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Assessing the Global Resilience of Water Quality Sensor Placement Strategies within Water Distribution Systems

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- 20

32 Abstract: Water quality sensors are often spatially distributed in water distribution systems 33 (WDSs) to detect contamination events and monitor quality parameters (e.g., chlorine residual 34 levels), thereby ensuring safety of a WDS. The performance of a water quality sensor placement 35 strategy (WQSPS) is not only affected by sensor spatial deployment that has been extensively 36 analyzed in literature, but also by possible sensor failures that have been rarely explored so far. 37 However, enumerating all possible sensor failure scenarios is computationally infeasible for a 38 WQSPS with a large number of sensors. To this end, this paper proposes an evolutionary algorithm 39 (EA) based method to systematically and efficiently investigate the WQSPS' global resilience 40 considering all likely sensor failures. First, new metrics are developed in the proposed method to assess the global resilience of a WQSPS. This is followed by a proposal of an efficient 41 42 optimization approach based on an EA to identify the values of global resilience metrics. Finally, 43 the sensors within the WQSPS are ranked to identify their relative importance in maintaining the 44 WQSPS's detection performance. Two real-world WDSs with four WQSPSs for each case study 45 are used to demonstrate the utility of the proposed method. Results show that: (i) compared to the 46 traditional global resilience analysis method, the proposed EA-based approach identifies 47 improved values of global resilience metrics, (ii) the WQSPSs that deploy sensors close to large 48 demand users are overall more resilient in handling sensor failures relative to other design 49 solutions, thus offering important insight to facilitate the selection of WQSPSs, and (iii) sensor 50 rankings based on the global resilience can identify those sensors whose failure would 51 significantly reduce the WQSPS's performance thereby providing guidance to enable effective 52 water quality sensor management and maintenance.

53 Keywords: Global resilience; Contamination intrusion; Water quality sensor placement strategy;
54 Water distribution system

55 1. Introduction

56 A water distribution system (WDS) is a network that is responsible for delivering drinking water 57 produced at treatment plants to end users (Zheng et al., 2016; Qi et al., 2018). Because of a large 58 spatial coverage and complex structures, WDSs are highly vulnerable to intentional or accidental 59 contamination intrusion (Yang and Boccelli 2016; Zheng et al., 2018). A recent intrusion incident 60 was reported in May 2016 in Beijing, China, where a large amount of reclaimed water entered into 61 the WDS due to the misconnection between reclaimed and drinking water supply pipes 62 (ChinaNews, 2016). The event had not been detected for a while and has resulted in severe public health hazard. This highlights the great importance and necessity to efficiently identify 63 64 contamination intrusion incidents, thereby minimizing the potential impacts of these events 65 (Ostfeld et al., 2004). To achieve this objective, water quality sensors are often placed within the 66 WDSs (i.e., type of sensors and their deployments) to form a contamination early warning system, 67 aimed to ensure potential intrusion events can be detected and a warning can be provided to the 68 public in an efficient manner (Wu and Walski, 2006; Hart and Murray, 2010; Kroll and King 2010; 69 Hu et al., 2017; Soldevila et al., 2018). However, due to the high cost associated with water quality 70 sensors, it is impossible to deploy them at all possible locations in a large WDS (Zhao et al., 2016). 71 This consequently motivates studies to investigate optimal deployment of a limited number of 72 sensors in the WDSs aimed at maximizing their performance in detecting water quality issues 73 (Rathi et al., 2015).

74 Identifying water quality sensor placement strategies (WQSPS) typically involves formulating an 75 optimization problem (Oliker and Ostfeld, 2014). Over the past decade, a number of different 76 optimization objective functions have been developed to maximize the detection ability of the 77 limited number of water quality sensors. These include the minimization of the detection time 78 (Ostfeld et al., 2004), the maximization of the detection coverage (Rathi et al., 2015), the 79 minimization of affected users (Aral et al., 2010), the minimization of sensor redundancy (Tinelli 80 et al., 2018), and the minimization of the maximum possible influence expressed as the event with 81 the highest consequence (Watson et al., 2009), the minimization of the mean extent of the potential 82 source area and redundant detection (Van, 2014) as well as the minimization of the risk of 83 contamination (Weickgenannt et al 2010). It has been demonstrated that the use of different 84 objective functions can lead to significantly different WQSPSs, and hence it is often difficult to 85 identify a single WQSPS that can ensure all these objectives are optimized (Zheng et al., 2018). To 86 address this issue, the methods of integrating multiple objectives through weighting approaches or 87 simultaneously considering multiple objectives within the optimization framework are adopted to account for the trade-offs between different objectives (He et al., 2018). 88

89 In parallel with the development of objective functions, many optimization techniques have been proposed to enable these objective functions to be effectively minimized/maximized (Berry et al., 90 91 2005; Bahadur et al., 2003; Hart and Murray, 2010). Among these optimization methods, 92 Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) have gained in popularity due to their strong search ability as well 93 as their flexibility in linking to water quality simulation models (e.g., EPANET2.0, Ostfeld et al., 94 2008). The practical applications of EAs to identify optimal WQSPSs are often challenged by their 95 low computational efficiency especially when dealing with large WDSs (Zheng et al., 2017). This 96 is because the EA search mechanisms are stochastically based and hence they need to call 97 continuously the water quality simulation model (that is often computationally expensive) to 98 enable the calculations of objective functions (Hart and Murray, 2010). To overcome this issue, 99 continuous efforts have been made to improve the optimization efficiency with the aid of several 100 techniques, including graph theory (Perelman and Ostfeld, 2011), preconditioning methods (Huang

and Mcbean, 2006; Diao and Rauch, 2013), surrogate models (Bi and Dandy, 2015), data-archive
methods (He et al., 2018) and sampling methods (Tinelli et al. 2017).

