

AS ONE I AM FRAGILE  
TOGETHER WE ARE STRONG.  
الوقوف مع اللاجئين  
STANDING TOGETHER WITH REFUGEES



## Analysing refugee camp management from a network perspective

*How network management contributes to the transition of refugee camp Za'atari*

APTART & AKU  
AMMAN - 2010

## Colophon

Title *Analysing refugee camp management from a network perspective  
How network management contributes to the transition of refugee  
camp Za'atari*

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## *Preface*

At a particular moment, I realised that things that appear on your path determine your life and your future. This report is the result of those things appearing on my path the last 1,5 years. The start of this thesis began with the blunt question of Ronald van Warmerdam to come and work in Refugee Camp Za'atari in Jordan for six months. It ended up being two months and amazing. Never before, I came this close to current terror that is haunting Syria these days. It was both exciting and disappointing at the same time.

With my naïve stance, I (and the team) tried to realise simple projects in a context incredibly complex. Getting things done turned out to be extremely difficult. Nothing was the same as we were used to at home, rules were different, and we were often confronted with unexpected events that caused projects to slow down or even terminate. This made me curious about what game was actually played. A game which was in my opinion, played at the expense of the many refugees that already been through so much horror.

So, I started this thesis with curiosity to the underlying tensions and mechanisms of refugee camp management. The amount of knowledge to get acquainted to was not to be underestimated. Getting lost in dozens of policy documents, coordination-kits set up by the United Nations, and a dizzying amount of academic literature available, made it a challenging task. Also developing a solid understanding of network management and its applicability took some doing.

First biased by the dust still present in my shoes and clothes, I noticed that gradually the gap of knowledge congested and my understanding of the before-mentioned tensions improved. At the same time, I tried my best to stay neutral. As researcher I do not prefer to choose sides. Nuances were definitely needed compared to the starting point of the research; therefore the research question evolved over time.

I got the opportunity to look at the situation from another perspective than is normally done. I hope this thesis provides valuable insights that can alleviate the tensions surrounding complex problems related to the transition of refugee camps and equivalent complex situations. Because, let's face it, refugee camps will be there for some time. Host countries, NGOs and other involved parties have a responsibility to work on solutions for the complex issues that arise. At least for refugees, as their experience in the camps is also something that will definitely determine their future in one or more ways.

Dirkje Bazuin

*The Hague, October 24, 2018*

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I have to express my gratitude to VNG International that made it possible to travel to Jordan twice and safely. It was a unique opportunity to travel to Jordan to interview a multitude of involved people and organisations. Not only my Dutch colleagues but also the local team in Amman was indispensable. I loved to work at their office, they helped me to move along Amman and supported me in getting the interviews done.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my mentors for their patience and support during the process of developing my personal experience in the field into an academic research. I really appreciate the brainstorming and open conversations we had.

Last, but for sure not least, I want to express my appreciation for all my friends and family that thought along with me and continued to support me until the end.

## Summary

### 1. Problem Analysis

According to the UNHCR, the number of refugees increased proportionally in the last decade. In 2017 the population of displaced people remained yet again at a record high (UNHCR, 2017a). The lifespan of a refugee camp, which is an important feature of the humanitarian landscape, has increased from seven up to almost twenty years (Kennedy, 2004; Oxford University 2012 in Dalal, 2015). Humanitarian agencies have acknowledged that the defining character of camps causes a significant negative impact on the lives of refugees. One of the policies developed to deal with this is the policy on alternatives to camps which strives to avoid the establishment of new camps and in the case of an existing camp seeks to build links between camp and host community to transform camps into sustainable settlements (Dalal, 2015; UNHCR, 2006, 2014).

Implementing policies seems to be more difficult than expected. Many researchers argue that the complexity of a refugee camp is currently underestimated by the introduced policies (Dalal, 2015; Feldman, 2014; Misselwitz, 2009). When aiming for a more sustainable approach to a refugee camp, it can be questioned whether it can be categorized as humanitarian assistance or not. This ambiguity can be described as the gap between humanitarian and developmental assistance. Humanitarian agencies are specialized to deliver short-term emergency assistance focused on saving lives and alleviating direct suffering when on the other hand development agencies are specialized in dealing with structural issues and long-term planning. Looking at the developed policies; a shift occurs towards a more developmental approach and development agencies are often absent to compensate the lack of expertise of humanitarian agencies (Branczik, 2004).

Developing a policy to deal with the long-term existence of refugee camps that also deals with the existing complex reality of the urbanized refugee camps is not an easy task. Currently, we are living in a network society that causes involved parties to be mutually dependent (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Stakeholders rarely share the same perception about the causes, problem formulation and desired solutions and there are many possible ways to take a step forward. In building sciences, this is commonly approached as a wicked problem. Approaching a wicked problem can be done by improving interactions between stakeholders; *“decisions can only adequately be handled by enhancing and intensifying interactions between stakeholders”* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; van Bueren, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2003). This aligns with the integrative aspect of the definition of ‘urban development’, which is defined as a complex process that consists of multiple disciplines that is depended on their capacity to interact with each other (Franzen, Hobma, Jonge, & Wigmans, 2011).

### 2. Problem Statement

Based on the problem analysis the following problem statement can be formulated:

- Implementation of policies to deal with the negative impact and inevitable urbanization of refugee camps seem to fail because the complexity of the camp is underestimated. The increasing long-term existence underlines the urge to find means to deal with this.
- the gap between humanitarian and development aid causes difficulties in finding solutions for the long-term existence of refugee camps.

### 3. Research aim

When defining the transition of the camp a wicked problem situated in a network society, network management can be one of the ways to deal with it. The aim of this research is to identify the obstacles in the transition of a refugee camp and explore the way network management strategies can be applied to enhance this.

#### 4. Research question

The main research question answered in this thesis is as the following:

*What are the obstacles to the transition of a refugee camp and how can network management be a way to deal with this?*

The main research question answered in this thesis is as the following: *What are the obstacles to the transition of a refugee camp and how can network management be a way to deal with this?*

The research question is divided in two parts. Firstly, the current situation is investigated, and secondly the way network management offers ways to deal with the transition.

##### A. "What are the obstacles to the transition of a refugee camp"

Goal: Identifying the difficulties in the interaction between involved stakeholders. What are the difficulties regarding interaction encountered by humanitarian agencies and other organisations in the urban development process of a refugee camp.

##### B. "and how can network management be a way to deal with this"


Goal: finding the applicability of network management strategies to overcome the identified obstacles. What network management strategies can be applied to improve the interaction between stakeholders regarding transition of a refugee camp.

#### 5. Theoretical Framework

##### Long-term existence of refugee camps

Bridging the gap between humanitarian and development aid seems one of the ways to deal with the increasing long-term existence and the inevitable urbanization of refugee camps. In this research, the transition of a refugee camp encompasses the shift from humanitarian assistance that is focused on day-to-day operations and short-term project towards projects that are developmental, long-term focused and connected to national structures.

Attempts to implement policies to close this gap and to look at refugee camps from a different perspective failed until now. Misselwitz (2009) identified that stronger stakeholder interaction is needed to enable the planning process of an urbanized refugee camp; *"The recognition of a need for stronger stakeholder interaction opens the door to establishing the managerial structures that are required to launch possible rehabilitation processes and integrated planning processes for urbanised refugee camps, as well as to integrate such undertakings within local, regional and national development plans."*



**Figure 0.1:** Failure of policies to deal with the long-term existence and urbanization of refugee camps. Source: own illustration


### Network management

Since cooperation and learning do not emerge naturally it is necessary to support interaction. A wicked problem can only be solved by means of interaction in which actors that are involved have to manage and coordinate their perception, activities and institutional characteristics (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). This can be done through network management which is about *the process of interaction, and how this can be influenced between the interdependent players*

This can be done by sequentially conducting an (1) *actor analysis*, a (2) *game analysis* and a (3) *network analysis* which provides an overview of the conditions under which complex decision-making processes of wicked problems take place. It can support stakeholders in designing or improving their strategic responses to certain problems or challenges.

### 6. Methodology

This research is explorative research into the applicability of network management for the transition of refugee camps. First, a theoretical framework is set up based on existing academic research and reports, this is supplemented by interviews with experts. The next step is a network analysis of a case-study. The aim is to identify the obstacles of the transition of a refugee camp towards a development state. After this, a specific case in the context of the selected case-study will be analysed. The aim is to identify the applicability of network management tools for this particular case.



**Figure 0.3:** Obstacles identified for the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. Source: own illustration

The case-study selected is the transition in refugee camp Za'atari. Access to data and stakeholders is granted through a graduation internship at VNG International in the Local Government Resilience Programme. The second case investigated is a project that is executed within the case study. The Think Tank project can be seen as one of the ways to enhance the interaction in the network about the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. Also here access to data and stakeholders is granted through the graduation internship at VNG International and fieldwork in the actual Za'atari camp.

### Case-study results

#### Case-study Za'atari camp

The actor analysis, game analysis and network analysis are done for the transition of refugee camp Za'atari.






Figure 0.3: Obstacles identified for the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. Source: own illustration


From the network analysis, it became clear that there is no appropriate arena available to have interaction regarding the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. This is caused by several reasons, originating from critical actors in the camp. There are many arenas present in the network, but these are primarily focused on the day-to-day operations. An arena is not available because the Jordan Government (1) did not sign up for the sustainable solution integration, (2) has difficulties in coordinating the refugee crisis (complex decision-making structure) and (3) sees the camp as the responsibility of the 'International Community'. But also characteristics of the UN agencies do not serve the possibility to have interaction about the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. An arena is not available because UN agencies work following (1) a short-term mandate, (2) rely on yearly funding system and therefore lack the ability to guide other actors (especially UNHCR) and (3) there is a lack of transparency between sectors and agencies. This automatically affects the other involved stakeholders (INGOs, Donors, Jordan citizens, Syrian Refugees).

Other obstacles in the transition of the refugee camp came forward by discussing the 'desired', or the 'whished' solution for the camp. Multiple times the desire to implement a more developmental approach was mentioned. The critical actors do not share the same perceptions and illustrate the trap the transition of the camp is in. To date, taking over by the Jordan authorities only occurs when a direct benefit can be found. Generally, handing-over to national structures or systems is obstructed because there is no guarantee that the international community continues to support Jordan financially. By the same token, the International Donors are not convinced that local authorities, or companies, private or public can comply with the same standards, and choose for the standard INGOs when needed. This also blocks the process of handing over and connecting to national structures

#### Case-study Think Tank

From a network management perspective, the Think Tank project initiated by VNG International and the City of Amsterdam can be seen as a way to enhance interaction between the involved stakeholders. It can actually be defined as 'furtherance of goal intertwinement' (Management of content) or 'the coupling of actors, arena's and games' (Management of the game) and 'adjusting the network composition' (Management of institutions). Nevertheless, the process seems to stagnate when actual work needs to be done and commitment is needed, which is demonstrated in the number of critical actors in the established working groups (see figure 6.2). From a network management perspective, it turns out that mostly making agreements about the rules of the process were missing in the Think Tank to ensure participation of the critical actors. A part of this, comprises protecting core-values of the participants. The rejection of integration by Jordan Government can be seen as one of the major obstacles; it is also one of the major core-values. Although the content of the Think Tank is framed as a regional "framework" and not focused on the camp; it is about integrating refugees in Jordan. This results in resigning from the process. "The benefits of having an agreement on other values does not outweigh the main concern of the Jordan Government which is the rejection of integration" (Al-Hyari, Personal Communication, 10-09-2018). In other

words, the core values of one of the most important actors is not protected sufficiently.



**Figure 0.4:** Agreement on process rules and the protection of core-values were missing in think tank. Source: own illustration

### Conclusions

From the network analysis it became clear that there is no appropriate arena available where interaction can take place about the transition of refugee camp Za’atari. This is caused by several obstacles as explained above. From a general point of view, seeing the transition of refugee camps as a wicked problem, enhancing, initiating and supporting any form of interaction, is always a step in the good direction. However, the process stagnated by the resignation of critical actors for which the absence of process rules and the protection of core-values can be an explanation.

This leads to the conclusion that network management can enhance the transition of refugee camp Za’atari because interaction can be initiated and supported. But this is limited to an extent wherein the core-values of the involved actors remain protected. When the Government’s attitude intentionally remains against integration of refugees, enhancing interaction about the transition through network management remains a difficult task.

In general, refugee camps are always a result of a negotiation between the critical actors involved. Although, the core-values and history of the host government often change. Network management can enhance the transition of a refugee camp because interaction can be initiated and supported. But this is limited to an extent wherein the core-values of the involved actors remain protected.

### Discussion

In this thesis, several obstacles are identified that block the interaction between critical actors in the transition of Refugee Camp Za’atari. However, this thesis does not state whether these obstacles were put in place intentionally or not, because sometimes blocking interaction can be beneficial of certain actors. Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) state; “Strategies are not necessarily cooperative. It may be attractive for actors to slow down or block the progress when it appears to be moving towards a policy measure that could harm the actor’s interest” (p.49). In the process of the transition of refugee camp Za’atari, the interest of the Jordan Government (safety and economy in Jordan) is threatened and the fact that no interaction takes places is, understandably, avoided.

### Recommendations

To enhance the transition of a refugee camp, it can be advised to consciously look at the possibilities of applying network management strategies in practice. One of the main conditions for applying network management strategies is to incorporate the protection of core-values and be aware of the extent to which the initiating party has steering ability.

- A starting condition for applying network management is the possibility to find consensus on one or more core-values of critical actors. This possible consensus forms a starting point for applying

network management. When there are no prospects for consensus, it is better to resign from network management.

- When initiating interaction it is recommended to apply a range of network management strategies including the protection of core-values, making agreements on the process rules and take into account the steering ability of the initiator.
- The process of handing-over and collaboration between humanitarian and development agencies and organisations from the start of the establishment of a refugee camp should be researched further.

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## *2.List of Acronyms*

CoA	-	City of Amsterdam
GIZ	-	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HPF	-	Humanitarian Partners Forum
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
INGO	-	International Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	-	Norwegian Refugee Council
MOI	-	Ministry of Interior
MOMA	-	Ministry of Municipal Affairs
MOPIC	-	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MoU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
RACO	-	Refugee Affairs Committee
RC/HC	-	Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator
SRAD	-	Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate -
UN	-	United Nations
UNCT	-	United Nations Country Team
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	-	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
VNG International	-	Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten International
WASH	-	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

### 3. Problem Analysis

#### *Increasing number of refugees in the world*

According to the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), the number of refugees increased proportionally in the last decade. In 2017 the world's forcibly displaced population remained yet again at a record high (UNHCR, 2017a). The stay in a refugee camp, which is an important feature of the humanitarian landscape, has increased from seven up to almost twenty years (Kennedy, 2004; Oxford University 2012 in Dalal, 2015). Humanitarian agencies have acknowledged that the regulative character of a camp causes a significant negative impact on the lives of refugees. This is described as *'limitation on the rights and freedom of refugees and their ability to make meaningful choices about their life'* (UNHCR, 2014).

Figure 1 | Trend of global displacement and proportion displaced | 2007-2017




Figure 3.1: trend of global displacement. Source: UNHCR, 2017a.

#### *Need to minimize regulative character of refugee camps*

The increase of refugees and thereby the lifespan of refugee camps causes urgency to find means to deal with the regulative character. *'Large refugee organisations such as the UNHCR have come to realize that a traditional relief-based approach ("feeding victims") is both dehumanising and ineffective in the context of urbanised camps'* (Misselwitz, 2009). UNHCR has attempted to make their work methods more sustainable for decades. Recently, UNHCR has published the policy on alternatives to camps which strives to avoid the establishment of new camps and in the case of an existing camp seeks to build linkages between camp and host community to transform camps into sustainable settlements (Dalal, 2015; UNHCR, 2006, 2014). However, the implementation of these policies does not seem to be easy as camps are very complex ensembles of reality itself (Misselwitz, 2009).

#### *Complexity of urbanization*

Commonly, a camp is thought of as a collection of tents that shelter refugees, coordinated by humanitarian agencies and protected by the military. It is underlined that in reality a camp is way beyond this; camps often show de facto permanent settings that will not disappear in the near future; *'Instead of ordered tent cities, you will find streets, markets, shops or public buildings surrounded by jungles of makeshift buildings'* (Misselwitz, 2009). In turn, this explains the increased amount of research into the relationship between a camp and urban life which is inevitably connected to each other (Agier & Bouchet-Saulnier, 2004; Dalal, 2015; Herz, 2013; Jansen, 2009). Several researchers argue that a more developmental approach is needed to minimize the regulative character and to subsequently deal with the complexity of a refugee camp; which is currently underestimated by the introduced policies (Dalal, 2015; Feldman, 2014; Kennedy, 2008; Misselwitz, 2009).



### *Trapped between humanitarian and development aid*

When looking for ways to deal with the long-term existence of refugee camps it can indeed be questioned whether it still can be categorized as humanitarian aid. It can be described as the current gap between humanitarian and developmental aid. Humanitarian agencies are specialized to deliver short-term emergency assistance focused on saving lives and alleviating direct suffering when on the other hand development agencies are specialized in dealing with structural issues and long-term planning. This shows the conflict between temporariness and permanency in many camps around the world. When looking at the policies developed, a shift occurred from a humanitarian approach towards a more developmental approach. However, development agencies are often absent to complement the short-term expertise of humanitarian agencies (Branczik, 2004).

### *Finding a solution*

Currently, we are living in a network society that causes involved parties to be mutually dependent (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Many organisations have a stake in this, from the refugees themselves to the host governments. These stakeholders often do not share the same perception about the causes, problem formulation and desired solutions and there are many ways to take a step forward. In building sciences this is commonly approached as a wicked problem. There are three aspects of wicked problems defined by Weber & Khademian (2014) that are also applicable to the transition of refugee camps. Little consensus about the problem and solution is available and each attempt of creating a solution changes the understanding of the problem. This asks for a continuous fluid decision-making process (Rittel & Webber, 1984). Secondly, a wicked problem cuts through hierarchy networks, authority structures and policy domains which means that wicked problems are inevitably connected to other problems (Weber & Khademian, 2014). Thirdly, wicked problems are relentless; there is not a clear finish line; solving one wicked problem will have consequences for other policy arenas (Weber & Khademian, 2014).

### *Network Management*

Approaching a wicked problem in a network society can be done by improving interactions between stakeholders; *'decisions can only adequately be handled by enhancing and intensifying interactions between stakeholders'* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; van Bueren et al., 2003). The existing competition and inter-organisational segregation of sectors, caused by the underlying donor system and institutional characteristics, causes challenges to shift towards this developmental approach (Hinds, 2015; Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2004) and shows a need to look at the possibilities of network management.

A way to improve the interaction between stakeholders is using tools presented in network management. Originating from the multi-dependent network society, network management tools aim to improve practice into improving interaction in a network: *'When a decision-making process has to take place in a network, this always implies that several actors are involved in the decision making. They have different interests and are interdependent. No single actor can fully realize his own goals (interdependence)* (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008).

### *Problem Statement*

Based on the problem analysis the following problem statement can be formulated:

- Implementation of policies to deal with the negative impact and inevitable urbanization of refugee camps seem to fail because the complexity of the camp is underestimated. The increasing long-term existence underlines the urge to find means to deal with this.
- The gap between humanitarian and development aid causes difficulties in finding solutions for the long-term existence of refugee camps.

## Research Aim

When defining the transition of a refugee camp a wicked problem which is situated in a network society, network management can be one of the ways to deal with it. This thesis aims to identify the obstacles in the transition of a refugee camp and explore ways network management strategies can be applied to enhance the transition.

A network management analysis is applied to a selected case-study to gain insight in the interaction of the involved actors in the transition of a refugee camp ; *'It provides a framework for analysing the strategic and institutional complexity of problem solving and decision making'* (van Bueren et al., 2003). The aim is to explore the obstacles encountered in the transition of a refugee camp and to subsequently offer managers, who are situated in a comparable context, insights in how to deal with this. The aim is to explore the reasons why the implementation of policies like the *'policy on alternatives to camp'* failed and if network management can be one of the ways to enhance the transition of refugee camps.

## Research Design

The main research question answered in this thesis is as the following: *What are the obstacles to the transition of a refugee camp and how can network management be a way to deal with this?*

The research question is divided in two parts. Firstly, the current situation is investigated and secondly the way network management offers ways to deal with the transition.

### A. *"What are the obstacles to the transition of a refugee camp"*

Goal: Identifying the difficulties in the interaction between involved stakeholders. What are the difficulties regarding interaction encountered by humanitarian agencies and other organisations in the urban development process of a refugee camp.

### B. *"and how can network management be a way to deal with this"*

Goal: finding the applicability of network management strategies to overcome the identified obstacles. Which network management strategies can be applied to improve the interaction between stakeholders regarding transition of a refugee camp.

## *Scope of research*

The scope of this thesis is defined by explaining individual components of the research question.

### *Refugee camp management*

In an emergency situation, establishing a refugee camp is one of the means to deal with an influx of refugees. Refugee camps are commonly managed by several UN agencies, International NGOs and host governments. This is done according to several standards, handbooks, toolkits and policies, developed since the establishment of the Refugee Convention after World War II. The refugee camp is not the only method to deal with refugees. A large percentage of displaced people reside in urban and rural contexts as well which encompasses other kind of challenges. This thesis is focused on a refugee camp only and not on refugees in urban or rural areas.

### *Transition*

In this thesis transition is defined as the shift from humanitarian aid, that is focused on temporary measures, day-to-day operations and short-term projects, towards a developmental approach that encompasses more permanent-like structures and long-term focused projects that are connected to national structures. It can be understood as the development from a temporary camp towards a settlement that will exist for a longer period of time. This not only includes physical structures but also social and governance structures. Hereby, it is asserted that developing a temporary camp into a settlement would make the need for humanitarian or developmental aid superfluous on the long run. More elaboration will be given in chapter 2.

