Deep Architecture

An Ecology of Hetero-Affection

Radman, A.

Publication date
2020

Document Version
Final published version

Published in
Architectural Affects after Deleuze and Guattari

Citation (APA)
Radman, A. (2020). Deep Architecture: An Ecology of Hetero-Affection. In M. Jobst, & H. Frichot (Eds.), *Architectural Affects after Deleuze and Guattari* (pp. 63-80). Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group.

Chapter 4

Deep architecture

An ecology of hetero-affection

Andrej Radman

> This hypothesis, that optical change can seemingly specify two things [i.e., locomotion through *and* the layout of a rigid world] at the same time, sounds very strange, as if one cause were having two effects or as if one stimulus were arousing two sensations. But there is nothing illogical about the idea of concurrent specification of two reciprocal things [for-ness *and* about-ness]. Such an idea is much needed in psychology.
>
> (Gibson, 1986, p. 76)

> We are trying to substitute the idea of assemblage for the idea of behavior: whence the importance of ethology, and the analysis of animal assemblages, e.g. territorial assemblages. […] In assemblages you find states of things, bodies, various combinations of bodies, hodgepodges; but you also find utterances, modes of expression, and whole regimes of signs. The relation between the two is pretty complex.
>
> (Deleuze, 2006, p. 177)

> Immediation functions radically differently [from mediation]: it makes no a priori assumptions about what can make a difference, nor does it map a space of interaction that moves between two existing limit-points, setting itself as the arbiter of that exchange. Immediation middles, which is to say that it crafts middlings from which it tends to experience still in germ.
>
> (Manning, 2019, p. 6)

A post-Darwinian theory of sensibility

This chapter makes a case for a pedagogy of the senses, thereby recasting the architect as an artist and artisan of relational lived experience (Guattari, 2013, pp. 231–9). In terms of architectural thinking, everything begins from the sensible, but the task of thinking is to go beyond the sensible to the potentials that make sensibility possible. This is pertinent given that the task of architecture, as I see it, is to (re)distribute the sensible (Rancière, 2006) and thus provoke thought. "If

different examples of architecture […] are places of visibilities", Deleuze claims, "this is because they are not just figures of stone, assemblages of things and combinations of qualities, but first and foremost forms of light that distribute light and dark, opaque and transparent, seen and non-seen, etc." (Deleuze, 1988, p. 49). Visibility is not to be confused with a general (radiant) light that supposedly illuminates pre-existing objects.[1] Instead, "it is made up of lines of light that form variable figures inseparable from an [assemblage]" (Deleuze, 2006, p. 339).

All consciousness is something, not *of* something – the error of hypostasis (Bergson, 1992, pp. 28–31).[2] In a cluttered world irreducible to deterministic laws or pure chance, architects work with sensation as the material (Deleuze, 2005). They design affordances, a way of affecting, and not forms. In my view, the basic medium of the discipline is a field of experience, rather than geometry, design, critique, or any *ontic* domain (Massumi, 1998, pp. 42–47). The post-phenomenological design moves away from the formalist objects of linguistic expression towards the *pathic* dimensions of experience (Mallgrave, 2018). From language and words to *collective* assemblages of enunciation. The signifying semiotic system is "only one regime of signs among others, and not the most important one" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 124). The resulting attitude recasts architects as psychotropic, i.e. mood-shaping, practitioners (Radman, 2019, p. 68). In the words of Sanford Kwinter:

> The task of design, thought and political action […] is to "hack" the world in the same gesture as our perception of it. This will allow us to modify the world around us with a clear understanding of the loops that pass through and shape us. Human destiny and capacity (hope) lies in the practices of psychotropic practices, which are never just internal.

He then cautions against the predominant "geodesic attitude" of conforming to the path of least resistance by succumbing to the (neo)liberal agenda of preserving the status quo:

> The guiding ethos of efficiency that exploits little more than our crudest needs for neurological stimulation needs to give way to expansion and transformation of experience and consciousness that our cognitive and sensory biological endowments are so rich in, but that are endlessly and brutally sealed from us by technical channelling processes. Anything that does not expressly "hack" our nervous system seems merely to pacify, blunt or enslave it.
>
> (Kwinter, 2018a, p. 12)

We perceive the world in which we live and infer the world of the scientist, not the other way around. This is not to dismiss formalisations as either unnecessary or redundant. It is simply to acknowledge that the current trend of digitalisation and algorithmisation of life falls short of laying out a single non-linguistic plane of immanence that fully integrates both subjects and objects. Perception and action

are not propositions nor are they based on a proposition. Therefore, they cannot be correct or incorrect (Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 109). A map is *not* a territory. Gregory Bateson pinpointed the issue of immediacy without objectification as follows:

> Thirty years ago we used to ask: Can a computer simulate *all* the processes of logic? The answer was yes. But the question was surely wrong. We should have asked: Can logic simulate all sequences of cause and effect? And the answer would have been no!
>
> (Bateson, 1979, p. 58)

This has been demonstrated time and again by the failed attempts to reverse-engineer perception. The tie between the environment and the organism is "two-fold" – ontological and epistemological. As espoused in the epigraphs, the environment provides the conditions for perception *and* is that which is perceived. This is what Karen Barad refers to as *onto-epistem-ology*, where knowing is the material practice of engagement as part of the world in its differential becoming (Barad, 2007, p. 89).