Given the selected objective function and the optimization algorithm as mentioned above, optimal 103 104 WQSPSs that have the best overall performance in detecting water quality issues can be identified 105 for the WDS. However, it should be noted that the WQSPS' performance is not only affected by 106 spatial sensor deployment, but can also be substantially influenced by sensor failures (e.g., 107 structural failures and communication failures). Failures of water quality sensors are not 108 uncommon within practical applications, as they can be caused by internal structural failures, 109 measurement errors, or communication failures (Berry et al., 2009). These failures can 110 significantly reduce the performance of the optimal WQSPS that is identified based on the 111 assumption that all water quality sensors can consistently provide accurate measurements (Berry et 112 al., 2009). Therefore, there is a need to consider the resilience during the selection of WQSPSs, 113 thereby ensuring the system performs well not only under normal conditions (perfectly working 114 sensors), but also maintains acceptable functionality levels during unexpected conditions that lead to sensor failures. 115

116 Resilience in engineering community is often defined as a system's ability to ensure the continuity 117 and efficiency of its function during and after the failure (Mugume et al., 2015). This concept has 118 now been considered in some engineering domains, such as urban drainage systems (Mugume et 119 al., 2015), water supply systems (Diao et al., 2016; Meng et al., 2018) and wastewater systems 120 (Sweetapple et al., 2019). However, to the best of our knowledge, the WQSPS's resilience that 121 accounts for sensor failures has been rarely investigated so far, and hence there is still a lack of 122 suitable method for resilience quantification. While Preis and Ostfeld (2008) and Berry et al. 123 (2009) have made attempts to consider sensor failures during the selection/assessment of WQSPSs,

124 they assume a known and fixed failure likelihood for each water quality sensor. However, these 125 approaches only considered a narrow range of possible sensor failures, and hence the results can 126 only represent a limited view of resilience (Mugume et al., 2015). Given that the failure 127 probability of each sensor as well as the total number of failed sensors is actually unknown and 128 unpredictable, it is ideal, if computationally feasible, to explicitly consider all possible failure 129 scenarios, thereby quantifying the global resilience of the WOSPS in coping with possible sensor 130 failures (Butler et al., 2014; Diao et al., 2016). However, enumerating all considered possible 131 sensor failure scenarios is often computationally infeasible for WQSPSs with a large number of 132 sensors. To this end, this study proposes an EA-based method to investigate the global resilience 133 of WQSPSs considering all likely sensor failure scenarios.

Rather than quantifying the probability of occurrence of sensor failures, which are highly uncertain, the proposed global resilience evaluation method considers the system performance as a result of sensor failure scenarios irrespective of their occurrence probability (Diao et al., 2016). The specific contributions/novelties of the present study are as follows:

(i) The proposal of new metrics to assess the global resilience of WQSPSs under different
sensor failure levels (i.e., the number of failed sensors). In this study, assessment metrics
are proposed to measure quantitatively the WQSPS's global resilience under different
sensor failure levels, where the impacts of different number of sensor failure scenarios on
the WQSPS's ability to detect contamination intrusions are considered, irrespective of their
occurrence probability.

144 (ii) The development of a novel EA-based optimization approach to identify the values of the
 145 global resilience metrics for different sensor failure levels. To demonstrate the utility of the
 146 proposed EA-based method (EAM), its performance is compared with the traditional global

resilience analysis (TGRA) approach (Diao et al., 2016) in capturing the impact extents of
the failure scenarios.

- 149 (iii) Identification of the relative importance of the sensors in maintaining the WQSPS's
 150 detection performance based on the global resilience metric values. This also helps
 151 improving knowledge of the underlying system properties of the WQSPSs as well as
 152 offering important guidance for the management and maintenance of water quality sensor
 153 systems.
- This paper is organized as follows. The proposed methodology is described in Section 2, where the definition of the global resilience metrics and the proposed EAM are presented. This is followed by the descriptions of the case studies considered in Section 3, and results and discussions in Section 4. Finally, the conclusion section (Section 5) shows the main observations and implications of this paper.

159 **2.** Methodology

160 2.1 Global resilience metrics for WQSPSs

161 2.1.1 Global resilience metrics definition


The proposed global resilience metrics are characterized by the consumed contaminated water during the contamination events. A more resilient WQSPS indicates the ability of improved detection of contamination events under different sensor failure levels resulting in less contaminated water consumed. The (percentage) functionality loss of the WQSPS under different sensor failure levels (*L*) can be described mathematically as follows:

167
$$FL(S_L^k, E_i, t) = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{N} Q_j(S_L^k, E_i, t)}{\sum_{j=1}^{N} DQ_j(t)}$$
(1)


168 where $FL(S_L^k, E_i, t)$ is the proportion of contaminated water that has been consumed relative to 169 the total consumed water of the entire WDS under the intrusion event E_i (*i*=1,2,...,*M*, *M* is the 170 total number of intrusion events) at time *t* for the sensor failure scenario *k* (*k*=1,2,...,*K*, *K* is the 171 total number of sensor failure scenarios) with *L* failed sensors (referred as S_L^k); $Q_j(S_L^k, E_i, t)$ is 172 the contaminated water that has been consumed at node *j* (*j*=1,2,...,*N*, *N* is the total number of 173 nodes with demand users) and $DQ_i(t)$ is the total water demands required by node *j*.

174 Figure 1 further illustrates the proposed formulation of the global WQSPS resilience. As shown in 175 this figure, the black solid curve line represents the dynamic behavior of the WDS functionality level (i.e., $1 - FL(S_L^k, E_i, t)$) associated with the WQSPS over time for a given contamination 176 event E_i starting at time t_i^s and a given sensor failure scenario. As it can be seen from Figure 1, 177 178 the functionality level of the WDS before the occurrence of the contamination event is 100%. 179 This functionality level consistently declines for the duration of the contamination event until this event is detected by the WQSPS within the WDS at time t_i^d . The shaded region A between 180 t_i^s and t_i^d is the total functionality losses of the WDS (i.e., the consumed contaminated water) 181 182 during this time period as indicated in Figure 1. If this contamination event cannot be detected by 183 the WQSPS, the functionality level would gradually increase after a period of reduction as 184 indicated by the black dotted line in Figure 1. This is because the contamination intrusion, 185 especially the intentional contamination injections, often lasts a limited time period (e.g., 1 to 2

hours, see Ostfeld et al., 2016 and He et al., 2018) and hence the functionality level of the WQS can improve as the contaminated water is consumed over time. For this case, the total functionality losses of the WDS are the shaded region A+B above the black solid and dotted curve lines in Figure 1.



