstrategieën gebruikt.

(Waarde)

Naast het omschrijven van succes bij projecten, kan ook het 'falen' van projecten worden omschreven.

### Vraag

*Wat was de belofte die voor de implementatie van de BVP werd gemaakt?*

Hoe zou je 'succes' omschrijven voor een BVP project?

*Eventueel keuze:*

*Optie A: Tijd en geld, waarbij het op de meest efficiënte manier koppelen van middelen aan taken het hoogste belang is.*

*Optie B: Werken op basis van vertrouwen, waarbij prestaties van eerlijkheid en gelijkwaardigheid het hoogste belang is.*

*Optie C: Veerkracht, waarbij een prestatie van betrouwbaarheid, aanpassingsvermogen en robuustheid het hoogste belang is.*

*Hoe zou je 'falen' omschrijven voor een BVP project? (Of: Waar is van geprobeerd weg te blijven?)*

*Eventueel keuze:*

*Optie A: Verkwisting, waarbij verwarring en inefficiëntie de standaard voor falen is.*

*Optie B: Misdrijf, waarbij oneerlijkheid, vooringenomenheid en misbruik van de machtpositie de standaard voor falen is.*

*Optie C: Storingen en falen door (zelfs onwaarschijnlijke) risico's zijn de standaard voor falen*

(Waarde)

De Marktvisie en Project DOEN waren duidelijke signalen dat er getracht werd om de kernwaarden van RWS te veranderen.

*Heeft BVP als doel gehad om de kernwaarden van de organisatie te veranderen? Zo ja, welke?*

*Had u het idee dat er bij de invoering van de BVP methodiek een omslag is geweest in de publieke waarde of eerder dat een omslag in waarde omslag heeft geleid tot BVP?*

Nu alle vragen zijn gesteld; wat heeft de grootste invloed gehad rondom de introductie van BVP:

Context, content, leiderschap, of output factoren?

## Attachment 8 - Interview protocol case 2

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# Interview Guideline

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## *Introductie*

Ik studeer aan de TU Delft, in de richting van civiele techniek en ben nu bezig met mijn afstudeeronderzoek. Het onderzoek is gericht op het bestuderen van veranderingen in contractstrategieën bij publieke opdrachtgevers, waarbij ik mij voornamelijk focus op Rijkswaterstaat en het Hoogheemraadschap van Delfland. Het doel van dit interview is om een beter beeld te krijgen van de daadwerkelijke beweegredenen van Rijkswaterstaat om de Project DOEN methode door te voeren als contractstrategie. Ook is het belangrijk om te zeggen dat ik het gesprek niet wil limiteren tot Project DOEN. De beweegredenen achter de Marktvisie zijn minstens zo relevant. Dit betekent we in dit gesprek het voornamelijk zullen hebben over de periode 2013-2016. Tenslotte, in dit interview ben ik vooral benieuwd naar uw perceptie over hoe deze initiatie tot stand is gekomen.

Voordat we kunnen beginnen, nog even wat praktische zaken:

- Alles is in het Nederlands
- Alles wordt anoniem verwerkt
- Het wordt opgenomen, zodat het achteraf beter verwerkt kan worden
- De resultaten zijn openbaar, dus als u wilt kan ik het verslag naar u toesturen.
- Het interview is semi gestructureerd, wat indirect betekent dat niet alle onderstaande vragen aan bod zullen komen

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## *Context - Externe factoren*

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Voor dit onderzoek heb ik de externe factoren in kaart gebracht doormiddel van een DESTEP analyse. DESTEP is een acroniem wat staat voor Demografisch, Economisch, Sociaal, Technisch, Ecologisch en Politiek. Het is een methode die vaak wordt gebruikt op strategisch niveau om de externe omgeving van een organisatie in kaart te brengen. Deze data kan daarna gebruikt worden om bijvoorbeeld verschillende toekomstige scenario's uit te schetsen. Van deze DESTEP analyse heb ik een selectie gemaakt van externe factoren en deze zou ik graag met u willen doornemen. Dit kan dus eigenlijk worden gezien als een validatieronde. Aangezien het over een periode gaat die al enige tijd geleden plaatsvond, zal ik voorafgaand aan elke vraag een korte introductie geven met wat voorbeelden uit die tijd.

### *Introductie*

(Demografie)

In de Koers2020 van RWS staat het volgende:

*Nieuwe generaties medewerkers maken hun keuzes in het werk vaker op basis van persoonlijke drijfveren. Zij werken het liefst aan een reëel en urgent probleem, willen weinig procedures en regels en werken informeel in netwerken. Zij willen snel communiceren en samenwerken en werken graag aan kortdurende opdrachten.*

Bepaalde aspecten hiervan zijn ook te herkennen in de Project DOEN filosofie, wat leidt tot de volgende vraag.

### *Vraag*

*Heeft de krapte op de arbeidsmarkt - en wellicht m.b.t. het aantrekken van jongeren naar de organisatie – bijgedragen aan de keuze voor om met Project DOEN te starten?*

(Economisch)

Project DOEN (2013) en de Marktvisie (2016) lijken beiden te zijn gestart in een economische hoogconjunctuur. Echter liep de Nederlandse economie iets voor op de groei van bouwsector, die in 2013 grofweg 28 procent was gekrompen t.o.v. het hoogtepunt in 2008.

*Wat is uw mening over de invloed van de situatie waarin de bouw verkeerde in 2013, heeft dit bijvoorbeeld een rol gespeeld in de uiteindelijke keuze om Project DOEN te implementeren?*

(Economisch)

Het concept van de 'ondernemende staat' (Mariana Mazzucato) wordt de laatste tijd steeds populairder. Kort samengevat betekent dit dat overheidsorganisaties meer en directer moeten investeren in innovatie. Als we vervolgens kijken naar Project DOEN, zien we dat er gewerkt wordt met een vast, vrij-royaal winst & risico percentage.

*Is er in deze periode meer budget vrijgekomen om te zoeken naar nieuwe contract strategieën?*

*Heeft deze nieuwe economische manier van denken een rol gespeeld rond de introductie van Project DOEN?*

(Sociaal)

Er wordt steeds vaker gesproken over een heterogene maatschappij, wat ertoe kan leiden dat bijv. stakeholdermanagement moeilijker wordt, omdat veel partijen andere wensen hebben. Weer kijkend naar de Project DOEN filosofie; deze schrijft voor dat de klant zelf moet bepalen wat volgens hem wel óf geen toegevoegde waarde heeft.