As of recently there is a near-consensus on the need to substitute the enactive for the symbolic approach to cognition (Thompson, 2016). By contrast to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception that "takes place" within consciousness, the reinvigorated Humean tradition rejects reliance upon constructing internal models of reality and insists on the world as its own best model (Brooks, 1990). As Evans (1995, p. 366) put it: "I am assuming space is dependent on matter while Kant and [Roger] Scruton assume it is not". In *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1998, pp. 157–8), Kant outlined what he meant by space: "Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences". Instead it is "a necessary representation, *a priori*". For Kant, therefore, space, time, and causality are not concepts derived from experience, rather they structure experience *a priori*. Deleuze, a keen reader of Hume, insists that the form of the self, as the supposed ground of representation, is something that needs explaining and is not an incontrovertible given from which all explanations arise. By the same token, perception is not apperception because *spatialisation* comes before space (Radman, 2017a). An organism's capacity for contractions of habit could only be explained by the fact that the kind of repetition that we perceive comes from the kind of repetition that we ourselves *are*:

> We are made of contracted water, earth, light and air – not only prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their being sensed. Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations.
>
> (Deleuze, 1994, 73)

The morphogenetic approach proposed by Deleuze effectively reunites the two halves of aesthetics as handed down from Kant (Smith, 2009): the transcendental

from the *First Critique* (Kant, 1998) and the empirical from the *Third Critique* (Kant, 2007). For as long as sensations are referred back to the *a priori* form of their representation, transcendental aesthetics cannot acquire a real status, but merely a formal one (Alliez, 2004, pp. 85–104). The Urdoxa of "transcendental unity of perception" prevents an account of the genesis of sense. The fact that Deleuze brings together the possible *a priori* and the real *a posteriori* conditions of experience has enormous implications and could be summed up in the assertion that the genetic principles of sensation are one and the same with the principles of architecture as a plane of composition: "Sensation is on a plane that is different from mechanisms, dynamisms, and finalities: It is on a plane of composition where sensation is formed by contracting that which composes it" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 212). It is a matter of the *posteriori* becoming *a priori*. As Yuk Hui (2019, p. 172) argues in his *Recursivity and Contingency*, memory is empirical, hence *posteriori*, but once it is recorded it becomes the condition of new experiences, hence *a priori*. This means that the plane of composition – as a work of sensation – is aesthetic through and through: "it is the material that passes into the sensation" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp. 192–3). *What Deleuze and Guattari effectively propose is a post-Darwinian theory of sensibility where our receptive faculties are themselves the result of design*. Not only is the built environment composed of habitats that store memory, but it also functions as a cultural catalyst of new habits. The process implies an evolution that exceeds natural means, where habits shape habitats that in turn shape habits (Richardson, 2004).[3] Simply put, we build our environments; thereafter they build us. By connecting the somatic and the social, we avoid the pitfalls of both genetic determinism and social constructivism.

Throughout history, the relationship between technical and aesthetic planes has continuously varied, yet "no art and no sensation have ever been representational" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 193). Attention, action and perception are joined in mutually supportive self-fuelling loops (Clark, 2016, p. 83). Once aesthetics (as in sensibility formation) is drawn into the context of design, its domain vastly expands. It becomes a dimension of being itself (Hui, 2019, p. 207).[4] Subjects arise from the resolution of a relational field of natural processes and social practices. Subjects and objects come to be seen as (untenable) immanent limits. They are but divergent processual destinations or *relata* that are not antecedent to the relation (of exteriority). As Claire Colebrook puts it: "Once we try to think the origin of all that is, the very ground of being, then we arrive properly not at the origin of sensibility, but sensibility as origin" (Colebrook, 2009, p. 29). Sensibility is "ground zero" (Radman, 2014).

Logos spermatikos

In pursuit of a pedagogy of the senses, I build on the legacy of James Jerome Gibson, whose highly innovative concepts developed over 40 years ago continue

to stir controversy even among the scholars of the Ecological School of Perception. Gibson was fully aware of the difficulties in challenging the orthodoxies to which he himself admitted to have contributed.[5] His neologism *affordance*, akin to *affect* or the capacity to affect and be affected, is the most important for our purposes. It is key to the ecological theory of *direct* perception (and action), which constitutes an alternative to the information-processing paradigm. The concept of affordance abides by the *nomos* of immediation (Manning, 2019). What it designates is that a mode of existence never pre-exists an event (Manning and Massumi, 2013, p. 84). It is difficult to imagine a more elegant shift of focus from the extensive space of properties to the intensive *spatium* of capacities. The compelling theory of (space) perception cannot start with the very thing it is a theory about, namely, extension as a given (Turvey, 2019, p. 141). In keeping with the Assemblage Theory, capacities do depend on properties but cannot be reduced to them (DeLanda, 2009). This is how Gibson explains the shift from the "absolute" experience-of-space to the *relational* – i.e. impredicative[6] (Turvey, 2019, p. 39) – space-of-experience:

> The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment.
>
> (Gibson, 1986, p. 127)

Gibson's assertion that the amodal and ambulant perception is a rule rather than an exception parallels Deleuze's claim that every perception is in fact hallucinatory (albeit veridical) because it has no object (Turvey, 2019, p. 122).[7] The amodal perception is a term describing the perception of an object or environment in its entirety despite the fact that only parts of it are visible. In the words of William James: "We were virtual knowers […] long before we were certified to have been actual knowers, by the percept's retroactive validating power" (James, 2008, p. 32). If perception is *ipso facto* virtual, the part-to-whole relationship is to be supplanted by the relationship of the ordinary and singular, i.e. remarkable (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, pp. 506–8; Deleuze, 1993, pp. 87–88). The singular cannot be mistaken for a particular, for that would imply its relation to the general. Singularities or spatio-temporal *haecceities* resist universalisation. What's more, it may arise at "any-moment-whatever", as opposed to the privileged moments of origin, telos, and such (Foucault, 1995). It is never a matter of bringing all sorts of things under a universal concept, but relating each concept to those singularities that determine its mutations (Deleuze, 1995, p. 31).