190



For all *M* contamination events, the average of functionality levels (in percentage) of the WQSPSis developed as shown below

195
$$f(S_L^k) = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M \left[1 - \frac{1}{(t_i^e - t_i^s)} \int_{t_i^s}^{T_i} FL(S_L^k, E_i, t) dt \right]$$
(2)

196
$$T_{i} = \begin{cases} t_{i}^{d}, E_{i} \text{ is detected} \\ t_{i}^{e}, E_{i} \text{ can not be detected} \end{cases}$$
(3)

where $f(S_L^k)$ is the average of functionality levels (in percentage) of the WQSPS across Mcontamination events for the sensor failure scenario S_L^k ; $\int_{t_i^s}^{T_i} FL(S_L^k, E_i, t) dt$ is the accumulative

functionality losses for the intrusion event starting at time t_i^s and ending at time T_i , and this 199 value is normalized between 0 and 1 through dividing it by the time difference between t_i^e and t_i^s 200 (i.e., $t_i^e - t_i^s$), where t_i^e is the time at which all the contaminated water within the WDS has been 201 202 consumed without detected by the water quality sensors. As shown in Equation (3), if a 203 contamination event E_i can be detected by any sensors with normal functionalities, T_i equals to t_i^d which is the time at which any of the sensors first detects this event. If the contamination 204 event cannot be detected, T_i is set to be t_i^e which is the time when all the contaminated water 205 206 have been consumed by customers.

The rationale behind Equations (1) and (2) used to represent the resilience of the WQSPS is that this formulation is able to simultaneously consider the impacts of sensor failures on the detection coverage and the time used to detect the contamination events, and the global resilience values are accordingly estimated when all possible failure scenarios are considered. In this study, three metrics are proposed to enable the global resilience assessment under a certain sensor failure level (*L*), which can be defined as follows

213
$$R_{\max}(L) = \max\{f(\mathbf{S}_L)\}$$
(4)

214
$$R_{\min}(L) = \min\{f(\mathbf{S}_L)\}$$
(5)

215
$$R_{\text{mean}}(L) = \frac{1}{K} \sum f(\mathbf{S}_L)$$
(6)

where $R_{\min}(L)$, $R_{\max}(L)$, $R_{mean}(L)$ are the minimum, maximum and mean of global resilience values respectively for a given sensor failure level L; $f(\mathbf{S}_L)$ is the performance level function that is used to represent the resilience values of the WQSPSs and $\mathbf{S}_L = \begin{bmatrix} S_L^1, S_L^2, ..., S_L^K \end{bmatrix}^T$ is the set that contains all possible scenarios with *L* failed sensors where *K* is the total number of sensor failure scenarios; the resilience value of each scenario S_L^k is computed using Equation (1).

221 Based on the definition of the global resilience metrics in Equations (1-6), a more resilient WQSPS 222 would possess overall lower total functionality losses of the WDS (the shaded region in Figure 1) 223 when their sensors fail (considering different failure levels). It is noted that Figure 1 only illustrates 224 the dynamic behavior of the functionality level variations of the WDS over time for one 225 contamination event under a given sensor failure scenario. To enable the identification of the 226 global resilience, a large number of contamination events (M) and all possible sensor failure 227 scenarios (\mathbf{S}_{L}) need to be considered. The global resilience as proposed in this paper (Equations 228 1-6) can have a value between 0 and 1, with a larger value representing that the WQSPS being 229 considered is more resilient as it can maintain acceptable detection performance during 230 unexpected conditions that lead to sensor failures. Two important assumptions are made in the 231 proposed global resilience metrics following Ostfeld et al. (2008). These are that: (i) the 232 functionality level of the WDS is not further reduced once the contamination event has been 233 detected (the A shaded region in Figure 1) by the water quality sensors as all users can be 234 quickly notified/warned to avoid consuming contaminated water, and (ii) the time period of the 235 contamination injections is limited as this is often the case for many intentional/accidental 236 intrusion events (Diao et al., 2016).


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238

239

240 2.1.2 Sensor failure scenarios

As shown in Equations (4-6), S_L includes all possible failure scenarios for a given failure level *L*, leading to a total of C(TL,L) failure scenarios (*TL* is the total number of sensors within the WDS). Taking a WDS with four water quality sensors (*TL*=4) as an example, the total number of scenarios involving a random failure of a single sensor is four (C(4,1) = 4) as shown in Fig. 2. For failure levels of *L* =2, 3 and 4, the total number of scenarios are six, four and one respectively (see Fig. 2). Therefore, for this small WQSPS, the total number of failure scenarios is 15.



248

Fig. 2. A schematic of sensor failure scenarios in a simple WDS with four sensors at different failure levels (*L*). The total number of failure scenarios for L=1, 2, 3 and 4 are 4, 6,

251 252

4 and 1, respectively. Note that only first 3 scenarios (i.e. for L=1, 2 and 3) are shown here for illustration purposes


253 2.2 Resilience Assessment using EA-based optimization

254 2.2.1 The EA-based method to identify global resilience values

255 As stated in the previous section, for each failure level L, all possible failure scenarios have to be 256 considered to enable the computation of the global resilience metrics (See Equations 4-6). 257 However, enumerating all possible sensor failure scenarios is only applicable to WQSPS with a 258 small number of sensors. For a relatively large WQSPS this is not tractable. For example, if 259 WQSPS uses 30 sensors the total number of failure scenarios with L = 1 to 30 is 1.07×10^9 . 260 Simulating such a large number of scenarios requires massive computational resources, which 261 would significantly go beyond the computational budgets that are typically available in practice. 262 Therefore, the present study develops an efficient evolutionary algorithm based method (EAM) to 263 identify the global resilience metric values (Equations 4-6) for different sensor failure levels.