### *Obstacles*

To date, the implementation of policies to make refugee camps more sustainable seems to be a difficult task. According to network management theory, these blockages or obstacles occur due to conflicting perceptions and interests. This thesis aims to identify these obstacles to be able to investigate if network management can overcome them. Without knowing a problem, you cannot design a solution.

Furthermore, this thesis focuses on obstacles on policy level and therefore focuses on the actors and organisations that are involved in policy making. Investigating the governance and power of refugees themselves, which is an important aspect of developing a refugee camp is beyond the scope of this thesis.

### *Network management*

Network management which is based on the mutual dependency of involved actors, aims to enhance interaction, cooperation and learning processes (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The analysis and possible management strategies explained by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) are taken as a starting point for this thesis. Furthermore, reframing that is one of the strategies to cope with wicked problems in a network setting, is explored as well.

## *Research Relevance*

The relevance of this thesis will be explained through the societal relevance, scientific relevance and utilization relevance

### *Societal Relevance*

The policy paper of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation in the Netherlands (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2018), stresses the urgency to alleviate the desperate situation of refugees in camps in the region. Currently, the debate about the migrant crisis in Europe seems to erupt (Denti, 2018) that makes sufficient '*opvang in the regio*' (*reception in the region*) more important on political level. As the number of refugees continues to grow and the lifespan of refugee camps continues to increase as well (UNHCR, 2017a), it is important to find sustainable ways of dealing with it and this way contribute to the alleviation of the consequences of these crises'

### *Scientific Relevance*

Public and private organisations in our network society are increasingly faced with controversies on the way to deal with wicked problems and an adequate response is still lacking (van Bueren et al., 2003). Exploring ways of applying network management strategies in other contexts contribute to the academic repertoire of the current network management.

Furthermore, the academic research into refugee camps and its urban development is often focused on the philosophy of spatial arrangements, the perspective of refugees, the urban planning itself is rarely focused on the policy level and the management of refugee camps. Although many reports and coordination kits by UN agencies and NGOs are available, academic research about management on policy level in the humanitarian context is scarce.

### *Utilisation Relevance*

Although, just one case study is conducted due to the complexity and the scope of this thesis, the applicability of network management strategies can be a way forward to enhance a sustainable way of looking at refugee camps worldwide.



## 4. Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the theoretical baseline of this thesis. Firstly, an overview of academic research into the transition of refugee camps and camp management is given. Secondly, theoretical concepts are explained to analyse and assess the selected case study.

### *Refugee Convention*

Humanitarian response finds its origin after World War II in 1951 at the time the Refugee Convention was established (UNHCR, 2017). The Convention is an instrument based on the following principles; non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement. Non-discrimination is about acting without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin, sex, age, disability, sexuality, or other prohibited grounds of discrimination. Secondly, non-penalization states that refugees should not be penalized for their illegal entry or stay; seeking asylum can require breaching of immigration laws. The last principle asserts that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom. Lastly, the Convention presents basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees like access to court, education, work and the provision of documentation. The UNHCR serves as a guardian of this convention and its 1967 Protocol and asserts that States are expected to cooperate in ensuring the rights of refugees are respected and protected (UNHCR, 2017). Until now, around 145 states signed the 1951 refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol (UNHCR, 2015a). According to the 1951 refugee Convention a *refugee* is defined as:

*“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”* (UNHCR, 2009, p10).

In the convention three durable solutions for refugees are described; (1) voluntarily repatriation, (2) local integration and (3) resettlement (UNHCR, 2012):

1. Voluntarily repatriation is about returning to the country of origin. This return should be voluntarily and sustainable. The UNHCR ensures *“the exercise of a free and informed choice, and to mobilize support for returnees”* (UNHCR, n.d.).
2. Local integration as defined by the UNHCR: *“A process whereby refugees establish increasingly closer social and economic links with their host society and are granted a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by their country of asylum, including the acquisition of permanent residence rights and, ultimately, citizenship”*. In the country of first asylum local integration can sometimes be an appropriate solution.
3. Resettlement is defined as: *“The resettlement of refugees from their country of first asylum, to a third country which has agreed to admit and grant them with residence rights”*. Resettlement is a sustainable solution for refugees to move to a third country where they have the possibility to get long-term protection and integrate into the host community. Especially for refugees that have limited prospect for the other durable solutions or refugees with special needs (UNHCR, 2007b).

### *Refugee camp*

One of the methods to protect refugees is by establishing a refugee camp. This is often seen as an appropriate method to deliver assistance to people in need (Misselwitz, 2009). A camp enables the humanitarian agencies to monitor the situation and to deliver appropriate assistance (UNHCR Handbook,

2007, p44). *“Refugee camps have always been present as a quick and ‘easy’ solution, which put the humanitarian organisations and the hosting countries in a better position of controlling refugees and providing services’* (Dalal, 2015). *“From an UNHCR perspective camps make life easy, camps are a sensible easy pragmatic environment to work in. A dispersed refugee population in host communities which is a mix of renting and squatting, is much more complicated to deal with”* (B. Mountfield, Personal Communication, 02-02-2018).

A refugee camp is established because of a refugee emergency situation which is defined as: *‘any situation in which the life or well-being of refugees will be threatened unless immediate and appropriate action is taken, and which demands an extraordinary response and exceptional measures’* (UNHCR, 2007, p4). UNHCR defines a refugee camp as; *“Camps are a form of settlement in which refugees or IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) reside and can receive centralised protection, humanitarian assistance, and other services from host governments and other humanitarian actors”* (UNHCR, 2018, p106). A refugee camp can be understood as *a space* apart from the conditions of crisis (whether war or natural disaster) that enables the provision of assistance to people in need (Feldman, 2014). Although, a camp is a preferred solution as a result of its controllability, the UNHCR acknowledges that the regulative characteristic of a camp is demonstrated in the degree of limitation on the rights of freedom of the refugees (UNHCR, 2014).

This regulative character of camps also comes to the fore in the academic world. Camps have been understood as spaces of deprivation and of protection, as psychologically damaging and nurturing (Feldman, 2014). Feldman (2014) gives a clear overview of the current understanding of refugee camps in the academic world;

*“Increasingly, scholars have researched camps as spaces of exception that offer refugees a form of protection that ensures their powerlessness (Agamben, 1998, 2005; Arendt, 1951; Hanafi, 2008; Ramadan, 2009; Turner, 2005; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004; Fassin, 2005; Papastergiadis, 2006 in Feldman, 2014). Differently, the camp is approached a space of regulation to serve the bureaucratic management of life to the convenience of the humanitarian providers”* (Hyndman, 2000; Agier, 2011; Mortland, 1987; Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010 in Feldman, 2014).

For this thesis, the definition of the UNHCR is used, taken into account the damaging and nurturing character which is mentioned by the other authors.

### Establishment of a refugee camp

The design and the construction of a refugee camp is determined by several standards. The most prominent document is the “*Emergency Handbook*” set up by the UNHCR (Dalal, 2015; Kennedy, 2004; UNHCR, 2018). Since its establishment, the handbook has been revised a couple of times and can be found as a digital version on the UNHCR website (UNHCR, 2018). In the handbook it is stressed that the design of a camp, including shelters and the infrastructure are crucial to the safety and well-being of refugees. Therefore, guidelines regarding land use, topography, drainage, soil, climatic conditions, health, shelter and infrastructure allocations and design are listed (Dalal, 2014; UNHCR, 2007, p.207; UNHCR, 2018, p.107).

### Organisation of a refugee camp

The refugee coordination model (RCM) forms the basis for response to refugee emergency situations. Depending on the scale of the refugee crisis, sector working groups can be established; “*Humanitarian organisations have agreed to lead certain clusters at global level. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organisations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action (water, health, shelter, logistics, etc.)*” (UNHCR, 2018, p.213). In figure 4.1 the division of clusters is displayed. The aim of this cluster approach is to improve the division of labour and to better define the role and responsibilities of the organisations.




Figure 4.1: Cluster approach refugee camp management. Source: UNOCHA, 2012.

There are several UN agencies active in refugee camps and the UNHCR is often responsible for three clusters; the Global Protection Cluster (GPC), co-leads the Global Cluster for Shelter and is responsible for the Global Cluster for Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) (UNHCR, 2018, p.235). This last cluster is about standardized coordination mechanisms applicable to refugee operations in general. It can be divided into three standard roles;



1. *Camp administration*: overall supervision of the camp including security. This often done by national or local authorities.
2. *Camp coordination*: often UNHCR takes this role that includes inter-camp coordination, strategy-making, setting standards, contingency planning and information management.
3. *Camp management*: this involves the coordination of the service delivery and the maintenance of infrastructure in the camp.

To guide the collaboration, the UNHCR has concluded Memoranda of Understanding with other active UN organisations. The material needs of refugees are likely to be covered by sectors for which other organisations in the UN system have special competence (UNHCR, 2007a). Beside other UN organisations there are non-governmental organisations which often act as UNHCR's operational partners (UNHCR, 2007a). These organisations can be described as "*private, non-profit, professional organisations, with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals*" (Clarke, 1998). Different from states and UN organisations, INGOs do not have a protection mandate, but can be present to contribute to the protection and wellbeing of affected people (Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2004). Next to these INGOs, the host country also plays an important role in a refugee camp. Often, they take care of the security by means of military protection, to protect the refugees themselves, but also to protect the host community from the refugees. The UNHCR plays an important role in mediating between refugees and the host government (UNHCR, 2007a).

## 4.2. Long-term existence of refugee camps

### Gap between humanitarian and development aid

The increased lifespan of a refugee camp in combination with the regulative character of refugee camps, stresses the need for a longer-term approach (Kennedy, 2004; Oxford University 2012 in Dalal, 2015). When discussing the long-term existence of refugee camps the gap between humanitarian and development assistance comes forward as one of the main challenges.

In the case of an emergency situation humanitarian assistance is delivered to save lives and to alleviate the direct suffering. This kind of aid lacks a long-term perspective which is present in development aid. This form of aid responds to on-going structural issues like poverty and the development of economic, institutional and social systems. It supports the capacity to construct resilient communities and sustainable livelihoods (Humanitarian Coalition, n.d.). See table 4.2.

<i>Humanitarian Aid</i>	<i>Development Aid</i>
<i>“In the immediate area of conflict, the primary aim is preventing human casualties and ensuring access to the basics for survival: water, sanitation, food, shelter, and health care. Away from the main fighting, the priority is to assist people who have been displaced, prevent the spread of conflict, support relief work, and prepare for rehabilitation” (Branczik, 2004).</i>	<i>“Reconstruct a country's infrastructure, institutions, and economy, is often a key part of the peace accord in the aftermath of war. This assistance ensures that the country can develop, instead of sliding back into conflict. Reconstruction of property and infrastructure: to facilitate return of the displaced security, governance, transport of food and supplies, and rebuilding of the economy”.</i>
Short-term	Long-term
Delivered in Disaster zones	Delivered in developing countries
Responds to incident of events	Responds to systematic problems
Focused on saving lives	Focused on economic, social and political development

**Table 4.1:** Comparison between humanitarian and development aid. Source: Based on Branczik, 2004

In a report of the World Bank it is stated that humanitarian-development assistance is seen as sequential for a long time; starting with humanitarian response followed by development assistance when the situation becomes protracted (World Bank, 2017, p.11). It is advised that humanitarian agencies should take care of a solid foundation to complement the long-term development objectives; *“By avoiding extended humanitarian programming, which can build aid dependence, and by addressing root problems in tandem with offering relief, humanitarian aid can contribute to the alleviation of cyclical crises”* (Branczik, 2004). It is likely that the best results are to be achieved when humanitarian and development actors work together from the beginning. Instead of succeeding each other, engaging in complementary efforts to generate greater impact (World Bank, 2017, p.11). Recently, a paradigm shift can be detected; *“This reflects a shift in policy over the last few years away from the view that protracted refugee crises were the sole responsibility of humanitarian agencies towards framing them as ‘development issues with humanitarian elements’* (Harild, 2016 in Bellamy et al, 2017).

*The transition of a refugee camp encompasses the shift from humanitarian assistance that is focused on day-to-day operations and short-term project towards projects that are developmental, long-term focused and connected to national structures.*

In this thesis the obstacles between humanitarian and development aid in a selected case are investigated. This is called *“transition”* in this thesis.

### *Urbanization of refugee camps*

Over the past few years, academics have conducted research into the long-term existence of refugee camps and its link to urbanization (Oka, 2011; Turner, 2011; Herz, 2012; Agier, 2014; Jansen, 2015; Picker and Pasquetti, 2015; Dalal, 2015 in Jansen, 2016). Jansen (2016) states that the 'temporary intended' camps show similarities to forms of urban life; camps develop into urban settings that are only distinguishable from the host country due to the presence of flags and stickers of aid organisations (Jansen, 2016). He underlines the fact that these camps are characterized by the proliferation of a temporary permanence and that they are formed in a particular way due to the presence of humanitarian governance. This proliferation of the urban form in a camp can be seen as something inevitable according to Misselwitz; *"as soon as a form of normality sets in, sometimes only weeks or months after arrival, refugees turn into camp dwellers, adapting themselves to life in a new environment. Camp dwellers become experts in surviving on minimal means, improvising, making do with what can be found and almost immediately transforming the physical, spatial, social and economic constitution of their initial emergency setting"* (2009, p.16).

The notion of inevitable urbanization in refugee camps stresses the fact that managing a camp should not be solely be a humanitarian issue. Especially because impermanence costs more on the long run (Kimmelman, 2014). This fact is already acknowledged by the UNHCR by attempting to implement policies that bridge the gap between humanitarian aid and development aid. An example of this the *"Policy on Alternatives to Camps"*, that advocates for the establishment of sustainable settlements and when possible to avoid the establishment of a camp (UNHCR, 2014). *"The UNHCR will pursue the progressive removal of restrictions on the ability of refugees to exercise their rights and seek to build linkages between the camp and host communities and anchor the camp within the local economy, infrastructure, and national social protection and service delivery systems, in order to transform them into sustainable settlements"* (UNHCR, 2014, p4). The end goal to which the UNHCR strives with this policy is : *"Being able to exercise rights and freedoms, make meaningful choices regarding their lives and have the possibility to live with greater dignity, independence and normality as members of communities"* (UNHCR, 2014, p.8). This policy is also embedded in the newest version of the *Emergency Handbook* (UNHCR, 2018).

### *Long term existence of refugee camps*

Already for decades the UNHCR conducted research into Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS) which is defined *“as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country”*(UNHCR, 2017a). In the early 2000’s, when there were relatively fewer refugee situations, there was time to focus on longer-term humanitarian concerns. Bowman (2016) names this the decade of initiatives because of the production of many research papers, official documents and discussions about the negative influence of PRS and ways to deal with this.

Also Crisp (2006) describes attempts from the 1970s until the 1990s. The latest attempt researched by Crisp is the Brookings Process which attempted to establish *‘action and field-oriented coalition’* that *“aims to explore and propose commonly agreed operational responses to strengthen the continuum between security, humanitarian assistance and early reconstruction and development”* (Worldbank, 2000 in Crisp, 2006). One of the main conclusions describes that it can be questioned whether the UNHCR should be involved in something as complex and difficult as a long-term development processes; *“the question should be raised as to what extent it can leave this task from the start to more experienced development agencies in conjunction with the national authorities”*(Crisp, 2006, p188). The role of UNHCR is criticized even more by Macrae (in Crisp, 2006, p189) *“Humanitarian agencies, she says, might do well to reassert their particular competence and mandate with regard to protection and human rights. Uncritical adoption of developmental and peace-building objectives risks compromising not only the technical quality of UNHCR’s work, but also its mandate for protection”*. Crisp (2006) concludes that it is time to reconsider the way scarce international resources continue to support *“warehouse refugees”* that are continuously being prevented from establishing livelihoods and becoming self-sufficient.

Dalal (2014) describes the obstacles to guide the urbanization of refugee camp Za’atari and states that urbanization is inevitable and *“that integration is a fundamental key strategy in order to achieve sustainable development in the camp”*(p.140). This can be explained by the fact that refugees in the camp are constantly excluded from participation in local economy, policy and society and are needed to develop the camp in a more sustainable way (Dalal, 2014), they keep being treated as the *“warehouse refugees”*. He states that a shift towards development is urgently needed (Dalal, 2015).


### *Emergency Handbook*

Also critics about the emergency handbook can be found. Kennedy (2004) argues the universality (one size fits all) of the document goes beyond its initial goal; *“The closer the Handbook gets to describing what activities and what items and materials are actually present in an emergency situation, the further away it gets from its own Principle of Response about ensuring that measures are appropriate”* (Kennedy, 2004, p19). In his dissertation in 2008, Kennedy describes other gaps in the handbook for the design of refugee camps that include (1) the lack of considering long-term solutions, (2) little knowledge about the time factor of refugee camps, (3) the lack of graphic tools developed in the field of refugee camp design; (4) the inapplicability of small-scale planning solutions; (5) no agreed upon vocabulary, textual or graphic language in the refugee camp planning field; and (6) the lack of attention towards the location of camps and their surrounding (Kennedy, 2008 in Dalal, 2014). Influenced by the underlying funding system Kennedy argues that the handbook is primarily focused on *“how well the shelter or settlement survives, and assists in the bare survival of the refugees, rather than how it performs in terms of its impact upon the social or economic fabric of the refugees over the long-term”* (Kennedy, 2008, p35). A decade has passed since Kennedy’s research and some of these elements discussed above are embedded in the newest version of the emergency handbook (fourth edition).

Although Kennedy (2008) argues that long-term solutions are not considered deliberately in the *Handbook* (2007). Some notions can be found in the newest *Handbook* (2018) that possible long-term existence should be taken into account; *“Service provision over that period of time is likely to remain as the*

*responsibility of humanitarian actors, and integration with local existing services will be challenging*”(UNHCR, 2018, p107). It is stated that the allocation of functions in the camp should enable refugees to become self-sufficient and integrate in the host community when needed; *“Site planning should ensure that the spatial allocation of functions is such that refugees and displaced persons can reduce their dependence on aid, increase their independence, and potentially integrate fully with host communities”* (UNHCR, 2018, p110).

Yet, several years have passed. It remains unclear if the approach to refugee camps is now changed or not. For this thesis some explorative interviews are held with experts in the field. Below their statements on how refugee camp management currently functions is given. The question is asked whether the Policy on Alternatives to Camps is implemented correctly ; *“As an observer my impression that it is not implemented properly. But I cannot justify that with a solid collection of examples”* (Interviewee 1, Personal Communication, 02-02-2018).



**Figure 4.2:** Failure of policies to deal with the long-term existence and urbanization of refugee camps. Source: own illustration

*Summary*

A refugee camp is one of the ways to deal with a refugee situation and is established according to the emergency handbook developed by the UNHCR. The long-term existence of refugee camps draws attention to the gap between humanitarian and development aid. Often, these forms of assistance follow each other sequentially although it would be desirable to connect these from the very start of a refugee camp. Also urbanization urges the need for a better connection between the forms of aid as connection would give the opportunity to better guide this urbanization. For decades, attempts were done to implement sustainable policies. Although some of these policies are embedded in the emergency handbook it seems to be unclear if these are implemented successful to prevent nurturing *‘feeding victims’* situations in refugee camps.

### 4.3. Network Management

This thesis looks at the transition of a refugee camp and its management through a network management lens. This chapter explains the term ‘network management’ and ‘wicked problems’.

#### Network Society

The context in which problems or wicked problems need to be solved, has become substantially more complex in the past decades: *“Through processes of specialization, professionalization, decentralization, individualization and informatization, there are increasing number of places in society where people, groups and organisations make important decisions. As a result, there is increasing fragmentation”* (Castells, 2000 in Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Simultaneously, these decision-makers have limited resources and are influenced by decisions of others, resulting in increased mutual dependency. The increasing fragmentation and the increased mutual dependency cause the society to grow into a web of networks, which can be called a network society (ibid).

#### Network and hierarchy

In the current network society, hierarchy as an organisation principle has lost much of its meaning and go-alone strategies seem to be less effective. In a network the idea of a leading actor or organisation, that is at the top of the hierarchy, that steers its subordinates, is obsolete. The hierarchical structure is replaced by a horizontal network with mutual dependent stakeholders (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.3). *“Actors cannot achieve their objectives without resources that are possessed by other actors”* (Scarp, 1978; Benson 1982; Rhodes 1988). The characteristics of a network can be explained comparing it to the hierarchical system defined by (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). See table 2.4 below.

<i>Hierarchy</i>	<i>Network</i>
Regular and sequential	Irregular and no clear sequence of activities
Phases	Rounds
Actors are stable	Actors join and withdraw and behave strategically
One arena, process has a clear starting point and end point	Several arenas, no isolated starting point and end point
Content of the problem is stable	Content of the problem shifts
Consistency and predictability	Flexibility and unpredictability
Incentive to regard problems as structured	Incentive to regard problems as unstructured

**Table 4.2:** Comparison Hierarchy and Network. Source; De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008

*“A network can be defined as (1) a number of actors with (2) different goals and interests and (3) different resources, (4) who depend on each other for the realization of their goals”* (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008, p.5). According to Heywood (2009) *“networks are flat organisational forms that are characterized by informal relationships between essentially equal agent or social agencies”* (Heywood, 2009 in Adams & Tiesdell, 2013). Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) define networks as more or less stable patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors which form around policy problems or clusters of means and which are formed, maintained and changed through a series of games.

The characteristics of a network make decision-making more complex. The attention shifts towards a process of interaction and focuses on how this can be influenced between the interdependent players. The decisions are made in a process of interaction; *“it is not a matter of course in a network, because an actor*

that wants to change something in a network depends on the cooperation of other actors” (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). In the network approach, explanations for the success or failure of policy processes are based on the extent to which co-operation has been achieved. Co-operation is not achieved interaction is blocked, when there are undesired consequences.