Famously, for Deleuze and Guattari "the plane of organization" is the *actual* arrangement of elements in empirically describable and historically determined configurations, while "the plane of consistency" is the *virtual* co-presence of all

elements of a totality in their real force-potential – "powers of the false". The virtual is thus real albeit incorporeal. Its power is "false" by virtue of harbouring "the coexistence of not-necessarily true pasts" (Deleuze, 1989, p. 131). The power of becoming stands opposed to the form of the eternal. It is a "memory of the future" that was never lived. This is where the ethical responsibility, better still "response-ability" (Haraway, 2016, p. 29),[8] resides. In the words of Constantin Boundas:

> making possible this freedom "for us", is called counter-actualization, that is, tracing back the present state of things to the virtual event that conditions it and tapping its not-yet-actualized dynamisms, for the sake of a time to come. Becoming worthy of the event, as we trace the lines of escape of and from the present (lines, nevertheless, that pre-exist our tracing efforts), belongs to this moment of turning freedom in itself and for itself into freedom for us in the refrain.
>
> (2019, p. xxiii)

For Gibson, a thing perceived as a whole is not based on the static property of its actual parts but on an invariant embedded in change, a.k.a. the *ritornello*. The invariant *is* the incommunicable pre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual singularity that creates dependency relations among the constituents. Although the "optical form" varies as a result of locomotion, the virtual "form that the change of form takes" is itself an invariant. In other words, there is an invariance of perception with a varying sensation:

> The terrestrial world is mostly made of surfaces, not of bodies in space. And these surfaces often flow or undergo stretching, squeezing, bending and breaking in ways of enormous mechanical complexity. So different, in fact, are environmental motions from those studied by Isaac Newton that it is best to think of them as changes of structure rather than changes of position of elementary bodies, changes in form, rather than of point locations, or changes in the layout rather than motions in the usual meaning of the term.
>
> (Gibson, 1986, p. 15)

Architecture could be said to facilitate "the pursuit of life by means other than life", the organic through the organised inorganic, i.e. milieu-technics (Stiegler, 1998). Its task is to produce and reintegrate the inorganic in order to not only preserve life, but also catalyse new modes of existence. In contrast to Deleuze who did not explicitly address architecture, except through his disciple Cache (1995), Gibson was critical of its unsatisfactory theoretical basis and open about his ambition to make a contribution on this score (Reed and Jones, 1982, p. 415). As we have seen in his *topologically* informed quote from above, the surface is where most of the

Table 4.1 The greater the extent to which architecture makes creative relays across the three planes, the more truthful the assertion that the culture of hylomorphism – imposition of form upon supposedly inert matter – has been superseded.

PHILOSOPHY	*ART*	*SCIENCE*
A R C H I T E C T U R E		
Plane of IMMANENCE ACTUAL > VIRTUAL CONCEPT Conceptual Persona *Variations*	Plane of COMPOSITION > INTENSIVE < PERCEPT/AFFECT Aesthetic Figure *Variables*	Plane of REFERENCE VIRTUAL > ACTUAL FUNCTION Partial Observer *Varieties*

action takes place and that is why architecture students should be taught not only physical laws but also their *ecological* counterparts (Gibson, 1986, p. 23). Let us therefore start by asking a naïve question: What do we mean by architecture in the first place? In terms of its kinship with art, architecture belongs to what Arthur Danto called the third realm of beauty, that is, neither "natural" like a sunset, nor "artistic" as in fine arts, but "applied". As Mark Kingwell explains, the applied beauty is always ethico-*political* because, one way or another, it addresses the issue of how to live: "[it]may be aspirational, admonitory or inspiring, it may, too frequently, be merely consumeristic. It may be all of these at once" (Kingwell, 2008, p. 81; cf. Danto, 2003). In the words of Robert Hughes, "painting can make us happy, but building is the art we live in; it is social art *par excellence*, the carapace of political fantasy, the exoskeleton of one's economic dreams. It is also one art nobody can escape" (Hughes, 1991, p. 164). Unlike the Three Daughters of Chaos – philosophy, science, and art – architecture can be said to be guilty of trespassing (Table 4.1). Yet, its sole purpose is to make experience "stand on its own", that is, apart from the object and distinct from the architect (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994).

In contrast to the resilient hylomorphic tradition in architecture design, the Stoics' immanent principle of organisation – *spermatikos logos* – requires a different, experimental attitude of "partnership" with matter (Sellars, 1999). If form is not to be imposed from the outside – by decree or architectural *plan* – but rather "teased out" of the latent potentiality of the *plane* of immanence (Speaks, 2002), a more humble yet audacious disposition is required from the architect. Thinking *par le milieu* (Stengers, 2005) places the concepts of relation and affect at the centre of both the ethics and the epistemic structures and strategies of the architect: "Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into [nested] molecular levels, from microformations already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc." (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 215). One of the great virtues of the Deleuzian approach that might as

well apply to Gibson, as Rosi Braidotti explains, is the rigorous brand of methodological pacifism that animates it:

> The monistic ontology that [Deleuze] adapts from Spinoza, to which he adds the Bergsonian time-continuum, situates the researcher – be it the philosopher, the scientist, or the artist [or the architect] – in a situation of great intimacy with the world. There is no violent rupture or separation between the subject and the object of her inquiry, no predatory gaze of the cold clinician intent upon unveiling the secrets of nature. An elemental ontological unity structures the debate. This nonessentialist vitalist position calls for more complexity and diversity in defining the processes of scientific inquiry.
>
> (Braidotti, 2010, p. 215)