264 Figure 3 is used to illustrate the proposed EAM. For each given sensor failure level L, an EA is 265 performed to identify the sensor failure scenario that has the largest detection ability of the 266 remaining sensors of the WQSPS (Figure 3a), and the detection ability level is considered as the 267 global resilience value R_{max} in Equation (4). More specifically, a large number of initial solutions 268 (sensor combinations with a given number of failed sensors L) are randomly generated, followed 269 by solution evaluations (Equations 1-3) with the aid of EPANET2.0 as the hydraulic and water 270 quality simulation model. These solutions are driven by the algorithm operations towards the 271 maximum value of the detection ability levels (Figure 3a) until the final optimal solution (i.e., 272 R_{max}) is identified (Wu and Walski, 2006). Similarly, the EA is run again to determine the sensor

failure scenario that has the lowest detection ability level of the remaining sensors of the WQSPS (Figure 3b), which is used to represent the global resilience value R_{min} in Equation (5). All the individual members within the entire searching of the two optimization runs are used to estimate the mean value of the detection ability levels under sensor failures ($R_{mean}(L)$ in Equation 6), as shown in Fig. 3(c).



278

Fig. 3. Illustration of the proposed EA-based optimization method (EAM) to identify the global resilience values for different sensor failure levels (L)

281 2.2.2 The data-archive method to improve optimization efficiency

In the proposed method, two EA optimization runs are performed for each sensor failure level, leading to a large number of EA runs as all different failure levels have to be considered. In addition, water quality simulation models need to be frequently called to enable the performance level computation (Equations 1-3) for each EA run, which are time-consuming especially for large-scale complex WDSs. To address this issue, a new data-archive method is developed in this paper to improve the computational efficiency of the optimization process. The data-archivemethod is based on the approach described in He et al. (2018)

289 In the proposed data-archive method, a calibrated water quality model is first established, 290 followed by the specification of simulation model parameters such as simulation time step and 291 duration time. Subsequently, all possible contamination scenarios (intrusion events) are defined 292 by adding a contamination source with a given injection rate and a given time period to each of N293 network nodes at different time within the total duration of a simulation described by DP 294 demand patterns. Therefore, the total number of contamination scenarios is $N \times DP$. A water 295 quality simulation is then executed with the pre-specified parameters for each intrusion event. A 296 data-archive is finally established to record the hydraulic and water quality simulation results 297 that are required to enable the calculation of the performance levels as a result of sensor failures. 298 However, it should be noted that the proposed data-archive approach is used to reduce the need 299 for calling the water quality simulation model for each EA function evaluation conditioned on a 300 predefined set of contamination characteristics (e.g., intrusion concentration and duration). This 301 implies that the data archive needs to be re-developed if the intrusion characteristics are changed. 302 This is a limitation of the proposed data-archive approach that needs to be addressed in future. 303 The details of the proposed method for the development of data archives are shown using the 304 pseudo-code in Figure 4.

Step 0: Set up the water quality simulation model for the WDS.
Step 1: Specify the simulation parameters, including the water quality time step, contamination injection quantity, injection time period, concentration threshold and total simulation duration time.
Step 2: Define all the possible contamination intrusion events for each demand node j = 1,2,...,N(N is the total number of demand nodes) at time t = t₁, t₂,..., t_{DP} (DP is the length of demand pattern) as [E₁, E₂,..., E_M](M = N × DP).
FOR i = 1,2,...,M
Step 3: Perform the water quality simulation with the pre-specified parameters for the intrusion event E_i (the start time of the injection and which node is to be injected)

FOR m = 1, 2, ..., TL(TL is the total number of sensors)Step 4: Perform the water quality simulation model for the intrusion event E_i with the prespecified total duration time If E_i can be detected by the m^{th} sensor $T_i = t_i^d$ Otherwise $T_i = t_i^e$ **FOR** $t = 0, \Delta t, 2\Delta t, ..., B\Delta t$ $(T_i = B\Delta t)$ Step 5: Perform the water quality simulation model at time t, and record $Q_i(S_{TL-1}^m, E_i, t)$ and $DQ_i(t)$ for each demand node j, where S_{TL-1}^m represents that only the m^{th} sensor is considered and the all the other sensors are failed (i.e., the failure level is TL-1). This is followed by the use of Equation (1) to calculate and record $FL(S_L^k, E_i, t)$ for each t. END t **Step 6:** Compute $\int_{t_i}^{T_i} FL(S_{TL-1}^m, E_i, t) dt$ in Equation (2), which equals to the total values of $FL(S_{i}^{k}, E_{i}, t)$ across different time. **Step 7:** Develop a data-archive for the event of E_i and the sensor *m*, referred to $\Phi(E_i, m) = \{t_i^s, t_i^e, T_i, \int_{t_i^s}^{T_i} FL(S_{TL-1}^m, E_i, t) dt\}$ END m END *i*

305 Fig. 4. The pseudo-code of the development of the data archives in the proposed method

306	Relative to the data-archive method stated in He et al. (2018) that only recorded the time of each
307	sensor in detecting each of the contamination events (t_i^d) , the archive structure used in this paper
308	has been significantly extended by adding a larger number of variables including
309	$t_i^s, t_i^e, T_i, \text{and } \int_{t_i^s}^{T_i} FL(S_{TL-1}^m, E_i, t) dt$ as shown in the pseudo-code (Figure 4). The application
310	procedures of the developed data archives within the optimization framework are outlined in
311	Figure 5 by pseudo codes. As shown in Figure 5, a total of <i>Pop</i> initial solutions is first randomly
312	generated for each sensor failure level (L) , followed by solution evaluations for all M intrusion
313	events based on Equations 1-3. The individuals that are survived from the selection operator are

314 subject to cross and mutation operations, and the generated offspring are driven by the EA

315 operations towards the optimal value until the final optimal solution is identified.