*Hebben dit soort sociale aspecten zoals de opkomst van de heterogene maatschappij een rol gehad bij de keuze om Project DOEN te adopteren?*

(Sociaal)

Tegenwoordig lijkt de Nederlandse maatschappij in een maatschappelijke paradox te verkeren; de burger wil een resolute overheid (bijv. m.b.t. klimaatdoelen), maar wil ook proactief deelnemen aan de gesprekken hierover.

*Hebben dit soort sociale aspecten een rol gehad bij de keuze om Project DOEN te adopteren?*

(Sociaal)

Er lijkt al een flink aantal jaren een maatschappelijk trend naar een meer egalitaire samenleving te zijn, waarmee meer hiërarchische bestuursorganen indirect worden aangespoord om meer via een netwerk aanpak te werken. We zien dit ook terug in bepaalde aspecten van Project DOEN en de Marktvisie.

*Heeft de sociale trend naar een netwerk samenleving een rol gespeeld om Project DOEN te adopteren?*

(Politiek)

Na de bouwfraude lijkt de relatie tussen de publieke organisaties en aannemers te zijn geschaad, het vertrouwen tussen beide lijkt daarmee te zijn afgenomen. We zien dat Project DOEN sterk stuurt op het creëren van vertrouwen tussen de opdrachtnemer en opdrachtgever.

*Is de bouwfraude (en de schade aan de relatie opdrachtgever-opdrachtnemer) van grote invloed geweest in het zoeken naar een nieuw model zoals Project DOEN?*

(Politiek)

In interne rapporten van RWS wordt geschreven over de afnemende autoriteit van de organisatie ten opzichte van een aantal decennia terug.

*Heeft dit een rol gespeeld in de keuze om Project DOEN te adopteren?*

(Politiek)

In mei 2004 werd een zeer kritisch rapport vrijgegeven van de Commissie Wijffels, waarmee alarm werd geslagen over de achterblijvende innovatieopgave van Nederland. Ook in het 'Mckinsey' rapport uit 2018 werd hierover gesproken.

*Heeft de achterblijvende innovatieopgave van de Nederlandse bouw een rol gespeeld bij de keuze om met Project DOEN te starten?*

(Techniek)

Sinds TenderNed is opgezet, worden aanbestedingen vaker digitaal werden afgehandeld en is er wellicht minder persoonlijk contact.

*Heeft dit bijgedragen aan de keuze om Project DOEN te starten?*

(Politiek)

Al sinds de jaren 80 heeft het Ministerie van Financiën sterk gestuurd op de institutionalisering van bijvoorbeeld het DBFM model

*Wat is de rol van de regering geweest (of specifiek bijv. de ministeries) rond de implementatie van de Marktvisie?*

(Politiek)

In 2012 is er een vernieuwde versie gekomen van de Aanbestedingswet, de nationale omzetting van de nieuwe Europese aanbestedingsrichtlijnen.

*Heeft dit meer ruimte geboden om bijv. een Project DOEN filosofie te kunnen implementeren?*

(Politiek)

Al sinds 2010 is er steeds getracht de omgevingswet in te voeren. Dit is inmiddels weer doorgeschoven tot 2022. De impact van deze wetgeving lijkt i.i.g. groot te worden en vraagt o.a. om een andere samenwerking met de ketenpartners.

*Heeft de (dreiging van de) omgevingswet een rol gehad rond de start van Project DOEN of de Marktvisie? (Relaties provinciale overheden)*

(Slotvraag DESTEP)

Dit was een selectie van de externe factoren van de DESTEP analyse.

*Zijn er nog andere belangrijke externe factoren geweest die niet zijn behandeld in deze vragen, maar wel een belangrijke rol hebben gespeeld bij de introductie van Project DOEN?*

#### *Samenvattend:*

Zoals u misschien heeft gemerkt zijn bepaalde onderdelen uit de DESTEP meer bevraagd dan anderen. Hierdoor kan het bij het analyseren straks onterecht lijken of meer bevraagde onderdelen belangrijker waren dan minder bevraagde onderdelen. Om deze reden zou ik graag nog even willen valideren wat vanuit uw perceptie de mate van invloed was van elk onderdeel.

Externe factoren	Mate van invloed
Demografisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Economisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Sociaal	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Technologisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Ecologisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Politiek	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed

Naast de externe factoren - die behandeld zijn in het vorige deel - kunnen ook interne factoren van invloed zijn op veranderingen bij publieke opdrachtgevers. Uit de literatuur blijkt dat de organisatiecultuur, de visie van het topmanagement en mogelijke reorganisaties, belangrijke invloedsfactoren kunnen zijn bij veranderingen. Voor dit deel zou ik graag uw perceptie willen horen over de invloed van deze factoren.

### *Introductie*

#### *(Organisatiecultuur)*

Er wordt soms geschreven dat RWS een eilandcultuur heeft. Om een stuk uit het 'Evaluatie van de nieuwe managementcontracten Rijkswaterstaat' te citeren: "RWS wordt als een veilige [werk]omgeving ervaren, maar elkaar aanspreken is nog niet normaal"

#### *(Reorganisatie)*

In 2012 is o.a. het triumviraat opgeheven en is er weer gekozen voor een eenhoofdig leiderschap. Daarnaast zijn diverse regionale en nationale afdelingen samengevoegd, waaronder de splitsing van de Bouwdienst in PPO en GPO.

#### *(Academici)*

Een andere mogelijke aanleiding voor veranderend beleid komt vanuit de academische wereld. Soms wordt vanuit de wetenschap het maatschappelijk debat geagendeerd (huidige werkwijze in twijfel getrokken) of nieuwe mogelijkheden geschetst vanuit ervaringen elders.

#### *(Waterschappen)*

In 2014 zijn de waterschappen al gestart met hun eerste versie van de Marktvisie.

#### *(Consultancy)*

Uit de literatuur blijkt dat consultancies een belangrijke invloedsfactor kunnen zijn bij veranderingen in publieke organisaties. Een voorbeeld is het 'McKinsey-rapport' uit 2019, welke van invloed lijkt te zijn geweest op de keuze voor het nieuwe twee-fasen contract.

#### *(Marktvisie)*

Aan het opstellen van de MarktVisie hebben o.a. de Stuurgroep Samenwerking Waterschapswerken, het Platform Waterschapswerken en de Taskforce Deltatechnologie meegewerkt.