Like Deleuze, Gibson starts his ecological description "from the middle", with disparities and relationships, rather than with ultimate elements (Lombardo, 1987, p. 76). Perception, for both Deleuze and Gibson, is clearly an act of subtraction and not of enrichment (cf. Barthélémy, 2009).[9] It is a process of differentiating variables of stimulation (right observables) rather than adding meanings to an impoverished stimulus input (Reed and Jones, 1982, p. 297). An inadequate notion of the organism as a composite entity made up of separate but complementary parts, related as an *innate* container to an *acquired* content, precludes the adequate account of ontogenetic *development* (Ingold, 2000). In the words of Zourabichvili (1996, p. 195): "Mind is the membrane of the external world, rather than an autonomous gaze directed towards it". There is less in perception than in matter. Quentin Meillassoux explains the underlying principles of the subtractive theory of perception:

> If, to pass from matter to perception, we must add something, this adjunction would be properly unthinkable, and the mystery of representation would remain entirely intact. But this is not at all the case if we pass from the first to the second term by way of a diminution, and if the representation of an image were held to be less than its simple presence. Now, if living beings constitute "centres of indetermination" in the universe, then their simple presence must be understood to presuppose the suppression of all the parts of the object that are without interest for their functions […] Perception does not, as in Kant, submit sensible matter to a subjective form, because the link, the connection, the form, belongs wholly to matter. Perception does not connect, it disconnects. It does not inform a content but incises an order. It does not enrich matter, but on the contrary impoverishes it.
>
> (Meillassoux, 2007, pp. 72–73)

According to Crary (1990, p. 71), Goethe did not hesitate to designate opacity as a crucial and productive component of vision. Similarly, William Blake wrote: "If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it

is, infinite" (Blake, 1994). According to the neuroscientist Walter Freeman, such cleansing would not be desirable at all. Without the protection of the "doors of perception" we would be overwhelmed by eternity (Freeman, 1991). Besides, it is never necessary to distinguish *all* the features of an object and to do so would in fact be impossible. Gibson concurs that perception is pragmatic: "Those features of a thing are noticed which distinguish it from other things that it is not – but not *all* the features that distinguish it from *everything* that it is not" (Gibson, 1966, p. 286).

In the traditional view, the event is decomposed into a succession of moments, each described by its own stimulus. For the event to be perceived, the succession of stimuli needs somehow to be strung back together. A *deus ex machina* is required for the mysterious task of reconstituting the dynamic. By contrast, under the ecological approach, the event is perceived directly by dint of lawful information generated in action. The non-fortuitous "information" here is meant in Batesonian terms – a difference that makes a difference (Bateson, 1979, p. 228). Perceiving is thus *not* a matter of constructing a mental representation from sensory inputs, or "computation" on the basis of "input data". It is, for this reason, that Gibson preferred the metaphor of "tuning in" – as in a radio frequency – as more appropriate than "computing" – with the brain as a computer, the eye as a camera, and so on (Gibson, 1966, p. 270).[10] Perception is a matter of skill and participation, not calculation. It cannot be considered independently of the environment since perception is defined as an evolved adaptive and constructive relation between the organism and the (increasingly more built) environment. Unfortunately, experimental psychology research has relied overwhelmingly on *object* perception, rather than environment perception, with the findings of the former providing the basis for understanding the latter (Ittelson, 1973, p. 142). Architecture continues to suffer from this fallacy.

Towards an ethico-aesthetic paradigm

We close the chapter with a plea for architecture capable of creating margin-excess capacity enabling different and even opposite interpretations and uses that become plausible "on the condition that one renounces any order of preference, any organization in relation to goal, any signification" (Deleuze, 1997, p. 153). *To subordinate significance to signification would be like putting the cart before the horse.* Consequently, architecture's proverbial attention to the actual and extensive givens – the fallacy of simple location, a.k.a. misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1925) – has to be met by a precursory *genetic* synthesis of affects/affordances and their characteristic relations of intensity. The kindred concepts of affect and affordance will prove instrumental in discontinuing the practice of treating systems as isolated first (structure) and as interacting second (agency). What they teach us is that structure and operation are co-constitutive (Simondon, 2017). Architects cannot continue to rely on the structure alone, which assumes that the whole is reducible to the sum of its parts (*partes extra partes*). Nor can

they solely rely on the operation, which assumes a functional holism in which the whole is primordial and expressed through its working. Instead, architects need to grasp the metastability of the emergent union, i.e. the provisional result of the process of becoming that harbours untapped potential (a.k.a. virtuality).

The concept of a permanent environment consisting of objects is widely accepted, unlike the concept of a quasi-permanent environment of *potential* stimuli that are energies and not objects. This is unfortunate given that the brain actually thrives on a productive margin of unpredictability. If the environment – designed, built, or "architectured" – is approached from the perspective of "malleable" affects/affordances, then the very concept of niche construction surpasses the binaries of social and material, human and non-human, natural and artificial.[11] The prerogative is to shift the focus away from mere usage and utility (i.e. techno-determinism) without regressing to relativism (Radman, 2017b, p. 457). *From the corporeal object to the constrained dynamical tendencies*. The information *for* the self (for-ness) is *about* its environment (about-ness) (Sherman, 2017). As Clark (2016, p. 16) puts it in his aptly named book *Surfing Uncertainty*:

> Active agents get to structure their own sensory flows, affecting the ebb and flow of their own energetic stimulation. […] Notice how different this conception is to ones in which the problem is posed as one of establishing a mapping relation between environmental and inner states.