FOR *L*=1, 2,..., *TL* **FOR** *n*=1, 2,..., *Pop* (*Pop* is the population size of the evolutionary algorithm, representing a sensor failure scenario with TL-L valid sensors) **FOR** i = 1, 2, ..., M (*M* is the total number of intrusion events) **Step 1:** Identify the sensor *m* that has the minimum value of T_i information recorded at the data archive (Φ) from all *TL-L* valid sensors. **Step 2:** Compute and record $\left[1 - \frac{1}{(t_i^e - t_i^s)} \int_{t_i^s}^{T_i} FL(S_L^k, E_i, t) dt\right]$ in Equation (2). END *i* **Step 3:** Compute and record $f(S_L^k)$ in Equation (2) using all the values recorded in Step 2. END n Step 4: Carry out the algorithm operators to lead the search towards identifying the minimum or maximum resilience values as defined in Equations 4 and 5. All the recorded values in Step 3 over different EA iterations are used to compute the mean of the global resilience values in Equation (6). END L

Fig. 5. The pseudo-code of the applications of the data archives in the proposed method

317 2.3 Sensor Ranking

In the proposed method, the sensors are ranked based on their impact on the global resilience values obtained using methodology shown in the above section, thereby indicating their relative importance in affecting the performance of the WQSPS induced by their failures. More specifically, the frequency of the sensors associated with the lowest global resilience values across different failure levels is used to enable the ranking, with details represented by the two equations below,

$$P_s(i) = \frac{1}{TL} \sum_{L=1}^{TL} \gamma(i, L) \tag{7}$$


$$\gamma(i,L) = \begin{cases} 1, \text{ Sensor } i \text{ is selected} \\ 0, \text{ Otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(8)

324 where $P_s(i)$ is the probability of the sensor i that has been identified to be included in the failure 325 scenarios associated with the lowest reliance values (R_{\min}) over all different failure levels; TL is the 326 total number of sensors; $\gamma(i,L)$ is an indicator function, with $\gamma(i,L) = 1$ if the sensor i is in the 327 failure scenario of R_{\min} at the failure level L, which is identified by the EA-based optimization 328 method, otherwise $\gamma(i,L) = 0$. For example, if a sensor is selected three times in the failure scenario of R_{\min} relative to a total of six failure levels, it has a $P_s(i) = 50\%$. As shown in Equation 329 330 (7), a sensor with a larger value of $P_s(i)$ indicates that this sensor is overall more important as its 331 failure is likely to induce more serious consequences relative to the sensors with low $P_{s}(i)$ 332 values. Such knowledge is practically important as it can be used as guidance for the 333 management and maintenance of water quality sensor systems.

334 **3.** Case Studies

335 3.1. Description

Two real-world WDSs in China, the Jiayou network (JYN) and the Zhuohao network (ZHN), are selected as case studies to demonstrate the proposed EA-based global resilience assessment method. The JYN consists of two reservoirs, 349 demand nodes and 509 pipes with many loops (Figure 6), and The ZHN has one reservoir, 3,439 demand nodes and 3,512 pipes with many branches (Figure 7). Both WDSs have a demand pattern varying over 24 hours, with each hour 341 representing a demand scenario. The JYN and ZHN network supplies approximately 256,592 m³ per day and 140,782 m³ per day respectively. Six and 30 water quality sensors (He et al. 2018) are 342 available for JYN and ZHN, respectively. Four different water quality sensor placement 343 344 strategies (WQSPSs) have been identified for each case study as shown in Figures 6 and 7. These 345 four WQSPSs were identified by He et al. (2018) who used an optimization algorithm. Different 346 contamination probability functions were considered to enable the WQSPS optimization. More 347 specifically, the WQSPS1, WQSPS2, WQSPS3 and WQSPS4 for both case studies were 348 determined using the equal contamination probability function at each node, the probability 349 function based on nodal demands, the probability function based on length of pipes immediately 350 connected to the contaminated nodes, and the probability function based on user properties, 351 respectively (see He et al. (2018) for details). This study aims to investigate the global resilience 352 of the four WQSPSs with sensor failures considered, thereby facilitating the selection of the 353 resilient sensor deployment methods.




355 Figure 6 The network typology of the JYN case study with four water quality sensor

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placement strategies (WQSPSs)



360 3.2 *Application of the proposed method*

The EPANET2.0 was used as the hydraulic and water quality simulation model in this study. For each case study, a total duration of 96 hours (four times of the 24-hour demand pattern) with a time step of 5 minutes was used to simulate each contamination scenario. Following Ostfeld et al. (2008), a contamination scenario was represented by adding a contamination source to each node with an injection rate of 100 mg/L of two-hour duration. Consequently, the total numbers of contamination scenarios for JYN and ZHN case studies were $24 \times 349 = 8,376$ and $24 \times 3439 =$ 82,536, respectively. The detection threshold of water quality sensors was set to 0.01 mg/L following He et al. (2018). It is noted that as each node of the WDS was considered as possible intrusion injection location with wide ranging time of injection, the defined contamination events were also considered representative following the description in Tinelli et al. (2017).

371 In the present study, the evolutionary algorithm Borg (Hadka and Reed, 2013; Zheng et al., 372 2016), which has been successfully and widely used to deal with various water resources 373 optimization problems, was employed to solve the proposed optimization problem. The 374 population size of Borg applied to JYN and ZHN case studies were 500 and 1,000 respectively 375 following the parameters used in He et al. (2018), and the maximum allowable number of 376 evaluations was 500,000 for both case studies. The values of the remaining parameters of Borg 377 were the default selections in Wang et al. (2014), which have been validated and verified through 378 various applications. Five runs of the Borg with random number seeds were applied to each case 379 study, and the results were overall similar among different runs.

380 3.3 The traditional global resilience analysis (TGRA) approach


The traditional global resilience analysis (TGRA) approach has been widely used to assess the resilience of various systems as a result of malfunctions (e.g., pipe breaks), such as electrical power systems (Johansson, 2010), urban drainage systems (Mugume et al., 2015) and water distribution systems (Diao et al., 2016). To demonstrate the capacity of the proposed EA-based method, its performance is compared with the TGRA presented in Diao et al. (2016) in terms of their ability to capture the global resilience values. 387 The TGRA provided a response curve (envelope) that represented the range of resilience 388 (corresponding Equations 4-6) under increasing failure levels by evaluating a limited number of 389 failure scenarios. When only one sensor in WDS failed (i.e., the failure level L = 1), it required 390 each sensor to be traversed and hence a total of M failure scenarios needed to be evaluated. 391 When all the sensors failed (L = TL), there was only one failure scenario to be considered. For 392 1 < L < TL, the TGRA involved two different types of failure scenario selections, which were 393 targeted failure type and random failure type (Diao et al., 2016). The targeted failure scenarios 394 were determined through an incremental manner, where the sensor with the largest/lowest impact 395 on the performance of WQSPS was incrementally added to the failure scenario as the failure 396 level increased. The random failure scenario selection aimed to enrich the targeted failure 397 scenarios through selecting the locations of L failed sensors randomly, thereby improving the 398 likelihood to identify the near-optimal failure scenarios that have the largest or lowest global 399 resilience values. Details of the TGRA can be found in Mugume et al. (2015) and Diao et al 400 (2016).