*Increase of wicked problems*

In turn, this causes problems to become more wicked; “the wickedness of many societal problems can be connected to a number of characteristics of this network society” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; van Bueren et al., 2003). The growing fragmentation and dependency causes that consensus about the nature of problems, its criteria and possible desired solutions do not emerge automatically. In addition, caused by the involved of various institutional arrangements, the complexity of how to handle these wicked problems is increasing as well (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

Following the three aspects of Weber & Khademian (2014) wicked problems are unstructured which means that causes and effects are extremely difficult to identify. Little consensus about the problem and solution is available and each attempt of creating a solution changes the understanding of the problem. This asks for a continuous fluid decision-making process (Rittel & Webber, 1984). Secondly, a wicked problem cuts through hierarchy networks, authority structures and policy domains which means that wicked problems are inevitably connected to other problems (Weber & Khademian, 2014). Thirdly, wicked problems are relentless; there is not a clear finish line; solving one wicked problem will have consequences for other policy arenas (Weber & Khademian, 2014). See table 4.3.

<i>Dimensions of wicked problems</i>	<i>Network</i>
Unstructured	Causes and effects are difficult to identify High information demand Fluid problem-solving Little consensus about problem definition or desired and possible solutions
Cross-cutting	Multiple stakeholders Diverse perspectives Mutual dependency Increased political and social complexity
Relentless	No finish line

**Table 4.3:** Aspects of a wicked problem. Based on Weber & Khademian, 2014

### *Transition of a refugee camp*

The question is whether the transition of a refugee camp can be considered a wicked problem. See table 4.4 below for the explanation.

<i>Dimensions of wicked problems</i>	<i>Network</i>	<i>Transition of camp</i>
Unstructured	Causes and effects are difficult to identify High information demand Fluid problem-solving Little consensus about problem definition or desired and possible solutions	- Talking about camp-cities is taboo (Misselwitz, 2009).  - Not one simple solution can be found.  - Guiding the urban development process is about integrating many sectors (Dalal, 2015).
Cross-cutting	Multiple stakeholders  Diverse perspectives  Mutual dependency Increased political and social complexity	- Multiple stakeholders are involved in a refugee camp ( NGOs, UN agencies, host government and refugees (UNHCR, 2007).  - UN is dependent on mandate and thus host government  - By talking about a camp as a city it is assumed that it becomes permanent. Hereby it touches a political and social issue for the host country (Misselwitz, 2009).
Relentless	No finish line, cannot be solved "once and for all"	When starting the transition, it automatically touches other problems to be solved

**Table 4.4:** Aspects of a wicked problem. Based on Weber & Khademian, 2014

### *Planning problems are wicked problems*

An extensive explanation of wicked problems is given in the article "*Planning problems are wicked problems*" by Rittel & Weber (1984). Herein, they give a more extensive explanation of the characteristics of a wicked problem, but in general overlap with the definition explained above. Most importantly is the statement that all planning problems are wicked problems; "*The problems that planners must deal with are wicked and incorrigible ones, for they defy efforts to delineate their boundaries and to identify their causes, and thus to expose their problematic nature*" (Rittel & Webber, 1984).

Cooperation and learning in a network do not emerge automatically, therefore it is necessary to support interaction. A wicked problem can only be solved by means of interaction in which actors that are involved have to manage and coordinate their perception, activities and institutional characteristics. This can be done through network management which is about "*the process of interaction, and how this can be influenced between the interdependent players*". Some constraints have to be taken into account as well. When there are structural opposing interests or absent common interests, network management seems to be an impossible job according to the authors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004)

Also Misselwitz (2009) identified that stronger stakeholder interaction is needed to enable the planning process of an urbanized refugee camp; "*The recognition of a need for stronger stakeholder interaction opens the door to establishing the managerial structures that is required to launch possible rehabilitation processes and integrated planning processes for urbanised refugee camps, as well as to integrate such undertakings within local, regional and national development plans*" (Misselwitz, 2009)




### *Analysing the situation*

According to Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) wicked problems and the process of decision-making is influenced by three kinds of uncertainty; *substantive, strategic* and *institutional uncertainties*. The first step to cope with these uncertainties is to map their nature and causes. This can be done by sequentially conducting an actor analysis, a game analysis and a network analysis which provides an overview of the conditions under which complex decision-making processes of wicked problems take place. It can support stakeholders in designing or improving their strategic responses to certain problems or challenges.

### *Actor analysis*

In the actor analysis several steps are taken to give a full overview of the actors involved. A formal chart of the actors is made and the perceptions of actors on the current situation, expected situation and desired situation researched and compared. Through their perception actor's interests and objectives can be identified. Finally, the critical actors can be identified that can be distinguished into potential blockers of changes, potential critics of change, potential blockers who will not directly act and finally actors who do not require attention immediately (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).



**Figure 4.3:** Three phases of network analysis. Based on Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004

### *Game analysis*

In the game analysis, the identified arenas and the breakthroughs and impasses in the process of decision-making will be explored. The arena is the place where actors meet and interact; *'it is the place where a specific group of actors make choices on the basis of their perception of problems, solution and each other's strategies'* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). By identifying the arena(s) the playing field of the actors can be revealed. An impasse can also be named a deadlock, which is caused by stagnation in the process. Conflict, duration, and the absence of decisions may also point out to an impasse. It is important to know where these deadlocks come from to prevent them from happening in the future (ibid).

### *Network analysis*

The network analysis is about the mapping of interaction, relations and rules. According to Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) a network analysis *"is an inventory of contact patterns between actors"*. The network analysis consists of two steps; firstly an inventory of the interaction patterns and secondly an inventory of the rules of the network. The institutional context is determined by both formal and informal rules. Informal rules concerning the autonomy and the mandate of organisations can be influential to their willingness to cooperate. In general this analysis aims to provides insight in the divisions between actors and the interaction patterns (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

## 4.4. Reframing

### *Perception and frames*

One of the management strategies Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) propose when stagnations in a process occur is *reframing*. Reframing is way to deal with diverging perceptions. That decision-making is influenced by the various perceptions of the stakeholders is not strange; *“no decision can be understood de novo or in vitro, apart from the perceptions of the actors and the mind-sets and cultures of the contexts in which they are embedded”* (Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada, & Saint-Macary, 1995). *“Problem formulations and preferred solutions are grounded in different problem-setting stories rooted in different frames that may rest, in turn, on different generative metaphors”* (Schön & Rein, 1994, p29). Schön & Rein are known authors for theory on frame reflection define framing as the following: *“Framing is, in our use of the term, a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill- defined problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon ”* (Schön & Rein, 1994, p23). Framing is the way we, people or institutions see the (social) reality<sup>1</sup> (Korsten, n.d.). More information about reframing can be found in appendix 4.

### *Process-oriented Network management*

Korsten (n.d.) indicates that the design rationality shows similarities to the process-oriented network management. When looking at process management the four core-aspects that the process-architect has to take into account are listed below.

1. *Openness* is about giving actors the opportunity to have influence on the agenda and be involved in the decision making (De Bruijn et al., 2010). The task of the process manager is to act as a mediator to give every actor the chance to participate and for the process manager it is important to stay away from the actual content.

2. *Protecting core-values* encompasses caring for the general objectives of the stakeholders. The process manager has to ensure that all the core-values are protected and if possible, a mutual gain can be found. These core-values should not be harmed because they are the reason why the actors participate in a process. It is important to be aware of core-values because it is easier to reach consensus on core-value than on specific details (W.J. Verheul, Personal Communication, 25 mei 2018).

3. *Progress* is about the balance between quick wins to keep up the momentum to keep everyone enthusiastic and involved, but at the other hand to keep the process attractive to stakeholders. It makes an exit strategy increasingly unattractive.

4. *Substance* is about the quality of the content the process produces. It should meet the quality standards of every actor that is involved: *“there may be strongly conflicting interests that force parties to make decisions that are substantively poor and perhaps even incorrect. Therefore it is crucial that the process has a sufficient number of substantive elements”* (De Bruijn et al., 2010, p42).

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
<sup>1</sup> *“Describing what is wrong in the present situation can be used to set the direction for its future transformation”* (Schön & Rein, 1994, p.27). An example of this frame can be illustrated by housing in the USA in the sixties; in the first example (A) urban housing is seen as a disease that must be cured and in the second example (B) as a threatened natural community that must be protected and restored. Once it is clear that a slum can be seen as a natural community, it becomes clear what needs to be done.



## 5. Methodology

### 5.1 Research strategy

This research is an explorative research into the applicability of network management for the transition of refugee camps. See figure 2.1 for the conceptual model.



**Figure 5.1:** showing the interface between management in the built environment and humanitarian practice. Source: own illustration

Network management, often applied in Urban Area Development, overlaps between Management in the Built Environment and the humanitarian field, see figure 2.2. “An explorative research is undertaken with the objective to explore an area where little is known about” (Kumar, 2011, p. 31), it does not intend to propose a final and conclusive solution. This research is a qualitative research which is characterized by generating theories instead of testing them (Bryman, 2012). Qualitative research makes it possible to investigate the essence of people, object or situations (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In other words, network management tools are used to clarify the current situation and in turn explore the applicability.

The relationship between theory can be classified in two ways; inductive and deductive reasoning. An inductive reasoning starts with observations that leads to generalization; *the process of induction involves drawing generalizable inferences out of observations* (Bryman, 2012). Deductive reasoning starts with theories and a hypothesis and then conducts the data analysis to prove the hypothesis (Bryman, 2012). This is research can be seen as inductive as it aims to generalize the observations found in the case-study. On the other hand, the research can be seen as a deductive research because it starts with existing theories (network management), aims to clarify the current situation and in turn assessing the applicability of network management in the humanitarian field.

### 5.2 Research Design

In figure 2.2, the different steps in the research are explained. A research design is described as a framework for the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2012). First a theoretical framework is set up based on existing academic research, this is supplemented by interviews with experts. The next step is network analysis of the selected case-study. The aim is to identify the obstacles of the transition of a refugee camp. After this, a specific case in the context of the selected case-study will be analysed. The aim is to identify the applicability of network management tools.




Figure 5.3: Research design. Source: own illustration

### 5.3 Research Method

#### Literature Review

First, a literature study is conducted to create a baseline describing the current state of knowledge on the humanitarian practice, the establishment of refugee camps and the designed policies to cope with the long-term existence of refugee camps. Secondly, network management and wicked problems in a network society will be elucidated.

#### Case-study method

The next step encompasses the study of the selected case. Case-study research is about the complexity and particular nature of the case in question (Bryman, 2012) it entails a detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena (Flyvbjerg, 2006). A case study is an empirical research that investigates the case by addressing the how or why questions regarding the phenomenon of interest (Yin, 2003).

Yin distinguished four types of case-study design of which the single holistic design is the applicable in this research. A single case study is justified when no other cases are available for replication (Yin, 2003). Also the complexity and representativeness of the case can justify to choose for a single case study (Yin, 2003). Secondly, Yin makes a distinction between holistic and embedded case study design. In an embedded case study, the case is split in multiple units of analysis, while a holistic case study has one unit of analysis for

each case (Yin, 2003). In this case a single case, Za'atari Camp is investigated. Sometimes, it is stated that generalization, or contribution to the scientific development cannot be delivered from a single case study; however Flyvbjerg (2006) proves the opposite; *'one can often generalize on the basis of a single case and the case-study may be central to scientific development or alternative to other methods. Formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development whereas the force of example is underestimated'* (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p228). The aim is to clarify the case in depth but to also be able to generalize the finding to other refugee camps around the world. Also exploring the applicability of network management tools should be reflected upon which can be useful in every complex network setting.

#### *Case Study Za'atari Camp*

The transition and the applicability of network management in refugee camp Za'atari will be investigated. This will be done in several ways. First a contextual analysis of the case will be done, also to show why this case is applicable for the research aim. The contextual history and the history of the camp is described, this will be done based on document study. Based on interviews and participant observation data will be collected. Access to data and stakeholders is granted through an graduation internship at VNG International (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten International) in the Local Government Resilience Programme. The case within the case investigated is a project that is executed within the case study. This case is seen as one of the way to enhance interaction between the involved stakeholders. Also here access to data and stakeholders is granted through the graduation internship at VNG International.

#### *Data collection*

Yin stated that there are six tools to collect data in a case study; documentation, archival records, direct observations, participant observation and physical artefacts (Yin, 2002). Data will be collected in several ways which is explained below.

#### *Documentation*

Three kinds of documents are used for document research. Firstly, there is the academic literature, the second layer includes reports developed by humanitarian or developmental agencies and (international) NGOs and lastly newspaper articles that are often used to illustrate or further explain statements.

#### *Interviews*

As Yin (1994) indicates, the interview is one of the most important sources of case study evidence. In this research interviews will be conducted with several stakeholder groups. The interviews are conducted as semi-structured interviews, which mean that the conversations are guided. The selection of interviewees is based on the a preliminary analysis of the selected case and the former experience of the author. Three kind of interviews will be held;

- interviews with involved stakeholders of the case study
- interviews with stakeholders in the think tank project of the case study (case-within-case)
- interviews with experts in the field

#### *Participant Observation*

Next to interviewing, participant observation will be done by participating as an intern in the Local Government Resilience Programme and specifically supporting the think tank of the City of Amsterdam. Participant observation *"...entails the relatively prolonged immersion of the observer in a social setting in which he or she seeks to observe the behaviour of members of that setting"* (Bryman, 2012, p.273). Often, participant observation entails a long period of time in the field or in a certain organisation; however if the specific topic of observation is well-defined, carrying out a micro-ethnography is possible that only needs a short period of time (Bryman, 2012, p.433). This will be done, by attending meetings and discussions between the City of Amsterdam, the VNG International and the involved aid organisations. Furthermore,

organising one or two workshops sessions is a part of the participant observation. Before, during and after these workshops, the behaviour of the involved stakeholders can be observed.

- Minutes of meetings
- Notes before, during and after participation
- Reports regarding project

#### 5.4 Analysing data

Yin's definition for analysing is; *"an analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing or otherwise recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a study"* (Yin, 2002). According to the tools presented in the network analysis the interviews will be assessed. An actor analysis, game analysis and network analysis will be done sequentially. The case of the Think Tank will be analysed according to the network management tools presented by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004).

#### 5.5 Sensitivity

Doing research in the context of a refugee camp is not always easy. Interviews and other data have to be interpreted under influence of a highly charged context and observations are influenced by the position of the researcher. Especially when interviewing or observing refugees themselves challenges come along. For example, acquiring genuine informed consent and taking into account their capacity of autonomy are very important when doing refugee research (Mackenzie, McDowell, & Pittaway, 2007).

The topic is also concerned with international safety issues. Worldwide people question how to take care of the large influx of immigrants and refugees. Suggesting the transition and also permanency of a camp that implies more freedom for refugees can raise objections, especially in the country that hosts the camp. This sensitivity can possibly result in the fact that people don't reveal what they are really thinking during interviews.

#### 5.6 Reflexivity

Being involved in a project for more than 1,5 year can influence the attitude or the position of the researcher. Therefore, it is important to be conscious of building in reflective moments for the researcher. *"Through reflection, he can surface and criticize the tacit understandings that have grown up around the repetitive experiences of a specialized practice, and can make new sense of the situations of uncertainty or uniqueness which he may allow himself to practice"*(D. Schön, 2017, p. 61)

#### 5.7 Language

In this thesis many interviews were held and quotes are used in the body. For the majority of the interviewees as well as the researcher English is not the mother language. The *"speaking language"* used during the interviews is corrected as long as it does not change the actual meaning of the sentence. Permission to use the adapted quotes is obtained.

## 6. Case study

In this chapter the case-study will be described. Also information about the refugee situation in Jordan as well as the history and the characteristics of Za'atari Camp is given. Finally, this chapter describes the programme of VNG International in collaboration with the City of Amsterdam which is used as a *case-in-a-case*.

### A The refugee situation in Jordan

#### The Syria Crisis

The Syria crisis started with uprisings against the Government, escalated into a devastating civil war and is now entering into the eighth year. Since the start of the conflict in March 2011, more than 12 million Syrians have fled their homes of which a majority fled to neighbouring countries (Immenkamp, 2017). According to the numbers estimated by the Jordanian government approximately 1.26 million Syrians lived in Jordan in 2015, alongside the existing population of 6.6million Jordanians (including Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin). This includes an estimation of non-registered refugees and Syrians that lived in Jordan prior to the crisis (Immenkamp, 2017; Lintelo, Lakshman, Mansour, & Soye, 2018).

#### Jordan the country of Refugees

It is not the first time that Jordan is dealing with an influx of refugees. Before the crisis in Syria, Jordan dealt with the Palestinian influx caused by the events in 1948, 1967 and the Gulf war in 1991. In addition, Jordan hosts thousands of Iraqis, caused by the first Gulf War and the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Approximately 29 000 Iraqis were registered with UNHCR in Jordan. In recent years other groups of refugees grew as well. For example refugees from Sudan, Egypt, Somali and Yemen sought refuge in Jordan already (Lintelo et al., 2018).




Figure 6.1: Camps in the Northern region of Jordan. Adapted illustration. Via Simplemaps.com




### The refugee convention

The history with refugees is one of the reasons why Jordan did not sign the refugee the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 protocol (Lintelo et al., 2018; Saliba, 2016). *“Jordan’s non-signatory status is often explained by reference to the politically and socially complex Palestinian refugee issue, popular sentiment against refugee integration, lack of resources and capacity to provide for refugees, and misinformation about the perceived social and economic burden of refugees and related questions of national security”* (Saliba 2016 in Lintelo et al., 2018).

The legal instrument to deal with the refugee crisis is the Memorandum of Understanding(MOU) signed between the Jordan Government (Ministry of Interior) and the UNHCR. The ministry of Interior is the main actor governing the refugees in Jordan. The document does recognize many of the standards originating from the 1951 Refugee Convention. *“Although Jordan has not ratified the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention, the government still recognizes Syrians as refugees and has granted them political asylum”* (Bowman, 2016). The government refers to guests instead of refugees which indicates an ambiguous legal framework the refugees are situated in (Bellamy, Haysom, Wake, & Barbelet, 2017). Also Bellamy et al (2016) state that the government wants to avoid the same level of integration that is granted to the Palestinian refugees of 1948 (Lenner, 2016 in Bellamy, Haysom, Wake, & Barbelet, 2017). More specifically, this can be detected in the camp as well: *‘The Jordanian government fights against its faith to deal with the unresolved Palestinian refugee issue and the protracted Syrian crisis ignites the idea that Za’atari might stay as well, something sensitive due to a risk that the host community responds if the camp becomes too developed’* (Roodenburg Vermaat, 2017). Ambiguity is also visible in the government’s attitude that changed throughout the crisis; *“from initially rejecting encampment to establishing camps; from a liberal employment policy for Syrians to a strict one; and from permeable borders to virtually closed ones”*(Bellamy et al., 2017).

### Refugee camps in Jordan

Just a small amount of the Syrian refugees actually live in camps, it is estimated that approximately 80% live in Amman or other urban areas like Mafraq and Irbid in the northern region of Jordan (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2015 in Immenkamp, 2017). The other 20% reside in camps in the North of Jordan; Za’atari, Azraq, the Emirati- Jordanian Camp (UNHCR, 2016c in Bellamy et al., 2017). The fact that many refugees live in the host communities and urban areas results in pressure on the delivery of services and subsequently results in political pressure on the Jordan Government (Lintelo et al., 2018); *‘Syrian refugees have stressed economic and resource infrastructure in Jordan, which was already suffering from structural issues before the refugee crisis’*(Francis, 2015). *‘Officials highlight the challenge that the refugee crisis poses for the government’s ability to deliver services’* (Bellamy et al., 2017). Even without the refugee crisis, Jordan faces significant economic obstacles(Betts & Collier, 2015).



**Figure 6.2:** Organisational scheme of the Jordan Government dealing with Refugees. Source; Ministry of Interior, 2018.

### Inter-agency coordination

In Jordan, there are several coordination structures and processes to handle the refugee situation. These are described in the inter-agency coordination kit developed by the UNHCR (2017b). In general, the refugee situation is described as a collaborative effort between donor communities, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, community based-organisations, refugees and Jordanian communities including all levels of the Jordanian Government. In 2014, the Ministry of Interior has established a special department to handle the Syrian Refugee Crisis; the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD). Since its establishment the SRAD acts as the main governmental entity that deals with (Syrian) refugees in the country (UNHCR, 2017b).

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has the overall lead for the UN effort, as it constitutes a formal refugee response. The Ministry of International Cooperation and Planning developed the Jordan Response Plan in 2015 that functions as the main strategic framework for the refugee response. It contains 11 task forces, is revised every year and is based on two pillars; Refugees and Resilience. The plan is described as “the first nationally-led response of its kind, joining refugee and development responses in one comprehensive national plan” (in Francis, 2015, p5). ‘All funding and programmes must align with the JRP’ (Bellamy et al., 2017). Secondly, there is the 3RP; the Regional Refugee and Resilience plan; this is regional plan coordinating refugee response on regional level in countries neighbouring the crisis in Syria, of which Jordan is also one.




Figure 6.3: Organisational scheme of the Jordan Government dealing with Refugees. Source; Ministry of Interior, 2018.

The inter-agency refugee response is led by the Inter-Agency Task Force, chaired by an UNHCR representative. The aim of this task force is to oversee the sector working groups and their related strategies, advocacy and funding processes. It consists of representatives of UN Agencies and NGOs and actually acts as an steering committee kind of entity. It communicates with the UN Country team (UNCT) and Humanitarian Country team (HCT) (UNHCR, 2017b).

Since 2013, the Inter Sector Working Group (ISWG) is established to enhance synergy between the different sectors, avoid duplication and work on common processes. Monthly, this group comes together, with the chairs of each sector. ‘Their aim is to coordinate, identify, process and elevate relevant topics to the IATF, referring to IATF for policy decisions and guidance at the heads of agency’(UNHCR, 2017b). Lastly, there is the International NGO forum Jordan (JIF), including 54 NGOs implementing developmental and humanitarian programmes to assist vulnerable groups in several countries surrounding the Syria Crisis (UNHCR, 2017b).