#### *(HWBP)*

RWS werkt steeds vaker samen met andere (lokale) publieke opdrachtgevers, zo ook in het HWBP. Hierbij komen inkoopmanagers, projectmanagers, en directeurs in aanraking met de werkwijze van andere publieke opdrachtgevers.

#### *(Media)*

### *Vraag*

*Speelde de organisatiecultuur toendertijd een grote rol in de keuze voor een nieuwe contractstrategie zoals Project DOEN?*

*Hebben dit soort reorganisaties een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij de invoering van Project DOEN?*

*Is er ook nog een rol geweest van Nederlandse academici bij de introductie van Project DOEN?*

*Heeft dit een rol gespeeld in de uiteindelijke keuze van RWS om ook hun eigen Marktvisie op te stellen?*

*Is er ook nog een rol geweest van consultancies tijdens de introductie van Project DOEN?*

*Wat is de rol geweest van kennisinstellingen en/of denktanks bij de introductie van Project DOEN?*

*Zijn er bepaalde allianties of netwerksamenwerkingen geweest die als inspiratie hebben gediend voor de keuze van Project DOEN?*

Projecten zoals de Zeesluis in IJmuiden heeft voor veel negatieve publiciteit gezorgd voor het gebruik van DBFM contracten. Niet lang daarna heeft RWS het DBFM model tijdelijk in de ijskast gezet en is bijvoorbeeld in 2019 begonnen met het twee-fasen contract. Een ander voorbeeld van verder terug is de bouw van de Oosterschelde, dat achteraf veel meer geld heeft gekost dan eerst was beraamd. Dit heeft bijvoorbeeld gezorgd dat de D&C contracten sneller zijn geïnstitutionaliseerd.

(Slotvraag)

Zoals vermeld stond aangegeven in de literatuur dat de visie topmanagement, organisatiecultuur en reorganisaties belangrijke interne factoren zijn voor veranderingen.

*Zijn er bepaalde projecten geweest die van invloed zijn geweest om te zoeken naar een nieuwe contractstrategie zoals de Project DOEN methodiek?*

*Hebben er naast deze, ook nog andere interne factoren een rol gespeeld bij de introductie van Project DOEN?*

*Samenvattend:*

Ook ditmaal zou ik graag willen horen wat uw perceptie is geweest van de mate van invloed van de verschillende interne factoren.

Interne factoren	Mate van invloed
Visie topmanagement	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Organisatiecultuur	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Reorganisaties	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Overig, namelijk...	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed

---

### *Content*

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Naast de context factoren (de externe en interne factoren) kan een verandering ook worden beïnvloed door andere veranderingen, soms ook van andere ordergroottes.

### *Introductie*

*(Orde van verandering)*

Een 'standaard' open aanbesteding - waarbij door de opdrachtgevers nog RAW bestekken worden gemaakt - wordt nog steeds toegepast op mindere complexe projecten. Daarentegen worden voor complexere projecten vaker intensieve aanbestedingsprocedures toegepast, bijv. een concurrentiegerichte dialoog.

### *Vraag*

*Voor wat voor soort projecten is de Project DOEN methode bedoeld? Projecten met een hoog detailniveau of sterk dynamische projecten?*

*Waarom is juist Project DOEN bijv. gestart met de Nijkerkerbrug?*

*(Content of change)*

Er wordt ook wel gezegd dat Project DOEN een invulling is van de Marktvisie. Alleen is Project DOEN gestart in 2013 en de Marktvisie pas ondertekend in 2016

*Wat is de reden hiervoor?*



(Content of change)

In 2018 werd duidelijk dat de bijzondere status van de Marktvisie vervalt bij RWS.

(Content of change)

Project DOEN is een hybride contractstrategie waarin veel aspecten zijn te herkennen uit andere contractstrategieën. Bijvoorbeeld dat Project DOEN gebruik maakt van een 'handleiding' ipv een dik contract. Deze filosofie is ook te herkennen in bijv. het Engelse NEC3/4.

(Content of change)

In 2010 is Engeland gestart met de 'early contractor involvement' aanbestedingsvorm. Waarbij de aanbesteding werd opgeknipt in 2 fasen. De Project DOEN filosofie maakt tot op zekere hoogte gebruik van een 'twee-fasen' aanpak, al is de directe invulling anders.

(Slotvraag)

In 2013 heeft de samenkomst van omstandigheden uiteindelijk geleid tot de introductie van de Project DOEN methode bij RWS.

*Waarom zat er 3 jaar tussen?*

*Waarom vervalt de status van de Marktvisie binnen Rijkswaterstaat?*

*Waarom is er geen gebruik gemaakt van bestaande contractstrategieën, zoals de NEC3/4 of wellicht zelfs een alliantie? (Anglo-Saxen cultuur?)*

*Wat was jullie reden om niet voor een alliantie model te kiezen?*

*Heeft de introductie van bijvoorbeeld de ECI in het VK als inspiratie gediend voor Project DOEN?*

*Zijn er nog andere nieuwe contractstrategieën overwogen?*

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### *Proces en leiderschap*

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Naast de contextuele factoren (Extern en Intern) en content factoren, kan ook het proces zelf en de rol van het leiderschap een grote invloed hebben op een verandering. Een bottom-up beweging bij een publieke organisatie is vaker gedreven door een ander soort waarden dan een top-down initiatief van het topmanagement. In dit deel van de interviews zou ik graag inzicht willen krijgen over het veranderingsproces rondom Project DOEN en de rol die het (top)management hierin had.

*Introductie*

(Top-down of bottom-up)

Bepaalde initiatieven – zoals de introductie van de concurrentiegerichte dialoog – stonden al grotendeels vast toen deze werden geïntroduceerd bij publieke opdrachtgevers. Namelijk schriftelijk voorgeschreven in het Europese Directive 2004.

(Visie topmanagement)

Om de vier jaar worden nieuwe kernwaardes en doelen opgenomen in het ondernemingsplan van RWS.

In het Ondernemingsplan 2008-2012 was dit:

“Resultaatgedreven, Aanspreekbaar, Dienstverlenend, Integer”

*Vraag*

*Stond de uitkomst van het concept van Project DOEN al grotendeels vast voordat het was voorgelegd aan het personeel?*

*Hoe belangrijk is de visie van het topmanagement geweest bij de invoering van Project DOEN?*

Maar in het ondernemingsplan 2012-2016:  
"Één Rijkswaterstaat, Samen met anderen, elke dag beter"

Dit lijkt een vrij grote omslag te zijn in waarden in slechts vier jaar.