401 **4. Results and discussions**

402 4.1 Comparison between the proposed EAM and the TGRA

The values of the three global resilience metrics defined in Equations (4-6) were identified by the proposed EAM and the TGRA respectively, with results given in Figures 8 (JYN) and 9 (ZHN). For the JYN with a relatively small number of sensors (six), it was seen that the proposed EAM exhibited similar performance with the TGRA in terms of R_{max} , R_{min} and R_{mean} values for each failure level applied to the four sensor placement strategies (SPSs). To further verify the effectiveness of the proposed EAM, all the possible failure scenarios for each failure level were

409 fully enumerated to enable the identification of the global values of the global resilience metrics, 410 with results also shown in Figure 8 (the EM). It is observed that while the R_{mean} values were 411 slightly different between the proposed EAM and the EM, the R_{max} and R_{min} values identified by 412 the EAM consistently matched those from the EM. This was also the case for the traditional global 413 resilience analysis method (TGRA) as shown in Figure 8. Using the results of the JYN case study 414 with six sensors, it can be deduced that the proposed EAM was effective in identifying the global 415 resilience values.



416

Fig. 8. Global resilience metric values of different failure levels applied to the four different WQSPSs of the JYN study

419 Interestingly, when the methods were applied to the ZHN with 30 sensors (Figure 9), the 420 envelope results produced by the EAM results consistently outperformed those from the TGRA 421 across all sensor levels. This was especially the case for the R_{\min} as the proposed EAM was able 422 to identify sensor failure scenarios with substantially more serious impacts on the WQSPS's 423 detection performance compared to the TGRA. For instance, if 20 sensors failed for the SPS2 424 (Figure 9(b)), the value of R_{\min} identified by the proposed EAM was 0.78, but the TGRA offered 425 a value of $R_{min}=0.84$. This indicated that the TGRA can significantly underestimate the potential 426 impacts of sensor failures on the detection performance of the water quality sensor systems. As 427 shown in Figure 9, the advantage of the proposed EAM relative to the TGRA became more 428 prominent for failure levels (L) between 10-20 (i.e., the number of failed sensors were between 429 10 and 20) for all the four WQSPSs. This was expected as the total search space for the L430 between 10 and 20 was appreciably larger than other failure levels, and hence the TGRA had a 431 lower likelihood to identify the global resilience metric values (minimum or maximum values) 432 relative to the proposed EAM.





Fig. 9. Global resilience metric values of different failure levels applied to the four different
WQSPSs of the ZHN case study


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To reveal the underlying mechanisms that caused the performance variation between the proposed EAM and the TGRA, Figure 10 presents the locations of the failed sensors at four different failure levels (*L*) identified by these two methods applied to WQSPS1 of the ZHN case study based on R_{min} metric. As shown in this figure, at L = 3, the locations of the three sensors with their failures having the largest impacts of the WQSPS1's detection performance were identical between these two methods (Figure 10a). However, for the EAM identified failure scenario based on R_{min} metric when L=4 (Figure 10b), one sensor has been removed when

443 compared to the failure scenario with L=3, and two new sensors have been added to the failure 444 scenario with L=4. However, for the TGRA, only one more sensor has been added to its already identified failure scenario based on R_{\min} metric when L=4. This was also the case when L 445 446 increased to 5 and 15 as shown in Figure 9(c,d). This was because the TGRA selected the failed 447 sensors mainly using an incremental (greedy) manner, where the sensor whose failure has the 448 largest impacts on the WQSPS's detection performance was incrementally added to the failure 449 scenario as the failure level increased. Therefore, the identified failed sensors were highly likely 450 to be trapped in a local solution. In contrast, the proposed EAM identified failed sensors 451 independently for each failure level, and hence it was able to find improved global resilience metric values compared to the TGRA, especially for the large and complex problems (Figure 9). 452








In terms of computational analysis, the computational budgets of the proposed EAM were primarily used by the generation of data archive that involved water quality simulations. For the ZHN case study, the total number of contamination scenarios considered was the value computed by the number of nodes (3,439) multiplied with the number of demand patterns (24), leading to a total of 82,536 events. Using a PC with 4.00-GHz Intel Core i9-7980XE processor in Windows

462 10, the total time for simulating these events for data archive development was 19.6 hours (note 463 that data archive only needed to be developed once). Within the optimization process, the 464 established data archive, rather than the water quality simulator, was used to enable the objective 465 function evaluations. Consequently, the optimization process was very efficient with a total of 466 approximately 0.5 hours for all optimization runs. Therefore, the total computational time used to 467 identify the global resilience metric values for the ZHN case study was 20.1 hours, which is 468 practically affordable. For the TGRA, a total of 11,679 sensor failure scenarios was identified 469 using the method described in Diao et al. (2016), and for each scenario, all the 82,536 470 contamination events had to be simulated to enable the objective function evaluations. The 471 estimated computational time was 229,261 hours or about 9,500 days (11,679×19.6 hours used 472 for the simulating 82,536 contamination events), which is impossible to complete. Therefore, the 473 established data archive was also used by the TGRA to produce the results, and hence the total 474 computational time of the TGRA was similar to that used by the proposed EAM (the main 475 computational budgets of each method were used by the data archive establishment). This was 476 also the case for the small JYN case study. However, the proposed EAM can produce 477 significantly better results for the large ZHN case study compared to the TGRA as shown in Figure 9. 478

479 4.2 Resilience comparison across different WQSPSs

Figure 11 shows the global resilience metric (R_{min} , R_{max} and R_{mean}) values of each WQSPS for the two case studies over all different failure levels (L). All these values were divided by R_0 (the global resilience value of WQSPS without sensor failures) to enable the performance comparison of the four WQSPSs. As shown in Figure 11, for each case study, the R_0 values were overall similar for the four WQSPSs, implying that the difference of the detection performance of thefour WQSPSs without any sensor failures was negligible.