### Tendency towards livelihood programming

In the research of Bellamy et al. (2017) the gap between humanitarian and development assistance in

Jordan is clearly described. Before 2016, many organisations acknowledged the fact that programming that did not support self-sufficiency, was not sustainable due to the expected decline of funding<sup>2</sup>. However, implementing livelihoods programming that supported the self-

sufficiency of refugees, was a difficult task caused by the reluctant attitude of the Jordan Government. Before the crisis, many Syrians filled seasonal labour gaps as agricultural workers. But after 2013 rules became stricter because of the fear of the impact on the Jordan society. The unemployment rate rose to 22% in the Northern region of Jordan that caused that no approval for livelihood programming for Syrian refugees was granted (Bellamy et al., 2017). *'leaders in those countries are deeply resistant to that idea, because they perceive refugees as a threat to domestic employment and a drain on stretched budgets'*(Betts & Collier, 2015).

Together with other organisations like the World Bank, the UN has gradually pushed for a 'resilience-based development' approach. According to Bellamy et al. (2017) the European Migrant crisis opened doors for development partners to step in and take a more leading role to steer towards this resilience-based development; *'Major donors have stepped up their contribution to the region, with a greater focus on direct budget support tied to livelihoods and education, and applying advocacy to address macro-economic factors that encourage job growth through policy advice and incentives'*(Bellamy et al., 2017). Collier (2015), an important author in, who can be seen as the mind behind the London Compact ( in which agreements were made about providing 100 000 permits for Syrians), elucidates that a new refugee policy is needed that *'improves the lives of the refugees in the short term and the prospects of the region in the long term, and it should also serve the economic and security interests of the host states'*(Betts & Collier, 2015)' which entails the integration of refugees into labour markets. *By understanding refugees as not only a humanitarian challenge but also a development opportunity, states could do much to sustainably improve the lives of the dispossessed* (Betts & Collier, 2015).

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<sup>2</sup> *Despite the large number of implementing partners, the humanitarian response is vastly underfunded. In 2016, UNHCR appealed for \$1,105,517,045 and in March 2016 had only received seven percent of the total amount requested* (Bowman, 2016, p7).

## 6.2. History of Za'atari Camp

A large amount of Syrian refugees fled to the Northern part of Jordan. Za'atari camp is established because of the rising tension between Syrian refugees and the host communities in the Mafraq (Dalal, 2014). The camp is situated on a former military air-base, approximately 12 km from the Syrian border. Currently, refugee camp Za'atari is co-managed by the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD) and the UNHCR. Around 40 international and national organisations are active in the camp, and the sectorial system is in place (UNHCR, 2017b). In the refugee camps, 'the UNHCR has the overall lead for the UN effort' (Office of Internal Audit and Investigations, 2017).




Figure 6.4: Zaatari Camp Coordination structure. Source: Adapted from UNHCR, 2017b

Since its establishment until now, the population fluctuated significantly; "While there were over 200,000 Syrians in April 2013, numbers have hovered around the 80,000 mark since August 2015 " (Lintelo et al., 2018). The camp consists of 12 districts of which district 1 and 2 are the oldest. The districts are covering about 5 km<sup>2</sup>.

### Development of Za'atari

Set up in just two weeks, Za'atari hosted many refugees fleeing from the Southern part of Syria Dara'a. When people arrived they received a package of non-food items and settled in tents structured in a grid system. Paved roads were still absent and households were served by communal WASH blocks. "The physical infrastructure of the camp was poor in its early days. Tents collapsed in the muddy sand in the winter, refugees demonstrated against both the conditions in the camp and the war at home, and the environment was one of general distrust"(Gatter, 2018). After a year or so, the tents were gradually replaced by caravans donated by the Gulf states (Rudoren, 2013) and the very first paved road transformed

into what is now known as the Souk or Sham Elysees<sup>3</sup> (Gatter, 2018; Verkerk, 2013). Although, the new caravans and tents were ordered in a grid system the families moved caravans and established family compounds (Roodenburg Vermaat, 2017). This is one of the most important characteristics that formed the camp to what it is today. The Syrians were resolute in determining their environment; *“these people accept nothing from above. Everything, top-down is associated with Assad. Everything that develops out of own work or rebellion is good”*; said the former camp manager Killian Kleinschmidt (Verkerk, 2013). To illustrate their persistence, approximately 400 private toilets and showers were built per day, consisting of stolen materials of the UNHCR facilities (ibid).

By means of involving with individuals and setting up a kind of governance system, peace seemed to return in the camp; *“Za’atari’s transformation happened after Mr. Kleinschmidt started talking with, and thereby neutralizing, the Mafia-like groups that had seized control of the camp. At the same time he worked to enlist allies among refugees, encouraging grass-roots initiatives, listening”* (Kimmelman, 2014). After this, the camp seemed to develop increasingly into a more permanent settlement. Businesses were set up and turned the informal economy in one, where the retail activity equates to approximately 10 million JDs per month (Dalal, 2014, 2015). Refugees came up with their own legal system to sell shops and businesses were now also established outside the main road connected to households (ibid).

Gradually, more roads in the camp were paved, the ring road was constructed and the service infrastructure includes; *“energy on household level, eleven schools, household level energy provision;; two hospitals, ten health care centres, including a dedicated delivery unit; two supermarkets; NFI distributions via an inter-agency distribution centre, a network of 27 community centres that provide psychosocial support & recreational activities and water and sanitation provision via three internal wells and a wastewater treatment plant. In addition, some 6,500 refugees benefit from cash-for-work opportunities on a rotational basis”* (UNHCR, 2017b).

#### *Return to Syria*

The camp is now in its seventh year and still hosts 80 000 refugees. Despite the Southern region of Syria is recaptured by the Assad regime and the first voices of return seems to get louder the UNHCR remains to give a negative repatriation advice and the Syrians fear to return (A-Noufal, Ibrahim, Clark, & Al Maleh, 2018).

#### *Selected as case study*

Research into the camp shows that; *“A shift towards development is urgently needed. However, it requires much more attention towards local dynamics, context and actors”*(Dalal, 2015). Also the former camp manager specifically advocated for another approach towards Za’atari and that the different views of the stakeholders should be taken into account; *“K.K. explains that the entities running the camp have complete different narratives: SRAD Security narrative and UNHCR cum-suis have the humanitarian narrative. You need to overcome this view from different worlds”* (Killian Kleinschmidt, Personal communication 28-06-2017). Moreover, Kleinschmidt argued already in 2013 that *“the camp should be directed from the phase of emergency aid to the phase of developmental aid”* (Verkerk, 2013). Because of these statements it is asserted that Za’atari is an excellent case to further investigate the field of tension regarding the transition from humanitarian to development aid.

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
<sup>3</sup> referring to the name of the Avenue des Champs Élysées, a prestigious street in Paris, with Sham meaning Syria in Arabic

### C. Technical Support transition

#### The Think Tank

A project, that can be seen as *a case-within-a-case study* is the Think Tank project initiated by VNG International in collaboration with the City of Amsterdam. This can be seen *as an attempt to create an arena to enhance the interaction between involved actors* to subsequently support the transition of refugee camp Za'atari.

Since 2015, the VNG International executes the Local Government Resilience Programme. The overall objective of the programme is to strengthen resilience at local government level to improve living conditions of the local population and refugees in host communities and in refugee settlements (VNGi, n.d.-a). The objective of the programme is to support local governments and humanitarian organisations to cope with the Syrian crisis by providing Dutch expertise (VNGi, n.d.-b). One of the pillars of the programme is offering technical assistance in the transition phase from humanitarian aid to development aid. See figure 4.4. For the visual representation.



**Figure 6.5:** Several projects that contribute to one of the pillars of the Local Government Resilience Program. Source: own illustration.

In the last three years, the interventions and support aimed for *“a technically sound, spatially sensible and humanly viable development trajectory grounded in the reality of the region”*(Al-Hiyari & Van Warmerdam, 2018). VNG International and the City of Amsterdam provided support to UNHCR, the Camp Management in consultation with host communities. This support included a design and planning component presented in an overall camp Development Framework. *“The proposals go beyond the boundaries of the camp and aim to engage with host communities and find synergies that help to organically integrate and embed the camp within its geographical surroundings. The next step is inclusively grow to design “A Development Framework for the region of Mafraq focusing on Za’atari Camp and the surrounding host communities”* (Al-Hiyari & Van Warmerdam, 2018)..

#### Role of the researcher during the process

Since the initiation of the Think Tank the researcher was involved in two different forms. First, in the months February until November 2017 at the City of Amsterdam as an intern and from February until August at VNG International as a graduate intern. The observations during the months in 2017 were not specifically meant to be included in this thesis. To ensure the objectivity of data the analysis of the project during this first phase are based on the interview with the involved project manager and official documents

and only supported by the personal notes of the researcher. In the second phase, as a graduate intern, the aim of this thesis was clear therefore, notes made by the research are more credible. As an observer the researcher attended meeting regarding the Think Tank and supported logistical operations in Jordan and in the Netherlands.

## 7. Network Analysis

The research question of this thesis is; *What are the current institutional barriers for the transition of a refugee camp and how can network management be a way to deal with this?*


The first part of the research question will be answered by means of a network analysis conducted for the case refugee camp Za'atari in Jordan. In the former chapter the case study is described and this chapter will describe the outcome of the interviews held with involved stakeholders and several experts. Their statements are supported by literature or reports when appropriate and available.

### *Interview protocol*

Based on the network theory explained by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) the interview protocol is designed and conducted. See appendix 2 for the interview protocol. The interviews were held in April 2018 and August 2018, it is important to be aware of the fact that the validity of the findings is limited in time.

### *The analysis*

The network analysis consists of three parts: (1) the actor analysis, (2) the game analysis and (3) the network analysis.



**Figure 7.1:** Schematic overview of different parts of Network Analysis as defined by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004). Source: Own illustration based on Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004.

In the actor analysis a formal chart of the actors will be given. Additionally, their perception on the current situation, expected situation and desired situation on refugee camp Za'atari will be given. Secondly, the identified arenas and the breakthroughs and impasses in the transition of the camp will be explored. Thirdly, the interaction between the actors will be described as well as the rules of the game. The chapter concludes with answers to the first part of the research question; *'what are the obstacles to the transition of Refugee Camp Za'atari?*

The following general constraints for the transition of the camp should be taken into account when reading the conclusion below;

- It should be noted that the officials were invited and answered questions on a personal invitation.
- Under the assumption that the camp will exist for at least a couple of years an approach should be designed to deal with the current challenges in the mean-time. As impermanency cost more in the long-run.



- It is assumed that for every actor peace and return to Syria is the ultimate desired solution, in other words, the closing down of the refugee camp.
- The actors always have to deal with a large amount of uncertainty but; *'the lifespan of a camp remains unpredictable but a longer lifespan is more probable than a shorter one'* (Kennedy, 2008).
- The camp is automatically not the first thing on the agenda of the involved actors because the amount of refugees residing in camp is only 10% and other crisis in the country and the region are also asking attention.

## 1. Actor Analysis

According to Enserink et al (2010) and Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) the following steps are a part of an actor analysis:

1. *Problem formulation*
2. *Inventory of actors, including a formal chart*
3. *Inventory of problem perception, objectives and interests*
4. *Dependency of actors and their resources*

This chapter/analysis uses these steps as outline, but is adapted when better fit to the purpose.

### *Problem formulation*

Enserink et al., (2010) state that a policy problem exists when there is both a gap and a dilemma. A gap can be explained as something to be solved between the existing or expected situation and a criterion or norm. A dilemma exists when there is an expectation that something can be done about this gap, yet it is not readily clear how to proceed. Based on the problem analysis and the theoretical framework, the following gap and dilemma can be identified in the case of Za'atari Camp:

The gap;  
*the existing humanitarian policies are inadequate to deal with the long-term existence of refugee camp Za'atari*

The dilemma;  
*It is unclear how to proceed to better deal with long-term existence. Closing the gap between humanitarian and development aid could be one of the ways to deal with the dilemma.*

### *Inventory of actors*

Based on the problem formulation involved actors on policy level are selected. The analysis focuses on actors that are involved in the primary policy-making process; hence the Syrian refugees and Jordan citizens are not taken into account. Although not included in the analysis, it is not implied that the voice of refugees and the Jordan citizens should not be heard in the policy-making process. Incorporating a thorough analysis these actors groups goes beyond the boundaries of this research. Much research has been done already into the governance on refugee level and therefore I would like to refer to those research papers.

Based on the explanation above roughly six groups of actors can be distinguished that are involved in the transition of Refugee Camp Za'atari:

1. the Jordan Government
2. UN agencies
3. International NGOs
4. Researchers
5. International donors
6. Local NGOs.

### *Formal chart*

A formal chart offers a schematic display of actor relations that are involved in the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. As explained in the case-study description, the UN agencies support the Jordan Government on coping with the refugee crisis. These are led by the humanitarian and resident coordinator represented by UNDP (Anders Pedersen). The UN is dependent on the Jordan government for approval by the line ministries, the refugee coordination committee and the ministers. The UN is funded by several international donors that can also fund the Jordan Government directly by means of budget support. International NGOs often function as operational partners of the UN agencies but also have their own contracts with the Jordan Government and international donors. In Jordan, a sectorial approach is applied to cope with refugee camps.

### *Inventory of problem perceptions*

In the following part of this chapter, the current, expected and desired situation of each actor group will be discussed. (A) the Jordan Government, (B) UN organisations, (C) NGOs and (D) external researchers and (E) International Donors. Unfortunately, it was *not possible to speak to local NGOs*.

## *A. The Jordan Government*

The first actor group is the Jordan Government. Three interviews were held with different ministries that are involved in the refugee situation and in refugee camp Za'atari in Jordan.

### *Current situation*

#### *Challenges in Jordan*

Currently, Jordan is dealing with a large number of refugees when at the same time, the country has to deal with several challenges itself: *"We are not a rich country and we are already facing economic challenges. According to UNHCR we are the fifth country receiving refugees, but if we compare it to the number of inhabitants in Jordan, we would be the first"* (Interviewee A, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018). It is underlined that the refugee situation generates more pressure on municipalities that already encounter difficulties in delivering their services (Imad, Personal Communication, 06-08-2018).

#### *Rejection of integration*

Jordan has signed a MOU with the UNHCR wherein the durable solution 'integration' is not included: *"We have a MOU with UNHCR. We agreed on everything in the Geneva convention except for integration"* (Interviewee A, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018).

#### *Lacking responsibility of international community*

According to Jordanian officials dealing with such a large influx of refugees should not only be on the shoulders of Jordan: *"The international community, they fail to response. They are not sharing the burden in a good way. What we are doing, we do that on the behalf of the international community"* (Interviewee A, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018).

#### *Negative influence of refugee camp*

When asking more specifically about the current situation in refugee camp Za'atari it is acknowledged that the camp, or staying in a camp has a negative influence on the refugees; *"Even if it is a seven star hotel, you would not be happy after a few weeks. Imagine living in a hotel for 7 years"* (Interviewee A, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018). *"The situation is not good for them. Whatever the NGOs are trying to do for them. I think they prefer either to go back to their home in Syria or to come to other governorates like Amman, for example. They want to live there and not live in the camps"* (Interviewee B, Personal Communication, 10-04-2018).

#### *Media Speech*

Also the media speech is criticized: *"We are not happy with the media speech. Especially, media abroad is not speaking about the challenges correctly. They consider it as a crisis as any other crisis. But if you think deeply, it is the biggest and dangerous crisis since the Second World War"* (Interviewee A, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018).

#### *Expected situation*

##### *Pressure on donors*

One of the tendencies mentioned regarding the expected situation is that the Jordan Government will put more effort in *"talking"* to the international community. More money is needed to continue to protect the Syrian refugees (Interviewee A, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018; Interviewee B, Personal Communication, 10-04-2018).

##### *Return to Syria*

It is expected that the amount of returning refugees will increase, that in turn relieves pressure on the delivery of services by the Jordan Government and municipalities; *"Many of the Syrians begin to go back to*

Syria. Therefore the number of refugees will become less in the camps. So the pressure on our services and on our budget will become less than before” (Interviewee B, Personal Communication, 10-04-2018). Finally, it is expected the camp will remain in use for the coming 5 years (ibid).

### Desired situation

#### Strengthening the country as a whole

The desired situation of the refugee camp is characterized by the idea to strengthen the country and the region as whole. The way the refugee situation is handled is mostly emergency response. This should have a more developmental character; “All the interaction was about emergency response. Now we must be thinking in development” (Interviewee A, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018). The second version of the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) is therefore more focused on development instead of emergency response (ibid).

#### Support of international community

Moreover, it is said that a new Marshall plan is needed and Europa cannot hide from the problems in the Middle East; “We need a new Marshall Plan. The Arab region is the main market for Europe and is the producer of raw materials. If you don’t participate in rebuilding the region you will be affected. You cannot say I am not interested. You cannot deal with it like you are living in Mars” (ibid).

#### Empowerment of refugees

Furthermore, the self-reliance of the refugees is mentioned; “We are trying to implement projects so they can help themselves. Together with the International community, especially with the EU, we are trying to enhance the area” (ibid). This statement was not specifically focused on refugee camps. It is also mentioned that the camp could benefit the surrounding municipalities; “We can have developmental linkages between the camp and the near area. For example with the municipalities of Um El Jammal or the other municipalities” (Interviewee C, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018).

<i>Current situation</i>	<i>Expected Situation</i>	<i>Desired situation</i>
Challenges in Jordan	Pressure on donors	Strengthening the country as a whole
Rejection of Integration	Return to Syria	Support of International community
Lacking responsibility of International community		Empowerment of Refugees
Negative influence of camps		
Media Speech		
The Jordan government aims to strengthen the country as a whole without integrating refugees.		

**Table 7.1:** Summary of current, desired and expected situation of JO Government. Source: own illustration.

### Summary

The first thing that comes to the front is that the Jordan officials plead for a more developmental approach to strengthen the country as a whole. Therefore, more support from the international community is needed. Conversely, this notion shows contrast to the rejection of the durable solution “integration” of the 1951 Refugee Convention. When talking about a development approach it is about social and economic aspects of which Syrian refugees and other groups are also a part of. In other words, the Jordan government wants to strengthen the country and the region as a whole without integrating refugees.

## B. UN Agencies

UN agencies involved in Za'atari camp are interviewed. Their perceptions are presented below

### *Current situation*

#### *Sophisticated camp*

The current situation of the camp Za'atari is characterized by the fact that it is called a five star camp (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018). A lot of money is invested in the infrastructure and it is a stable situation compared to where the refugees come from; *"We have a city like infrastructure with water and waste water network"* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018).

#### *Sensitivity*

However, talking about the permanency, long-term projects or sustainable development of the camp is sensitive and is therefore only discussed internally; *"Everything is sensitive when you are talking about something that the host government is fundamentally not comfortable with, which is a long-term plan for the camp. We do it as an internal exercise and it remains something very internal"* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

#### *Understanding and capacity*

The sensitivity is reinforced by the divergence of perceptions of the involved ministries; *"It is also very difficult to have on board, the full support and the same understanding of the authorities. Because most of the time they see refugees not as a threat, but as a burden that they don't have the capacity themselves to deal with"* (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

#### *Segregation UN agencies*

Although UN agencies are expected to collaborate in the camp; *"The competition for funds of territory between UN agencies is quite real"* (Interviewee 1, Personal Communication, 02-02-2018). On the long-term, no shared strategies are developed; *"But even [UN agency], they have had their internal workshop, to discuss the future. But this is where [UN agency] is not involved"* (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018). *"We never get any feedback; there are no minutes of the meetings. And when asked, people say it was very general"* (ibid). This also comes to the front in an internal audit of the UNICEF country office: *"the office reported that it had been a challenge to strike the right balance on the level of detail in the national-level memorandum of understanding (MoU) between UNHCR and UNICEF"*. The MoU does not clearly stipulate who does what in the camps, which causes an on-going dialogue, and sometimes disagreement, on respective roles and responsibilities (Office of Internal Audit and Investigations, 2017).

#### *Developmental projects*

Finally, the gap between humanitarian and development assistance is discussed and the interventions seem not to be solely humanitarian anymore. Since the wash blocks are demolished, the interventions shifted from a humanitarian approach to a developmental approach (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018). This will be further be elaborated on in the game analysis.

#### *Investments*

The investments made are not always done correctly. An example is the sewage system that is not future proof; *"it is like a spaghetti network with very strange angles. It is working now, it is brand new, but in a couple months we may have some issues of pipes being blocking"*(Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

## *Expected situation*

### *Decreasing funding*

When asking about the expected situation, the combination of shrinking budgets and the large footprint in the camp of the organisations is one of the biggest challenges the coming years; *“Most importantly, it depends on the funding. At the current pace, funding is decreasing very rapidly for all of us, including for the government itself. So the camp will develop into poor neighbourhoods with very bad services. It is going to look like the Palestinian camps”* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018).

### *Existence of camp*

And because of the decreasing funding it is expected to become a big mess; *“A big mess at all levels. The crisis will not end tomorrow for sure. It will at least take a couple of years. Za’atari will remain a refugee camp and in the meantime budgets are shrinking every year”* (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018).

### *Desired situation*

#### *Long-term plans*

Although, managing a camp will always be an uncertain inquiry, a desire to plan for a longer-term is present; *“We want to develop for the long-term. The question is; what will be the minimum standard for maintenance that we need to put in place to keep Za’atari’s infrastructure interesting enough for someone to take over the society”* (Interviewee , Personal Communication, 02-04-2018). Three different scenarios are mentioned for the future of the camp; use by poor families, making it a distribution centre or a place for military families. The main message is to not spill the investments already made in the camp, and to do investments that serve Jordan in the future.