(Sturend of faciliterend)

Grofweg kan er gezegd worden dat een initiatief een top-down of een bottom-up traject kan doorlopen. Met andere woorden, een idee kan ontstaan bij bijv. de inkoopafdeling waarna het (top)management deze verandering faciliteert. Maar het kan ook zo zijn dat een idee ontstaat bij iemand van de directie, die vervolgens de inkoopafdeling aangestuurd om de verandering door te voeren.

(Sturend of faciliterend)

In het ondernemingsplan van RWS 2012-2015 (opgesteld in 2012) staat niets specifiek over Project DOEN en de verandering in waarden die zij hiermee beoogden.

(Proces)

De afdeling Strategische Verkenningen (samen met het early-warning system) monitort belangrijke externe factoren rondom RWS. Zij proberen te voorspellen in wat voor omgeving RWS over 10 tot 15 jaar zal opereren, vaak door ook zo'n DESTEP analyse te gebruiken.

(Proces)

NOVA is de plek voor nieuwe ontwikkelingen op het snijvlak van inhoud, werkwijzen en organisatie. Samen met andere organisaties en specialisten zoekt NOVA naar nieuwe vormen van samenwerken, manieren om bestaande netwerken te versterken of om de dialoog te faciliteren of zelf aan te gaan.

(Slotvraag)

Hierboven zijn een aantal voorbeelden genoemd van factoren die een mogelijk effect hebben gehad op het proces (rol academici, denktanks, consultancies, etc)

*Wat waren de strategische doelstellingen op het gebied van inkoop voor de introductie van de Project DOEN methodiek?*

*Kijkend naar deze verschillende processen; hebben de werknemers van bijv. de inkoopafdeling een actieve rol gehad rondom de implementatie van de Project DOEN methode? Of werden zij voornamelijk aangestuurd om Project DOEN te gaan gebruiken?*

*Heeft het topmanagement een sturende of een faciliterende rol gehad rondom de implementatie van Project DOEN?*

*In hoeverre speelde het bestuur (leiderschap) in die tijd een rol in het definiëren van de organisatiewaarde?*

*Heeft deze afdeling een belangrijke rol gespeeld rondom de introductie van Project DOEN en de Marktvisie?*

*Heeft NOVA een rol gespeeld rondom de initiatie van Project DOEN of de Marktvisie?*

*Zijn er nog andere factoren of organisaties die een rol hebben gehad bij de introductie van de Project DOEN methode?*

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## Output

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Als laatste kunnen ook waarden zelf een belangrijke drijver zijn voor veranderingen. Soms kunnen deze waarden zelfs voortkomen uit grote geopolitieke gebeurtenissen. Een bekend voorbeeld is het aantreden van Margret Thatcher als PM van Engeland. Dit wordt gezien als een kritiek punt waarna de maatschappelijk en politieke kijk op overheden in de Westerse wereld is veranderd. De overheid zou meer moeten worden 'gerund als een bedrijf'. Dit kan als gevolg hebben dat de balans tussen private waardes (zoals verhogen van efficiency of 'winstgevendheid') en publieke waardes (zoals robuustheid, toewijding, etc) verschuift. In dit deel zou ik graag uw perceptie van de publieke waardes uit die tijd willen horen.

### Introductie

(Belofte)

De drang achter de implementatie van het DBFM model berust op het vinden van een nog efficiëntere vorm om infrastructurele projecten te ontwikkelen. Achteraf gezien past dit vrij goed in het tijdsbeeld van die tijd.

(Waarde)

Voor Project DOEN waren er contractstrategieën zoals D&C, DBFM en BVP. Allen vrij contractuele samenwerkingsvormen. Bij Project DOEN is veel meer een relationele vorm van samenwerken.

(Waarde)

Als we nog even blijven bij het DBFM model, dan zien we dat voor dit model, de projectkosten en projectduur de belangrijkste streeffactoren zijn geweest. Deze waardes kunnen ook worden gezien als 'succesfactoren' voor projecten die één van deze contractstrategieën gebruikt.

### Vraag

*Wat was de belofte die voor de implementatie van Project DOEN werd gemaakt?*

*Wat is er veranderd in de tussentijd?  
(Opportunistisch gedrag aannemer)*

Hoe zou je 'succes' omschrijven voor een Project DOEN werk?

*Eventueel keuze:*

*Optie A: Tijd en geld, waarbij het op de meest efficiënte manier koppelen van middelen aan taken het hoogste belang is.*

*Optie B: Werken op basis van vertrouwen, waarbij prestaties van eerlijkheid en gelijkwaardigheid het hoogste belang is.*

*Optie C: Veerkracht, waarbij een prestatie van betrouwbaarheid, aanpassingsvermogen en robuustheid het hoogste belang is.*

(Waarde)

Naast het omschrijven van succes bij projecten, kan ook het 'falen' van projecten worden omschreven.

*Hoe zou je 'falen' omschrijven voor een Project DOEN project? (Of: Waar is van geprobeerd weg te blijven?)*

*Eventueel keuze:*

*Optie A: Verkwisting, waarbij verwarring en inefficiëntie de standaard voor falen is.*

*Optie B: Misdrijf, waarbij oneerlijkheid, vooringenomenheid en misbruik van de machtspositie de standaard voor falen is.*

*Optie C: Storingen en falen door (zelfs onwaarschijnlijke) risico's zijn de standaard voor falen*

(Waarde)

De overgang naar geïntegreerde contract vormen aan het begin van het nieuwe millennium waren duidelijke signalen dat er getracht werd om de kernwaarden van RWS te veranderen.

*Heeft Project DOEN als doel gehad om de kernwaarden van de organisatie te veranderen? Zo ja, welke?*

*Had u het idee dat er bij de invoering van de Project DOEN methodiek een omslag is geweest in de publieke waarde of eerder dat een omslag in waarde omslag heeft geleid tot Project DOEN?*

Nu alle vragen zijn gesteld; wat heeft de grootste invloed gehad rondom de introductie van Project DOEN:

Context, content, leiderschap, of output factoren?