For as long as they remain ignorant of geometry, infants pay attention to the affordances of layout and not its (primary) properties. Although *logically* one advances from space to affordance, developmentally the progress is in the opposite direction: "the metaphor of filling [space] is wrong. Time and space are not empty receptacles to be filled; instead, they are simply the ghosts of events and surfaces" (Gibson, 1986, p. 101). The unique capability of filmmakers and, according to Gibson, magicians, to supersede the *extensive* state of things in order to engage the *intensive* qualities and powers, is unappreciated by the discipline of architecture which remains committed to the ontology of presence and continues to rely on its reductive conceptual palette (Jobst, 2010). This is not surprising, according to Guattari, as "the paradigms of techno-science place the emphasis on an objectal world of relations and functions, systematically bracketing out subjective affects, such that the finite, the delimited and coordinatable [commensurable], always takes precedence over the infinite and its virtual references" (Guattari, 1995, p. 100). I was often told that it is nearly impossible to address the non-discursive without committing the performative paradox. However, to paraphrase Gibson, trying to understand the continuous in the same way we understand the discrete – i.e. in terms of the familiar – is a sign of intellectual laziness (Gibson, 1986, p. 63). Thus, architects ought to resist the lure of the familiar and realise that what is allegedly incommunicable is anything but negligible. Not everything can be fully known, mastered, or rendered present to thought.

Experience stubbornly resists formalisation. "Next to shit, perhaps the most conspicuous instance of the extent to which the world resists algorithmization is sexuality" (Hayles, 2005, p. 123). Ironically, this truism has been exploited not by architects but by *imagineers*. As Chung (2001) points out in his *Disney Space*, "the architecture on the park's Main Street, USA, is composed of several incommensurable scales: first floors are about 90 percent full scale, second floors about 80 percent, and third floors or roofs about 50 to 60 percent". The topological manipulation of scale with the effect of enhanced foreshortening is key to the creation of a particular atmosphere (Böhme, 2017). Despite the cartoon-like effect it produces, one cannot but acknowledge the skill and know-how of Disney's imagineers.

In a similar vein, marketing specialists continue setting wristwatches and clocks to 10 past 10, which would be too facile to dismiss as mere anthropomorphism. We cannot afford to ignore these "smiles without the clock"[12] under the pretence of architecture's highbrow attitude. As Spencer's (2016) provocative book title suggests, contemporary architecture has become an instrument of control. Pace Spencer, however, we conclude that its compliance with the imperatives of neoliberalism actually proves that architecture is *not* yet "Deleuzist" enough. The contemporary built environment successfully moulds the convergent *need*, but it stops short of modulating the divergent *desire*. The *homophilic* principle of like breeds like, which according to Wendy Chun fosters segregation by closing the world it pretends to open, remains an ethico-political issue par excellence (Chun, 2019).[13]

For better or worse, the demonstrated level of craftsmanship in the production of effect by advertisers and (gentry)fictionists reveals a deep understanding of the affective approach where the thing is power and not form (Frichot, 2014). As William Connolly suggests, there are more intense vague existential dispositions in which creed and affect mix together below the ready reach of change by reflective considerations alone:

> It also touches those feelings of abundance and joy that emerge whenever we sense the surplus of life over the structure of our identities. That is the surplus Deleuze seeks to mobilize and to attach to positive political movements that embrace minoritization of the world.
>
> (Connolly, 2010, p. 196)

While asignifying semiotics is an excess in relation to the discursive, semiology remains flawed because it does not get us out of structure and prohibits us from entering the real world of the machinic (structuration) (Zepke, 2017). "The structuralist signifier is always synonymous with linear discursivity", whereas heterogeneous machines refuse to be "at the mercy of a universal temporalisation" (Guattari, 1995, p. 48).

Aestheticism is not apolitical. What we are "permitted" to experience is a political question par excellence (Kwinter, 2018b). The limit of something, as

the Stoics taught us, is the limit of its *action* and not the outline of its figure. Even if this something is *just* perceived. As a matter of fact, especially when it is being perceived (as potential for action) (Massumi, 2004, p. 328). Has not Leibniz taught us that the point of view is deeper than whosoever places themself at it? "The subject is second in relation to the point of view" (Deleuze, 1980). Moe's (2017, p. 22) otherwise most worthy contribution to contemporary architecture theory, we have to resist reducing "incorporeal materialism" to "corporeal energetics" of thermodynamics. Thermodynamic processes are not equivalent to information pickup. Materially and dynamically, absolute novelty is a fiction. The causal properties present on Earth have persisted ever since the Big Bang (Deacon, 2012, p. 38). By contrast, the quasi-causality of perception continues to evolve as a result of new enabling constraints. New virtualities can come to command and direct the actuality from which they emerged and modify it in a metastable way. Consequently, under the rigorous non-eliminative materialism, the pathic cannot be subsumed by the ontic, and the kinematic is not to be conflated with the kinetic (Radman and Sohn, 2017). "With cause-and-effect events, prior causes produce subsequent effects. Inversely, with means-to-ends behavior, subsequent ends produce prior means, and not nearly as predictably" (Sherman, 2017, p. 42). In other words, *the kinematic tendency is already a movement without the actual kinetic movement* (Massumi, 2004, p. 324). Things will look as they do because they *afford* what they do when they do and if they do. Yet, perspectivism is not to be confused with relativism. To paraphrase de Castro (1998, p. 478), different life forms do not see the same world in different ways, but rather see *different worlds* in the same way. According to Gibson, herein lies the possibility for a new theory of design:

> We modify the substances and surfaces of our environment for the sake of what they will afford, not for the sake of creating good forms as such, abstract forms, mathematically elegant forms, aesthetically pleasing forms. The forms of Euclid and his geometry, abstracted by Plato to the immaterial level, have to be rooted in the substances and surfaces and layouts that constrain our locomotion and permit or prevent our actions. […] What one sees as he looks around is not a patchwork of forms but the possibilities of support, of falling, of resting, of sitting, of walking, of bumping into, of climbing; of taking shelter, of hiding, of grasping, of moving movable things, of tool using, and so on and on.
>
> (Reed and Jones, 1982, p. 415)

Indeed, and so on and on and on. Architectural design needs to address bodies on the level of their *potential* movement that never bottoms out. This does not call for the affirmation of the relativity of truth, but the affirmation of relationalism through which one can affirm the truth of the relative. The kindred heuristic/abductive concepts of affect and affordance become invaluable for operating below the level of object recognition and familiar function (Kousoulas, 2018).