#### *Yearly funding*

Making long-term strategies for the camp is difficult because of the underlying yearly donor budget and the high turnover of staff; *“We are working on a yearly cycle and obviously you have the turnover of the staff. People are there for a maximum one to five years, which is in the end very short. In regard of the length of preparation of what might happen and the need of this long-term vision, there is no deep focus on a long-term vision”* (ibid). This makes it very difficult to predict what can be implemented or not.

#### *Decreasing footprint- exit strategies*

Decreasing the footprint of the UN organisations in the camp is a desired situation and can be done by handing over the delivery of services to local companies, NGOs or authorities; *“It is also bringing in the private sector for some of the services. Local NGOs could be one, but is not really evident, so from our side it is more community based programming and private sector subcontracting”* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018). The difficulty here is that these private parties or other organisations should meet the standards the UN follows and the permits that has to be granted by the ministries, this often causes difficulties as this is not the case; *“In camps this have been very difficult, also because of the permit issue, the MOPIC approvals etcetera. It is incredibly difficult for local agencies to operate in the camps”*(ibid).

#### *Empowerment of refugees*

Thirdly, to decrease the footprint of the UN agencies in the camp, a shift to projects supporting the empowerment of the refugees is desired; *“The step we have taken in some of our programming is increasingly in more empowerment of the Syrian refugees themselves”* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018). However. for this self-sufficiency, resources from the government are needed that are currently not available due to the political situation; *“if they have to prioritize resources, they are not going to prioritize them for camps. Of course, that is understandable from a political point of view”*(ibid).

<i>Current situation</i>	<i>Expected Situation</i>	<i>Desired situation</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sophisticated camp</li> <li>- Sensitivity</li> <li>- Understanding Jordan Government</li> <li>- Segregation UN agencies</li> <li>- Developmental projects</li> <li>- Investments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decreasing funding</li> <li>- Endurance of camp</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Long-term plans</li> <li>- Yearly funding</li> <li>- Decreasing footprint</li> <li>- Empowerment of refugees</li> </ul>

**Table 7.2:** Summary of current, desired and expected situation of UN Agencies. Source: own illustration.

### Summary

UN agencies mostly share the same perceptions about the current situation of the camp: Za'atari can be described as a sophisticated camp with several permanent city-like features. The sensitive environment of proposing livelihoods, long-term or permanent projects caused by the attitude and the complex decision-making structure of the Jordan Government is mentioned several times. The current situation of the camp is not solely described as humanitarian although some investments in for example the water system were not made correctly. For the expected situation the UN agencies see more or less the same challenges. It is expected that the declining funding will hamper the delivery of services in the camp that will result in deteriorating conditions and delivery of services. Consensus can be found in the desired situation although the different focus of the UN agencies seems to come forward slightly. For one UN agency the camp seems to be more core-business while the other UN agency is also focused on long-term project elsewhere in Jordan. The desired situation is characterized by handing over to local authorities or organisations and the empowerment of the refugees themselves. Although, managing a camp will always be an uncertain inquiry, a desire to plan for a longer-term is present. However, this is often blocked by the short-term funding system or the lacking resources ( or political will) of the Jordan authorities. Also the non-transparency between the agencies in mentioned when making holistic plans for the camp.



## C. International Non-Governmental Organisations

A large number of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) provide assistance to refugees in emergencies. These organisations often act as the operational partners of UN agencies (UNHCR, 2007a). For the analysis three NGOs involved in the camp or surroundings are interviewed. Their perceptions are presented below.

### Current situation

#### Stable camp

The International NGOs underline the fact that the camp is primarily stable, especially compared to the early situation when the camp was daily startled by uprisings and demonstrations against the humanitarian regime; *“A protest over conditions at a refugee camp in Za’atari turned violent on Monday. Security forces used tear gas to break up the demonstration”* (Al Jazeera, 2012). The camp is called a stable enterprise; *“So I think if you look at it through the lens of what is used to be and what it is today, it is quite a stable enterprise”* (Interviewee F, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

#### Short-term Strategy

It is stated that a long-term strategy for the camp does not exist or is not implemented well. The INGOs focus on their predetermined pillars and *“camp governance is not one of them”* (Interviewee F, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018). The INGOs particularly point towards UNHCR for making this overall strategy for the camp; *“UNHCR had a strategy, which they passed to the sectors, but I have never seen it really discussed or take off”* (Interviewee G, Personal Communication, 2018). The explanation for this can be the uncertainty about when the refugees will leave the camp which makes it hard to make plans for the longer-term; *“You are stuck in a trap. You can’t commit, because people can go home tomorrow”* (Interviewee G, Personal Communication, 2018).

#### Sensitivity

Moreover, an ingredient to talk about these long-term strategies is missing. During the interviews it is emphasized that talking about sustainability or long-term solutions is a sensitive topic and only happens behind closed doors; *“It is continuing to take a step forward from an urban planning perspective to being more and more a permanent settlement. But we still can’t use that”* (Interviewee G, Personal Communication, 2018). Also in the research by Bellamy, et al. (2017) this sensitivity is underlined; *“projects regarding livelihoods is a ‘taboo’ or a ‘swear word’ and according to donors, talking about livelihoods happened in ‘closed conversations’”* (Bellamy et al., 2017).

### Expected situation

#### Decreasing funding

It is expected that the camp will remain for a couple of years because the situation in Syria remains to be unsafe. It will become a challenge due to the shrinking budgets, especially because the situation in the camp is quite good compared to other crisis situations nearby; *“What is going to be difficult to continue, is the funding needed for this massive development. Because if you look at the priorities of the donors, Za’atari is doing pretty well. If you see how people are living, if you look at the conditions, if you look at the quality of life, the services they have. There are other contexts, other groups of people, who really need emergency money in a different way and more quickly than the people in Za’atari”* (Interviewee F, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018). It is stated that the camp will continue to increasingly resemble a permanent structure; *“But of course, it continues to develop, and of course look more and more like a longer-term structure”* (ibid). Cash for work was one of the main opportunities for the refugees in the camp to manage themselves. However also due to shrinking budget, this seems to decrease as well (Interviewee G, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018).

## Desired situation

### Decreasing footprint

Handing over services to local NGOs or authorities is mentioned when asking about the desired situation in the camp: *“just like all the other NGOs we are not going to be here forever. So the question is how you can build the capacity of national actors to be able to take over something that you do, so it is sustainable”*(Interviewee F, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

### Empowerment of refugees

Another desire mentioned, is the enhancement of the self-reliant capacity of the refugees; *“The solution for the camp would be self-reliance, so that the refugees are self-reliant. So, within the way we view the camp and that its run, the way the organisations are supporting the refugees, moving away from this”* (Interviewee G, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018). Additionally, supporting the shift from needs-based to right-based; *“It is more about the way that support is provided. Move away from a needs-based to a rights-based, that would be one very good shift to make”* (ibid).

### Governance in camp

Something that possibly contributes to self-reliance of refugees in the camp is acknowledging the leadership/governance structures. *“Because you have a relative stability now, it is much easier to identify the community leaders, it is much easier for the people to vote or to elect their own community leaders”* (Interviewee F, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

### Experimental Ground

Finally, it is said that the camp should be seen as an opportunity to test new ideas; *“it could be experimental ground for creating social cohesion, for new building techniques, also discussing public goods. It is really an opportunity”* (Interviewee H, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

<i>Current situation</i>	<i>Expected Situation</i>	<i>Desired situation</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sensitivity</li> <li>- Sector specific</li> <li>- Stable developed camp/enterprise</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decreasing funding</li> <li>- Decreasing CFW</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local Capacity/Decreasing footprint</li> <li>- Empowerment of refugees</li> <li>- Experimental Grounds</li> </ul>

**Table 7.3:** Summary of current, desired and expected situation of International NGOs. Source: own illustration.

## Summary

International NGOs mostly share the same perceptions about the current, expected and desired situation of camp and share these also with the UN agencies. The camp is seen as a stable enterprise and the sensitivity in combination with the shrinking funds also hamper the operational work of the INGOs in the camp. For the desired situation similarities can be found with the UN agencies, both aim to empower the refugees and want to decrease their footprint in the camp by handing over to local authorities. A small statement is to use the camp as experimental grounds and the desire to organize elections in the camp. The main difference between the INGOs and UN agencies is about the responsibility to develop the camp, in their view this mainly lies in the hand of the UN agencies whilst they focus on their own predetermined pillars or specific sectors.

## D. Other actors

The study center for Refugees, Displaces Persons and Forced Migration of the Yarmouk University is interviewed. The refugee center conducted several researches into the refugee situation in Jordan and in Za'atari Camp. Also interviews with independent consultants are incorporated and their perceptions are presented below

### Current situation

#### Stable camp

It is stated that the camp is quite stable and that the situation for the refugees is better than the situation they come from; *“From my perspective the situation is progressive improved. It is better than before”* (Interviewee L, Personal Communication, 03-04-2018). *“It is like an entity in itself. You know like a settlement”*(Interviewee 7, Personal Communication, 03-08-2018).

#### Position of researchers

It is stated that the politicians do not take the researchers seriously; *‘All over the developing countries politicians usually do not pay attention to the research centers, they consider themselves that they owe the trophy’* (ibid).

### Expected situation

#### Political hard situation

It is expected that the camp will last for at least a period of 10 years and that will increase in being a political hard situation (Interviewee 7, Personal Communication, 03-08-2018).

### Desired situation

The research centre involved advocates for a central umbrella organisation that deals with all the refugee affairs; *“One of the mayor recommendations from our last international conference, is that Jordan needs one umbrella that is responsible for all the refugees in Jordan. We have so many ministries that work with the Syrian refugees”* (ibid).

<i>Current situation</i>	<i>Expected Situation</i>	<i>Desired situation</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stable camp</li> <li>Researchers are not taken seriously</li> <li>-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Politically hard</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Umbrella organisation</li> <li>- More involvement of researchers</li> </ul>

**Table 7.4:** Summary of current desired and expected situation of International NGOs. Source: own illustration.

To summarise, the research centre share the perception of a sophisticated camp, is not valued by the Jordan politicians and advocates for an umbrella organisation in the Jordan Government. It is stated from their side that the coordination of Jordan Government is lacking and an overarching institution is needed to deal with all the refugee issues.

## *E. International Donors (UN donors)*

There are several international donors that fund programmes direct or indirectly in and around refugee camp Za'atari. Their perceptions are presented below.

### *Current situation*

#### *Stable enterprise*

It is said that refugee camp Za'atari is not a bad camp; *"It has become an established refugee camp. People have their home, education and food. People can get approval to work somewhere else. Of course it can be improved considering the organisation of the camp. But if you look at the safety, it is not a bad camp for sure"* (Interviewee I, Personal Communication, 13-04-2018).

#### *Sensitivity*

The transition of the camp is a sensitive topic. People learned that topics like Za'atari camp is not one to talk about anymore (Interviewee J, Personal Communication, 27-04-2018). Additionally, the lack of public discussion is mentioned as well; *"Of course there is discussion between foreign governments and the Jordanian Government about the future of the camps and other sustainable solutions. But it not a public discussion that is currently held here, and that is generally necessary"* (Interviewee K, Personal Communication, 02-08-2018).

### *Desired situation*

#### *Handing over*

The UN donors acknowledge the fact that assistance to Jordan cannot endure forever. They want the government or local organisations to gradually take over and to become less dependent on humanitarian agencies. For the camp, from a developmental perspective, this would mean that it would be desired to connect the camp to the national structures on the long-run (Interviewee K, Personal Communication, 02-08-2018).

Additionally, it is also stated that the UN is situated in a difficult situation because UN Donors push the UN for certain changes host governments are not comfortable with. Simultaneously, the UN has to cooperate with these host governments and don't want to step on their toes (Interviewee J, Personal Communication, 26-04-2018). Secondly, if handing over to local organisations is desirable, requirements should also change to fit the capacity of local organisations. Their capacity does not meet the requirements of the donors; *"It is often easier to work with large international NGOs because they are better known to the donors and they therefore know what to expect"* (ibid).

#### *Focus on vulnerable groups*

Recently, the attention shifted towards an approach that is more focused on vulnerable groups instead of Syrian refugees only; *"When strengthening the country as a whole, it automatically improves its ability to cope with the large influx of refugees"* (Interviewee I, Personal Communication, 13-04-2018). . The focus on vulnerable groups encompasses the adoption of a *"one refugee approach"* by UNHCR which means that all people of concern, with or without refugee status are eligible for cash assistance. A vulnerability-based approach by UNICEF expands the cash assistance from Syrian refugees to all vulnerable people in Jordan regardless their nationality. However, not all organisations took this step. Voucher or cash assistance provided by WFP are yet only available for Syrian refugees (Interviewee J, Personal Communication, 15-08-2018)(Council of EU, 2018).

#### *Discussion to have*

Another desire is that the discussion about the refugee camp is held in the society; *"So this discussion*

needs to happen. The Jordanian society and the Jordanian Government, they have to have that discussion and see what is the most useful way to move forward “(Interviewee K, Personal Communication, 02-08-2018).

#### *Formalizing Humanitarian Partners Forum*

Lastly, it is said that it would be desirable to formalize the humanitarian partners forum to enable a better advocacy messages towards the Jordan Government.

<i>Current situation</i>	<i>Expected Situation</i>	<i>Desired situation</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stable enterprise</li> <li>- Sensitivity</li> <li>- Lack of public discussion</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Handing over</li> <li>- Focus on vulnerable groups</li> <li>- Have a public discussion</li> <li>- Formalize HPF</li> </ul>

**Table 7.5** Summary of current desired and expected situation of International donors. Source: own illustration.

#### *Summary*

The donors do acknowledge the camp as a part of the problem in Jordan. In general, it is stated the approach should become more developmental, although in the case of the camp it is difficult to work through the national structures, because the structures are still missing. The desired situation is also characterized by handing over to national authorities, the focus on vulnerable groups, activating the discussion in Jordan society<sup>4</sup> and formalizing the humanitarian partner’s forum.

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<sup>4</sup> It is often said that the ‘normal’ Jordanians have no clue of what is happening in the camp (T. Khrais, Personal Communication, 2018)

## Dependency of actors and their resources

	Interests	Resources	Dependency	Critical actor?
<i>Jordanian Government</i>	Stability in Jordan Economic perspective Security	Authorative power Budget support	high	Yes
<i>UN Agencies</i>	Protection/Support of refugees and other focus groups <sup>5</sup>	Mandate Operational knowledge UN Donor funding support	high	Yes
<i>International NGOs</i>	Protection/Support of refugees and other focus groups	Operational knowledge Funding	medium	No
<i>Research Centres</i>	Advocacy for research	Research/Knowledge	low	No
<i>International Donors</i>	Stability in region Protection vulnerable groups	Funding	medium	?

**Table 7.6:** Interests and resources of involved stakeholders .Source: based on Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004

<i>Resources</i>	Financial	Production	Competencies	Knowledge	Legitimacy
<i>Jordanian Government</i>			X		X
<i>UN Agencies</i>	x		X	X	x
<i>International NGOs</i>	x	X		X	
<i>Research Centres</i>				X	
<i>International Donors</i>	X				

**Table 7.7:** Different resources of stakeholders. Source: own illustration.


“Critical actors are actors who own resources which are important to the problem owner, or own resources that can hinder the activities of the problem owner” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p146).

Looking at the resources and their replace ability, especially those of the UN agencies are not replaceable, their mandate ‘to act’ is important; this resource cannot be replaced by other actors. Another critical actor is the Jordanian Government, as they have to authorative power to block the process.

<sup>5</sup> “UNHCR takes full operational responsibility only when circumstances require and it is in the interest of refugees” (UNHCR, 2018).

*Power interest matrix*

To look into each actor that is interviewed more specifically a power interest matrix is developed. It should be noted that this is rather a tool to create insight in the situation than the exact/detailed representation of the actual situation. Also here can be seen that the key players are again the UN agencies and the Jordan Government.



**Figure 7.3:** Power interest matrix of actors involved. Source: Based on Olander & Landin, 2005

*JO = Jordan Government*  
*DO= Donors*  
*UN = UN Agencies*  
*J= Jordan society*  
*JO M= Jordan municipalities*  
*R= Syrian refugees*

## *2. Game Analysis*

The next step in the analysis encompasses the game analysis. The analysis of the game is focused on two aspects: (1) identifying the arenas where the actors make relevant decisions for the problem and the related solution, and (2) the analysis of stagnation that occurs during the game.

It is important to identify the arena's to be able to know the location where to implement change and where to act as a network manager. In this case it is important to identify the arena's in which the topic transition of refugee camp is discussed. Secondly, identifying the causes for stagnation can provide insights or guidelines in how to overcome them (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). First the arenas will be discussed, thereafter the stagnations and breakthroughs.



## Arena's

### Working groups

In general, there are many places to discuss the day-to-day operations in the camp. One of these places is for example the camp coordination meetings and various other workgroups subdivided per sector. It is doubtful that discussing the transition of the refugee camp takes place in these working groups, these meetings are primarily about reporting and not about acting strategically; *“Because they are not typically used to plan and think ahead. They are used to report on what is being done. It is reporting and responding to events.”* (Interviewee 1, Personal Communication, 02-02-2018).

Possible arena's where a discussion about the transition of the camp can take place;

	Working Groups	Level
1	Intersector Working group (ISWG)	Camp
2	Sector Gender Focal Points (SGFPN)	Camp
3	Basic Needs Working group	Camp
4	Education Working Group	Camp
5	Food Security Working Group	Camp
6	Health Working Group	Camp
7	Livelihoods Working Group	Camp
8	Protection Working Group	Camp
9	WASH Working Group	Camp
10	Shelter Working Group	Camp
11	PSEA Working Group	Camp
12	Humanitarian Partners Forum – Jordan (donors)	Region
13	Bilateral meetings between governments and ministries	Country
14	Bilateral meetings with ministries and INGOS and UN agencies	Country
15	JIF (Jordan INGO Forum)	Country
16	IATF (Inter-Agency Task Force)	Region
17	UNCT (United Nations Country Team)	Country
18	Durable solutions working group	Region

**Table 7.8:** Inventory of identified arena's regarding the operations in the camp. Source: own illustration.

### Lack of long-term strategies

Another place to discuss longer-term plans, or the transition of the refugee camp, is internally within organisations. The outcomes of this are strategies, guidelines or toolkits. UNHCR chairs the coordination working group and could be seen as the organisation that looks at the camp the most holistically. Permission for projects or programs to be implemented in the camp is granted by UNHCR. It seems they struggle to make a strategy for the camp; it is stated that the strategy is solely a list of projects of which not all are implemented due to lack of funding (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

### Durable solution working group or coordination platforms

Another possible location where the transition of the refugee camp can be discussed is the working group for durable solutions, however it is expected that the long-term development of refugee camp will not be a regular topic on the agenda; *“There are coordination platforms, but they will have a number of things they will discuss. Camps might come up but are not a part a systemic way of discussing it”* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication).

*No place to discuss long terms plan for the camp*

In general it is said that there is no place to discuss the transition of the refugee camp. See below the quotes of the interviewees.

*"I don't think that there is anyone that is specifically tasked to looking at Za'atari, or to look at a holistic vision for camps, it is very much sector specific also when it comes to coordination"*(Interviewee F Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

*"So the lack of forum is not... I know people may tend to think UNHCR is not really planning and envisioning, maybe it is because they are too much of a humanitarian agency. Maybe partly, but also there is no impotence from the government to have these discussions"* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018).

*"And even it is now a part of the JRP discussions now, it is more and more shifting the focus towards the resilience part which is addressing the needs of the vulnerable Jordanian communities, there is no really importance at all for having a discussion about the future of this camps"* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018).

Another thing that is mentioned is that the discussion about the future of the camp should be held with the Jordanian society; *"but it's not a public discussion that is held here, and that is necessary. The future of the camps should be a public discussion in the Jordanian public"* (Interviewee K, Personal Communication, 02-08-2018).

Probably not all the available arenas wherein the topic can possibly be discussed are written down. Only the arena's mentioned in the interviews and found in reports and literature.

## *Impasses and breakthroughs*

Interaction regarding the transition of the camp expresses itself in a number of ways. Below situations that have positive or negative influence on this interaction are discussed. Naturally, many impasses and breakthroughs can be identified throughout the existence of refugee camp Za'atari. However, this chapter solely presents the situations mentioned in the interviews. Impasses are formulated as blockages towards developmental projects or programmes. Breakthroughs can be seen as actions or implemented projects that support the transition of refugee camp Za'atari.

### *Reacting to ad hoc situations*

Over time the general attitude of the Jordan Government did not change. The attitude can be described as offensive against any permanent or long-term project that implied a longer stay of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Only when a direct benefit for Jordan was included, there was a possibility to discuss something ad hoc. However, discussion about the future of the camp seem to be out of question; *"I think they changed where they see a direct benefit potentially for Jordan. But when it is about the future of the camp, I don't see any difference in the way they are approaching it"* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018).

Other interviewees said that the attitude did change; *"I think the government has come to terms with the fact that people will be in the camps maybe longer than they initially expected. Or at least, they are more publicly, or behind closed doors, but still publicly willing to acknowledge that these camps are going to be here for a number of years, which is why they are also more willing to let certain things approved and to see certain things happening than before"* (Interviewee F, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

Inevitably, the Jordan Government had to accept changes to keep the circumstances in the camp humane. *"In the meantime, there is an acceptance that it is a temporary solution, nobody wants to Za'atari becoming the third city in Jordan. At the same time, it is impossible to keep building things with tents and prefabs. In the beginning, it was impossible to get an approval to put down five centimeter concrete foundation. Now you have concrete schools and concrete clinics. Over a period of time, you have seen a developmental change in the camp"* (ibid). This shows that the government becomes more willing to discuss the long term development of the refugee camp behind closed doors.