## Attachment 9 - Interview protocol case 3

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# Interview Guideline

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## *Introductie*

Ik studeer aan de TU Delft, in de richting van civiele techniek en ben nu bezig met mijn afstudeeronderzoek. Het onderzoek is gericht op het bestuderen van veranderingen in contractstrategieën bij publieke opdrachtgevers, waarbij ik mij voornamelijk focus op Rijkswaterstaat en het Hoogheemraadschap van Delfland. Het doel van dit interview is om een beter beeld te krijgen van de daadwerkelijke beweegredenen van Delfland om de Best Value methode door te voeren als contractstrategie. In dit interview ben ik vooral benieuwd naar uw perceptie over hoe deze initiatie tot stand is gekomen.

Voordat we kunnen beginnen, nog even wat praktische zaken:

- Alles is in het Nederlands
- Alles wordt anoniem verwerkt
- Het wordt opgenomen, zodat het achteraf beter verwerkt kan worden
- De resultaten zijn openbaar, dus als u wilt kan ik het verslag naar u toesturen.
- Het interview is semi gestructureerd, wat indirect betekent dat niet alle onderstaande vragen aan bod zullen komen

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## *Context - Externe factoren*

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Voor dit onderzoek heb ik de externe factoren in kaart gebracht doormiddel van een DESTEP analyse. DESTEP is een acroniem wat staat voor Demografisch, Economisch, Sociaal, Technisch, Ecologisch en Politiek. Het is een methode die vaak wordt gebruikt op strategisch niveau om de externe omgeving van een organisatie in kaart te brengen. Deze data kan daarna gebruikt worden om bijvoorbeeld verschillende toekomstige scenario's uit te schetsen. Van deze DESTEP analyse heb ik een selectie gemaakt van externe factoren en deze zou ik graag met u willen doornemen. Dit kan dus eigenlijk worden gezien als een validatieronde. Aangezien het over een periode gaat die al enige tijd geleden plaatsvond, zal ik voorafgaand aan elke vraag een korte introductie geven met wat voorbeelden uit die tijd.

### *Introductie*

(Demografie)

In een rapport van de EIB uit 2016 staat dat:

*De werknemerspopulatie in de waterbouw vergrijst. Het aandeel 55-plussers is tussen 2009 en 2015 toegenomen van 17% naar 20%.*

*Werknemers jonger dan 25 jaar vertegenwoordigen 10% van het personeel. Dit aandeel is licht afgenomen in de afgelopen jaren.*

Daarnaast staan er ook in diverse andere rapporten van Delfland zelf dat de organisatie zich bewust is van de krapte op de arbeidsmarkt en de vergrijzing van de organisatie.

### *Vraag*

*Heeft de krapte op de arbeidsmarkt - en wellicht m.b.t. het aantrekken van jongeren naar de organisatie – bijgedragen aan de keuze voor om BVP te starten?*

(Economisch)

BVP lijkt voor het rond 2013 te zijn ingevoerd bij Delfland. Een economisch vrij onstabiele periode (Naweeën Huizencrisis en Europese Schulden crisis). Beide economische crisissen hebben flinke nadelige gevolgen gehad voor de Nederlandse economie, waaronder de bouwsector. Het jaar 2013 was bijvoorbeeld het absolute dieptepunt voor de Nederlandse bouwsector, welke 28 procent onder het niveau van voor de crisis stond.

(Economisch)

Tot 2011 financierde het Rijk het HWBP programma voor 100%, maar met ingang van 2011 zijn de waterschappen medefinancier.

(Economisch)

Binnen rapporten van het Rijk wordt weleens gesproken van de 'Water Valley', ofwel NL als kennis exportland op het gebied van water.

(Sociaal)

Het CBS heeft gemeten dat het institutionele vertrouwen van de burger al jaren matig afneemt. Een belangrijk speerpunt van BVP is dat de opdrachtnemer de expert is en dat de opdrachtgever tijdens de aanbestedingsfase vooral moet luisteren naar de expert.

(Sociaal)

Er wordt steeds vaker gesproken over een heterogene maatschappij, wat ertoe kan leiden dat stakeholdermanagement moeilijker wordt.

(Sociaal)

(Intro) Er lijkt al een flink aantal jaren een maatschappelijk trend naar een meer egalitaire samenleving te zijn, waarmee meer hiërarchische bestuursorganen indirect worden aangespoord om meer via een netwerk aanpak te werken. Er wordt bijvoorbeeld in het Waterbeheersplan van 2006-2009 gesproken over het versterken van 'Netwerkmanagement'

Quote: "Versterken netwerk: het continueren en uitbreiden van de contacten met derden, want het is van groot belang dat Delfland de netwerkpartners kent, en zij Delfland. Op die manier kan in vertrouwen worden samengewerkt binnen ieders verantwoordelijkheden."

(Sociaal)

Burgers/bewoners lijken steeds mondiger te worden en zich steeds beter te verenigen.

*Heeft de economische laagconjunctuur een rol gespeeld in de uiteindelijke keuze voor het BVP model?*

*Is voor dit programma ook meer budget vrijgekomen om te zoeken naar nieuwe contract strategieën zoals de BVP methodiek?*

("Verder betalen alle waterschappen mee aan het HWBP. Ook de waterschappen die geen primaire keringen hebben")

*Hebben dit soort doelen een rol tijdens de keuze om te starten met Best Value?*

*Heeft het geleidelijk afnemen van het institutionele vertrouwen van de burger een rol gespeeld bij de introductie van BVP*

*Hebben dit soort sociale aspecten een rol gehad bij de keuze om BVP te adopteren?*

*Merkten jullie destijds dat de toenmalige samenwerkingsvormen hiervoor toereikend genoeg waren?*

*Heeft de sociale trend naar een netwerk samenleving een rol gespeeld bij de keuze om BVP te adopteren?*

*Heeft het feit dat burgers steeds mondiger worden een rol gespeeld in de keuze om met de BVP methode te starten?*

(Sociaal)

In 2013 is bij RWS Project DOEN geïntroduceerd die aanspoort tot 'werken vanuit de bedoeling' en 'maximale klantwaarde'. Waarbij de aannemer direct medeverantwoordelijk wordt voor het goed interpreteren van de wensen van de klant.

(Politiek)

Het EIB schreef in 2016 dat het algemene vertrouwen tussen de aannemer en de waterschappen goed zit, beter zelfs dan bij andere publieke opdrachtgevers. Daarentegen stelt de BVP methode dat er in principe geen (relationeel/blind) vertrouwen nodig is tussen de opdrachtgever en opdrachtnemer wanneer het model wordt gebruikt, oftewel ingecalculeerd vertrouwen. Daarbij is een belangrijke aanname in het BVP model dat aannemers opportunistisch zijn en irrationeel handelen.