They help us escape linear causality and move toward determination as an aesthesis, as a process of experience/experimentation (Manning and Massumi, 2014). The injunction to temporarily suspend "interpretosis", as in the neurotic act of code breaking, might not be as difficult as it seems (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p. 114). According to William James (2002, pp. 300–1), our waking consciousness is but one special type of consciousness among many: "No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of [non]consciousness quite disregarded".

The Proustian apprenticeship in semantics has taught us that there are two ways to miss the sense of a sign: objectivism and subjectivism. The former characterises the belief that sense can be found in the object emitting the sign, while the latter finds sense within, in the "chains of association" (Deleuze, 2007). In contemporary architectural discourse, the logic of objectivism goes by the name of parametricism (Schumacher, 2012). A parametricist's wet dream is "algorithmic governance" (Rouvroy, 2012): "smart city", "big data", and "intelligent control system", to name but a few. Subjectivism is associated with neo-phenomenologists such as Steven Holl and Peter Zumthor, who privilege "the poetics of space", "the subjective", "the haptic", and similar emphatic submissions (Perez-Gomez, 2016). Contemporary affect theories circumvent both tendencies. They constitute first and foremost an ecosophical bulwark against the self-fulfilling prophecy of denigrating the material in favour of the discursive, as perpetuated by contemporary media theories. The assumption that data can be stored, retrieved, and processed may be appropriate for the theory of communication pertaining to the algorithmic condition (Colman et al., 2018), but not for the theory of perception (Gibson, 1986, p. 242; Deleuze, 2007).[14] Gibson's plea, that we must not understand aesthesis by analogy with socially *coded* stimuli, becomes more relevant for architecture than ever (Gibson, 1960, p. 702).[15]

Notes

1 "Ecological optics": the study of how (ambient) light is modulated by the milieu.
2 "Hypostasis": (Greek: ὑπόστασις) the underlying state or underlying substance as the fundamental reality that supports all else. The Bergsonian formulation – that consciousness *is* – is contrasted with the Husserelian one whereby consciousness is always *of* something. The same way that Spinozism does not require an internal correlate in the form of "I", neither does Bergsonism require an external correlate in the form of "thing".
3 Nietzsche's main disagreement is with Darwinism's emphasis on survival or preservation, instead of power or growth (to become more).
4 Aesthetic education allows the reconciliation between necessity and contingency, the inscription of the infinite in the finite.
5 A vast quantity of experimental research in handbooks is concerned with snapshot vision, fixed-eye vision, or aperture vision, and is not relevant to understanding *ambulatory* vision.
6 "Impredicativity": what is defined participates in its own definition.
7 "Veridical hallucination": William James's term as quoted in: Turvey, 122.
8 "Responseability": an ability to respond and be responsive in return.

9 The logic of subtraction also applies to biochemical events. Morphologically, a human hand's "mitten" is transformed into a "glove" by the process of *apoptosis* or "cellular suicide".
10 The animal may change as a consequence of experience, but we view that change not as an accumulation of knowledge, but as a keener ability to detect the affordances of the environment. According to Gibson, learning becomes the education of attention.
11 Oxford biologist John Odling-Smee who coined the term "niche construction" was the first to make the argument that niche construction should be recognised as an evolutionary process.
12 A play of words on "a grin without a cat" related to the Cheshire Cat, a fictional character popularised by Lewis Carroll in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. In our interpretation, its distinctive mischievous smile is an example of the autonomy of affect.
13 "Homophily": a tendency to maintain relationships with people who are similar to themselves in terms of age, race, gender, religion, or profession.
14 According to Gibson, the information in ambient light is *inexhaustible*, and the same applies to sound, odour, touch, and natural chemicals. According to Deleuze, the novel is not about memory, as is commonly assumed, but *signs*.
15 Gibson belongs to the (minor) tradition that resists the tendency of collapsing the co-constituting distinction such as operation/structure (Simondon), difference/repetition (Deleuze), pattern/reason (Brassier), contingency/recursivity (Hui).

References

Alliez, E. (2004) Appendix I: Deleuze's Virtual Philosophy. In: *The Signature of the World: What is Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy?* (E. R. Albert & A. Toscano, Trans.), pp. 85–104. London and New York, NY: Continuum.

Barad, K. (2007) *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Barthélémy, J.-H. (2009) Du mort qui saisit le vif: Simondonian Ontology Today (J. Clemens, Trans.). *Parrhesia* 7, pp. 28–35.

Bateson, G. (1979) *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity*. New York, NY: E.P. Dutton.

Bergson, H. (1992) *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics* (M. L. Andison, Trans.). New York, NY: Citadel Press (Original work published in 1946).

Blake, W. (1994) *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*. New York, NY: Dover.

Böhme, G. (2017) *Atmospheric Architectures: The Aesthetics of Felt Spaces* (A. Engels-Schwarzpaul, Trans.). London and New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic.

Boundas, C. (2019) Translator's Prologue. In: D. Olkowski & E. Pirovolakis (eds.), *Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy of Freedom: Freedom's Refrains* (pp. xxii–xxiii). New York, NY and London: Routledge.