### *Former camp managers*

During 7 years of camp management it is attempted several times to make long-term strategies or to change the way the camp is managed. A document that is mentioned during the interviews is the strategic plan made by former camp manager Hovig Etyemezian; *"but again because some topics were so sensitive, that has never been developed properly"* (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018). In this document, the camp manager attempted to make a strategy up to 2020. Also one of the very first camp managers Killian Kleinschmidt is mentioned; *"Thanks to him Za'atari is what it is today. He tried to think out of the box and involve private and entrepreneurship, donors and a lot of VIP people came. So Za'atari has a very high visibility compared to other camps"*(ibid).

### *Long-term Projects*

Another breakthrough in the transition of refugee camp Za'atari is the implementation of the water supply network on household level and the construction of a solar power plant. It is stated that implementing long-term projects like this water supply network and the solar power plant can be seen as a step towards more a developmental way of working; *"I would still rather see it more at the humanitarian side, but you know building long-term infrastructure is the first step towards the development side"* (Interviewee K, Personal Communication, 02-08-2018). It is stated that the moment the WASH blocks in the camp were demolished working method started to be increasingly developmental: *'Ever since we have dismantled the wash blocks that was the end* (Interviewee D, Personal Communication, 02-04-2018). Although it is argued

that giving it a name is not helpful; “We now have a city like infrastructure with water and waste water network. The difference is not whether it is developmental or humanitarian, it is about who has the accountability and responsibility for it” (ibid).



**Figure 7.4:** Part of a new 12.9-megawatt solar power plant, funded by the German government that went into operation on November 13, 2017. Khalil Mazraawi / AFP

Both the Solar power plant and the water supply network can be seen as long-term projects, thus can be seen as a breakthrough in the transition of the camp. However, the maintenance and the ownership of these projects show a big difference. The solar power plant is maintained by an international consortium, connected to the energy network of the surrounding villages and is owned by the Ministry of Energy in Jordan; “Because it was implemented and financed through national structures. It is owned by the Ministry of Energy” (Interviewee K, Personal Communication, 02-08-2018). In contrast to this, the water network is still owned and maintained by an UN agency. Although, initiation and implementation went through the Ministry of Water, the Ministry did not take over the system; “For water it was always implemented through [an UN Agency]. Of course Ministry of Water was informed and contributed. There was coordination, and there is coordination with national authorities” (ibid). Currently, it is the case that an UN agency maintains the systems until it can be handed over to another organisation. Maintenance of the water system by an UN Agency is not considered a sustainable solution.

The reason for the difference between these projects can be explained by the costs of the ownership of such a system; “I think the main difference is that operating a water system comparing to the electricity is much more costly. Much bigger hustle, much more workforces than operating the solar power plant that is operated by three people, basically” (ibid).

### No exit strategies

This also came up to the front in the tender that was initiated by UN agencies to hand over the maintenance of service in the camp; “We developed de TOR for an external body to come. But when the government and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation heard about it, they denied and refused the term of reference. It went up to the Ministry of Interior, who put more pressure and denied this approach and study” (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018). The government was not involved from the beginning and wants to avoid UN agencies to develop exit strategies for the camp; “They are putting pressure to [an UN agency] to stay in the camp to continue to do the WASH” (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018). One of the reasons the water supply system could be the avoidance of the development of exit strategies by UN Agencies.

<i>Impasses</i>	<i>Breakthroughs</i>
Rejection of tender to hire external body for maintenance in the camp	Permission for ad hoc projects with direct benefit
Long-term strategies by former camp managers	Realisation of Water supply system
Water supply system not in ownership of Jordan authorities	Solar Power Plant in ownership of Jordan authorities

**Table 7.9:** Summary of breakthrough and impasses in Za’atari Camp. Source: own illustration.

### 3. Network Analysis

First the interaction pattern between actors will be discussed, and secondly an analysis of rules of the network will be conducted (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004,p151).

#### *Interaction Patterns*

##### *Sensitivity*

In general, it is stated that there is almost no interaction about the transition of refugee camp Za'atari because the topic is very sensitive. Only internally or behind closed doors the topic is discussed. On other topics there is interaction.

##### *Involvement of government*

It is important to carefully collaborate with the Jordan Government according to the UN agencies; *“at the end, we can have all the ideas, all the options and plan A, B, C. If we do not have the input from the government to tell us, this is what we see, it will be very difficult to plan some things”* (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

##### *Complex decision-making Jordan Government*

All the UN agencies and International NGOs have a contract with one of the line ministries, based on their assigned sectors. The problem is that every ministry looks differently at the problems; *“UNICEF will deal with the ministry of water and irrigation. The health sector will deal with the Ministry of Health. And on top, you have the ministry of Planning and on top of that you have the Ministry of foreign affairs and in between you have the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence and everybody will see this issue of the refugee crisis from a different angle”* (Interviewee E, Personal Communication, 04-04-2018).

##### *Interaction with the society*

The government recently took a seat can be an opportunity to start the discussion with the Jordan society: *“So the government, in its current position, I assume, they would be able to have that national dialogue on that, or a participatory approach with the society”* (Interviewee K, Personal Communication, 02-08-2018).

## *Rules of the Network*

### *Complex formal approval system*

*“The institutional environment is characterized by a high degree of government control and centralization; the government leads the discourse around refugees, and its policy decisions affect actors at every level”* (Bellamy et al., 2017,p50). There are several institutions in the Jordan government that deal with refugees coming to or living in Jordan. INGOs are also required to sign MOUs with certain line ministries, depending on their area of operation. The prime minister, along with key ministries, then reviews the proposal in the IMCC, and gives final approval (Bellamy et al., 2017,p.53); Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2016). By almost all interviewees it is acknowledged that this hampers the implementation of projects.

### *Jordan takes a leading role*

*“The Jordanian government has positioned itself as a coordinator rather than implementer of the refugee response, with a strong view of what it needs from the international community. In that space, formal coordination structures have facilitated dialogue to clarify the strategic direction for both humanitarian and resilience work, but have failed to facilitate approval of projects”* (Bellamy et al., 2017, p.63). This is also confirmed in an audit document of UNICEF in Amman; The Government had increasingly taken a leading role in the response to the crisis. It is said that the assistance of UN agencies is needed; *“We are the doctor, you are the nurse. The government keeps leading the process as a doctor and they cannot do it without being helped by the nurses, which is provided by the UN agencies”* (Interviewee A, Personal Communication, 09-04-2018).

## 4. Conclusion Network Analysis


The research question of this thesis is; *What are the obstacles to the transition of a refugee camp and how can network management be a way to deal with this?*

### Interaction

This chapter answers the first part of the research question. The main obstacle to the transition of refugee camp Za'atari is that no interaction takes place caused by the lack of arena:

*There is no suitable arena available for interaction about the transition of refugee camp Za'atari*

In the current composition of the network there is no arena available that is "fit" for the interaction regarding the transition of the camp towards a developmental approach, this causes that no or minimal interaction takes place about the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. Although, there are many arenas present in the network, these are primarily focused on the day-to-day operations. In the interviews it came forward that the transition is very sensitive topic, "long-term" or "permanency" are taboo words and interaction can only take place behind closed doors or very informally.



**Figure 7.5;** *Expected tendency about the interaction and diverging views regarding the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. Source: Based on De Bruijn, et al., 2010.*

Figure 5.3 shows a representation of the interaction about the transition of camp for the current, expected and desired situation. The current situation of the camp is discussed; day-to-day



operations are addressed and many stakeholders participate in the interaction about this, the view on what needs to happen immediately is quite average.

It is detected that interaction regarding the expected situation is less convergent because the views on this situation differ. This is demonstrated by the statements of the government that are focused on the responsibility of the international community and the return of Syrians compared to the statements of the UN agencies about the funding challenges to overcome in coming years of the existence of the camp. Lastly, the desired solution is not discussed at all. It is acknowledged there is no platform or place where the transition of the camp is discussed. Although, empowerment of refugees and the need for a more developmental approach is mentioned by the majority of the critical actors, the perspective is different. The focus of the Jordan authorities is focused on the country while the perspective of the other actors is on the camp.

The lack of an appropriate arena and lack of interaction can be explained by some main institutional differences in both the host government, the UN Agencies and to a lesser extent the International NGOs and UN Donors. The critical actors identified in the network are the Jordan Government and the UN Agencies, therefore their obstacles will be discussed in depth below.

#### *Rejection of Integration*


One of the main institutional obstacles identified at the Jordan Government side is the rejection of integration, *see figure 5.13*. The Jordan Government resigned from signing up the durable solution 'integration' in the refugee convention and signed a MOU instead. This was done to prevent another influx of refugees, next to for example many Palestinian refugees, to integrate in Jordan. This institution is as well formal, signed between the UN and Jordan, as informal because it funnels through into the Jordan society; when speaking to Jordanian officials they continuously state is not wishful to integrate the refugees in Jordan and continue to avoid talking about long-term solutions. As a result of this existing institution, interaction about any kind of permanency, which is associated with the term integration, is blocked. The rejection of integration can be seen as an institution that determines the behaviour of the government in many aspects (Vermeulen, 2012).

#### *Complex decision-making structure*

Secondly, the decision-making structure of the Jordan government in dealing with the refugee situation is scattered over the ministries. Although, the Jordan Response Platform is established and several committees are present to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis, the structure seems to fail to coordinate the great amount of donors and international organisations. This is not confined to the external coordination, but also within the ministries a game of power is played. Because dealing with the "normal" challenges is not sufficient, it is understandable that dealing with a wicked problem like the transition of a refugee camp is even harder. Looking from an institutional perspective, it is the informal power play in and between the ministries that contributes to the lack of interaction and an appropriate arena to facilitate the interaction about the transition of refugee camp Za'atari.

#### *Responsibility of International Community*

Another aspect that contributes to the lack of interaction and arena is that the refugee camp has a low priority on the agenda of Jordan officials. In comparison, to the other stakeholders interviewed, the Jordanian officials were primarily focused on refugees residing in host communities and alleviating the pressure on the delivery of services in those communities. In the eyes of the Jordan officials the camp is seen as the responsibility of the 'International community'. Funding-wise, Jordanian officials often referred to the lacking support of the International Community. When always pointing towards other to solve the problems regarding the camp make it easy to avoid interaction about it.



**Figure 7.6:** Explaining lack of interaction platform by diverging perceptions. Source :own illustration

#### *Mandate*

From the UN agencies' side, obstacles to the transition of the refugee camp can be found as well. First of all, their mandate is to protect refugees in an emergency situation. Therefore, the agencies started their operation in a humanitarian manner to cover the direct needs for refugees arriving in Jordan and in the camp. Their main objective is to support the Jordan Government in managing a camp for refugees, for which mandate/permission is granted. When the crisis evolved and took longer than expected, the UN agencies changed their working method gradually according to the needs but encountered difficulties in the form of rejection of permission for livelihood- or permanent-like projects. This is understandable because, although the needs said differently, supporting livelihoods and realizing more permanent structures was not embedded in the mandate agreed upon (UNHCR, 1998)<sup>6</sup>.

#### *Funding system*

From the interviews it becomes clear that the leading agency in the overall camp-planning and camp coordination, which would be an excellent arena in which the transition of the camp could be discussed, is not capable of making long-term strategies. This is caused by the underlying short-term funding system. As a consequence of this, it can be doubted if guiding other agencies is possible. The yearly-funding cycle and the absent long-term strategy is an obstacle to facilitate interaction about the transition of the camp. The high degree of financial uncertainty causes a lack of incentive to design strategic longer-term plans.

#### *Non-transparency*


Lastly, it seems that the interviewed UN agencies are not eager to share their strategies. The conscious withholding of strategies indicates a lack of interaction, but also shows a reason why facilitating interaction about the long-term plans of the refugee camp is sometimes a difficult task. There are some breakthroughs to find, when UN agencies together initiated a tender for the maintenance of the camp.

#### *The desired situation*

The desired situation is characterized by the will to implement a 'developmental' method. In other words, there is a will to support the "transition" as defined in this thesis. Due to decreasing funding the UN agencies desire to decrease their footprint in the camp by handing services over to local organisations or authorities, they want to have an exit-strategy. Also, the Jordan government advocates for a more developmental approach, although in their perception this encompasses strengthening the country as a whole and not taking over responsibilities in the camp. The government does underline the fact that refugees should be helped 'to take care for themselves'. However, it remains unclear this is meant for the

<sup>6</sup> In the MOU only providing quick response for emergencies is agreed upon. This includes the establishment of a joint emergency mechanism to make available food, water, sanitation, shelter, medical treatment and also to provide for physical safety for refugees and asylum seekers (article 12, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1998)

refugees in the camp or refugees in the host community remains unclear and can be seen as the difference in perception.



**Figure 7.7:** Explaining trap of the transition of refugee camp Za’atari based on funding and exit strategies. Source: own illustration

When looking at the transition in the camp, taking over services will cost more money and capacity that is not readily available at the Jordan authorities. Until now, taking over only occurs when a direct benefit for Jordan is there and income can be generated. From a financial perspective, looking at the already difficult economic situation of Jordan it is understandable that no extra money is invested in the camp. Especially, when there is no guarantee that the international community continues to support Jordan when the camp is eventually managed by Jordan authorities and organisations. Also from the UN side reason can be found that hamper the handing over to local authorities or executing their exit strategies. The UN agencies and international donors adhere to requirements/rules which the local organisations cannot meet. It indicates a lack of capacity at the Jordan side, or too stark rules from their side. This example shows how perceptions about the term transition can be understood:

*Perception Jordan Government*  
 Transition moves responsibility away from international community and therefore more resources from international community are needed

*Perception UN Agencies*  
 Transition moves responsibility away from international community and therefore less resources from international community is needed

Diverging or opposing perceptions can lead to stagnations in a process as actors cannot decide, or not dare to decide on their own course of action; “As long as there is no shared perception of the content of the problem, it is difficult to be sure about the strategies other parties will develop, and it will also be difficult to decide upon one’s own course of action”(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 48). Above an indication of the difference in perception is given. This can be one of the explanations for the stagnations in the process of the transition of refugee camp Za’atari.

## 8. Analysis of Think Tank project

This chapter identifies the network management strategies applied in the Think Tank. The project is initiated by VNG International and the City of Amsterdam and can be seen as one of the ways to deal with the transition of refugee camp Za'atari and to offer a platform for interaction; *'The proposal therefore is to establish a think tank on this subject to serve as a platform where experts and interested stakeholders are able to discuss and explore – in a non-political ambiance – possible developments, their pros and cons, specific topics and trends in addition to the challenges and constraints thereof'* (Al-Hiyari & Van Warmerdam, 2018).

The aim of this analysis is to explore if network management strategies were applied and if these are successful to overcome the obstacles identified in the former chapter. Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) developed three tables of possible network management strategies *see Annex 3* and are used to analyse the Think Tank project. These tables show overlap with process management strategies described by the Bruijn et al (2010). Therefore, also the process management principles of De Bruijn et al (2010) are taken into account when analysing the project. Before proceeding it should be noted that the establishment and the design of the Think Tank was not designed according to the network theory. It was a process of reacting to the context based on former experience of both parties involved (Al-Hiyari, Personal Communication, 10-09-2018). So this analysis exercise is done, not to evaluate the project but to see if the presence or absence of network management strategies can be an explanation for the outcome of the Think Tank.

### *Supply-driven project*

The Think Tank project is initiated by the City of Amsterdam and the VNG International which is an exception because often projects included in the programme are developed based on a demand of the receiving party (A. Risseeuw, Personal Communication). This time, it was also about creating the demand and looking for ownership for the project (Van Warmerdam, Personal Communication, 01-02-2018), this is also something that can be identified during the months the project is analysed as a lot of effort was put in getting actors involved.

## A. Description of Think Tank Process

The events belonging to the Think Tank will be sequentially be discussed. The project can be divided in six phases:

1. Preparation phase ( May- June 2017 )
2. Small kick-off event ( July 2017)
3. Second meeting ( November 2017 )
4. Launch Event ( April 2018 )
5. Working group workshop ( July 2018 )
6. On-going process (2018)

### *1. Preparation phase ( May- June 2017 )*

The first discussions to establish the Think Tank started informally in May 2017 at the Dutch Embassy in Amman, Jordan. The front officer, stationed in Za'atari Camp, noticed that some important aspects regarding long-term solutions and a holistic approach were not discussed in the camp. He wanted to address them and started a conversation with the Dutch Embassy (R. Van Warmerdam, 02-2018, Personal Communication). The Dutch Ambassador supported the idea and invited the team to organize the first meeting and offered a meeting room at the embassy to host the meeting<sup>7</sup>.

### *2. Small kick-off event ( July 2017) – Transition of Za'atari Camp*

In July 2017, the first meeting was held wherein the idea was officially discussed with some representatives of UN Agencies and International NGOs. In this meeting, the project manager of the City of Amsterdam explained the need for urban planning and posed the question if there was a platform already available and in case a discussion was to be organized, which parties needed to be addressed. Secondly, the landscape architect presented a “*development framework*” to the attending representatives. This was about offering a guideline to the investments made in the camp taken into account the natural and climatological conditions (VNG International, 2017a);

*“Camp investments are on-going. And so are the needs of the residents. The aim is to phase these investments - present and future- in a way that living conditions, livelihood and ways to express cultural identity are improved in the given situation”*(VNG International, 2017a).

A comment received from participants was to focus on the host communities as well; *“Investments should not focus too much on the camp but also on the host communities and the relations between camp and host communities in the meetings because they are the most important ‘owners’ of the proposed solutions”* (J.Chaix in VNG International, 2017b). Also, the involvement of the authorities was stressed by several participants. It was said that the Jordan Government should take the lead because aid organisations will eventually leave the camp (Dupin, 2017). Also some prudence was expressed to not involve the government too fast and to scale the ambition level; *“the level of ambition needs to be scaled down, and then let’s see what we can do tomorrow”*(R. Jenkins in VNG International, 2017b).

### *3. Second meeting ( November 2017) – A Think Tank Meeting*

This was the second meeting with representatives. For this meeting more representatives of international NGOs were invited, like for example Acted and Oxfam (Van Warmerdam, Personal Communication, 2018). A representative of the City of Amsterdam gave a presentation to underline the non-commercial or neutral

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<sup>7</sup> Until the end of 2018 the Netherlands and thus the Dutch Embassy had no political agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This offered the opportunity to have a neutral position and support and host a platform with a topic as sensitive as this (A. Risseuw, Personal Communication, 26-09-2018)

position of Amsterdam and VNG International in the discussion and further ideas on the '*development framework*' were again presented by the landscape architect.

During this meeting, participants confirmed to have difficulties to work and coordinate with the Jordan Government layers, caused by fear for all kinds of regional risks (Risseeuw, 2017). It is said that approval or endorsement could be obtained easily when presented as problem solutions (ibid). In this meeting it is also questioned if the UNHCR should be the vis-à-vis towards the Jordan Government as they also have the responsibility to close the camp in the end. This was denied by the UNHCR (ibid).

#### *4. Launch Event ( April 2018 )- Think Tank on displacement and development*

Before the event, the City of Amsterdam and VNG International decided to partner up with the Yarmouk University's research centre. The research centre offered the possibility to invite the former Crown Prince of Jordan; Prince Hassan bin Talal. In April, the Think Tank project was launched among a broader audience; effort was done, to involve different layers of the Jordan Government and also other aid agencies like the UNDP and UNWRA were invited to the event.

During the event around 80 representatives of several organisations attended. The programme consisted of several speeches and presentations. The meeting was kicked off by a speech of the HRH Prince Hassan bin Talal and followed by a presentation of the director of the refugee Centre. Also a view on the refugee situation in Lebanon was given by the project leader from VNG-International in Lebanon. Finally, the project manager of the City of Amsterdam gave a presentation on the future of the region. After the presentations, there was space for discussion. Several remarks of the discussion are listed in the analysis below (VNG International, 2018).

#### *5. Working group workshop ( July 2018 )*

After the launch event, working groups were formed and another event was organized to discuss possible topics for the working groups to work on. There are no reports or notes available about this meeting.

#### *6. On-going process*

Currently, the working groups are set to work to prepare for the final event in November. In August, several participants of the working groups were interviewed.

## B. Analysis of Think Thank process

Below the composition of the actor groups that attended the events is analysed. In figure 6.2 the distribution of the different groups can be seen in the Launch Event and in the Working Groups. The transition from the Launch Event that can be seen as a 'voluntarily' and 'spectacle-like' event to the working groups, where people start to really contribute and spent time, is important to analyse, as it is one of the most crucial steps in keeping critical actors on board in a process like this.

It is noteworthy, to underline that the group of the University and the international NGOs were represented in the largest numbers in both events. The Jordan Government was represented with 20 persons, compared to just 10 persons from the UN Agencies. This analysis gives a very schematic or general view on the attendance of critical actors. It should be noted that the function of attendees is not taken into account; a high level manager should actually count the same as 3 normal employees, or interns should not even be counted at all.




Figure 8.1: Attendees of Launch Event per actor group. Source: own illustration.

Also for the working groups the chart is made, the right chart of the table. Here, it can be seen that mostly 'other' actors are involved. The group 'other' includes independent researchers, consultants and delegates from the university. From the Jordan government there is just one person engaged in the working groups and also the UN is represented with just two persons. Compared to the launch event, the critical actors are underrepresented. Looking at the available resources of the participants in the working groups, those seem not to be able to support the transition of the refugee camp.

### Working Groups

For the analysis of the Think Tank two participants were asked about their perception of the problem and the perceptions of others.