(Politiek)

Op 11 december 2013 is de wet Houdbare Overheidsfinanciën (HOF) officieel gepubliceerd, wat een effect heeft op decentrale overheden. De UVW schijft hierover: "Een risico voor de waterschappen is dat zij binnen het EMU-saldo onvoldoende ruimte krijgen om hun noodzakelijke investeringen in waterveiligheid, waterbeheer en waterzuivering uit te voeren"

(Politiek)

In de korte geschiedenis heeft Delfland een tweetal fuseer-pogingen ontlopen van het ministerie en de provincieën, welke wilde dat het fuseerde met andere waterschappen. Een keer in 2001 en later nog een keer in 2004.

(Politiek)

Al in mei 2004 werd een zeer kritisch rapport vrijgegeven van de Commissie Wijffels, waarmee alarm werd geslagen over de achterblijvende innovatieopgave van Nederland. Uit verschillende meer hedendaagse rapporten blijkt dat innovatieopdracht nog steeds achterblijft.

(Techniek)

Je ziet ook dat in 2004 bijvoorbeeld TenderNed is opgezet, waarmee aanbestedingen digitaal werden afgehandeld en er wellicht minder persoonlijk contact was.

(Politiek)

Aan het begin van de millenniumwisseling zijn een aantal nieuwe publieke instanties opgericht rondom het gebruik van PPS bij de overheid. Instututen zoals PIANOo, PSiBouw, RegieRaad en PPP Taskforce.

(Politiek)

Al sinds de jaren 80 heeft het Ministerie van Financiën sterk gestuurd op de institutionalisering van het DBFM model.

*Waren dit soort geluiden ook aanwezig rond 2012-2014 bij Delfland?*

*(en daardoor verantwoordelijkheden naar de markt worden overgedragen)*

*Is de bouwfraude (en de schade aan de relatie opdrachtgever-opdrachtnemer) van grote invloed geweest in het zoeken naar een nieuw model zoals de BVP?*

*Heeft de introductie van de HOF in 2013 een effect gehad om juist te starten met de Best Value methodiek?*

*Heeft de (constante) dreiging van fusering – en de algehele discussie om bestaansrecht – een rol gespeeld in de keuze om BVP te introduceren?*

*Heeft de achterblijvende innovatieopdracht een rol gespeeld bij de introductie van BVP?*

*(2.5% regeling?)*

*Heeft dit bijgedragen aan de keuze om BVP te starten?*

*Heeft de totstandkoming van dergelijke instituten een rol gespeeld bij de keuze voor het BVP model?*

*Wat is de rol van de regering geweest (of specifiek bijv. de ministeries) rond de implementatie van het BVP model?*



(Politiek)

In 2012 is er een vernieuwde versie gekomen van de Aanbestedingswet, de nationale omzetting van de nieuwe Europese aanbestedingsrichtlijnen.

*Heeft dit meer ruimte geboden om bijv. een Best Value breder te kunnen implementeren?*

(Politiek)

De eerste vertaling van de Europese *Richtlijnen* waren ook richtlijnen, wat betekent dat het niet verplicht was voor decentrale overheden (zoals de waterschappen) om EMVI te moeten gebruiken.

*(In de herziende richtlijnen van 2016 werd het gebruik van 'EMVI' verplicht, was het niet dat EMVI nu een overkoepelende term voor: Best-Prijs-kwaliteit-verhouding, laagste prijs en laagste levenscycluskosten.)*

*Waarom is dit uiteindelijk dan toch zo belangrijk geweest?  
(RWS was het wet)*

(Politiek)

In 2005 is de UAV-GC (2005) uitgegeven, welke ook het gebruik van geïntegreerde contracten én het gebruik van EMVI mogelijk maakte.

*Waarom hebben de waterschappen daar toendertijd weinig tot niets mee gedaan?*

(Politiek)

Al sinds 2010 is er steeds getracht de omgevingswet in te voeren. Dit is inmiddels weer doorgeschoven tot 2022. De impact van deze wetgeving lijkt i.i.g. groot te worden en vraagt o.a. om een andere samenwerking met de ketenpartners.

*Heeft de (dreiging van de) omgevingswet een rol gehad rond de start van Best Value  
(Relaties provinciale overheden)*

(Slotvraag DESTEP)

Dit was een selectie van de externe factoren van de DESTEP analyse.

*Zijn er nog andere belangrijke externe factoren geweest die niet zijn behandeld in deze vragen, maar wel een belangrijke rol hebben gespeeld bij de introductie van BVP?*

*Samenvattend:*

Zoals u misschien heeft gemerkt zijn bepaalde onderdelen uit de DESTEP meer bevroegd dan anderen. Hierdoor kan het bij het analyseren straks onterecht lijken of meer bevroegde onderdelen belangrijker waren dan minder bevroegde onderdelen. Om deze reden zou ik graag nog even willen valideren wat vanuit uw perceptie de mate van invloed was van elk onderdeel.

Externe factoren	Mate van invloed
Demografisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Economisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Sociaal	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Technologisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Ecologisch	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Politiek	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed

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## Context – Inter en intra Factoren

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Naast de externe factoren - die behandeld zijn in het vorige deel - kunnen ook interne factoren van invloed zijn op veranderingen bij publieke opdrachtgevers. Uit de literatuur blijkt dat de organisatiecultuur, de visie van het topmanagement en mogelijke reorganisaties, belangrijke invloedsfactoren kunnen zijn bij veranderingen. Voor dit deel zou ik graag uw perceptie willen horen over de invloed van deze factoren.

### Introductie

#### *(Organisatiecultuur)*

In een rapport uitgegeven door Delfland staat het volgende geschreven:

*"Bij Delfland bestaat een echte 'familiecultuur', met de nodige positieve, maar ook minder negatieve aspecten kent. Positief zijn de zorgzaamheid voor elkaar en het feit dat mensen erop gericht zijn harmonieus met elkaar om te gaan. De familiecultuur zorgt echter ook voor conflict mijndend gedrag, praten over elkaar in plaats van met elkaar, moeite om elkaar aan te spreken etc. en staat hiermee professionaliteit in de weg."*

#### *(Reorganisatie)*

Het aantal arbeidsplaatsen bij Delfland is toegenomen van circa 475 begin 2006 tot circa 560 eind 2009.