As expected, the detection performances of the four WQSPSs were consistently reduced as measured by the three global resilience metric values when the failure level increased for both case studies. Among the four WQSPSs, the WQSPS2 had an overall greater ability in maintaining its detection performance for both case studies under different failure levels compared to its counterparts. In contrast, the WQSPS4 exhibited the worst performance for the two case studies as it consistently exhibited the fastest performance deterioration in R_{min} and R_{mean} induced by sensor failures with different levels.



493

494 Fig. 11. Global resilience metric values of the four WQSPSs under all failure levels (L) for 495 the two case studies (R_0 is the global resilience value of WQSPS without sensor failures)


496 The rationale behind the observations made above was that the WQSPS2 was identified based on 497 deploying sensors closer to large demand users (He et al. 2018). Therefore, the contamination 498 events at these large demand nodes that could result in large functionality losses of the WDS can 499 be detected in an efficient manner. Consequently, this sensor deployment strategy (WQSPS2) 500 tended to be overall more resilient as measured by the proposed global resilience metrics. While 501 the WOSPS4 also considered the demand values within its deployment, many sensors were 502 located exactly at the important users such as hospitals and schools as stated in He et al. (2018) 503 (this was the main difference between WQSPS2 and WQSPS4). Consequently, the global 504 resilience of this deployment strategy can be significantly reduced if the sensors at the important 505 users simultaneously failed. Therefore, the WQSPS2 was identified as the most resilient system for both the JYN and ZHN case studies in dealing with sensor failures. 506

507 Another interesting observation from Figure 11 is that while WQSPS2 exhibited the overall best 508 performance in global resilience metric values across different failure levels, this sensor 509 deployment strategy performed similarly with the other three alternatives when the failure level 510 was low, such as L between 1 and 3. This is because many contamination events can be detected 511 by multiple sensors with relatively small time differences due to the looped water delivery 512 manner as well as relative large sensor density (e.g., 30 sensors for the ZHN). Consequently, the 513 relatively low sensor failure levels (e.g., L=2) would not induce significant variations across 514 different WQSPSs given that their initial detection ability levels were overall similar. This 515 implies that the global resilience that accounts for all possible failure scenarios (as it was done in 516 this study) can provide knowledge/insights, which goes beyond the resilience analysis only 517 considering limited failure scenarios (e.g., L between 1 and 3) as did in the majority of previous 518 studies (Preis and Ostfeld 2008, Berry et al. 2009).

519 4.3 Ranking the sensors within the WQSPSs

520 The sensors of the WQSPS2 for the JYN and the ZHN (identified as the most resilient design 521 solutions in the previous section) were ranked based on the R_{\min} values of all different failure 522 levels, with results given in Figure 12. It was seen that Sensor 5 was selected in all failure 523 scenarios (100% probability to be included in the failure scenarios) associated with R_{\min} within 524 the WQSPS2 of the JYN (Figure 12(c)), and hence this sensor was crucial in maintaining the 525 overall detection performance of the sensor system (the locations of Sensor 5 was shown in 526 Figure 12(a)). Sensor 4 was selected in addition to Sensor 5 as the two sensors that have the 527 largest impact on the WQSPS2 detection performance due to their simultaneous failures, i.e., 528 L=2, as shown in Figure 12(c). For the WQSPS2 of the ZHN case study (ranks of only six 529 sensors were presented to enable clear visualization), Sensor 29 (Figure 12(b)) was the most 530 important sensor as it was consistently selected to be included in the failure scenarios that 531 produced R_{\min} (100% probability in Figure 12(d)). This was followed by Sensor 18 as it was 532 always selected from L=2 to 30 as shown in Figure 12(d). Detailed analysis of results revealed 533 that sensors with a relatively high rank were either located in the surrounding regions of the 534 large/important demand users or deployed in a region with sparse sensors. For example, Sensor 8 535 of the ZHN case study (low ranking with a relatively low probability) was only selected when L 536 was relatively large as shown in Figure 12(b,d). This was because this sensor was located at the 537 downstream end of the WDS and hence the impact of its failure on the WQSPS's detection 538 performance can be relatively small when compared to other sensors located in the middle of the 539 WDS.

540 The results of the sensor rankings based on the R_{\min} are practically significant as this knowledge 541 can be used as guidance to enable the effective water quality sensor maintenance management. 542 For instance, for the WQSPS2 of the JYN, Sensor 5 needed to be maintained more frequently 543 than other sensors as its failure consistently resulted in larger performance reduction of the 544 WQSPS over different failure levels. This was also the case for Sensor 29 within the WQSPS2 of 545 the ZHN case study. From the practical point of view, the number of simultaneously failed 546 sensors often ranged between 2 to 4, and for such cases, the ranking results obtained from the 547 global resilience analysis can also inform the sensors whose failures have the largest impacts on 548 the WQSPS's overall detection performance. For example, if L=2 was considered for the two 549 case studies, Sensors 5 and 4 for the JYN and Sensors 29 and 19 for the ZHN were identified as 550 the most important sensors that needed to be maintained in more frequently than other sensors.



551

552 Fig. 12. Sensor rankings based on the R_{\min} of all the failure levels for both case studies,

state where $P_s(i)$ is the probability of the sensor *i* that has been identified to be included in the

554

failure scenarios associated with the lowest reliance values.