	Perception of camp	Perception Government	Perception UN	Proposed solution/direction
7	<i>"It is like an entity in itself. You know like a settlement. Similar to a settlement"</i> .	<i>"So maybe this is a prize we pay for being so much open. To endure dealing with other's problem".  "From a human perspective we pay a price"</i> .	<i>'I think it is obvious now. To everyone. We need solutions. Everyone knows, the diagnostic approach regarding the current challenges and problems, everyone knows about and talks about it.'</i>	Temporarily permanent: <i>"Because if we are going to deal with them as temporarily permanent it will be handled or tackled differently. In the sense that we will consider them as playing an active role, within the Jordanian context in terms of day-to-day life"</i> .  <i>'Sharing the day-to-day life and compliance'</i>
8	<i>"It is much more dense than large cities in Jordan"</i> .	<i>"The current situation is that everybody thinks it is the negative one. And they need to find solutions"</i> .	<i>"The same. They do see it as a negative thing and they don't know what to do with it".  But : No, I think the priorities are very different from one entity to the other. That is why making a plan is proposed</i>	Frame integration differently; <i>'What we are saying integration means open up the communities, open up the societies. If you don't want to give them passports, ok!'</i>  Symbiosis: <i>"maybe you can change integration to symbiosis, a way of living together in harmony"</i> .  Think in opportunities

**Table 8.1** Perception of participant's think tank working group. Source: Interviewee 7&8, Personal Communication, August 2018.

In this table, several things can be identified. Firstly, the participants share mostly the same perception about the current situation of the camp; both say it is an *'entity in itself'*, or that the density is larger than Jordan cities: a comparison to a city is made. Secondly, but unconsciously, the main obstacle identified in the network analysis in chapter 5 is also acknowledged when talking about reframing the definition of integration; *'it is not about giving them passports'*. Instead, the respondents come up with ideas to reframe integration of the camp in its surroundings as;

- Living together as a community
- Temporarily permanent
- Symbiosis; a way of living together in harmony

When looking at the perception of the participants, towards the perception of other stakeholders and possible owners of the Think Tank, there is also agreement on the negative view towards the camp. However, some information was missing. When asking about the challenges for the coming years and the more detailed situation of the camp, it seemed that there was no up-to-date knowledge about the camp.



### *C. Obstacles identified*

During the Think Tank some additions and confirmation of the former identified obstacles can be found. These are described below.

- *The Syrian Phobia*
- *Rejection of integration*
- *Lacking coordination Jordan Government*

#### *The Syrian Phobia*

The attitude towards the Jordan society came up during the launch event of Think Tank. Something was said about the public message from the Government to the Jordan society; *“Jordanians blaming Jordan Government for the advertising of the blaming culture against Syrian refugees. The approach should be based on positive analysis. Do not steer our population into a Syrian phobia by giving false information on expenses and effect of Syrians on Jordan”* (Abbasi, 2018, p.25 in VNG International, 2018). This showed how the Syrian refugee crisis is framed towards the Jordanian society.

#### *Rejection of Integration*

In the former chapter the rejection of integration was identified as one of the most important obstacles to the transition of refugee camp Za’atari. In the discussion this also came forward when a Jordanian official made a remark about this; *“To answer the question on why not integrate the refugees in Jordan? We did not sign the Geneva Convention - 51 - and its Protocol, whose articles depict that once the refugees’ problem is solved, they can go back to their original or third-party country. This is why we are not integrating them in our Jordanian communities. As for the location, it was meant to be on temporary basis, because no one saw this coming”* (VNG International, 2018, p. 12). In addition, the representatives also expect the crisis in Syria will be solved and that the leftovers of the camp can be used by surrounding municipalities or schools. This remark shows that integration of the refugees is really not an option.

#### *Coordination from Jordan Government*

Another obstacle identified in the network analysis also came to the front; the complex decision-making structure and coordination by the Jordan Government; *“Furthermore, we are missing harmony among strategies. We have so many work and executive plans, but it is high time (on the level of MOPIC) that we align our strategies and plans to aggregate and save scattered efforts in order to present proper guidance for decision-makers”* (Dr. Randa Faouri, 2018, p26 in VNG International, 2018).

#### *D. Network management identified*

This chapter describes network management strategies that are identified in the process of the Think Tank. The aim is to see if these strategies help to overcome the obstacles identified. The researcher went through the tables set up by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) a couple of times to identify the network strategies applied. This is in turn discussed with the involved project manager. The full analysis can be found in appendix 3. Below the most important findings are described.

- *Establishment of think tank as setting up new arena*
- *Introducing new actors to promote cognitive reflection*
- *Heavily staffed*
- *Substantive insights for facilitation*
- *Involvement of experts*
- *Development framework as frame reflection device*

##### *Establishment of think tank*

The establishment of the Think Tank can be seen as setting up a new arena to support interaction. The City of Amsterdam, in collaboration with VNG International played the role as facilitator and facilitated *the game* by establishing a platform and facilitating new forms of interactions. The authors Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) describe this phenomenon as; *“the facilitator will organize a platform for discussion about how parties can interact”* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.208). The establishment can also be defined as an entangler as described in the book; *‘supporting interaction through couplings, agreements of game rules and facilitation’*(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.210).

##### *Introducing new actors*

Introducing new actors like the Yarmouk University and the speech of HRH Hassan bin Talal helps to promote cognitive reflection according to the authors Koppenjan & Klijn. In network management theory this is described as *‘By consciously introducing new actors and roles such as entrepreneurs, brokers and devil’s advocates in order to bring up for discussion perceptions that are taken for granted’*(ibid). The Prince framed the crisis of the Syrian Refugee Crisis as a task for humanity; *‘The knowledge we need is for the purpose of helping humanity’* (HRH Hassan bin Talal, 2018). In addition to this he called for a way to strengthening the region as Arabs; *‘The time has come to envision a future without labels? Can we adopt a new term for our Region? Mashreq is good, and Mashreq... What does it matter, Kurdi, Persian, Arab or Turkish? I want to be part of an inclusive region based on respect. Respect for others, respect for all and mutually work together on joint creativity’* (HRH Hassan bin Talal, 2018). It is said that the attendance of the prince helped to shed a light on the moral view of the refugee crisis (M. Peters, Personal Communication, 2018).

##### *Heavily staffed*

The willingness of the Dutch ambassador can be seen as a breakthrough (R. van Warmerdam, Personal Communication); without her support, the process would have been stagnated. Involvement of the Dutch Embassy was a good step and shows similarities to the process management strategy identified by de Bruijn et al. (2010) as *“Ensure that the process is heavily staffed”*. De Bruijn et al. (2010) state that heavy representation promotes external authority and image of the process and commitment of related organisation. Another advantage of involving heavy representation is that the representative can take a distance from the organisation it represents. This is especially helpful in situations; *“in which parties sometimes have to make compromises that may be difficult to accept”* (De Bruijn et al., 2010). This was not the case for the Dutch Ambassador, but can be the case for the high-level representatives of the UN agencies or international organisations.

### *Substantive insights for facilitation*

Another network management strategy applied, is the presentation of the development framework. By showing possible practical solutions, the attendees were triggered and it functioned as a mean to facilitate the discussion of several meetings. This can be understood as; *“Substantive insights are used for facilitation”* as defined by De Bruijn et al. (2010).

### *Involvement of experts and researchers*

The involvement of the landscape architect can be understood as an aspect of process management. De Bruijn, et al.,(2010) state that it is important to involve experts in a process because by substance the process can be facilitated and the participants have the opportunity reflect on the latest facts or beliefs.. According to Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) it is also important to show the bandwidth of solutions when conducting research. *“Conducting research that is not focused on settling down knowledge conflicts but on supporting interaction by addressing diverging knowledge issues. Showing the bandwidth of solutions”*(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

### *Development framework as reframing*

The development framework can also be seen as a part of reframing strategies discuss ed. As Schön & Rein (1994) stated; by offering the participants a way to contribute and involving them in the discussion of the design process of the development can form a way to reframe through design rationality. This way a moment of frame reflection was created. A part of the reframing strategy is *‘frame reflection’* that is about becoming aware of the diverging frames of the other stakeholders; *“Only when it is known that different frames of reference are involved it becomes possible to discover and answer the actual substantive question. In turn, this creates the possibility to develop a joint frame of reference”* (Schön & Rein, 1994; Roe, 1994 in Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p. 226). However, it is doubtful if this was already helpful as the Jordan Government was not present during this *‘frame reflection’* moment.

## *E. Missing network management*

Also aspects were missing in the process of the think tank:

- *Preventing cognitive fixation*
- *Making agreements about how solutions will be chosen/ Agreements on decision-making*
- *Making agreements on process rules (quality, entry and exit rules)*
- *Making agreements about sharing information*
- *Making agreements on decision-making in the process*
- *Protecting core-values of critical actors*

### *Missing focus on rules of the process*


One of the first things mentioned as crucial for network management is the prevention of cognitive fixation, that can be defined as: *'Ensuring at the beginning of the process that the focus is on the question of how the process should be organized and not on the content of the problem'* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). In the Think Tank the project manager often said that people got stuck in talking about the problems. In addition to this, although substance can facilitate the discussion, the rules for selecting substantive ideas are missing. These are aspects included in management of the game and a part of process management rules set up by the Bruijn et al (2010); *'The conscious organizing of the process in which substantive selection occurs by making agreements over how solutions will be chosen'* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). There is too much focus on the content of the problem instead of organizing the process. The first five topics mentioned above are all a part of consciously agreeing on process rules. Almost no rules were agreed upon to design the process. The creating of game rules is bypassed in the process of the think tank.

### *Protecting core-values*

Another aspect of process management that is not thought of consciously in the Think Tank is the protection of core-values. As described in network management theory; *'It is important that the 'core-values' of actors are protected against unexpected and unintended attacks from others'* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.247). According to the literature a process manager should keep an overview if all the core-values remain protected and if a mutual gain can be found in this core-values (De Bruijn et al., 2010). Looking at the main obstacle, the rejection of integration, this can be seen as a major core-value of the Jordan Government. During the process of the Think Tank, when talking constantly about integrating the refugee camp in its environment, the core-values of the Jordan Government are not protected properly. This can also be the reason why little representatives of the Government are involved in the working groups of the Think Tank.

## F. Summary Analysis Think Tank

As described above, several aspects of network management and process management can be identified in the process of the Think Tank. When looking at the composition of the working groups it seems that the majority of critical actors, the UN agencies and officials from the Jordan Government, resigned. On the same token, the numbers show a majority of independent researcher and consultants. Additionally it seems that the research that has to be done is not organized. No agreements are made on how to prevent cognitive fixation, to select substantive solutions, how to make decisions or how to exchange information. Also, regarding the sequence of activities no clear path or planning is given. This shows the general finding of the analysis which is the lack of the agreement of process rules in the Think Tank. In addition, not protecting core-values of the critical actors causes some of the critical actors to resign from the process.



**Figure 8.2:** Conclusion of think tank analysis. Source: own illustration.

In essence, a platform for interaction was offered, and a multitude of stakeholders was able to participate. Although participation was on voluntary basis, several UN agencies and INGOs were present and shared thoughts with each other. This shows opportunities to overcome the competition between the UN agencies in a way that more openness is reached. Nevertheless, the implementation of ideas is still pending and it is unclear if this openness also funnels through to internal strategies and project proposals within and between UN agencies. Also the marginal attendance of solely one delegate the UN agencies in the working groups is not positive observation for this notion.

## 9. Conclusions


In this thesis Refugee camp Za’atari is investigated to identify the obstacles to the transition of refugee camps and to subsequently explore the applicability of network management to overcome these obstacles. The transition of a refugee camp can be categorized as a wicked problem in a network society, which is therefore heavily depended on interaction to come to a solution. By means of a network analysis, the critical actors are identified upon which the most important obstacles could be identified for the transition of refugee camp Za’atari. The analysis is focused on the actors that have the mandate and authority to be involved in the decision-making regarding policies for the transition of a refugee camp. Several actors involved in Za’atari Camp and its surroundings are interviewed. In addition, a case-study within the selected case-study of Za’atari Camp, the Think Tank project, is analysed. This project can be seen as one of the ways to enhance interaction in the context of this research. The aim is to determine if network management tools were applied and if this could overcome the identified obstacles. This chapter answers the following research question:

*What are the obstacles to the transition of a refugee camp and how can network management be a way to deal with this?*

The answer to the research questions is described below after which will be reflected upon the network management in general. The applicability to other refugee camps around the world will be discussed in the discussion.

### Obstacles for transition


From the network analysis it became clear that there is no appropriate arena available to have interaction regarding the transition of refugee camp Za’atari. This is caused by several reasons, originating from critical actors in the camp. There are many arenas present in the network but these are primarily focused on the day-to-day operations. An arena is not available because the Jordan Government (1) did not sign up for the sustainable solution *integration*, (2) has difficulties in coordinating the refugee crisis (complex decision-making structure) and (3) sees the camp as the responsibility of the ‘International Community’. But also the characteristics of the UN agencies do not serve the possibility to have interaction about the transition of refugee camp Za’atari. An arena is not available because UN agencies work following (1) a short-term mandate, (2) rely on yearly funding system and therefore lack the ability to guide other actors and (3) there is a lack of transparency between sectors and agencies. This automatically affects the other involved stakeholders (INGOs, Donors, Jordan citizens, Syrian refugees).



**Figure 9.1:** Explaining lack of interaction platform by diverging perceptions. Source: Own illustration

Other obstacles in the transition of the refugee camp came forward by discussing the ‘desired’, or the ‘whished’ solution for the camp. Multiple times the desire to implement a more developmental approach was mentioned. The critical actors do not share the same perceptions and illustrate the trap the transition of the camp is in. Until now, taking over by the Jordan authorities only occurs when a direct benefit can be found. Generally, handing-over to national structures or systems is obstructed because there is no


guarantee that the international community continues to support Jordan financially. By the same token, the International Donors are not convinced that local authorities, or companies, private or public can comply with the same standards, and choose for the standard INGOs when needed. This also blocks the process of handing over and connecting to national structures.



**Figure 9.2:** Explaining lack of interaction platform by diverging perceptions. Source: Own illustration

#### Network Management in the Think Tank

From a network management perspective the Think Tank project initiated by VNG International and the City of Amsterdam can be seen as a way to enhance interaction between the involved stakeholders. It can be defined as ‘*furtherance of goal intertwinement*’ (Management of content) or ‘*the coupling of actors, arenas and games*’ (Management of the game) and ‘*adjusting the network composition*’ (Management of institutions). Nevertheless, according to the analysis the process stagnates when actual work needs to be done and commitment is needed, which is demonstrated in the number of critical actors in the established working groups (see figure 6.2). From a network management perspective it turns out that mostly making agreements about the rules of the process were missing in the Think Tank to ensure participation of the critical actors. A part of this comprises the protection of core-values of the participants. The rejection of integration by Jordan Government can be seen as one of the major obstacles; it is actually one of their core-values as defined by De Bruijn et al. (2010). Although, the content of the Think Tank is framed as a regional ‘framework’ and not focused on the camp particularly; it is about integrating refugees in Jordan. This contravenes with the ‘core-value’ of the Jordan Government and can therefore possibly be the reason why the Government resigns from the Think Tank process. One of the project managers involved, stated that: ‘*The benefits of having an agreement on other value does not outweigh the main concern of the Jordan Government which is the rejection of integration*’. In other words, the core-values of one of the most important actors are not protected sufficiently and other benefits of transition do not outweigh the downside of accepting some form of integration of Syrian refugees.



**Figure 9.3:** Conclusion think tank analysis. Source: Own illustration

### *To overcome obstacles*

Looking at the process of the Think Tank project; which is a small project in the context of all the projects that are currently on-going in Jordan; wherein network management strategies were not applied consciously and were not completely applied, an indication of the applicability of network management can only partly be given to the transition of refugee camps in general.

From a general point of view, seeing the transition of refugee camps as a wicked problem, enhancing, initiating and supporting any form of interaction, is always a step in the good direction. In the Think Tank project a platform for interaction was offered, and a multitude of stakeholders participated. Although, participation was on voluntary basis, several UN agencies, INGOs, officials from the Jordan Government and independent researchers were present and shared thoughts with each other. In a very basic form it shows opportunities to overcome the obstacles identified from as well the Jordan Government side as the UN Agencies side.

Nevertheless, the Think Tank process is still on-going and it is unclear if this interaction also funnels through to internal strategies and project proposals. Additionally, the fact that the Jordan government as well as the UN agencies resigned predominantly from the working groups, consciously, or unconsciously, shows evidence that the network management strategies that were applied were not effective or that fundamental network management strategies were missing. Not protecting core-values and having agreements on process rules is probably one of the reasons for the resignation of actors from the Think Tank process.

This leads to the conclusion that network management can enhance the transition of a refugee camp Za'atari because interaction can be initiated and supported. But this is limited to an extent wherein the core-values of the involved actors remain protected.





## 10. Discussion

### *Explanation of results*

The conclusion of this thesis consists of two parts: (1) obstacles for the transition of refugee camp Za'atari and (2) the applicability of network management to enhance this transition. In this chapter these will be discussed.

### *Obstacles Transition*

There are several obstacles identified regarding the transition of Refugee Camp Za'atari. Many of these obstacles were expected to be an outcome of the analysis. Upfront, it was expected that integration of refugees was not accepted and indeed came forward as a dominant obstacle. Also the short-term mandate of UN agencies was an expected obstacle and is confirmed by the interviewees. There was also an unexpected finding, that encompasses the general will for *'a more developmental'* approach by almost all involved actors. Although, this *'will'* was not always focused on the camp, it seemed that the continuing crisis forced many actors start thinking differently. This reaction can also be seen as logical when funding decreases radically after some years of emergency operations. Nevertheless, this finding is important because it shows willingness to think differently which can lead to new perspectives in the future.

The case-in-case shows that network management can enhance the transition in a very basic form. The fact that interaction is missing in the first place shows urgency to apply network management to initiate and facilitate this missing interaction. However, it should be considered whether the reasons why there is no interaction in the first place are not too fundamental and can be changed, reframed or minimized by means of network management. When there are structural opposing interests or absent common interests, network management seems to be an impossible job according to the authors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

Additionally, van Bueren et al. (2003) concluded that the network analysis not only elucidates the nature of a wicked problem but that it also shows that actors have a collective action problem. It is said that; *'institutional barriers, cognitive differences, and the dynamics of the interactions themselves can block joint action and the undertaking of necessary network management strategies'* (van Bueren et al., 2003). In other words, when obstacles are too big it can block the network management activities. Network management is limited to a space wherein the core-values of all the actors are protected. It should be possible to reach on consensus on the level of the core-values otherwise it is not helpful to apply network management strategies. Hence, when you look at this notion of protecting the core-values, it is actually an open door where managers should apparently be made aware of.

### *Non-cooperative strategies*

In this thesis, several obstacles are identified that block the interaction between critical actors in the transition of Refugee Camp Za'atari. However, this thesis does not state whether these obstacles were put in place intentionally or not, because sometimes blocking interaction can be beneficial of certain actors. Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) state; *"Strategies are not necessarily cooperative. It may be attractive for actors to slow down or block the progress when it appears to be moving towards a policy measure that could harm the actor's interest"* (p.49). In the process of the transition of Refugee Camp Za'atari, the interest of the Jordan Government (safety and economy in Jordan) is threatened and the fact that no interaction takes places is, understandably, avoided.

### *The Think Tank Analysis*

The Think Tank project was analysed based on the network management strategies developed by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004). It was expected that not all these strategies were applied consciously. Comparing these with the identified obstacles, made it possible to identify the lacking strategies and formed an explanation for the resignation of the critical actors in the Think Tank process. It should be taken into account that the analysis of this process was very basic and quantitatively-based. Based on comparing the

numbers of participants during two events is concluded that participants '*resigned*' from the process. However, this is not confirmed directly by the participants. The researcher did not have the opportunity to interview the resigning participants (although attempted). Additionally, there can also be other reasons why participants resigned from the process. For example, that they were not invited in the first place or could not be there due to other events or illness. Also the rank or function of the participants is not taken into account. In essence, a director could have counted for 3 participants based on his or her influence and access to resources compared to an intern that should not be taken into account at all.

#### *Applicability other refugee camps*

The obstacles identified are mostly specific for the selected case because these are determined by the actors involved. Although, integrating refugees in a host country will always be difficult tasks the characteristics will probably differ.

In the selected case, the role of the Jordan Government was very dominant and negative towards '*integration*' of refugees. When comparing this to the situation in Uganda, where the government provides refugees with pieces of land<sup>8</sup> shows a different attitude and thus different obstacles to the transition of refugee camps. When comparing the situation of Jordan to Lebanon, the government's attitude towards Syrian refugees is also different and refugee camps do not even officially exist. There is a dominant segregation within the national government about the status of refugees, but does offer broader perspectives on local level (J.Stollenga, Personal Communication, 18-10-2018). Also the attitude towards the level of integration of Syrian Refugees is often based on religion or geographical situation; Christian Syrians are sometimes more integrated in the Lebanese society (T. te Pas, Personal Communication) and the level of aid differs drastically amongst different regions in Lebanon (Hourani & Van Vliet, 2014)<sup>9</sup>

Also, the origin of the refugees and the status of the host country can differ significantly. The Syrian refugees as well as the countries that host the Syrian refugees are middle-income countries, which are different from many refugees in Africa that are dominantly low-income countries. This causes different priorities and wishes by both the host country and the refugees themselves. Additionally, there will also be a difference in refugee camps internally; dealing with minorities of inside the same country. Also the cause of the crisis can differ significantly: armed conflict or natural disasters, like a tsunamis or earthquakes will cause the outcome to be completely different.

The obstacles formed by the UN and actors can be more recognized more generally around the world. Similar organisations are involved in the establishment and the management in other refugee camps around the world. Although, the context of the crisis and the institutional characteristics of the other involved actors will be different, the same difficulties will come up because these are embedded in the systems of the organisations and form strong regulative institutions. In the conclusion it is stated that very basically network management can facilitate interaction. Nevertheless, it remains a question to what extent network management strategies are able to fully overcome obstacles that embedded in regulative institutions. Network management is more about coping with the existing situation than fundamentally changing systems. As long as core-values of actors are protected, that are formed by the institutional characteristics, network management can be a way to facilitate interaction to improve refugee camp management to deal with the long-term existence.