#### *(Reorganisatie)*

In 2009 is besloten om het de programmamanagement-aanpak te introduceren, zodat Delfland meer 'adequaat en integraal' kon reageren op ontwikkelingen in de externe omgeving. Dit vroeg o.a. om een goede samenwerking tussen de sectoren, transparantie in de keuzes en inzicht in de consequenties van de keuzes voor de doelstellingen.

#### *(Consultancies)*

Uit de literatuur blijkt dat consultancies een belangrijke invloedsfactor kunnen zijn bij veranderingen in publieke organisaties. Een voorbeeld is het 'McKinsey-rapport' uit 2019, welke van invloed lijkt te zijn geweest op de keuze voor het nieuwe twee-fasen contract.

#### *(HWBP)*

Delfland werkt steeds vaker samen met andere (lokale) publieke opdrachtgevers, zo ook in het HWBP. Hierbij komen inkoopmanagers, projectmanagers, en directeuren in aanraking met de werkwijze van andere publieke opdrachtgevers.

#### *(Academici)*

Een andere mogelijke aanleiding voor veranderend beleid komt vanuit de academische wereld. Soms wordt vanuit de wetenschap het maatschappelijk debat geagendeerd (huidige werkwijze in twijfel getrokken) of nieuwe mogelijkheden geschetst vanuit ervaringen elders.

### Vraag

*Speelde de organisatiecultuur toendertijd – wellicht in een poging deze te veranderen – een grote rol in de keuze voor een nieuwe contractstrategie zoals BVP?*

*Hebben dit soort reorganisaties een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij de invoering van de BVP methodiek? (bijv. meer capaciteit)*

*Heeft de introductie van programmamanagement een rol gespeeld bij de introductie van de Best Value methodiek?*

*Is er ook nog een rol geweest van consultancies tijdens de introductie van BVP? (Jeroen van de Rijt)*

*Zijn er bepaalde allianties of netwerksamenwerkingen geweest die als inspiratie hebben gediend voor de keuze van BVP?*

*Is er ook nog een rol geweest van Nederlandse academici bij de introductie van BVP?*

De academische link met het BVP gedachtengoed is heel helder (nml. Kashiwagi, VS).

(Media)

Er zijn bij Rijkswaterstaat een aantal projecten geweest die voor veel negatieve publiciteit hebben gezorgd m.b.t. DBFM contracten, zoals de Zeesluis in IJmuiden. Niet lang daarna heeft RWS het DBFM model tijdelijk in de ijskast gezet en is bijvoorbeeld in 2019 begonnen met het twee-fasen contract. Een ander voorbeeld van verder terug is de bouw van de Oosterschelde, dat achteraf veel meer geld heeft gekost dan eerst was beraamd. Dit heeft bijvoorbeeld gezorgd dat de D&C contracten sneller zijn geïnstitutionaliseerd.

(Slotvraag)

Zoals vermeld stond aangegeven in de literatuur dat de visie topmanagement, organisatiecultuur en reorganisaties belangrijke interne factoren zijn voor veranderingen.

*Zijn er bepaalde projecten geweest bij Delfland die van invloed zijn geweest om te zoeken naar een nieuwe contractstrategie zoals de BVP methodiek?*

*Hebben er naast deze, ook nog andere interne factoren een rol gespeeld bij de introductie van BVP?*

*Samenvattend:*

Ook ditmaal zou ik graag willen horen wat uw perceptie is geweest van de mate van invloed van de verschillende interne factoren.

Interne factoren	Mate van invloed
Visie topmanagement	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Organisatiecultuur	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Reorganisaties	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed
Overig, namelijk...	Weinig invloed / Matige invloed / Grote invloed

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### *Content*

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Naast de context factoren (de externe en interne factoren) kan een verandering ook worden beïnvloed door andere veranderingen, soms ook van andere ordergroottes.

## *Introductie*

*(Orde van verandering)*

BVP is tijdens de Spoedaanpak in 2007 al breed toegepast door Rijkswaterstaat. Delfland heeft dit pas veel later in 2014-2015 opgepakt. Daarin tegen was Delfland wel snel bij het oppakken van het DBFM model, al in 2002.

## *Vraag*

*Waarom is uw kijk hierop, waarom heeft het bijna 8 jaar geduurd voordat Delfland de Best Value methode heeft omarmd?*

*(Zelfde EMVI?)*

(Content of change)

De discussie rondom Best Value is begonnen rond 2012, maar pas echt duidelijk geïmplementeerd in 2015

(Orde van verandering)

Een 'standaard' open aanbesteding - waarbij door de opdrachtgevers nog RAW bestekken worden gemaakt - wordt nog steeds toegepast op mindere complexe projecten. Daarentegen worden voor complexere projecten vaker intensieve aanbestedingsprocedures toegepast, bijv. een concurrentiegerichte dialoog.

(Slotvraag)

In 2007 heeft de samenkomst van omstandigheden uiteindelijk geleid tot de introductie van de Best Value methode bij Defland.

*Wat is er in deze tussentijd gebeurd?*

*Heeft de opkomst van EMVI bij Defland een belangrijk effect gehad op de latere introductie van de BVP methodiek?*

*Voor wat voor soort projecten was de BVP methode bedoeld? Projecten met een hoog detailniveau of sterk dynamische projecten?*

*Zijn er nog andere nieuwe contractstrategieën overwogen?*

*Zijn er nog andere belangrijke veranderingen geweest die op invloed zijn geweest om de Best Value methodiek te introduceren?*

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### *Proces en leiderschap*

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Naast de contextuele factoren (Extern en Intern) en content factoren, kan ook het proces zelf en de rol van het leiderschap een grote invloed hebben op een verandering. Een bottom-up beweging bij een publieke organisatie is vaker gedreven door een ander soort waarden dan een top-down initiatief van het topmanagement. In dit deel van de interviews zou ik graag inzicht willen krijgen over het veranderingsproces rondom BVP en de rol die het (top)management hierin had.

*Introductie*

(Top-down of bottom-up)

Bepaalde initiatieven – zoals de introductie van de concurrentiegerichte dialoog – stonden al grotendeels vast toen deze werden geïntroduceerd bij publieke opdrachtgevers. Namelijk schriftelijk voorgeschreven in het Europese Directive 2004. Andere initiatieven lijken meer te zijn gevormd over tijd en door veel partijen te betrekken bij de verandering, bijvoorbeeld de introductie van Project DOEN.