Braidotti, R. (2010) Elemental Complexity and Relational Vitality: The Relevance of Nomadic Thought for Contemporary Science. In: P. Gaffney (ed.), *The Force of the Virtual: Deleuze Science, and Philosophy*. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press.

Brooks, R. A. (1990) Elephants Don't Play Chess. *Robotic and Autonomous Systems* 6, pp. 3–15.

Cache, B. (1995) *Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Chun, W. H. K. (2019) Queering Homophily. In: C. Apprich et al. (eds.), *Pattern Discrimination* (pp. 59–97). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Chung, C. J. (2001) Disney Space. In: R. Koolhaas et al. (eds.), *Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping* (pp. 470–98). Köln: Taschen.
Clark, A. (2016) *Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Colebrook, C. (2009) Derrida, Deleuze and Haptic Aesthetics. *Derrida Today* 2(1), pp. 22–43.
Colman, F. et al. (2018) *Ethics of Coding: A Report on the Algorithmic Condition*. Brussels: European Commission.
Connolly, W. E. (2010) Materialities of Experience. In: D. Coole & S. Frost (eds.), *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics* (pp. 178–200). Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
Crary, J. (1990) *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Danto, A. C. (2003) *The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art*. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing Company.
Deacon, T. (2012) *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
DeLanda, M. (2009) *A New Philosophy of Society Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity*. London: Continuum.
Deleuze, G. (1980) *Leibniz. Cours Vincennes*. Available at: https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/50 [Accessed 2 April 2020].
Deleuze, G. (1988) *Foucault* (S. Hand, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota (Original work published in 1986).
Deleuze, G. (1989) *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (H. Tomlinson & R. Galeta, Trans.). London: The Athlone Press (Original work published in 1985).
Deleuze, G. (1993) *The Fold: Lebniz and the Baroque* (T. Conley, Trans.). London: Athlone Press (Original work published in 1988).
Deleuze, G. (1994) *Difference and Repetition* (P. R. Patton, Trans.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press (Original work published in 1968).
Deleuze, G. (1995) *Negotiations, 1972–1990* (M. Joughin, Trans.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press (Original work published in 1990).
Deleuze, G. (1997) *Essays Critical and Clinical* (D. W. Smith & M. A. Greco, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota (Original work published in 1993).
Deleuze, G. (2005) *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (D. W. Smith, Trans.). London: Continuum (Original work published in 1981).
Deleuze, G. (2006) *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995* (A. Hodges & M. Taormina, Trans.). Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).
Deleuze, G. (2007) *Proust and Signs: The Complete Text* (R. Howard, Trans.). London: Athlone (Original work published in 1964).
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1994) *What Is Philosophy?* (H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell, Trans.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press (Original work published in 1991).
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (2004) *A Thousand Plateaus* (B. Massumi, Trans.). London and New York, NY: Continuum (Original work published in 1980).
Evans, R. (1995) *The Projective Cast: Architecture and Its Three Geometries*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Foucault, M. (1995) Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In: D. F. Bouchard (ed.), *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (pp. 139–64). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (Original work published in 1977).

Freeman, W. (1991) The Physiology of Perception. *Scientific American* 264(2), pp. 78–85.
Frichot, H. (2014) Gentri-Fiction and our (E)States of Reality: On the Exhaustion of the Image of Thought and the Fatigued Image of Architecture. In: N. Lahiji (ed.), *The Missed Encounter of Radical Philosophy with Architecture* (pp. 113–32). London: Bloomsbury.
Gibson, J. J. (1960) The Concept of the Stimulus in Psychology. *American Psychologist* 15(11), pp. 694–703.
Gibson, J. J. (1966) *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Gibson, J. J. (1986) *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. New York, NY: The Psychology Press (Original work published in 1979).
Guattari, F. (1995) *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm* (P. Bains & J. Pefanis, Trans.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press (Original work published in 1992).
Guattari, F. (2013) *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* (A. Goffey, Trans.). London: Bloomsbury.
Haraway, D. J. (2016) *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin with the Chthulucene*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
Hayles, K. N. (2005) *My Mother was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Hughes, R. (1991) *The Shock of the New: Art and the Century of Change*. New York, NY: Knopf.
Hui, Y. (2019) *Recursivity and Contingency*. London and New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield.
Ingold, T. (2000) From Complementarity to Obviation: On Dissolving the Boundaries between Social and Biological Anthropology, Archeology and Psychology. In: S. Oyama et al. (eds.), *Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ittelson, W. H. (1973) Environment Perception and Contemporary Perceptual Theory. In: *Environment and Cognition*. New York, NY: Seminar Press.
James, W. (2002) *On the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*. London and New York, NY: Routledge (Original work published in 1902).
James, W. (2008) *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. New York, NY: Cosimo (Original work published in 1912).
Jobst, M. (2010) Exception, Rule and Architecture Out-of-Field. *Rhizomes* 21, pp. 1–41.
Kant, I. (1998) *Critique of Pure Reason* (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Original work published in 1781).
Kant, I. (2007) *Critique of Judgement* (J. Creed Meredith, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Original work published in 1790).
Kingwell, M. (2008) *Concrete Reveries: Consciousness and the City*. New York, NY: Viking.
Kousoulas, S. (2018) Shattering the Black Box: Technicities of Architectural Manipulation. *International Journal of Architectural Computing* 16(4), pp. 295–305.
Kwinter, S. (2018a) Game-Changing Rules. *Domus: Innovation* 2018, pp. 12–15.
Kwinter, S. (2018b) *Non-Ordinary Reality – Beyond the Virtual*. Venice Biennale IoA Panel Discussion. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtzY2pZmjNg [Accessed 2 April 2020].
Lombardo, T. J. (1987) *The Reciprocity of Perceiver and Environment: The Evolution of James. J. Gibson's Ecological Psychology*. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Mallgrave, H. F. (2018) *From Object to Experience: The New Culture of Architectural Design*. London: Bloomsbury Visual Arts.