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/mar/02/uganda-welcomes-refugees-environmental-cost-trees>

<sup>9</sup> <https://civilsociety-centre.org/paper/regional-differences-conditions-syrian-refugees-lebanon>

### *Ambidexterity*

Looking more specifically at the role of the UN agencies, another explanation for the obstacles can be possibly being found in the term 'ambidexterity'. This can be defined as '*an organisation's ability to be aligned and efficient in its management of today's business demands while simultaneously being adaptive to changes in the environment*' (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008, p. 375). It can be said that the humanitarian agencies are good at what they do, but missed the boat when adapting to a crisis that endured for a longer period of time.

### *Humanitarian business model*

When acknowledging that camps should not be set up anymore while it is the main '*business*' of humanitarian organisations can be an obstacle. This can be a reason why there is not already a process designed to hand over refugee camps to developmental agencies after a couple of years. This is also observed by former camp manager Killian Kleinschmidt, in an interview he argues that there is a wrong business model in the humanitarian world that is depended on donors (K.Kleinschmidt, Personal Communication, 27-06-2017).

### *Refugees in host communities*

There is an increasing movement towards resilient assistance for refugees residing in host communities (Worldbank, 2017). Although, the context is very different in urban areas the interaction will also encounter difficulties when looking for long-term solutions. The method of network analysis can be applied regardless the kind of challenges.

### *Network vs. hierarchical character of government*

It can be argued if the transition of Refugee Camp Za'atari takes places in a network, when the host government involved remains to be very hierarchical<sup>10</sup> and centrally organised.

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<sup>10</sup> In Jordan the king has a lot of power: "The king is the head of state and is immune from any liability and responsibility." Source: Fanack (2011). Governance & Politics of Jordan. Retrieved 24-10-2018 <https://fanack.com/jordan/governance-and-politics-of-jordan/>



## 11. Recommendations

### *Applying network management strategies*

This thesis has investigated the obstacles for the transition of refugee camps towards sustainable settlements and shows that conducting a network analysis gives an extensive explanation of the mutual dependency of the actors involved and the existence of an overarching wicked problem. To enable the transition of a refugee camp, it can be recommended to consciously and continuously look at the possibilities of applying network management strategies in practice. One of the main conditions for applying network management strategies is to incorporate the protection of core-values and be aware to which extent the initiating party has steering ability. The mandate of an organisation is a factor that determines this steering ability. The goals of facilitating a certain interaction should be matched with the steering ability of the initiating party. Getting familiar with the core-values and identifying the critical actors for a certain problem can be done by conducting several analytical exercises.

### *Doing network analysis*

Conducting a network analysis based on the literature of Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) is not a straightforward task. Although the separate steps are described, extensive information about actors is needed and the interpretation of the person who conducts the analysis plays an important role. To enhance the usage of network analysis, a clearer and less detailed guideline is needed. Additionally, more attention should be given to the core-values in this, without consensus on this level between actors, applying network management strategies is pointless. In the book of Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) this should be incorporated more clearly. Currently, this is embedded in Guideline 2; wherein is stated that it is necessary to assess the starting conditions and check whether cooperation could be possible in the first place. This notion should be incorporated more prominently in the tables developed by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004).

### *Process of handing-over & exit strategies*

In this thesis, it is asserted that one of the steps towards a more sustainable approach for refugee camps can be found in connecting humanitarian and development aid. However, it turned out that no clear distinction between the humanitarian or development ways of working can be made when looking at the organisations active in Refugee Camp Za'atari. Almost all organisations also work in Jordan on developmental programmes and stated that the operational nature in the camp is already a developmental one. On the other hand, developmental agencies like UN habitat or UNDP are not active in the camp and the humanitarian agencies remain in the lead of the refugee camp. With regards to further research, this thesis offers starting points for the following direction of investigation. It is recommended to look at the process of handing-over earlier on during implementation, and collaboration between these parties. Therefore, research could be focused on this process and the relation between humanitarian agencies and developmental agencies.

- To enhance the transition of a refugee camp, it can be recommended to consciously and continuously look at the possibilities of applying network management strategies in practice.
- A starting condition for applying network management is the possibility to find consensus on one or more core-values of critical actors. This possible consensus forms a starting point for applying network management. When there are no prospects for consensus, it is better to resign from network management.
- When initiating interaction it is recommended to apply a range of network management strategies including the protection of core-values, making agreements on the process rules and take into account the steering ability of the initiator.
- The process of handing-over and collaboration between humanitarian and development agencies and organisations from the start of the establishment of a refugee camp should be researched further.

#### *VNG International specific recommendations*

- The obstacles identified in this thesis can be taken into account in any future programmes of VNG International executed in the context of a refugee camp, other projects concerning Syrian refugees in Jordan and possibly elsewhere. By taking into account these obstacles from the beginning of project implementation, VNG International can better anticipate on (un)intended effects/outcomes of the programme. The findings on the obstacles regarding UN agencies (mandate, short-term funding and non-transparency) can be taken into account when designing or implementing any other programme concerning refugees or migration issues.
- The transition of refugee camps can be stimulated by finding consensus on one or more core-values. The benefits of these values should outweigh the obstacle '*rejection of integration*' which is often an barrier for the sustainable development of refugee camps worldwide. Other values where there are possibilities to find consensus is for example on the economic level. When there is a direct benefit for country concerned, possible consensus can be found.
- The obstacle '*rejection of integration*' seems difficult to overcome by means of network management. Fundamentally changing perceptions through reframing can be another strategy to deal with this. However, it should be taken into account that a large amount of resources is needed and the outcome remains very unpredictable.

## 12. Reflection

This chapter presents a detailed reflection on the process of the research.

### *Research topic*

The subject of the research originates from personal experience in a refugee camp. During this internship already a lot of discussion about the transition of the refugee camp took place. The starting point of this thesis was not a theoretical framework to prove, or improve, but a practical experience that needed clarification. Therefore, the research was a search for a suitable theory that was able to clarify and to possibly improve what was currently happening in the camp.

### *Internship*

Being involved like an intern in the camp and afterwards as a graduate intern at VNG International opened doors that are normally not opened. As an intern, the researcher was involved from the very first ideas to set up a think tank, which provided the researcher with a lot of insights. Also having access to many contacts of the existing network and expertise of VNG International helped to bring the research to a next level. However, this can also have a downside, in being biased and or having a tacit understanding without having a source.

### *Evolution of research question*

Also the gap of knowledge was a challenge to master. This subsequently explains why the research question evolved over time. By reading literature and interviewing experts closing the knowledge-gap, the focus of the research changed. First, there was a major focus on the role of a specific project manager and in time changed towards a more general application of network management. Also defining the development of a refugee camp as '*transition*'; the change between humanitarian and development aid can be seen as a real breakthrough in the theoretical part of the research.

### *Sensitivity*

One major aspect that influenced the research throughout the process was the political sensitivity of the topic. Permission to record full interviews was not always granted and asking for permission to use quotes was sometimes rejected. Also making the research too 'serious' caused obstacles in the process. When inviting a Jordan official, immediately the project number was asked and without that number the researcher was not able to arrange a meeting. Also contextually the research was challenging in the sense that the Syria crisis continued to evolve and tension in the country rose. A visit to the camp was not initiated due to conflicts at the border. Otherwise, more data concerning the refugees themselves and employees in the field could have been gathered.

### *The relationship between graduation topic and master track*

The graduation lab of this thesis is '*designing project management*'. As explained before, through gradually gaining more knowledge the research question of this thesis shifted more towards network management which is a part of the course urban area development. This thesis contributes to the applicability of network analysis of wicked problems in complex settings. The transition of a refugee camp, which is in turn also a cross-cutting topic between management in the Built Environment and humanitarian practice forms a valuable addition to the current master track in which a refugee camp is a new topic. The courses for qualitative research methods, operational research and case-study research also contributed to the technical aspects of writing this thesis.

### *Single Case Study*

For this thesis a single case-study approach was chosen to investigate the transition of refugee camps. It would be interesting to also conduct the network analysis on other refugee camps to enhance the generalizability of the results. However, for a master thesis like this, the complexity of one case already



exceeds the time limits which in turn, to some extent, limit the scientific relevance as well.

#### *Respondents*

The number of people interviewed are limited. As a researcher, I would have preferred to at least talk to two officials of each involved organisation in the transition of refugee camp Za'atari. It was difficult to arrange interviews with officials from the Jordan Government as well as UN agencies and INGOs, outside of the existing network of the researcher and the internship organisation. In addition, the interviews were often conducted on personal note to avoid official permission from headquarters. The distance from Netherlands to Jordan did no help with this. In just 18 days (2 times eleven days and 4 travels days) the researcher had interviewed about 20 people. If the stay in Jordan would be longer more interviews could have been held.

#### *Feedback of mentors*

During the research, some constructive discussions about steps forward took place. Both my mentors from the university and VNG International helped to look at possible next steps based on the gained knowledge or data. However, a sidestep was sometimes taken. For example after the first mission to Jordan in April I was directed towards '*story telling*' and '*reframing*' which in the end became a smaller part than suggested at that moment. The focus on general network management was more valuable than specifically reframing techniques.

#### *Practical implementation*

To transfer the knowledge about network management a step-by-step guide will be developed after P4 presentation. This way, the project manager working at VNG International can be trained or can use the guide during their work and future refugee related programmes. Also the recommendation to apply process rules of the game more consciously, can possibly implemented in a similar kind of 'think tank' project of VNG International.

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## Annex

### 1. List of interviewees

#### Expert interviews

Interviewees	Experts	Function
1.	Ben Mountfield	Independent Consultant
2.	Bram Jansen	Assistant Professor Wageningen University
3.	Jaap Gräber	Founder urban solutions and planning for mass migration
4.	Jos Hartman	Senior Project leader Cities Jordan
5.	Carlos Hernandez Ferreiro	Independent Consultant

#### Involved actors interviews

Interviewee	Organisation
A	Employee Jordan Government
B	Employee Jordan Government
C	Employee Jordan Government
D	Employee humanitarian organisation in refugee camp Za'atari
E	Employee UN Agency
F	Employee INGO
G	Employee INGO
H	Employee INGO
I	Employee Embassy
J	Employee Embassy
K	Employee Development Bank
L	Delegate Research Centre

#### Think Tank interviews

Interviewee		Function
6.	Ronald van Warmerdam	Senior Project Manager
7.	Participant of Working Group	Independent Consultant
8.	Participant of Working Group	Independent Consultant
9.	Participant of Working Group	Independent Consultant
10.	Baker Al-Hiyari	Senior Project Manager

## 2. Interview Protocol

### Interview Guide

#### Introduction Research & Interviewee

*The Syrian Refugee Crisis is already in its 7<sup>th</sup> year and the civil war in Syria does not seem to be solved in a short notice. Almost 80 000 refugees are living in Za'atari Camp that was initially set up as a temporary settlement. The enduring situation of the camp presents challenges for the humanitarian organisations that have their means for longer-term development not readily available. However, my research is focused on the interaction between these involved organisations when talking about these challenges.*

1. Can you tell me more about your role and involvement in the refugee situation in Jordan?  
(what is your position?)

#### Problem Perception

2. Can you describe the current situation in Za'atari Camp in Jordan?
  - a. How does your organisation assess the current situation?
  - b. What are the indicators?
3. Can you predict how Za'atari Camp will develop the coming years?
4. And what are the (desired) goals of [organisation name] regarding Za'atari Camp?
  - a. And is there also a difference in for example local offices and national offices?/ Local governments and central government?
5. From the perspective of [organisation name] what is the desired solution regarding Za'atari Camp the coming years?
  - a. Assuming the desired solution is peace in Syria and assuming this will take a while, what would be the approach in the meantime?
6. Can you explain why this is the desired solution to Za'atari Camp (and surroundings)?
  - a. What are the specific interests of [organisation name]?
7. Which organisation or agency should take the lead in this? Together with ....?
  - a. Can you indicate if there is a lack of alignment between certain organisations ?
8. Are there means of ways you [organisation name] can have influence on this process? (resources)

#### Arenas/Game

9. Is the 'approach in the meantime' currently discussed in meetings or other events?
  - a. Who: Who is involved in this kind of meetings?
  - b. Level: On what level is this topic mostly discussed? (strategic/operational)
  - c. Location: Where do these meetings take place
  - d. Frequency: and how often?
  - e. Formal/informal : Do these meetings have a formal or an informal nature?
  - f. Language

10. What happened until now? What is the progress, what meetings took place and what are the results of this?
11. Can you indicate difficulties in these meetings?
  - a. And what was the cause of this?
12. Can you indicate if there was sudden progress in these meetings?
  - a. And what was the cause of this?
13. Who decides in the end?
14. Who has the mandate to decide about this?

### **Network**

15. Who are the most important partners of [*organisation name*] regarding the challenges of Za'atari Camp?
  - a. Who [name certain agencies/organisations]
  - b. Level What is nature of this relationship?
  - c. Frequency; What is the frequency that [*organisation name*]
  - d. How; In what manner?
16. Do you plan change the current relation to some of these parties?

### **Think Tank**

16. If an think tank will be organized about these challenges, would you be interested to attend?
17. If working groups were established afterwards, would you be interested to participate?
  - (1) Sustainable Development
  - (2) Opportunities for all
  - (3) The carrying capacity of physical environment



**Interview Protocol – follow up think tank**

Introduction research; camps urbanize > attempts to guide this, planning for the long-term seems to fail until now ( although some long-term, developmental project are implemented) > how to cope with transition phase> does network management offer a way to deal with this?

1. Can you introduce yourself and explain why you participate in the Think Tank?
2. Can you describe the current situation in Za’atari from your perspective? Was this different before attending the Think Tank launch event?
3. What do you think is the biggest challenge in the camp? ( expected situation) And how does this relate to your choice of working group?
4. What would be the best solution from your perspective? ( desired solution)
5. What do you think is the desired outcome of the Think Tank?
6. And what would be the next step? And who would be responsible for this?

**Frame Exercise**

1.How is the development of refugee camp Za’atari framed by Jordan Government?  
*Indicate your preferred answer;*

- 0 a disease that has to be cured
- 0 an natural community to learn from
- 0 ..... (suggestion)

2. What other metaphors can you think of?  
.....  
.....

3.How is the development of refugee camp Za’atari framed by Jordan Government?  
*Indicate your preferred answer;*

- 0 the camp is seen as a burden which has to be put away as quick as possible
- 0 the camp is seen as best-practice which should be taken advantage of
- 0 ..... (suggestion)

4. What is the story told in Jordan about refugee camp Za’atari?  
.....  
.....

5. How do UN agencies frame the development of refugee camp Za’atari?

*Indicate your preferred answer;*

0 a way to have an exit-strategy

0 a way to offer the refugees a better future

0 ..... (suggestion)

6. Does this influence the story mentioned above?

## Reframing (EXTRA)

*In this appendix more information will be given about reframing strategies.*

*Controversies are immune to resolution by appeal to the facts, often these seem to be intractable, enduring and seldom finally resolved (p4).* Controversies can often be recognized by the on-going recourse to the facts. No resolution can be reached because the facts are continuously interpreted or valued differently.

### *Stagnation in the process caused by diverging frames*

Diverging or opposing frames can lead to stagnations in a process as actors cannot decide, or not dare to decide on their own course of action; *"As long as there is no shared perception of the content of the problem, it is difficult to be sure about the strategies other parties will develop, and it will also be difficult to decide upon one's own course of action"*(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Schön and Rein (1994) state that conflicting frames are tacit; *"they are remote from conscious attention and reasoning"*. Furthermore, gathering information or doing more research about a specific topic will not help to come to a resolution; *.. 'disputes are resistant to resolution by appeal to facts or reasoned argumentation because parties' conflicting frames determine what counts as a fact and what arguments are taken to be relevant or compelling'* (Schön & Rein, 1994, p23; Korsten, n.d.)

*Information gathering, the use of experts and conducting research will then prove to be counter-productive'*(Schön & Rein, 1986; Roe, 1994 in Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p37-38). This will lead to asymmetrical debates; *'When parties insufficiently consider the fact that they have different problem frames, knowledge conflicts and asymmetrical debates are the result* (Schön & Rein, 1986; Roe, 1994 in Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p37-38). This means that no progress will be booked towards a solution.

### **Frames connected to institutions**

So where do these frames come from? *Frames are not free-floating but are grounded in the institutions that sponsor them, and policy controversies are disputes among institutional actors who sponsor conflicting frames* (Schön & Rein, 1994, p23). According to Schön & Rein there are three kinds of action frames. The first one is (1) the policy frame, this is a frame an actor uses to construct the problem of a specific policy situation. Secondly, there is (2) the institutional action frame. This is a more generic frame that are used to deal with a wide range of policy situation and thirdly there are(3) the meta-cultural frames, these frames are broad, culturally shared systems of belief, the generative metaphors are part of this meta-cultural frame (Schön & Rein, 1994, p33). The authors state that policy controversies are formed by conflicts of these action frames (Schön & Rein, 1994, p37).

### *Reframing to deal with diverging frames*

Schön & Rein (1994) describe how intractable policy controversies can be steered towards resolution by applying reframing strategies. A part of the reframing strategy is *'frame reflection'* that is about becoming aware of the diverging frames of the other stakeholders; *'Only when it is known that different frames of reference are involved it becomes possible to discover and answer the actual substantive question. In turn, this creates the possibility to develop a joint frame of reference* (Schön & Rein, 1986; Roe, 1994 in Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004); *When we share our frames with others (the process of framing), we manage meaning because we assert that our interpretations should be taken as real over other possible interpretations'*(Fairhurst, 2005, p168). Nevertheless it should be noted that the outcome of reframing cannot always be predicted; *'frame reflections does not always lead to reframing, and reframing does not always lead to resolution. Moreover reframing may happen even without any explicit reflection on frames. Frame-critical analysis may not be a panacea for all policy controversies'*(D. A. Schön & Rein, 1994).

Korsten (n.d.) explored the applicability of the frame reflection of Schön & Rein (1994) and concluded that their vision on reframing resembles process oriented network management mentioned by 't Hart en Kleiboer (1995).

### *Process-oriented Network management*

Korsten (n,d.)indicates that the design rationality shows similarities to the process-oriented network

management. When looking at process management the four core-aspects that the process-architect has to take into account are listed below.

1. *Openness* is about giving actors the opportunity to have influence on the agenda and be involved in the decision making (De Bruijn et al., 2010). The task of the process manager is to act as a mediator to give every actor the chance to participate and for the process manager it is important to stay away from the actual content.

2. *Protecting core-values* encompasses caring for the general objectives of the stakeholders. The process manager has to ensure that all the core-values are protected and if possible, a mutual gain can be found. These core-values should not be harmed because they are the reason why the actors participate in a process. It is important to be aware of core-values because it is easier to reach consensus on core-value than on specific details (W.J. Verheul, Personal Communication, 25 mei 2018).

3. *Progress* is about the balance between quick wins to keep up the momentum to keep everyone enthusiastic and involved, but at the other hand to keep the process attractive to stakeholders. It makes an exit strategy increasingly unattractive.

4. *Substance* is about the quality of the content the process produces. It should meet the quality standards of every actor that is involved: *"there may be strongly conflicting interests that force parties to make decisions that are substantively poor and perhaps even incorrect. Therefore it is crucial that the process has a sufficient number of substantive elements"* (De Bruijn et al., 2010, p42).

#### *Reframing by Koppenjan & Klijn*

Koppenjan & Klijn define reframing as robust changes of perceptions. They distinguished four kinds of reframing strategies; (1) use of policy documents, (2) administrative stories, (3) sensitizing concepts, (4) a crisis situation or big events. These four techniques will be explained below;

The first reframing strategy that is discussed is about using (1) **policy documents** as an attempt to reframe. A public actor can use policy document to support a reframing process. By developing and publishing policy documents, other actors, like semi-private and local government that have to act according to these policies are forced to change their minds. *'Lower level governments and semi-private and private actors must invest according to the ideas of central governments'* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p226).

Secondly, (2) **administrative stories** can be used in an attempt to change perceptions. This is an extension of the use of policy documents, but these kinds of strategies are often organized as a type of a discussion in which as well political as administrative actors prepare for changes to come. This administrative story can for example embody a vision or an image of society. *'It must provide political office holders with an image; but it must also function as a means to convince others of different ideas and thus drastically change the perception of others'* (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p227). An example is the introduction of New Public Management that reformed the public sector. It is about presenting authoritative narratives as a new frame of reference within which problems can be regarded in a sector or network (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

A third way to reframe is the use of (3) **sensitizing concepts**. This means that individual concepts or idea may stimulate the process of reframing. 'Sensitizing' refers to the fact that it must be a guiding concept which makes other actors sensitive to certain developments, problems or solutions (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.228). Examples of sensitizing concepts are autonomization, performance indicators and public-private partnerships. In qualitative research, sensitizing concepts are commonly used and the definition of Blumer (1954) in (Bowen, 2006) can help to understand; *"A sensitizing concept lacks specification of attributes or benchmarks and consequently does not enable the user to move directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive*

concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look”.

The project manager can also use a (4) **crisis or big events** to support the reframing process. An example is the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001. This changed the thinking of American politics about topics like security drastically. A crisis or an big event can create opportunities for new perceptions to evolve (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.229).<sup>11</sup>

There are several reframing strategies described in literature. In table 4.7, these are summarised.

<i>Reframing strategies</i>	<i>Author</i>
Policy document	Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004
Administrative stories	Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004
Sensitizing concepts	Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004
Big events or crisis situations	Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004
Design rationale	Schön & Rein, 1994
Process management	Korsten, n.d.; 't Hart en Kleiboer, 1995
Incorporating four aspect of process management: <i>Openness, Protecting Core-values, Progress, Quality</i>	(De Bruijn et al., 2010)

**Table 4.7:** Summary of reframing techniques.

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<sup>11</sup> When applying reframing as a management strategy, one must keep in mind that the meaning and effort of the manager can be interpreted differently by the various involved actors. Whether administrative stories, sensitizing concepts or other memos are implemented or proposed, the actors that are targeted by these strategies will interpret it in their own ways (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). This overlaps with the statement of Schön & Rein (1994), which state that the outcome cannot not be fully predicted.