(Sturend of faciliterend)

Grofweg kan er gezegd worden dat een initiatief een top-down of een bottom-up traject kan doorlopen. Met andere woorden, een idee kan ontstaan bij bijv. de inkoopafdeling waarna het (top)management deze verandering faciliteert. Maar het kan ook zo zijn dat een idee ontstaat bij iemand van de directie, die vervolgens de inkoopafdeling aangestuurd om de verandering door te voeren.

*Vraag*

*Stond de uitkomst van het concept van BVP al grotendeels vast voordat het was voorgelegd aan het personeel?*

*Kijkend naar deze verschillende processen; hebben de werknemers van bijv. de inkoopafdeling een actieve rol gehad rondom de implementatie van de BVP*

(Sturend of faciliterend)

In de waterbeheersplannen van 2010 tot 2016 staan verder staat niets specifiek over de BVP methodiek of de verandering in waarden die zij hiermee beoogden.

(Visie topmanagement)

Delfland (of waterschappen in het algemeen) heeft een bijzondere constructie vergeleken met bijv. een Rijkswaterstaat. Namelijk zitten er 'boven' de algemeen directeur nog de Verenigde Vergadering, het dagelijkse bestuur en de dijkgraaf.

(Visie topmanagement)

De Dijkgraaf wisselt in principe om de zes jaar en de hoogheemraden (gekozen uit het dagelijks bestuur) wisselen ook door na elke waterschapsverkiezing.

(Visie topmanagement)

Al in 2010 werd in het waterbeheerplan geschreven dat er sterk wordt gestuurd op transparantie, slagvaardigheid, klantgerichtheid en een representatieve organisatie. Dit zijn bepaalde strategische waarden waarop de rest van de organisatie wordt ingericht.

(Sturend of faciliterend)

Sinds april 2013 werken de waterschappen met een geharmoniseerd inkoopbeleid. Met het geharmoniseerd waterschapsbeleid voor inkoop en aanbesteden dragen de waterschappen bij aan de uniformering van de decentrale overheden. Grotendeels aangestuurd door de Unie van Waterschappen.

*methode? Of werden zij voornamelijk aangestuurd om BVP te gaan gebruiken? Heeft het topmanagement een sturende of een faciliterende rol gehad rondom de implementatie van BVP?*

*(Dijkgraaf Michiel van Haersma Buma of Secretaris directeur Paul van den Wijngaart?)*

*In hoeverre speelde het bestuur (leiderschap) in die tijd een rol in het definiëren van de organisatie waarde?*

*Hebben het dagelijkse bestuur en de dijkgraaf veel zeggenschap over het inkoopbeleid? (invloed Best Value?)*

*Hebben er wisselingen plaatsgevonden rond de periode 2012 tot 2014 die van invloed zijn geweest om uiteindelijk te starten met Best Value?*

*Wat is uw perceptie geweest over de strategische doelstellingen rond de periode 2012 – 2014?*

*Kwamen deze overeen met wat er werd beloofd met de introductie van de BVP methodiek?*

*Heeft de drang om het inkoopbeleid te harmoniseren een rol gespeeld in de keuze om BVP te adopteren?*

*In hoeverre heeft de Unie van Waterschappen de ontwikkeling van Best Value gedreven? (Wat was de rol van Brigitte Broekert?)*

(Slotvraag)

Hierboven zijn een aantal voorbeelden genoemd van factoren die een mogelijk effect hebben gehad op het proces (rol academici, denktanks, consultancies, etc)

*Zijn er nog andere factoren of organisaties die een rol hebben gehad bij de introductie van de BVP methode?*

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### Output

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Als laatste kunnen ook waarden zelf een belangrijke drijver zijn voor veranderingen. Soms kunnen deze waarden zelfs voortkomen uit grote geopolitieke gebeurtenissen. Een bekend voorbeeld is het aantreden van Margaret Thatcher als PM van Engeland. Dit wordt gezien als een kritiek punt waarna de maatschappelijk en politieke kijk op overheden in de Westerse wereld is veranderd. De overheid zou meer moeten worden 'gerund als een bedrijf'. Dit kan als gevolg hebben dat de balans tussen private waardes (zoals verhogen van efficiency of 'winstgevendheid' ) en publieke waardes (zoals robuustheid, toewijding, etc) verschuift. In dit deel zou ik graag uw perceptie van de publieke waardes uit die tijd willen horen.

### Introductie

(Belofte)

De drang achter de implementatie van het DBFM model berust op het vinden van een nog efficiëntere vorm om infrastructurele projecten te ontwikkelen. Achteraf gezien past dit vrij goed in het tijdsbeeld van die tijd.

(Waarde)

Tot niet heel geleden werkten waterschappen voornamelijk met 'huisaanemers'. Ze werkten zelf een (technisch) RAW bestek uit en zetten het daarna uit naar de markt. Op een gegeven moment moest dat anders en werd de markt verantwoordelijk voor bijv. het ontwerp (D&C), vaak in combinatie met wat-vaag gespecificeerde EMVI eisen. Het schijnt dat dit tot onvrede heeft gezorgd, o.a. vanwege het prijsduiken van aannemers.

(Waarde)

Waterschappen hebben volgens de Waterwet en Waterschapswet een zorgplicht voor het juiste beheer van diverse watersystemen. In dat aspect verschillen zij wettelijk gezien van RWS. Bij EMVI moet 'kwaliteit' vooraf worden gespecificeerd, maar dat schijnt nog niet mee te vallen voor een dijk die 150 jaar mee moet gaan.

(Waarde)

De Marktvisie en Project DOEN waren duidelijke signalen dat er getracht werd om de kernwaarden van RWS te veranderen.

### Vraag

*Wat was de belofte die voor de implementatie van de BVP werd gemaakt?*

*Is er uiteindelijk ook voor de Best Value omdat kwaliteit van D&C + EMVI aanbesteden slechter werd?*

*Is Best Value in het leven geroepen om beter om te gaan met het kwaliteit-aspect van een aanbesteding?*

*Heeft BVP als doel gehad om de kernwaarden van de organisatie te veranderen? Zo ja, welke?*

*Had u het idee dat er bij de invoering van de BVP methodiek een omslag is geweest in de publieke waarde of eerder dat een omslag in waarde omslag heeft geleid tot BVP?*

Nu alle vragen zijn gesteld; wat heeft de grootste invloed gehad rondom de introductie van BVP:

Context, content, leiderschap, of output factoren?