Manning, E. & Massumi, B. (2013) Coming Alive in a World of Texture for Neurodiversity. In: G. Siegmund and S. Hölscher (eds.), *Dance, Politics & Co-Immunity: Thinking Resistances/Current Perspectives on Politics and Communities in the Arts*, Vol. 1 (pp. 73–96). Zürich-Berlin: Diaphanes.

Manning, E. & Massumi, B. (2014) *Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience*. Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Manning, E. (2019) Toward a Politics of Immediation. *Frontiers in Sociology* 3(42). doi:10.3389/fsoc.2018.00042.

Massumi, B. (1998) The Diagram as Technique of Existence. In: B. van Berkel & C. Bos (eds.), *Diagram Work*, Special Issue of *ANY* 23, pp. 42–47.

Massumi, B. (2004) Building Experience; The Architecture of Perception. In: A. Benjamin & L. Spuybroek (eds.), *NOX Machining Architecture* (pp. 322–31). London: Thames & Hudson.

Meillassoux, Q. (2007) Subtraction and Contraction: Deleuze, Immanence, and Matter and Memory. *Collapse: Unknown Deleuze* III, pp. 72–73.

Michaels, C. F. & Carello, C. (1981) *Direct Perception*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Moe, K. (2017) *Empire, State & Building*. Barcelona: Actar.

Perez-Gomez, A. (2016) *Attunement: Architectural Meaning after the Crisis of Modern Science*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Radman, A. (2014) Sensibility is Ground Zero: On Inclusive Disjunction and Politics of Defatalization. In: R. Braidotti & R. Dolphijn (eds.), *This Deleuzian Century: Art, Activism, Society*. (pp. 57–86). Leiden & Boston, MA: Brill/Rodopi.

Radman, A. (2017a) Space Always Comes After: It is Good When it Comes After; It is Good Only When it Comes After. In: S. van Tuinen (ed.), *Speculative Art Histories: Analysis at the Limits* (pp. 185–201). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Radman, A. (2017b) Zigzagging: Bound by the Absence of a Tie. In: P. de Assis & P. Giudici (eds.), *The Dark Precursor: Deleuze and Artistic Research*, *Volume II: Image, Space, and Politics* (pp. 456–65). Leuven: Leuven University Press (Orpheus Institute Series).

Radman, A. (2019) Involutionary Architecture: Unyoking Coherence from Congruence. In: R. Braidotti & S. Bignall (eds.), *Posthuman Ecologies: Complexity and Process after Deleuze* (pp. 61–86). London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Radman, A. & Sohn, H. (2017) The Four Domains of the Plane of Consistency. In: A. Radman & H. Sohn (eds.), *Critical and Clinical Cartographies: Architecture, Robotics, Medicine, Philosophy* (pp. 1–20). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Rancière, J. (2006) *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible* (G. Rockhill, Trans.). London: Continuum.

Reed, E. S. & Jones, R. (1982) *Reasons for Realism, Selected Essays of James J. Gibson*. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum.

Richardson, J. (2004) *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rouvroy, A. (2012) The End(s) of Critique: Data-Behaviourism vs. Due-Process. In: M. Hildebrandt & E. de Vries (eds.), *Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: Philosophers of Law Meet Philosophers of Technology* (pp. 143–68). Abingdon: Routledge, 2012.

Schumacher, P. (2012) *The Autopoiesis of Architecture*, *Vol. 2*: *A New Agenda for Architecture*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.

Sellars, J. (1999) The Point of view of the Cosmos: Deleuze, Romanticism, Stoicism. *Pli* 8, pp. 1–24.

Sherman, J. (2017) *Neither Ghost Nor Machine: The Emergence and Nature of Selves*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Simondon, G. (2017) *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects* (C. Malaspina & J. Rogove, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: Univocal Publishing (Original work published in 1958).

Smith, D. W. (2009) From the Surface to the Depths: On the Transition from Logic of Sense to Anti-Oedipus. In: C. V. Boundas (ed.), *Gilles Deleuze*: *The Intensive Reduction* (pp. 82–97). London and New York, NY: Continuum.

Speaks, M. (2002) Design Intelligence: Or Thinking After the End of Metaphysics. *Architecture and Urbanism* 12(387), pp. 10–18.

Spencer, D. (2016) *How Contemporary Architecture Became an Instrument of Control and Compliance*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Stengers, I. (2005) Introductory Notes on an Ecology of Practices. *Cultural Studies Review* 11(1), pp. 183–96.

Stiegler, B. (1998) *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus* (R. Beardsworth & G. Collins, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Thompson, E. (2016) Introduction to the Revised Edition. In: F. J. Varela, E. Thompson, & E. Rosch (eds.), *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*, Revised Edition (pp. xvii–xxxiii). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Turvey, M. T. (2019) *Lectures on Perception: An Ecological Perspective*. New York, NY and London: Routledge.

Viveiros de Castro, E. (1998) Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 4(3), pp. 469–488.

Whitehead, A. N. (1925) *Science and the Modern World*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Zepke, S. (2017) A Work of Art Does Not Contain the Least Bit of Information: Deleuze and Guattari and Contemporary Art. In: S. van Tuin & S. Zepke (eds.), *Art History After Deleuze and Guattari* (pp. 237–53). Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Zourabichvili, F. (1996) Six Notes on the Percept (On the Relation between the Critical and Clinical). In: P. Patton (ed.), *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.