555 4.4 Sensitivity analysis

556 In this section, sensitivity analysis was conducted to evaluate the impacts of EA runs and 557 intrusion characteristics on the values of global resilience metrics and sensor rankings. It is noted 558 that the Borg parameter values used were default values based on a comprehensive sensitivity 559 analysis performed in previous studies (Hadka and Reed, 2013; Zheng et al., 2016). Therefore, 560 the parameterization strategies of Borg were not explored in this paper. This is also partly 561 because Borg was only used as an optimization tool in the proposed method, rather than being 562 the research focus of this study. More specifically, for each case study, five different invasion 563 scenarios were considered, which were: (1) 50 mg/L intrusion concentration with 1 hour duration, 564 (2) 100 mg/L intrusion concentration with 1 hour duration, (3) 100mg/L intrusion concentration 565 with 2 hour duration, (4) 100 mg/L intrusion concentration with 3 hour duration, and (5) 150 566 mg/L intrusion concentration with 2 hour duration. For each invasion scenario, the proposed EA-567 based method was run five times with different starting random seeds. Therefore, a total of 25 568 Borg runs were performed, leading to 25 global resilience metric values (R_{max} , R_{mean} and R_{min}) 569 and sensor rankings obtained over different failure levels.

Figure 13 presents the boxplot of global resilience metric values for the large ZHN case study over different failure levels. It can be observed from this figure that the variability of global resilience metric values was insignificant, which was especially the case for the low sensor failure levels. For instance, in terms of R_{\min} value, the largest variability occurred for the sensor failure

level *L*=24 with a maximum difference of 0.11 (from 0.69 to 0.80). Figure 14 shows the boxplot of sensor rankings based on the R_{\min} values of all the failure levels calculated from the 25 solutions for the ZHN case study. As shown in this figure, the rankings of the sensors that were associated with a high probability $P_s(i) > 80\%$ were not affected by the choices of different invasion scenarios and starting random number seeds for Borg. However, for the sensors with a moderate value of $P_s(i)$ between 40% and 60%, slightly larger variations were observed. Similar observations were made for the small JYN case study.





Fig. 13. Boxplot of global resilience metric values (*R*_{max}, *R*_{mean} and *R*_{min}) based on 25 Borg
runs for the ZHN case study with five different invasion scenarios and five staring random
number seeds over all different failure levels.



585



586 Fig. 14. Boxplot of sensor rankings based on the R_{min} of all failure levels calculated based on the 25 solutions for the ZHN case study, where $P_s(i)$ is the probability of the sensor *i* that 587 588 has been identified to be included in the failure scenarios associated with the lowest reliance 589 values.

590 5. Summary and conclusions

591 A contamination early warning system is typically used to protect the water quality safety of a 592 water distribution system (WDS), where the water quality sensors are spatially distributed to 593 detect/warn contamination events. The majority of the current research focuses on identifying the 594 water quality sensor placement strategy (WQSPSs) based on an assumption that all sensors are 595 able to consistently provide accurate measurements, i.e., measure, record and communicate. 596 However, water quality sensors are generally vulnerable to their surrounding environment and 597 hence their failure likelihoods are often not insignificant. Therefore, it is critical to design a 598 resilient WQSPS that cannot only detect contamination events with great effectiveness when all 599 sensors are functioning normally, but also can maintain reasonable performance when sensors fail. However, few attempts have been made so far to explore the WQSPS's resilience 600

601 considering sensor failures, especially for the global resilience that should account for all602 possible failure scenarios.

This paper proposes a method to systematically assess the global resilience of WQSPSs with 603 604 sensor failures considered. In the proposed method, new metrics are firstly developed to represent 605 the global resilience of WQSPSs under different sensor failure levels (i.e., the number of simultaneously failed sensors), where all possible sensor failure scenarios are considered 606 607 irrespective of their occurrence probability. Subsequently, an efficient Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) 608 based optimization approach is proposed to effectively identify the values of the global resilience 609 metrics for different sensor failure levels. Finally, the sensors within the WQSPS are ranked based 610 on their global resilience values. Two real-world WDSs with four WQSPSs for each WDS 611 analyzed are used to demonstrate the utility of the proposed global resilience identification method. 612 Based on the results obtained the following observations/implications can be made:

613 (i) The proposed EA-based optimization method (EAM) was able to identify improved 614 values of the global resilience metrics relative to the traditional global resilience analysis 615 (TGRA) method that has been widely used so far for the WDS with a large number of sensors (Mugume et al., 2015, Diao et al., 2016). The advantage of the proposed EAM is 616 more prominent when dealing with WQSPSs with a large number of sensors. This 617 618 implied that the TGRA results may underestimate the potentially extreme 619 impacts/consequences of the sensor failures on the WQSPS's detection performance, and 620 this issue has been addressed using the proposed EAM.

621 (ii) It was observed that when using the global resilience metric R_{mean} , the WQSPSs based on 622 deploying sensors relatively close to large demand users (WQSPS2) were overall more 623 resilient in dealing with sensor failures compared to other designs. Similar observations were made before in the literature. However, this work also showed that deploying
sensors very close to large or sensitive users (e.g., hospitals or schools) can also be risky
as the failures of these sensors can significantly reduce the detection performance of the
WQSPS. These insights were practically informative as it can be used to facilitate the
selection of WQSPSs for the WDS.

629 The sensor ranking based on the global resilience metric values R_{min} can identify the (iii) 630 important sensors whose failures would significantly reduce the WQSPS performance at 631 different failure levels. In addition, a sensitivity analysis showed that sensor location 632 rankings obtained this way were not significantly affected by the intrusion event 633 properties such as injection concentration and duration. This knowledge can provide 634 guidance to enable efficient and effective water quality sensor management as the highly ranked sensors should be given higher priority for maintenance (due to their large impacts 635 636 on WQSPS's detection performance).

637 It should be noted that global resilience of identified optimal WQSPSs was assessed in the 638 current paper as suggested by previous studies (Mugume et al., 2015, Diao et al., 2016). This was 639 done post WQSPS optimization as incorporating such a methodology directly into the 640 optimization process would be extremely computationally expensive. It is acknowledged that 641 assessing the global resilience of WQSPS post-optimization rather than optimizing for global 642 resilience in the first place may result in sub-optimal solutions. Having said this, the proposed 643 method is still of high practical significance as the identification of sub-optimal solutions using 644 manageable computational efforts is often sufficient for real-world water resources problems 645 (Maier et al. 2014). Still, future studies should extend the proposed method to identify the most 646 resilient solutions considering sensor failures within the WQSPS design optimization process.

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